# Brown v. Chambers-Smith

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · November 16, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381293

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 16, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381293

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a federal court "may sua sponte raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction because of the applicability of the eleventh amendment" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

MILOUS BROWN,

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:22-cv-2469

District Judge Michael H. Watson
- vs - Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al.,

Defendants. :

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is pending on Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendations (the “Report,” ECF No. 9) which recommended on initial
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Complaint herein be dismissed without prejudice insofar as it
seeks monetary damages against any Defendant in his or her official capacity or injunctive relief
to enforce any provision of Ohio law against any Defendant. Id. at PageID 205. Plaintiff objected
to that conclusion (Objections, ECF No. ECF No. 31). Defendants have timely responded to those
Objections (ECF No. 34) and District Judge Watson has recommitted the case for reconsideration
in light of the Objections (ECF No. 33).
Plaintiff objects that the Report conflates 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (b)(2)(Objections,
ECF No. 31). Defendants respond that dismissal is appropriate under either of those statutes
(“Response,” ECF No. 34, PageID 299).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides:
(a) Screening.— The court shall review, before docketing, if
feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity

(b) Grounds for Dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.

(c) Definition.— As used in this section, the term “prisoner” means
any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused
of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole,
probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.

Plaintiff does not dispute that this case comes within the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 Title VIII of P.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321(effective April 26, 1996)(the "PLRA") and thus is
subject to the screening required by § 1915A. The statute provides, at least inferentially, that
screening is to take place sua sponte since it is to occur if feasible before the case is docketed.
That is indeed what happened here: the case was referred to the undersigned on June 29, 2022, as
soon as District Judges Marbley and Watson had decided that it was related to Plaintiff’s prior
case, Case No. 2:19-cv-2425 (ECF No. 5). The undersigned immediately granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6). To execute Congressional intent that 1915A screening
take place before issuance of process is possible, the construction of the Report became the
Magistrate Judge’s next task in this case and the Report was filed July 13, 2022.
Plaintiff did not object to the Report within the time allowed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 and Judge
Watson adopted it August 3, 2022 (ECF No. 13). Eventually the dispute over whether Plaintiff
had been properly “served” with the Report was resolved by requiring that Plaintiff’s newly-
appointed counsel be furnished with a copy and a new deadline for objecting was set (ECF No.
28).

Plaintiff objects to the “conflation” of analysis of claims under 1915A(b)(1) and (b)(2). As
Plaintiff concedes, the statute is disjunctive, meaning that claims are to be dismissed if they either
fail to state a claim or seek monetary damages from a party which is immune. But in addition to
those bases for dismissal, every federal court is bound to raise, sua sponte if necessary, limits on
its own jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
As stated in the Report, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

It has been construed to bar suits against a State by its own citizens. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 276 (1986); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974);
Florida Dep't. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982). The Amendment also bars
actions against state agencies where the State is the real party in interest and the action seeks to
recover money from the state treasury. Estate of Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846,
848 (6th Cir. 1988); Ford Motor Company v. Dep't. of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459
(1945); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
Is the Eleventh Amendment a jurisdictional bar or does it merely create an immunity? The
Sixth Circuit has held it is a jurisdictional bar which federal courts must raise sua sponte. Fairport
Int'l Exploration, Inc., v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence, 105 F.3d 1078,
1082 (6th Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996). In Cady v. Arenac
County, 574 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2009), the court opined that
The Sixth Circuit has largely followed the "jurisdictional bar"
approach in Edelman by holding that a federal court "can raise the
question of sovereign immunity sua sponte because it implicates
important questions of federal-court jurisdiction and federal-state
comity." S&M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted); see also Nair v. Oakland County Cmty.
Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Like
subject-matter jurisdiction, a sovereign-immunity defense may be
asserted for the first time on appeal, and it may (and should) be
raised by federal courts on their own initiative." (citations omitted));
Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that a
federal court "may sua sponte raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction
because of the applicability of the eleventh amendment" (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Id. at 344-45. Whether the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar or creates an absolute
immunity for state officials in their official capacities, the issue is properly raised sua sponte.
Nothing in federal law creates a barrier to combining jurisdictional and immunity analysis in the
same Report. Plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that conflating analysis of those
questions in a 1915A recommendation makes the analysis invalid.
Aside from the “conflating” argument, Plaintiff has made no substantive objections to the
Report. In particular, he does not dispute that a suit for money damages against a state employee
is his official capacity is legally to be construed as a suit against the State and therefore barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 1996). Nor does he
dispute that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections is an Ohio state agency for
Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Court, 628 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2010),
quoting Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005)(en banc), citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44, 45, 51(1994).
Likewise Plaintiff does not dispute that this Court is barred from enforcing state law by
injunction in a § 1983 case. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984); Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005)(en banc); Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. &

Corr., 157 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1998); In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litig. (Gary Otte), 2017 U.S.
App. LEXIS 17436 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2017), affirming In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.
(Tibbetts & Otte), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115583 (S.D. Ohio July 25, 2017)(Merz, M.J.).
Sovereign immunity bars a plaintiff from using state law to enjoin state officials from carrying out
their official responsibilities even when the officials are sued in their individual capacities. In re:
Ohio Execution Protocol Litig. (Gary Otte), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17436 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2017),
citing Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526, 1531, 1543 (6th Cir. 19934).

Conclusion

Having reconsidered the case in light of the Objections, the Magistrate Judge respectfully
recommends that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice (1) insofar as it seeks monetary
damages against any Defendant in his or her official capacity because the Court is without subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain such a suit under the Eleventh Amendment and (2) insofar as it
seeks injunctive relief to enforce any provision of Ohio law against any Defendant for the same
reason. Procedurally, these recommendations are grounded in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because suit
to obtain monetary relief against a state official or employee in his or her official capacity or
injunctive relief to enforce state law does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
42 US.C. § 1983.
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond
to another party’s objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure
to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. #

November 16, 2022.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10381293. Public record. Not legal advice.