# Amor v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · August 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380699

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

SARAH A.1 Case No. 1:21-cv-599

Plaintiff, McFarland, J.
v. Bowman, M.J.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff filed this Social Security appeal in order to challenge the Defendant’s
determination that he is not disabled. Proceeding through counsel, Plaintiff presents five
claims of error, all of which the Defendant disputes. As explained below, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)’s finding of non-disability should be AFFIRMED, because
it is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record.
I. Summary of Administrative Record
Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) on June 19, 2019, alleging disability as of June 9, 2019. (Tr. 175). The
Administration denied Plaintiff’s claim initially and upon reconsideration. A telephone
hearing was held on July 28, 2020, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified
(Tr.32-77). Shortly after, the ALJ issued a decision, denying Plaintiff’s applications. (Tr.
12-28). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the denial of his application for benefits.

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the
United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal
high school and attended three years of college. (Tr. 192). She has past relevant work as
an insurance agent. (Tr. 193). Plaintiff alleges disability based primarily depression and
anxiety, panic disorder, and seizures.
Based upon the record and testimony presented at the hearing, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “history of left frontal lobe meningioma with
vasogenic cerebral edema, midline shift of brain, and diplopia; s/p resection with mind
residual left frontal lobe encephalomalacia and glosis; seizure disorder; obesity; chronic
depressive disorder, and adjustment disorder with depression and anxiety.” (Tr. 28). The
ALJ concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments alone or in combination met or

medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subp. P, Appendix 1.
Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform
sedentary work subject to the following limitations:

She can have a 15-minute break every 2 hours and 30-minute lunch break;
can push/pull within the lift and carry restrictions; cannot climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds, but can occasionally climb ramps or stairs; can
occasionally balance, but never on wet, uneven, or moving surfaces; can
occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl; she must avoid all exposure to
the following hazards: unprotected heights, unprotected sharp objects;
unprotected bodies of water; the use of moving machinery or machinery
with unprotected moving parts, or commercial driving; she can tolerate work
environments with up to a moderate level of noise, such as typically found
in a business office or department store; she cannot work outdoors; further,
the claimant can perform simple, routine, repetitive 1-2 step tasks, with an
SVP up to 2, which can be learned by demonstration, and requires the
ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace no longer than 2 hours at a
time; and is performed in a low stress work environment, defined as free of
fast-paced production requirements, involves only simple, work-related
decisions, few, if any, work place changes, changes can be explained in
advance and gradually implemented, involves no interaction with the
general public, and up to occasional and superficial interaction (no conflict

2
co-workers or supervisors.

(Tr. 20-21). Based upon the record as a whole including testimony from the vocational
expert, and given Plaintiff’s age, education and work experience, and the RFC, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff could perform a significant number of unskilled jobs in the regional
and national economy, including such jobs as final assembler, table worker, and
document preparer. (Tr. 27). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not under
disability, as defined in the Social Security Regulations, and is not entitled to DIB and/or
SSI. Id.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Therefore, the ALJ’s
decision stands as the Defendant’s final determination. On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) improperly considering the findings of the state agency
psychological consultants, (2) failing to include limitations relating to the quality of
Plaintiff’s social interaction in his RFC assessment, (3) improperly evaluating the findings
of Dr. Patel; (4) improperly evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; and (5) failing to

include all of Plaintiff’s limitations in his hypothetical question to vocational expert. Upon
close analysis, I conclude that Plaintiff’s arguments are not well-taken.
II. Analysis
A. Judicial Standard of Review
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability.” See 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a “disability” includes only physical or
mental impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe enough to prevent
the applicant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in “substantial

3
of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986).
When a court is asked to review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, the court’s
first inquiry is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability finding is supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (additional citation and internal quotation
omitted). In conducting this review, the court should consider the record as a whole.
Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s denial of benefits, then that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial

evidence also exists in the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. Bowen, 35
F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The Secretary’s findings are not subject to reversal merely because
substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion....
The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone of
choice’ within which the Secretary may proceed without interference from
the courts. If the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
a reviewing court must affirm.

Id. (citations omitted).
In considering an application for supplemental security income or for disability
benefits, the Social Security Agency is guided by the following sequential benefits
analysis: at Step 1, the Commissioner asks if the claimant is still performing substantial
gainful activity; at Step 2, the Commissioner determines if one or more of the claimant’s
impairments are “severe;” at Step 3, the Commissioner analyzes whether the claimant’s
impairments, singly or in combination, meet or equal a Listing in the Listing of
Impairments; at Step 4, the Commissioner determines whether or not the claimant can

4
claimant can no longer perform his or her past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to
the agency to determine whether a significant number of other jobs which the claimant
can perform exist in the national economy. See Combs v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d
525, 528-29 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining sequential process); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520,
416.920.
A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that he is
entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). A claimant seeking benefits must
present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, he suffered an

impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that
left him unable to perform any job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
B. The ALJ’s Decision is supported by Substantial Evidence
1. Evaluation of the Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the evidence of record.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of the state
agency psychologists. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by improperly
determining that Dr. Patel’s statement did not qualify as a medical opinion. Plaintiff’s
contentions will be addressed in turn.
Effective for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, such as Plaintiff's claim, the

agency has comprehensively revised its regulations that govern medical opinions.
Pursuant to the updated regulations, the ALJ now considers the persuasiveness of a
medical opinion rather than assigning weight to the opinion. See Revisions to Rules

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(technical errors corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15, 132-01 (Mar. 27, 2017)). The most
important factors in evaluating an opinion's persuasive value are (1) supportability, and
(2) consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The agency no longer has a “treating
physician rule” deferring to treating source opinions. 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan. 18,
2017) (technical errors corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15,132 (Mar. 27, 2017)). Under the new
regulations, the agency “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),
including those from [the claimant's own] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).
Additionally, the ALJ will consider the following factors when considering medical

opinions: relationship with the claimant; specialization; and other factors, including
understanding of the agency's disability program's policies and evidentiary requirements.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5). The new regulations also alter how the ALJ articulates
his consideration of medical opinions. While the ALJ must articulate consideration of all
medical opinions, the new regulations no longer mandate the “controlling weight” analysis
or the “good reasons” standard in weighing a treating source opinion. Compare 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b). The ALJ is only required to explain
how he considered the supportability and consistency factors, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), which are the two most important factors in determining the
persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion or a prior administrative finding. 20 C.F.R.

404.1520c(b)(2).

6
Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of the state
agency. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to note that the state
agency consultants used an “improper” standard of law in suggesting that her
impairments must meet or equal a listing to be found disabled. Plaintiff further contends
that the state agency psychologist failed to consider evidence of her “nerve treatment.”
Plaintiff’s contentions lack merit.
State agency psychological consultants Paul Tangeman, Ph.D., and Carl Tishler,
Ph.D., found that Plaintiff would be able to perform simple, one to two-step tasks, some
multi-step tasks that are not fast paced in nature, and that she could interact with the

general public, coworkers and supervisors on no more than a superficial basis in a static
work environment that does not require strict production demands. (Tr. 89-91, 104-06).
In support of these findings, the consultants considered Plaintiff’s reported difficulty
remembering words and cognitive problems but that she was not seeing any psychiatric
doctors at the time of the assessment. (Tr. 85-86, 101). The consultants also considered
that although Plaintiff felt depressed and reported having little motivation at times to get
out of bed, she nonetheless could overcome these symptoms. (Tr. 85-86, 101). In finding
the state agency opinions “generally persuasive”, the ALJ found that these opinions were
well-supported. (Tr. 25).
The ALJ also explained these opinions were consistent with the evidence of

record, including the evidence received after these opinions were rendered. (Tr. 25).
Specifically, the ALJ explained that they were supported by and consistent with the
evidence, as Plaintiff had varying mental status exam findings, sometimes showing

7
Indeed, the record shows that Plaintiff only presented with abnormality on occasion and
other times her mental status exam findings were largely intact related to mood, affect,
attention/concentration, thought process, orientation, insight, judgment, behavior,
speech, and memory. (Tr. 287-89, 378, 387, 786, 795, 823, 828, 1707, 1717, 1727, 1749).
The ALJ also considered that the opinions were within the area of the consultants’
specialty (psychology) and that as state agency reviewing psychologists, they were
familiar with the Commissioner’s regulations, Agency policy, and evidentiary
requirements. This explanation by the ALJ was all that was required under the revised
regulations, which only require an explanation of the most important factors of

"supportability" and "consistency." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
As noted by the Commissioner, the state agency consultants appropriately
followed the sequential evaluation used in disability claims in determining whether
Plaintiff’s conditions met or equaled a listing prior to assessing her RFC. (Tr. 78-93, 95-
108). Had the consultants thought the standard for disability ended at step three (i.e.,
whether Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled a listing), they would not have proceeded
to the fourth and fifth steps of the process. Even assuming the consultants had erred,
Plaintiff has not established any prejudice here since the ALJ made no such error and
reasonably found that she was not disabled at step five. (Tr. 20-27).
Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to recognize that the

consultants’ opinions did not consider evidence of her “nerve” (mental health) treatment,
which was submitted after these assessments were made. (Doc. 5 at 2). This assertion
lacks merit. The ALJ explicitly noted that the opinions were generally persuasive because

8
received at the hearing level after their reviews” (Tr. 25) (emphasis added).
As such, the undersigned finds that the ALJ properly considered that these
opinions were rendered prior to the submission of this evidence, but that such evidence
did not show disabling limitations. In light of the foregoing, the ALJ’s evaluation of this
opinion evidence is substantially supported.
B. Dr. Patel
In his decision the ALJ noted that Veer Patel, D.O. was Plaintiff’s treating primary
care provider. (Tr. 26). As detailed by the ALJ, in February 2020, Dr. Patel noted that
Plaintiff had difficulty concentrating and processing information. He reported that

Plaintiff’s symptoms of delayed cognition, slowed processing, and slowed concentration
are related to her seizures and meningioma. In July 2020, Dr. Patel reported that Plaintiff
cannot drive due to seizures and cannot work. The ALJ determined that Dr. Patel’s
statement that Plaintiff cannot work “is not a medical opinion with in the regulations, such
that is it not entitled to any particular deference. Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s decision in this
regard is erroneous. Plaintiff’s contention is unavailing.
A medical opinion is a “statement from a medical source about what you can still
do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have one or more impairment-related
limitations or restrictions” in “[y]our ability to perform mental demands of work activities,
such as understanding; remembering; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace;

carrying out instructions; or responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work
pressures in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). The revised regulations that
govern claims filed after March 27, 2017, such as this one, do not require an ALJ to make

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404.1520b(c)(2). The regulations specifically contemplate that statements about whether
a claimant is or is not disabled, able to work, or is able to perform regular and continuing
work are considered under the umbrella of evidence that is “inherently neither valuable
nor persuasive” because they are statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3)(i).
As such, these statements do not require any analysis by the ALJ. Dr. Patel’s
statements clearly fall into this category, as he only gave a conclusory statement that
Plaintiff “cannot work” (Tr. 1745) and requested that her disability application “be
considered again.” (Tr. 387). As noted by the Commissioner, absent from Dr. Patel’s

statements is any form of specific functional limitations or number of days that Plaintiff
would be absent from work, as Plaintiff suggests.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Patel’s
statement that Plaintiff’s cannot work.
2. Mental RFC
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC fails to properly account for her mental
impairments. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his definition of “superficial”
because he failed to find that superficial refers to the quality of such contact and not to
the quantity of contact on an unskilled, entry-level job. (Doc.5 at 5).
Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that the RFC finding here accounted

for both the quantity and quality of interaction Plaintiff could have in the workplace. First,
Plaintiff was limited to occasional and superficial interaction with supervisors and
coworkers and no interaction with the public. (Tr. 21). As noted by the Commissioner, the

10
“occurring from very little up to one-third of the time.” See SSR 83-10. Accordingly, the
ALJ accounted for the quantity of interaction Plaintiff could have.
Here, in terms of quality of interaction, Plaintiff was limited to “superficial”
interaction with supervisors and coworkers. (Tr. 21). This term has no defined meaning
under Agency policy; as such, the ALJ provided a definition of “superficial” as work
involving “no conflict or dispute resolution, persuading others, tandem tasks or team
work.” (Tr. 21). This definition clearly accounts for the quality of interaction Plaintiff was
limited to. Seeing as Plaintiff has failed to put forth any regulatory or Agency definition of
the term “superficial” that contradicts the ALJ’s RFC assessment, she has failed to carry

the burden here.
Additionally, as outlined by the Commissioner, Plaintiff makes no showing that she
was harmed at Step Five. The unskilled jobs identified by the ALJ at step five could still
be performed in light of Plaintiff’s social limitations. See Milliken v. Astrue, 397 F. App’x
218, 223 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Unskilled work would not seem to require intense contact with
supervisors and coworkers . . . .”); SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (“[Unskilled] jobs ordinarily
involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people . . . .”). Here, the VE
testified that Plaintiff could perform work as a final assembler, table worker, and document
preparer despite being limited to occasional and superficial interaction with coworkers
and supervisors. (Tr. 27, 70).

3. Plaintiff’s subjective Complaints
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's evaluation of her subjective reports that she was
disabled by her mental impairments. In this regard, Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the

11
prior to reconsideration.” (Doc. 5 at 8). Plaintiffs’ contentions are unavailing.
It is the job of the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of
Plaintiff’s subjective statements. Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Our
role is not to . . . examine the credibility of the claimant’s testimony.”); Brainard v. Sec. of
Health & Human Svcs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) (“We do not . . . make credibility
findings.”). Accordingly, this part of the ALJ’s determination is given great weight and
great deference. Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Upon
review, we are to accord the ALJ’s determinations of credibility great weight and
deference particularly since the ALJ has the opportunity, which we do not, of observing a

witness’s demeanor while testifying.”).
Agency regulations require the ALJ to look at both the objective medical evidence
and a nonexhaustive list of factors including: (1) daily activities; (2) the location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and
aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than
medication; (6) any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to
relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c);
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *7-8. An ALJ is not required to discuss every factor in
his ruling. Id

Here, the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of severe
and persistent mental symptomatology were undermined by the varying mental status
exam findings, some showing abnormalities and others revealing normal findings, (Tr.

12
of sufficient objective medical evidence makes credibility a particularly relevant issue, and
in such circumstances, this court will generally defer to the Commissioner’s assessment
when it is supported by an adequate basis.”). To the extent that Plaintiff points to some
abnormal findings in the record that could support her allegations, so long as substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, this Court should “defer[s] to those findings ‘even if
there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite
conclusion.’” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:15-cv-384, 2017 WL 427359, at *7
(S.D. Ohio Feb 1, 2017) (MJ Ovington) (citations omitted); see also Ulman v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 713–14 (6th Cir. 2012) (“As long as the ALJ cite[s] substantial,

legitimate evidence to support his factual conclusions, we are not to second-guess.”);
Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (“As long as substantial
evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, we must defer to it, even if there is
substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.”)
As noted by the Commissioner, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s testimony regarding
the frequency and intensity of her symptoms, her medications and side effects, and her
treatment history. (Tr. 21-24). See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 at *7 (Mar. 16, 2016).
Despite claiming her mental impairments were debilitating, Plaintiff did not seek mental
health treatment until November 2019, and only utilized conservative measures, such as
medication and counseling. (Tr. 23, 786, 1749). The ALJ discussed that Plaintiff reported

having panic attacks and racing thoughts, but Plaintiff also admitted that these symptoms
responded to Ativan. (Tr. 21). The ALJ considered that Plaintiff reported severe symptoms
but that she presented with normal mood after starting Sertraline in mid-2020. (Tr. 24,

13
for relief of symptoms). The ALJ also reasonably considered Plaintiff’s daily activities. See
SSR 16-3p (an ALJ may consider statements about a claimant’s daily activities when
assessing the consistency of the claimant’s statements). Here, the ALJ considered that
Plaintiff reported not being able to leave her home due to her mental symptoms but that
she talked with family members on a regular basis and was capable of ordering her
groceries online. (Tr. 19-20). See Meyer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:09-cv-814, 2011
WL 1124698 at *11 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2011) (Litkovitz, MJ) (“As a matter of law, the ALJ
may consider [the claimant’s] household and social activities in evaluating her assertions
of pain or limitations.”) (citing Blacha, 927 F.3d at 231). The ALJ also discussed that the

cooking and household chores were managed by her fiancé and children. (Tr. 20).
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints complied with Agency Regulations and controlling law.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is substantially supported in this regard and should not
be disturbed.
4. Hypothetical Questions
Plaintiff's final assignment of error asserts that the ALJ’s analysis at step-five is not
supported by substantial evidence. Namely, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's hypothetical
questions to the vocational expert were improper because he failed to properly define
superficial work. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to include the number of days

she would be absent from work and the extra breaks needed for her crying spells.
Plaintiff's assertions are unavailing.

14
claimant's credible impairments and limitations. See Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 378
(6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d
1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993). The ALJ was not required to ask about the impact of the
opined limitations that he did not accept. See Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993) (“It is well established that an ALJ may pose
hypothetical questions to a vocational expert and is required to incorporate only those
limitations accepted as credible by the finder of fact.”) (citing Hardaway v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 823 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1987)).
Here, the ALJ's hypothetical question was supported by the medical record and

other evidence as detailed above, and Plaintiff has not shown that she had limitations
greater than those reflected in the ALJ's hypothetical question and eventual RFC finding.
Accordingly, the ALJ's decision is substantially supported in this regard.
In sum, the ALJ’s findings in this case were well within the zone of reasonable
choices. See McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833; accord Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693
F.3d 709, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2012) (“As long as the ALJ cite[s] substantial, legitimate
evidence to support his factual conclusions, we are not to second-guess.”); Warner v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (“As long as substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s decision, we must defer to it, even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.”). Substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and her conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

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For the reasons explained herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant's
decision is SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and should be AFFIRMED,
and that this case be CLOSED.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman___
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

SARAH A.2 Case No. 1:21-cv-599

Plaintiff, McFarland, J.
v. Bowman, M.J.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendants.

NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

2 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the
United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal
courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last initials. See General Order 22-01.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380699. Public record. Not legal advice.