# Fisher v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380887

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

CINDY F.,1 : 21 00047
:
Plaintiff, : CMaaseg iNstora. t3e: Jud-cgve- Caroli ne H. Gentry
: (by full consent of the parties)
vs.
:
:
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
:
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
:
Defendant. :

DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income in May 2018. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. After a hearing at Plaintiff’s request and a supplemental hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff was not eligible for benefits
because she was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff subsequently filed this
action.
Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this matter to the Commissioner for the award
of benefits or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the

1 See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns
in social security cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last
initials.”).
Court to affirm the non-disability decision. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s
Statement of Errors (Doc. 12), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc.

17), Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 18), and the administrative record (Doc. 9).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially asserted that she was under a disability beginning October 23,
2016. She subsequently amended her alleged onset date of disability to March 27, 2017.
(Doc. 9-2, PageID 118; Doc. 9-5, PageID 274.) At that time, she was forty years old.
Accordingly, Plaintiff was considered a “younger person” under Social Security

Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c), 416.963(c).2 Plaintiff has a “high school
education and above.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(4).
The evidence in the administrative record is summarized in the ALJ’s decision
(Doc. 9-2, PageID 55-67), Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 12), the Commissioner’s
Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. 17), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 18). Rather than

repeat these summaries, the Court will discuss the pertinent evidence in its analysis
below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Administration provides Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income to individuals who are under a “disability,” among other

eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42
U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(a)(1), 1382(a). The term “disability” means “the inability to do any

2 The remaining citations will identify only the pertinent Disability Insurance Benefits Regulations, as
they are similar in all relevant respects to the corresponding Supplemental Security Income Regulations.
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).
This Court’s review of an ALJ’s unfavorable decision is limited to two inquiries:
“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ
are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399,
406 (6th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”).

“Unless the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of
fact unsupported by substantial evidence,” this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.
Emard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court “may
not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Id.

“Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the
agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citation omitted). This limited standard of review does not permit the Court to weigh the
evidence and decide whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a different

conclusion. Instead, the Court is confined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal
criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651
(6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the
Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a
substantial right.’” Id. (citations omitted). Such an error of law will require reversal even
if “the outcome on remand is unlikely to be different.” Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
IV. FACTS
A. The ALJ’s Findings of Fact
The ALJ was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to Plaintiff’s application
for benefits. In doing so, the ALJ considered each of the five sequential steps set forth in

the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ made the following
findings of fact:
Step 1: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October
23, 2016,3 the alleged onset date.

Step 2: She has the severe impairments of “cervical and lumbar spine
degenerative disc disease; status-post total hip replacement in 2019
secondary to history of left hip osteoarthritis; fibromyalgia;
migraine-type headaches; obstructive sleep apnea; hepatitis C;
obesity; bipolar disorder; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder.”

3 Although Plaintiff amended her alleged disability onset date to March 27, 2017, the ALJ considered the
time period beginning with the initially alleged onset date of October 23, 2016. Plaintiff did not allege
error with this issue.
Step 3: She does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s
Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4: Her residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most she can do
despite her impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276
F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002), consists of sedentary work as defined
in 20 CFR § 404.1567(a), subject to the following limitations: “can
lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds
frequently; can stand and/or walk 2 hours out of an 8-hour workday;
sit 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday; occasionally climb ramps and
stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance;
occasionally stoop and crouch; never kneel or crawl; frequent
overhead reaching, bilaterally; occasionally push and pull with the
left lower extremity; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat,
extreme cold, humidity, wetness, and atmospheric conditions; no
exposure to unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts; limited
to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, defined as work that can be
learned in 30 days or less; unable to perform at a production rate
pace, but can perform goal-oriented work; occasional contact with
coworkers, supervisors, and the general public; and only occasional
changes in an otherwise routine work setting, with those changes
being explained in advance.”

She is unable to perform any of her past relevant work.

Step 5: Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy that she can perform.

(Doc. 9-2, PageID 57-67.) These findings led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff does not
meet the definition of disability and so is not entitled to benefits. (Id. at PageID 67.)
B. Family Physician Timothy Dixon, M.D.
Dr. Dixon completed a medical assessment form about Plaintiff’s physical
condition on December 23, 2019. (Doc. 9-10, PageID 1968-72.) Dr. Dixon opined that
Plaintiff could lift and carry no more than five pounds occasionally and was unable to lift
and carry any significant amount of weight on a frequent basis. (Id. at PageID 1969.) Dr.
Dixon opined that Plaintiff could stand and/or walk for fifteen minutes at a time and for a
total of two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id.) Dr. Dixon also opined that Plaintiff

could sit for fifteen minutes at a time and for a total of four hours in an eight-hour
workday. (Id.) He noted that Plaintiff needed to change positions due to pain. (Id.)
According to Dr. Dixon, Plaintiff could never bend, squat, climb, stoop, crouch, kneel, or
crawl, and she could occasionally balance. (Id. at PageID 1970.) Dr. Dixon opined that
Plaintiff’s ability to reach, handle, finger, push, and pull was “affected” by her
impairments. (Id.) He also opined that Plaintiff’s ability to be exposed to heights and

moving machinery was “restricted,” because she could not “move out of [sic] way” and
was unable to climb to heights. (Id. at PageID 1971.) Dr. Dixon concluded that Plaintiff
was unable to perform light or even sedentary-level work on a sustained basis. (Id. at
PageID 1971-72.)
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Dixon’s opinion was “only minimally persuasive.”

(Doc. 9-2, PageID 65.) The ALJ explained:
In December 2019, [Plaintiff] presented to Dr. Dixon asking for paperwork
supporting a finding that she cannot work, and she told him that her pain
management doctor had restricted her to standing no longer than 20
minutes (23F/6). Dr. Dixon apparently complied with [Plaintiff’s] request,
but never examined [Plaintiff] at that time (23F/6). Instead, Dr. Dixon
simply wrote down [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints in the notes section
of the appointment, and then completed the requested paperwork (23F/9).
Dr. Dixon opined that [Plaintiff] cannot lift even five pounds, however,
objective treatment notes consistently reveal that she has full, 5/5 strength
in all of her extremities, and she has reported that her pain is well-
controlled with pain medication. Dr. Dixon opined that [Plaintiff] can stand
and walk for a total of two hours combined, but can only sit for a total of
four hours, just shy of an 8-hour workday. However, Dr. Dixon did not
indicate why [Plaintiff] cannot sit longer, other than she has to change
positions due to pain. However, [Plaintiff] reported that her pain is well-
controlled with pain medication. Moreover, Dr. Dixon’s extreme
limitations are not supported by objective physical examination findings
and are inconsistent with the overall objective record. Notably, Dr. Dixon’s
opinion is contradicted by [Plaintiff’s] orthopedic specialist (19F).
Therefore, Dr. Dixon’s opinion is only minimally persuasive.

(Id.)
C. Orthopedist Jennifer Jerele, M.D.
Dr. Jerele completed a medical assessment form on December 24, 2019. (Doc. 9-
10, PageID 1973-77.) Dr. Jerele stated that Plaintiff was physically impaired by severe
left hip osteoarthritis. (Id. at PageID 1973-76.) She limited Plaintiff to lifting and carrying
up to twenty-five pounds occasionally and fifteen pounds frequently. (Id. at PageID
1974.) She opined that Plaintiff could stand and/or walk for an hour at a time and for a
total of no more than four hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id.) Dr. Jerele opined that
Plaintiff could sit for two to four hours at a time and for a total of eight hours in an eight-
hour workday. (Id.) According to Dr. Jerele, Plaintiff could never crouch or crawl;
occasionally climb, stoop, and kneel; and frequently balance. (Id. at PageID 1975.) She
opined that Plaintiff was “limited” in pushing and pulling and “restricted” in the ability to
tolerate exposure to heights and moving machinery. (Id. at PageID 1975-76.) Dr. Jerele
concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform light exertion work. (Id. at PageID 1977.)
However, Dr. Jerele opined that Plaintiff could perform sedentary-level work on a

sustained basis. (Id. at PageID 1976.)
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Jerele’s opinion was persuasive. (Doc. 9-2, PageID
65.) The ALJ explained:
Dr. Jerele is a specialist, and her findings are consistent with a finding that
[Plaintiff] can perform sedentary work. Dr. Jerele’s findings are reasonably
consistent with the overall objective examination evidence, and are
somewhat supported by other physician opinion evidence, albeit with
greater restrictions to lifting and standing (1A, 5A). Dr. Jerele’s opinion is
consistent with the overall objective evidence. Therefore, Dr. Jerele’s
opinion is persuasive.

(Id.)
V. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ reversibly erred “in evaluating the medical source
opinions and medical evidence and Plaintiff’s symptom severity thus failing to carry the
Step Five burden.” (Doc. 12, PageID 2544.) Plaintiff specifically challenges the ALJ’s
conclusion that primary care provider Dr. Dixon’s opinion was only minimally
persuasive and that orthopedist Dr. Jerele’s opinion was persuasive. (Id. at PageID 2548.)
As explained below, these arguments are not well-taken.
A. Applicable Law

1. Evaluation of medical opinion evidence
Social Security regulations require ALJs to adhere to certain standards when
evaluating medical opinions. ALJs must analyze the persuasiveness of “all of the medical
opinions” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (emphasis added). A “medical opinion” is
a “statement from a medical source about what [an individual] can still do despite [her]
impairment(s)” and whether the individual has one or more impairment-related
limitations or restrictions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). By contrast, a statement from a
medical source about an issue reserved to the Commissioner—such as whether an
individual is disabled—need not be addressed by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3).
Because Plaintiff filed her claims in August 2018 and March 2019, the new
regulations for evaluating medical opinion evidence apply. Under these regulations, the

ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) . . . .” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of each medical
opinion and prior administrative medical finding by considering the following factors: (1)
supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the plaintiff; (4) specialization; and
(5) any other factor “that tend[s] to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior

administrative medical finding.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
Significantly, because the first two factors–supportability and consistency–are the
“most important” ones, the ALJ “will explain” how he or she considered them. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b)(2) (emphasis added).4 As to the first factor (supportability), “[t]he more
relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a

medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the
medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). As to the second factor
(consistency), “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the
medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).

4 By contrast, the ALJ “may, but [is] not required to,” explain the consideration given to the remaining factors. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
2. Evaluation of symptom severity
When a claimant alleges symptoms of disabling severity, the Social Security
Administration uses a two-step process for evaluating an individual’s symptoms. SSR 16-

3p, 2017 WL 5180304, *3 (revised and republished Oct. 25, 2017).
First, the ALJ must “determine whether the individual has a medically
determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s
alleged symptoms.” SSR 16-3p at *3. The ALJ must make this determination based upon
objective medical evidence in the form of medical signs or laboratory findings. Id.

Medical signs are “anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities established
by medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques that can be observed apart from an
individual’s symptoms.” Id. The ALJ will not, however, consider whether the objective
medical evidence supports the alleged severity of the individual’s symptoms. Id.
Second, the ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of an individual’s

symptoms … and determine the extent to which an individual’s symptoms limit his or her
ability to perform work-related activities.” SSR 16-3p at *9. The Social Security
Administration “recognize[s] that some individuals may experience symptoms differently
and may be limited by symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than other individuals with
the same medical impairments, the same objective medical evidence, and the same non-

medical evidence.” Id. The ALJ must therefore examine “the entire case record, including
the objective medical evidence; an individual’s statements about the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information provided
by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the individual’s
case record.” Id.

When evaluating the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the claimant’s
alleged symptoms, the ALJ must consider the following factors:
1. Daily activities;
2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other
symptoms;
3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication
an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;
5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has
received for relief of pain or other symptoms;
6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to
relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back,
standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board);
and
7. Any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations
and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
SSR 16-3p at *7-8; cf. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). The ALJ need only
discuss those factors that are pertinent based upon the evidence in the record. Id. The
ALJ's discussion of the applicable factors “must contain specific reasons for the weight
given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence,
and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how
the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.” Id. at *10.
The ALJ must determine whether an individual’s symptoms and accompanying
limitations are consistent with the evidence in the record. SSR 16-3p at *8. For example,
the ALJ will consider an individual’s statements, keeping in mind that those statements
may be inconsistent because “[s]ymptoms may vary in their intensity, persistence, and

functional effects, or may worsen or improve with time.” Id. at *8-9.
The ALJ will also consider whether the claimant sought medical treatment and
followed treatment that was prescribed. SSR 16-3p at *9. Attempts to obtain treatment
may show that symptoms are intense and persistent; conversely, a lack of such efforts
may show that an individual’s symptoms are not intense or persistent. Id. However, the
ALJ “will not find an individual’s symptoms inconsistent … on this basis without

considering possible reasons he or she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment
consistent with the degree of his or her complaints.” Id. The ALJ must consider these
reasons “before drawing an adverse inference from the claimant’s lack of medical
treatment.” Dooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 656 F. App'x 113, 119 (6th Cir. 2016).
The SSR lists several examples of why individuals may not seek or follow

treatment, including side effects from medications, an inability to afford treatment, and
an inability to understand the need for treatment due to a mental impairment. Id. at *9-10.
The ALJ may need to contact the claimant to ascertain the reason(s) for the lack of
treatment. Id. at *9. The ALJ “will explain how [he or she] considered the individual’s
reasons” in the evaluation of the individual’s symptoms. Id. at *10 (emphasis added).

B. Family Physician Timothy Dixon, M.D.
The ALJ complied with applicable regulations when she found that Dr. Dixon’s
opinion is minimally persuasive, and her analysis is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ found that Dr. Dixon’s limitations were “not supported by objective
physical examination findings and are inconsistent with the overall objective record.”

(Doc. 9-2, PageID 65.) The ALJ explained that although Dr. Dixon limited Plaintiff to
lifting no more than five pounds, the objective treatment notes consistently documented
full strength in all extremities. (Id.) The ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff’s reports of well-
controlled pain with medication undermined Dr. Dixon’s lifting, standing, walking, and
sitting limitations. (Id.) The ALJ discussed the lumbar and cervical spine MRI reports.
(Doc. 9-2, PageID 61-62.) She acknowledged that Plaintiff underwent a cervical

discectomy 2017 and left hip replacement surgery in December 2019. (Id.) The ALJ
acknowledged that Plaintiff exhibited an antalgic gait on a few occasions, but reasoned
that numerous other physical examinations showed a normal gait, full strength in the
extremities and intact sensation. (Id.)
In sum, the ALJ balanced all the evidence and concluded that Dr. Dixon’s opinion

was not persuasive. Because the ALJ cited to records from Dr. Dixon and other evidence,
she addressed the supportability and consistency factors in compliance with the
applicable regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), (c)(2). Further, the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and so cannot be reversed by this Court.
C. Orthopedist Jennifer Jerele, M.D.

The ALJ complied with applicable regulations when she found that Dr. Jerele’s
opinion is persuasive, and her findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ found that Dr. Jerele’s opinion was “reasonably consistent with the
overall objective evidence” and “somewhat supported by other physician opinion
evidence, albeit with greater restrictions to lifting and standing (1A, 5A).” (Doc. 9-2,
PageID 65, citing the State agency medical consultants’ findings at Doc. 9-3, PageID

152-54, 180-82.) The ALJ’s conclusion is supported by her discussion of the medical
evidence, i.e., the lumbar and cervical spine MRI reports, Plaintiff’s surgical history, and
numerous physical examinations showing a normal gait, full strength, and intact
sensation. (Id. at PageID 61-63.) The ALJ recognized that Dr. Jerele—an orthopedist—is
a specialist (id. at PageID 65), which is an appropriate factor to consider under 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(4). The ALJ balanced the evidence and found that Dr. Jerele’s opinion

was persuasive. The ALJ addressed the supportability and consistency of Dr. Jerele’s
opinion as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2), (c)(1), and (c)(2),5 and her findings
are supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff contends that “[t]he ALJ identifies Dr. Jerele as a ‘specialist,’ yet fails to
account for Dr. Jerele’s attention to only that specific area of expertise—Fisher’s left hip

impairment. Dr. Jerele specifically attributed her restrictions only to ‘severe left hip
OA.’” (Doc. 12, PageID 2548.) But the ALJ did not mechanically adopt Dr. Jerele’s
limitations, which were clearly based on a diagnosis of severe left hip osteoarthritis.
(Doc. 9-10, PageID 1973-76.) Instead, the ALJ’s limitations are more restrictive than
those that were identified by Dr. Jerele. For example, although Dr. Jerele opined that

5 The supportability factor requires consideration of the “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
presented by a medical source . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) (emphasis added). By contrast, “consistency”
involves comparing a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding with “the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2) (emphasis added). The ALJ
appears to have conflated these terms. Nevertheless, the ALJ addressed both factors because she considered the
objective findings documented by Dr. Jerele, as well as other medical and non-medical evidence of record.
Plaintiff could lift and carry up to twenty-five pounds occasionally and fifteen pounds
frequently (id. at PageID 1974), the ALJ’s RFC limited Plaintiff to lifting and carrying up

to ten pounds occasionally and less then ten pounds frequently. (Doc. 9-2, PageID 60.)
Also, while Dr. Jerele opined that Plaintiff could stand and/or walk a total of four hours
in an eight-hour workday (Doc. 9-10 at PageID 1974), the ALJ’s RFC limited Plaintiff to
standing and/or walking a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Doc. 9-2, PageID
60.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument is not well-taken.
Plaintiff also asserts: “Dr. Jerele’s opinion was completed on December 24, 2019,

the same month as Fisher’s left hip replacement surgery . . . . Dr. Jerele’s opinion must be
taken in context, acknowledging the timing of the opinion and the multitude of additional
severe impairments contributing to Fisher’s overall level of restriction.” (Id.) The Court
finds that the ALJ did place Dr. Jerele’s opinion in the context of other evidence in the
record. As noted, for example, the ALJ included more restrictive limitations in the RFC

than Dr. Jerele identified in her opinion. (Doc. 9-2, PageID 60.) The ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and so cannot be reversed by this Court.
D. Evaluation of Symptom Severity
The ALJ complied with the two-step process required by SSR 16-3p. The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff has medically determinable impairments (cervical and lumbar

spine degenerative disc disease, status-post total hip replacement in 2019 secondary to
history of left hip osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, migraine-type headaches, obstructive sleep
apnea, hepatitis C, obesity, bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder)
that could reasonably cause the type of symptomatology alleged. (Doc. 9-2, PageID 58,
61.) The ALJ then considered the evidence in the record and found Plaintiff’s statements
about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms to be not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence of record. (Id. at PageID 61.)
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s findings at the second step of the analysis, arguing
that “[t]he totality of the medical record is not inconsistent with the symptom severity
reported by Fisher or the restrictions set forth by Dr. Dixon.” (Doc. 12, PageID 2549.)
Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion, the Court cannot weigh the
evidence itself and must instead affirm the ALJ’s decision.

The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony at both hearings. (Doc. 9-2, PageID
61.) She noted that Plaintiff complained of back and hip pain, headaches, and fatigue, and
stated that she is able to lift no more than five pounds and needs to lie down for seventy-
five percent of the day. (Id.) The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff reported similar
complaints to her medical providers on several occasions. (Id. at PageID 61-62.) The ALJ

acknowledged Plaintiff’s history of musculoskeletal issues, as evidenced by MRI reports,
a cervical discectomy, left hip replacement surgery, and pain management. (Id.) She cited
to records that documented some gait difficulties and pain with range of motion. (Id.) The
ALJ compared this evidence to numerous records that documented full strength in the
extremities, intact sensation, and on numerous occasions, a normal gait with no use of

any ambulatory aids. (Id.) The ALJ noted that several conditions such as headaches and
hepatitis C had responded well to treatment. (Id.) The ALJ concluded that the balance of
the evidence did not support Plaintiff’s allegations of symptom severity. (Id. at PageID
61.) The ALJ accounted for the preponderance of the evidence by limiting Plaintiff to the
reduced range of sedentary work set forth in the RFC. (Doc. 9-2, PageID 60, 63.) The
Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff argues that her “strong work history should weigh in favor of according
her symptom severity complaints substantial weight.” (Doc. 12, PageID 2550.) This
argument essentially challenges the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility. This
Court must give great weight and deference to an ALJ’s credibility assessment. Workman
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 Fed. App’x 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s credibility
findings “are virtually unchallengeable” absent compelling reasons. Ritchie v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 540 Fed. App’x 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit has considered the
argument raised by Plaintiff and has held that ALJs are “not required to explicitly discuss
[a claimant’s] work history when assessing his credibility.” Dutkiewicz v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 663 F. App’x 430, 433 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff has
not identified any compelling reason to disturb the ALJ’s credibility assessment.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the ALJ properly applied the governing legal
framework and substantial evidence supports her conclusions. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Statement of Errors lacks merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 12) is OVERRULED;

2. The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s non-disability determination;
and

3. The case is terminated on the Court’s docket.

/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380887. Public record. Not legal advice.