# Oliver v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · March 10, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381930

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 10, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381930

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

TANYQUA OLIVER, Case No. 1:23-cv-57

Plaintiff,
McFarland, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.

HAMILTON COUNTY COURT
OF COMMON PLEAS, et al.,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff brings this pro se action against Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas,
Judge Robert Ruehlman and Assistant Hamilton County Court Administrator Sue
Selegean. By separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte
review of plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it,
should be dismissed it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a
“litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying
litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized
federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action
is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable
basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v.
Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis
when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable

factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or
“wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need
not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A
complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same
token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading

that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint purports to bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violations of her constitutional rights under the First Amendment. In this regard,
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Judge Reuhlman presided over several of her civil cases in
2020. In September 2020, Plaintiff apparently used a voice recorder to record her hearing

with Judge Reuhlman. According to her complaint, when she “returned on 10-28-20
[Judge Reuhlman] said he found out I posted it on my Facebook page, charged me with
contempt 4x after finding a voice recorder in my locked bag.” (Doc. 1 at 4). It appears that
Plaintiff was later incarcerated for contempt. For relief, Plaintiff requests:
- return of the voice recorder stolen by Ruehlman,
- punitive damages of $35,000,
- immediately make the Hamilton Co. of Common Pleas redact all Court rules
that contradict civil liberties rights. Such as “no recording devices or
requirement to be a federally recognized business to exercise our inalienable
rights.
(Doc. 1 at 6).
Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Notably, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to clearly explained how the
Judge's alleged conduct, even if true, runs afoul of her free speech rights, or provide any

additional factual content or context from which the Court may reasonably infer that the
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights.
Furthermore, Defendant Judge Rhuelman is afforded absolute immunity from
liability for actions taken while functioning within his judicial capacity. “Like other forms of
official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Barrett v. Harrington,
130 F3d 246, 255 (6th Cir. 1997). Judges retain absolute immunity from liability even if
they act maliciously or corruptly, as long as they are performing judicial acts and have
jurisdiction over the subject matter giving rise to the suit against them. Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); see also Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617
(6th Cir. 2004); Stern v. Mascio, 262 F. 3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff’s claims asserted against Sue Selegean are also subject to dismissal
because the Assistant Hamilton County Court Administrator is entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity. Immunity afforded to judges “has also been extended to non-judicial officers
performing ‘quasi-judicial’ duties.” Marshall v. Green, 2010 WL 1959514, * 2 (W.D. Ky
May 17, 2010) (citing Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994)); see also Teats v.
Johnson, 2012 WL 4481436, * (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2012), (“In the Sixth Circuit, ‘it is well
established that judges and other court officers enjoy absolute immunity from suit on
claims arising out of the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.’”) (quoting
Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988)), report and recommendation adopted,
2012 WL 4471257 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2012). As such, Defendant Selegean is entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity from Plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff has also failed to plead any
specific facts to show that the administrator behaved unconstitutionally.

Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief against
the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Capacity to sue or be sued in the United
States District Courts is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. Rule 17(b) which provides, in
pertinent part: “In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the
law of the state in which the district court is held....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). The Ohio
Supreme Court has concluded that Ohio courts are not sui juris. “Absent express statutory
authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right.” Malone v. Court of
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 344 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio 1976) (quoting State ex
rel. Cleveland Municipal Court v. Cleveland City Council, 296 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio

1973)). See also Phillips v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:18-CV-541, 2019 WL 2289277, at *10
(S.D. Ohio May 29, 2019) (holding that the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas is
not sui juris). Therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the Hamilton
County Court of Common Pleas.
Last, it appears clear from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff’s claims are time-
barred. A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by Ohio’s two-year statute
of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. See Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d
989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Ewing v. O’Brien, 115 F. App’x 780, 783 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Section 1983 claims brought in federal court in Ohio are subject to the two-year statute
of limitations period set forth in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11.”); Huffer v. Bogen, No. 1:10-
cv-312, 2011 WL 5037209, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2011) (and authorities cited therein)
(“With respect to alleged violation[s] of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such claims are governed by
Ohio’s personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years.”). Here, plaintiff’s
allegations all concern conduct that occurred in 2020, during plaintiff’s state court

proceedings. Therefore, the complaint under § 1983, filed approximately three years later
is time-barred.
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED this action be
DISMISSED with PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief. It is further
RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the
foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma
pauperis.
s/ Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

TANYQUA OLIVER, Case No. 1:23-cv-57

Plaintiff,
McFarland, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.

HAMILTON COUNTY COURT
OF COMMON PLEAS, et al.,

Defendant.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381930. Public record. Not legal advice.