# Feaster v. Chambers-Smith

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · January 26, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381672

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** January 26, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381672

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

TERRANCE J. FEASTER, : Case No. 1:22-cv-453
:
Plaintiff, :
: District Judge Susan J. Dlott
vs. :
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
:
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:

ORDER AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Ohio State Penitentiary, previously located at the Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility (SOCF), has filed a pro se civil rights complaint in this Court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to
determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
A. Legal Standard
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower
judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing
so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed
by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,
malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(1) as part of the statute, which
provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires
sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or
malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands
on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d
502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of
considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the
defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds
pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett
v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;
“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989)).
B. Allegations in the Complaint
Plaintiff brings this complaint against defendants ODRC Director Annette Chambers-
Smith, SOCF Warden Ronald T. Erdos, SOCF Health and Safety Coordinator Greg Holdren,
SOCF Inspector Linnea Mahlman, and SOCF Nurse Practitioner David Conley in their individual
capacities. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 12). As discussed below, the complaint includes three
claims concerning the conditions of confinement at SOCF, alleged denial of medical care, and the
administrative grievance process.
As to his claim regarding the conditions of confinement, plaintiff claims that in August
and September of 2020, plaintiff filed complaints with the SOCF medical department and
defendant Greg Holdren. (Id. at PageID 13-14). Plaintiff alleges that the prison conditions at
SOCF included black mold and rust in the showers, cells, and prison ventilation, as well as extreme
mice and roach infestation. (Id. at PageID 14). According to plaintiff, as a result of exposure to

the conditions at SOCF, he sustained severe and permanent damage to his feet and respiratory
system, resulting in physical pain while standing, shortness of breath, and anxiety/emotional
distress. He further alleges that he contracted “P.B.C.” and developed a heart murmur. (Id. at
PageID 14-15).
In his second claim, plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical treatment for his injuries.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges he was assessed by defendant Nurse Practitioner Conley on numerous
occasions. During this time, plaintiff claims that his injuries became more severe and infected, yet
Conley “deliberately refused to refer the plaintiff to a proper physician and foot doctor.” (Id. at
PageID 14).

With respect to the grievance process, plaintiff claims that he filed numerous complaints,
grievances, and kites with defendant Inspector Mahlman concerning the prison conditions and his
medical care. (Id. at PageID 17). According to plaintiff, Mahlman’s failed to take action on his
complaints, investigate his grievances, or properly implement the grievance process. Plaintiff
further claims that Mahlman instead placed him on grievance restriction and confiscated his
complaints from his cell. (Id. at PageID 17-18).
As relief, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. (Id. at PageID 20).
C. Analysis.
Based on the above factual allegations, plaintiff brings three claims. First, plaintiff claims
defendants Chambers-Smith, Erdos, and Holdren violated his Eighth Amendment rights in
connection with the prison conditions at SOCF. In his second claim, plaintiff alleges that
defendant Conley was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, also in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Mahlman violated his due process
rights in connection with the grievance process.
At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to this action,
the undersigned concludes that plaintiff may proceed with his Eighth Amendment, medical-care
claim against defendant Conley. Out of an abundance of caution, plaintiff may also proceed with
his conditions of confinement claim against defendant Holdren. However, the remainder of
plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).
First, plaintiff’s claims against defendants Chambers-Smith and Erdos are subject to
dismissal. As noted above, plaintiff claims that these defendants violated his constitutional rights

in connection with the alleged conditions at SOCF. To establish an Eighth Amendment violation,
a plaintiff must first demonstrate objectively the unique deprivation of “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 454 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347); see also Brown v.
Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (“[T]he inmate must
show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”). He then
must subjectively show the defendant acted “wantonly, with deliberate indifference to the
plaintiff’s serious needs.” Richmond, 450 F. App’x at 455 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
However, “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an
inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
In this case, plaintiff has not alleged any facts to plausibly suggest that defendants
Chambers-Smith and Erdos were aware of the conditions allegedly resulting in his injuries,2 much

less that they were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Although plaintiff claims these defendants
should have addressed the conditions at SOCF through compliance with state regulations and
ODRC policies, “[m]erely failing to alleviate a significant risk that the official should have
perceived is insufficient to establish liability.” Schrader v. Collins, No. 97-4471, 1998 WL
863427, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 1998) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38)).
Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff claims defendants were negligent or otherwise
seeks to hold defendants liable for failing to comply with state regulations or ODRC policy (see
Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 14), he has failed to state a claim actionable in this § 1983
proceeding. See, e.g., Warren v. Doe, 28 F. App’x 463, 464 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Ritchie v.

Wickstrom, 938 F.2d 689, 692 (6th Cir. 1991), as support for holding that “the district court
properly dismissed [the plaintiff’s] case because his allegations involved mere negligence that is
not actionable under § 1983”). See also See Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“Allegations of state law or state constitutional violations will not support a § 1983 claim.”); Smith
v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347–48 (6th Cir. 1992) (violation of municipal policy does not create
liability under § 1983); McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94–2347, 1995 WL 236687 (6th Cir. Apr. 21,

2 Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Holdren is distinguishable at least in this regard, as plaintiff alleges that he
complained to Holdren about the prison conditions (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 15-16). Plaintiff’s claim against
Holdren is worthy of further development and as noted above, out of an abundance of caution, plaintiff may proceed
with this claim at this juncture in the proceedings.
1995) (“failure to comply with a prison policy . . . does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation because the policy directive simply does not create a protectable liberty interest.”).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against defendants Chambers-Smith and Erdos should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Inspector Linnea Mahlman are also subject to dismissal

at the screening stage. As noted above, in his third claim, plaintiff alleges that Mahlman violated
his due process rights by failing to process his complaints/grievances, investigate his complaints,
and placing him on grievance restriction. However, plaintiff’s claims against Mahlman brought
in connection with the grievance process cannot give rise to a § 1983 claim because “[p]rison
inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure.” Miller v. Haines,
No. 97–3416, 1998 WL 476247, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug.03, 1998) (citations omitted). See e.g., ., Hill
v. Warden, Southern Ohio Corr. Facility, No. 1:12cv63, 2012 WL 1639991, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
13, 2012) (Litkovitz, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation) (recommending dismissal of portion of
complaint complaining about “the failure of prison staff to provide [plaintiff] with inmate

grievance forms and other deficiencies in the inmate grievance procedure” because “plaintiff has
no federal constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure”), adopted, 2012 WL
1623565 (S.D. Ohio May 9, 2012) (Weber, J.). Prison officials whose only roles “involve their
denial of administrative grievances and their failure to remedy the alleged [unconstitutional]
behavior’” cannot be liable under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
Nor does a prison official’s alleged failure to adequately investigate claims of misconduct rise to
the level of “encouragement” that would make the official liable for such misconduct. Knop v.
Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.
1984).
To the extent that plaintiff claims that his restricted access to the grievance process resulted
in a constitutional violation, he has also failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
“The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has held that placement on modified access does not constitute an
adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim.” Weatherspoon v. Williams, No. 2:14-cv-108,
2015 WL 2106401, at *5 (W.D. Mich. May 6, 2015) (citing Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App’x.

656, 660 (6th Cir. 2005); Walker v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 446 (6th Cir.
2005); Kennedy v. Tallio, 20 F. App’x. 469, 471 (6th Cir. 2001); Corsetti v. McGinnis, 24 F. App’x.
238, 241 (6th Cir. 2001)). The right to file institutional grievances without being subject to
retaliation extends only to the filing of non-frivolous grievances and “an ordinary person of
reasonable firmness would not be deterred from filing non-frivolous grievances merely because
he or she had been placed on modified status.” Walker, 128 F. App’x. at 445–46. Accordingly,
plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted to the extent that he alleges a
constitutional violation in connection with being placed on restricted access to the grievance
process.

Plaintiff has also failed to state claim upon which relief may be granted based on his
allegation that Mahlman has prevented him from exhausting his claims through the administrative
grievance process. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 19). While the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
exhaustion requirement is “mandatory,” with steps to exhaustion defined by the prison’s grievance
process, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007), an inmate need only exhaust “available”
remedies under the statute, not unavailable ones, Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). See
also Paolone v. Altiere, No. 4:12CV1344, 2012 WL 5463871, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2012) (“A
corrections officer therefore cannot prevent an inmate from proceeding to court by refusing to
accept a grievance or an appeal.”).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims seeking to hold Mahlman liable in connection with the
grievance process should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, in sum, plaintiff may proceed with his Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement claim against defendant Holdren and his Eighth Amendment medial-care claim
against defendant Conley. Having found that the remaining claims alleged in the complaint fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, plaintiff’s remaining claims should be dismissed
with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and § 1915A(b), with the exception of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement
claim against defendant Holdren and medical-care claim against defendant Conley.
2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an
appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith,
and therefore, deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. The United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint, summons,
the Order granting plaintiff in forma pauperis status, and this Order and Report and
Recommendation upon defendants Holdren and Conley as directed by plaintiff, with costs of
service to be advanced by the United States.
Plaintiff shall serve upon defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel,
upon defendants’ attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for
consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the
Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any document was mailed
to defendants or defendants’ counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge
which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be
disregarded by the Court.
2. Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may

occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections
to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served
with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either
side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,
and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall
respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy
of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit

rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947
(6th Cir. 1981).

Date: January 25, 2023 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381672. Public record. Not legal advice.