# Augustus v. Green County Adult Detention Center

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · November 30, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381350

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 30, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381350

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

ANTHONY AUGUSTUS, : Case No. 3:22-cv-328
:
Plaintiff, :
: District Judge Michael J. Newman
vs. :
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
:

GREENE COUNTY :

ADULT DETENTION CENTER, :
:
Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Greene County Adult Detention Center, has filed a pro se civil
rights complaint in this Court against defendant the Greene County Adult Detention Center. By
separate Order plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This matter is
before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint,
or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); §
805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
A. Legal Standard
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower
judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing
so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendation.
by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,
malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(2)2 as part of the statute, which
provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires
sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or
malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands
on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d
502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of
considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the
defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds
pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett
v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;
“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,
482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989)).
B. Allegations in the Complaint
Plaintiff brings this complaint in connection with the loss of his wedding ring at the Greene
County Adult Detention Center. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 9). According to plaintiff,
the loss of his ring was the result of negligence, resulting in emotional distress and a financial loss
of $25,437.00. (Id.). As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id. at PageID 9-10).
C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal at the screening stage. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
As noted above, the Greene County Adult Detention Center is the sole named defendant to
this action.3 (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 5, 8). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that
“[e]very person who, under the color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A
correctional facility is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Parker v.
Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F. App’x. 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (Department of Corrections
not a “person” under § 1983). See, e.g., Aladimi v. Hamilton Cnty. Justice Center, No. 1:09-cv-
398, 2012 WL 292587, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2012) (finding that the Hamilton County Justice
Center was not a person subject to suit), adopted, 2020 WL 529585 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2012).
Even if the Court were to liberally construe the complaint as against Greene County itself, plaintiff

has failed to allege that his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a county policy. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Therefore, the Greene County Adult
Detention Center should be dismissed as a defendant to this action.
Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold any defendant liable for the
destruction of his property, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed. In order to assert such a claim,
plaintiff must first “plead . . . that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory

3 Plaintiff lists “Greene County Adult Detention Center, et al.” as a defendant in the complaint. (Id. at PageID 8).
However, the only additional named individual in the complaint is Sgt. Richley, who plaintiff indicates he talked to
regarding the investigation of his administrative grievance. (Id. at PageID 7). For the reasons stated below in
discussing plaintiff’s claims regarding the loss of his wedding ring and the grievance procedure/investigation, the
complaint is subject to dismissal even if plaintiff intended to name individuals allegedly involved in the loss of his
property or grievance process.
v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
“If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no
constitutional deprivation has occurred despite the injury.” Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub.
Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587-88 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, in order to state a procedural due
process claim under section 1983 “the plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well

as the substantive wrong.” Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Vicory, 721 F.2d at 1066). A plaintiff “may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first
pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and remedies to redress
[his] due process violations.” Jefferson, 360 F.3d at 588.
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts even remotely indicating that his remedies under Ohio
law to redress the wrong of which he complains are inadequate. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to
explain why a state tort remedy for conversion would not suffice to address his claim. See Fox v.
Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, he fails to state a due process claim
that is actionable in this § 1983 proceeding.

The complaint is also subject to dismissal to the extent that plaintiff complains about the
administrative grievance procedure. As noted above (see supra n.2), the complaint indicates that
plaintiff filled out an investigation form for lost items, but that “Sgt. Richley talked to me once
and that was it.” (Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 7). To the extent that plaintiff may seek to hold
Richley or any other individual liable in connection with the grievance procedure or investigation,
he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Prison officials whose only roles
“involve their denial of administrative grievances and their failure to remedy the alleged
[unconstitutional] behavior’” cannot be liable under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300
(6th Cir. 1999). Nor does a prison official’s alleged failure to adequately investigate claims of
misconduct rise to the level of “encouragement” that would make the official liable for such
misconduct. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1014 (6th Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d
416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
Finally, insofar as plaintiff is alleging claims under Ohio law, the Court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.4 Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d

195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004) (although the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1367 is a matter of discretion, when a court dismisses all federal claims before trial, it generally
should dismiss the state law claims as well).
Accordingly, in sum, because plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim against the
named defendant, the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); and

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the
foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and
Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore
deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

November 30, 2022 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge

4 Plaintiff purports to bring a state law negligence claim, as well as a federal claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 9). Even if the Court could conclude a federal claim for intentional
infliction of emotion distress is actionable under the PLRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also Lanning v. Doyle, Case
No. 3:14-cv-24, 2015 WL 710427, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2015), the conclusory allegations in the complaint are
insufficient to plausibly support such a claim.
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections
to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served
with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either
side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall
respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy
of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit
rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947
(6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381350. Public record. Not legal advice.