# Adkins v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 18, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380485

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 18, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380485

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

SCOTT A.,1

Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:20-cv-00263
v. Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,2

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), regarding the applications of Plaintiff Scott A. for Disability
Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for
Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et
seq. Plaintiff appeals from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
those applications. This matter is now before the Court, with the consent of the parties, see Joint
Consent of the Parties, ECF No. 5, on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors, ECF No. 12, Defendant’s
Brief, ECF No. 17, Plaintiff’s Reply, ECF No. 18, and the Certified Administrative Record, ECF
No. 9. After careful consideration of the entire record, the Court decides this matter pursuant to
Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors and affirms the Commissioner’s decision.

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States has
recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal courts should refer to
plaintiffs in such cases by only their first names and last initials. See also S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01.
2 Kilolo Kijakazi is the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
1
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income on November 9, 2012, and November 7, 2012, respectively, alleging that he has been
disabled since February 8, 2012, based on a number of physical and mental impairments. R. 209-
10.3 The applications were denied following an administrative hearing, and Plaintiff sought

review in this Court of that final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. A[.] v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 3:16-cv-0272 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2017). Concluding that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) had erred in failing to consider the opinion of Plaintiff’s
treating physician Thomas Brown, M.D., the Court reversed that administrative decision and
remanded the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Id. at PageID# 752; R. 772-
81. Upon remand, a different ALJ, Deborah F. Sanders, held another administrative hearing on
April 15, 2019. R. 690-723. Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, as did a
vocational expert.4 In a decision dated June 19, 2019, ALJ Sanders concluded that Plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from February 8, 2012,

his alleged disability onset date, through the date of that decision. R. 660-79. That decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council
declined review on April 28, 2020. R. 648-54. Plaintiff timely filed this appeal pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 1. On March 23, 2022, the case was reassigned to the undersigned.
ECF No. 20. The matter is ripe for disposition.

3 References to pages as they are used in the Certified Administrative Record will be cited as “R. .”
4 ALJ Sanders first held a hearing following remand on August 20, 2018, but Plaintiff did not appear at that hearing.
R. 724-37.
2
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, “[t]he Commissioner’s
conclusion will be affirmed absent a determination that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal
standard or made fact findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Kyle v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). The United States Supreme Court has explained the
substantial evidence standard as follows:
Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative
record and asks whether it contains sufficien[t] evidence to support the agency’s
factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of substantial in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this
Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means – and means only – such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). In addition, “‘[w]here substantial evidence supports the [Commissioner’s]
determination, it is conclusive, even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite
conclusion.’” Emard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Crum v.
Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d
399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Therefore, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this
Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have
supported an opposite conclusion.’”) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.
1997)). “Yet, even if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the Commissioner will not
3
be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a
claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d
742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).
B. Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four; at step
five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner.” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 652 (citing Jones v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003)).
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, then the inquiry ends because the
plaintiff is not disabled.
At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or

combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the plaintiff does not
have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the
plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of
impairments “meets” or “medically equals” the severity of an impairment in the Listing of
Impairments (“Listing”) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, then the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or

4
combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12
months. Id. at §§ 404.1509, 416.909. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step four.
At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
and determine whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
(f), 416.920(e), (f). If the plaintiff can perform past relevant work, then the inquiry ends because

the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.
At step five, the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff, considering the plaintiff’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the ALJ determines that the
plaintiff can do so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed to be
disabled if the impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least twelve months.
III. ALJ DECISION AND APPELLATE ISSUES
The Plaintiff was 44 years old at his alleged disability onset date. See R. 209. At step one,

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity from April 15, 2015,
through the end of 2017, but that he had not otherwise engaged in substantial gainful activity
since his alleged disability onset date of February 8, 2012. R. 662.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease of his cervical and lumbar spine, mild carpal tunnel syndrome, history
of coronary artery disease, polysubstance abuse disorder, and affective, anxiety, personality, and
trauma-related mental disorders. R. 663.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. R. 664.

5
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work subject to
various additional limitations. R. 666. The ALJ found that this RFC permitted the performance
of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a production assembler. R. 676-77.
At step five, the ALJ also found that a significant number of jobs—i.e., approximately

85,000 jobs as a marker; approximately 100,000 jobs as a warehouse checker; approximately
120,000 jobs as a laundry folder—existed in the national economy and could be performed by an
individual with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC. R. 678. The ALJ therefore concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from February 8, 2012,
his alleged disability onset date, through the date of the decision. R. 678.
Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s findings at step four and asks that the decision of the
Commissioner be reversed and remanded with directions for the granting of benefits. Plaintiff’s
Statement of Errors, ECF No. 12; Plaintiff’s Reply, ECF No. 18. Specifically, Plaintiff disagrees
with the ALJ’s refusal to accord controlling weight to the opinions of disability articulated by

Cheng T. Pan, M.D., his treating psychiatrist, and by Thomas Brown, M.D., his treating family
practitioner. Id. The Acting Commissioner takes the position that the ALJ’s decision should be
affirmed in its entirety because the ALJ correctly applied the governing legal standards and
considered the entire record, and her decision is supported by sufficient explanation and
substantial evidence. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 17.
IV. DISCUSSION
Although Plaintiff’s applications originally alleged that he is disabled by reason of both
physical and mental impairments, he addresses in this action only the ALJ’s assessment of his
mental impairments—and specifically, the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinions of his mental health
providers. The Court therefore limits its discussion to those issues.

6
An ALJ must consider all medical opinions in evaluating a claimant’s applications. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Under the controlling regulations5 at the time Plaintiff filed
his applications, the opinion of a treating physician must be accorded controlling weight if it is
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is
not “inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). If a treating physician’s opinion is not accorded controlling
weight, the ALJ must proffer “good reasons” for discounting the opinion of a treating physician.
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). Those reasons must also
find substantial support in the record and be sufficiently specific to make clear the weight given
to the opinion and the reasons for that weight. Id. However, a formulaic recitation of factors is
not necessary. See Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010) (“If the
ALJ’s opinion permits a claimant and a reviewing court a clear understanding of the reasons for
the weight given a treating physician’s opinion, strict compliance with the rule may sometimes
be excused.”).

As is relevant here, when an ALJ does not assign controlling weight to the opinions of
the claimant’s treating providers, the ALJ must explain the weight assigned to the opinions of all
medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(ii), 416.927(e)(2)(ii). In doing so, the ALJ is
required to apply the following factors: “The length of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of

5 On January 18, 2017, the Social Security Administration promulgated “Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence,” which, inter alia, served to eliminate the treating physician rule for claims filed
on or after March 27, 2017. See 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R.
pts. 404, 416). Because Plaintiff’s applications in this case were filed prior to that effective date of March 27, 2017,
the treating physician rule applies to his claims.
7
the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the
treating source. . . .” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 660 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6)).
A. The Opinion of Treating Psychiatrist Dr. Pan
Dr. Pan began his treatment of Plaintiff in 2010. See R. 361. Office notes generated
during Plaintiff’s alleged period of disability include findings of fair appearance, normal

demeanor, goal directed thought processes, “partial” or “fair” insight and judgment, and slight or
“fair” depression. R. 399. Medication was continued and Plaintiff was encouraged to maintain
sobriety. R. 400 (March 2012), 401 (September 2012). Dr. Pan’s February 2013 notes indicate
that Plaintiff’s condition was “stable. No depression or psychosis noted.” R. 483. Notes from a
May 2013 office visit reflect a flat appearance, goal directed thought process, and depressed
mood. R. 520. In June 2013, Plaintiff was seen for crisis assessment. R. 514. His medication was
changed and he expressed a willingness to begin counseling. R. 516. In August 2013, Dr. Pan
noted that Plaintiff’s appearance was flat and his demeanor was slow. R. 501. His mood and
affect were “[f]air” and insight and judgment were “[p]oor.” Id. However, his condition

remained “stable” and “[n]o significant depression or psychosis was noted.” R. 502. In February
2014, Dr. Pan noted that Plaintiff was cooperative but unkempt and withdrawn. R. 577. His
thought processes were normal, he manifested no abnormal or psychotic thoughts, had normal
attention and concentration, and his mood was anxious, depressed, and dysphoric. R. 577-79. His
GAF was placed at 35. R. 581.6 Dr. Pan’s office notes from May 2014 reflected normal thought

6 The Global Assessment of Function, or GAF, reflects a person’s psychological, social, and occupational
functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental illness. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at
34 (4th ed. 2000). A GAF score of 31-40 indicates “[s]ome impairment in reality testing or communication” or
“major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking or mood (e.g., . . .
avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to work).” DSM-IV at 34. A GAF score of 51-60 is indicative of
“[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks)” or “moderate difficulty
in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” Id. A GAF
score of 61-70 indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia” or “some difficulty in
social, occupational, or school functioning. . . but generally functioning pretty well).” Id. A GAF score of 71-80
8
processes, no abnormal psychotic thoughts, issues with working memory, normal attention and
concentration, and anxious and dysphoric mood and affect. R. 559-60. In August 2014,
Plaintiff’s though processes were normal; no hallucinations were noted. R. 549-50. There were
issues with recent memory but no issues with attention and concentration. R. 551. His mood and
affect were anxious, depressed and dysphoric. Id. His GAF was 35. R. 553. In November 2014,

Dr. Pan noted normal thought processes, R. 536, but auditory hallucinations and paranoid
delusions. R. 537. Plaintiff had normal attention and concentration, but his mood was anxious,
depressed, and dysphoric. R. 538. His GAF remained 35. R. 540. In his February 2015 office
notes, Dr. Pan indicated that Plaintiff had denied side effects from medication, was sleeping well,
and his mood was “stable for the most part. NO delusions or paranoia noted” [sic]. R. 615. On
clinical examination, Dr. Pan noted that Plaintiff was cooperative but was unkempt, had limited
eye contact, was withdrawn and pre-occupied, and had psychomotor retardation. R. 617. He did
not suffer from hallucinations or delusions, was not suicidal or homicidal, and had normal
attention and concentration. R. 618-19. No impairment of memory was noted; Plaintiff’s

attention and concentration were normal. R. 619. His mood and affect were depressed,
constricted and blunted. Id. Plaintiff’s GAF was again 35. R. 621.
Dr. Pan completed a “Mental Impairment Questionnaire” on February 11, 2015. R. 602-
14. The psychiatrist diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, nos. R. 602.
According to Dr. Pan, Plaintiff had “marked” or “extreme” functional limitations in several areas

indicates “no more than slight impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., temporarily falling
behind in schoolwork).” Id. A GAF score represents a “snapshot” of a person’s “overall psychological functioning”
at or near the time of the evaluation. See Martin v. Commissioner, 61 F. App’x 191, 194 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003). The
Commissioner “has declined to endorse the GAF score for use in the Social Security and SSI disability programs,
and has indicated that GAF scores have no direct correlation on the severity requirements of the mental disorders
listing.” Kennedy v. Astrue, 247 F. App’x 761, 766 (6th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

9
as they pertained to mental functioning. Id. Specifically, Dr. Pan opined that Plaintiff had
“extreme” limitations in his ability to, inter alia, understand and remember detailed instructions;
carry out very detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods;
perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within
customary tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, complete a normal

workday and work week; and accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
supervisors. R. 604. Dr. Pan indicated that Plaintiff had “marked” limitations in his ability to
engage in most other work-related activities. R. 604-05. Dr. Pan placed Plaintiff’s GAF at 55, R.
602, which is indicative of moderate impairment of function. In describing the clinical findings
that support these opinions, Dr. Pan wrote: “Pt is extremely passive, avoidant & helpless[.] He
isolates self and is withdrawn[.] He has poor motivation & energy.” R. 603. According to Dr.
Pan, Plaintiff had responded “partially” to treatment. His prognosis was “poor.” Id. Plaintiff’s
impairments would cause him to be absent from work more than three times per month. R. 604.
On that same date, Dr. Pan also responded to written interrogatories in which he checked the

response “NO” in connection with Plaintiff’s ability to engage in work-related activities from a
mental perspective. R. 606-14. In explaining those responses, Dr. Pan wrote merely “Due to
mental illness.” Id.
ALJ Sanders assigned “little weight” to Dr. Pan’s opinions. R. 673. In doing so, the ALJ
correctly noted the applicable standard for evaluating the opinions of a treating provider and
summarized in extensive and thorough fashion the administrative record. R. 660-79. The ALJ
went on to reason:
I give little weight to his assessments and do not give them controlling or
deferential weight, because they are unsupported by objective signs and findings
in the preponderance of the record, including the objective findings in the
[treating agency’s] progress notes. As discussed above, Dr. Pan’s progress notes
10
show some depressed and/or anxious moods, a flat or constricted affect, some
preoccupied or negative behavior, slowed activity, some decreased memory, and
some poor insight and judgment. However, Dr. Pan documented a fair mood and
affect, fair to normal demeanor and activity, and fair insight and judgment on
several other occasions. Further, Dr. Pan consistently documented normal speech,
goal-directed thought processes, normal attention and concentration, intact
abstraction abilities, and full orientation. As discussed above, the claimant
inconsistently reported hallucinations and generally denied them, as well as
delusions, paranoia, and suicidal ideation. He was working in 2011, and just after
Dr. Pan’s assessment, he began working fulltime in April 15, 2015, and continued
to do so through at least the end of 2017. Moreover, he testified at the hearing that
he is now working part-time. Progress notes generally show similar findings
during periods that the claimant did not work and periods that he did work, except
for when he engaged in substantial polysubstance abuse. On the evaluation form,
Dr. Pan referred to a current GAF score, as well as a GAF score in the past year,
of 55, and while I give little weight to the GAF scores in general, as noted below,
a score of 55 generally indicates only moderate symptoms. Lastly, while Dr. Pan
checked off various aspects of the attorney’s form, there was no room for nuance
in the “yes or no” questions. Further he did not provide any detailed explanation
for such serous findings. He cursorily cited “mental illness” a few times but
provided no reference to specific symptoms or why they would cause such
blanket dysfunction that would support the variance from his own treatment notes.
For all of these reasons, I give little weight to Dr. Pan’s findings of marked to
extreme impairment.

R. 673 (citations to record omitted).
An ALJ is justified in declining to give controlling weight to a treating physician if that
physician’s opinion is inconsistent with his own medical records. Driggs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 2:11-cv-0229, 2011 WL 5999036, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2011). Here, there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s decision to accord little weight to Dr.
Pan’s opinion. It is true that, as Plaintiff points out, the record also includes evidence that would
support the opposite conclusion. However, as stated above, an ALJ’s decision is entitled to
considerable deference on appellate review. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406. This is so even if
substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different outcome. Emard, 953 F.3d at 849.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in criticizing Dr. Pan for using
“yes or no” questionnaires with no “room for nuance.” Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors, ECF No.
11
12, PageID# 2451. However, the ALJ’s comments in this regard constituted merely one of many
factors relied upon by the ALJ in her assessment of Dr. Pan’s opinions; they do not amount to
reversible error.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in referring to Dr. Pan’s February 2015 GAF
score of 55, but not to the other, more restricted, GAF scores reflected in Dr. Pan’s treatment

records. Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors, ECF No. 12, Page ID 2451. However, the ALJ expressly
indicated that she assigned little weight to the GAF scores generally, and noted the score only as
inconsistent with Dr. Pan’s opinions of extreme impairment of function. R. 673. The ALJ’s
comments in this regard do not amount to reversible error.
In short, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Pan’s opinions conformed
to applicable regulations and enjoy substantial support in the record.
B. The Opinion of Treating Family Physician Dr. Brown
The ALJ also accorded “little weight” to the opinions of Dr. Brown, Plaintiff’s treating
family physician. R. 674. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in doing so.

This Court disagrees.
Thomas Brown, M.D., has treated Plaintiff for, inter alia, fatigue, hypothyroidism, and
coronary artery disease for more than ten years. See R. 451, 453, 454, 593. Office notes include
complaints of, inter alia, depression and sadness. R. 450, 454. In January 2013, Plaintiff reported
difficulty concentrating and suicidal thoughts; Dr. Brown diagnosed schizoaffective disorder,
chronic, and depression, and commented, “Has degenerated to the point where he is
unemployable.” R. 454-55. See also 458 (February 2013 diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder).
In February 2013, Dr. Brown signed a prescription form stating, “Patient with schizophrenia.
Permanently disabled and under my care.” R. 476. In a February 2014 evaluation for disability,

12
Dr. Brown commented that Plaintiff’s severe and chronic schizoaffective disorder is manifested
by disordered thoughts and hallucinations. R. 526. Plaintiff’s affect and demeanor were
depressed, flat, and paranoid; his cognitive functioning was diminished. R. 527. That same
month, Dr. Brown again wrote (apparently in response to a request made in connection with
Plaintiff’s disability claim), “Patient with schizophrenia. Permanently disabled and under my

care.” R. 529.
In February 2014, Dr. Brown completed an assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to do work-
related activities, R. 588-92, and opined that Plaintiff’s ability to engage in physical activities is
reduced as a result of “schizophrenia.” R. 590-91. See also R. 591 (“Schizophrenia w/ paranoia –
poor interactions w/ others.”) Dr. Brown also answered written interrogatories, R. 593-601, in
which he opined that, as a result of his schizophrenia, Plaintiff would not be able to: be prompt
and regular in attendance; respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and customary work
pressures; withstand the pressure of meeting normal standards of productivity and accuracy
without significant risk of physical or psychological decompensation or worsening of his

physical and mental impairments; sustain attention and concentration on his work to meet normal
standards of work productivity and accuracy; understand, remember, and carry out simple work
instructions without requiring very close supervision; behave in an emotionally stable manner;
maintain concentration and attention for two-hour segments; relate predictably in social
situations; complete a normal workday and work week; and demonstrate reliability; perform
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary
tolerances; complete a normal work day and work week without interruption from
psychologically and/or physically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace without
unreasonable numbers and length of rest periods; respond appropriately to changes in a routine

13
work setting; get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting
behavior extremes; sustain ordinary routine without special supervision; work in coordination
with, or in proximity to, others without being unduly distracted by them; and accept instructions
and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. R. 595-601. According to Dr. Brown,
Plaintiff had “marked” restrictions in his activities of daily living, difficulties in maintaining

social functioning, and deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to
complete tasks in a timely manner. R. 601.
As noted above, the ALJ accorded “little weight” to Dr. Brown’s opinions:
Although Dr. Brown had been seeing the claimant for over 10 years at the time of
the assessment, he was a family physician and unqualified to offer an opinion on
the claimant’s level of mental functioning. Although Dr. Brown’s name is
mentioned in the record, it does not appear that he has provided significant
ongoing treatment to the claimant since his assessments. Further, at the time, Dr.
Brown had seen the claimant on only approximately seven occasions in the three
years since the allege disability onset date, and the February 2014 note was
apparently written in response to the claimant’s request to Dr. Brown that he
“write a letter for disability to Job and Family Services stating that [he was]
unable to work due to his diagnosis”. Moreover, Dr. Brown’s opinion, and the
findings documented in his progress notes, appear to be based primarily on the
claimant’s subjective complaints. However, as explained throughout this decision
good reasons exist for questioning the consistency of the claimant’s subjective
complaints. Notably, Dr. Brown attributed the limitations to schizophrenia, but as
discussed above, Dr. Pan made no such diagnosis. Further, he reported
significantly more severe symptoms to Dr. Brown, including regular complaints
of hallucinations and suicidal ideation, yet with just a few exceptions the claimant
consistently denied such symptoms during visits with Dr. Pan. These
inconsistencies do not reflect favorably on the consistency of the claimant’s
allegations to Dr. Brown, which warrants less weight to Dr. Brown’s opinion
regarding the claimant’s condition. The totality of the medical evidence clearly
supports that the claimant is not as severely limited as assessed by this doctor.

R. 674-75 (citations to record omitted).
As noted above, an ALJ must give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating provider
if that opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques,” and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§
14
404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). This Court concludes that ALJ Sanders provided “good reasons”
for declining to accord controlling weight to Dr. Brown’s opinion. See Gayheart, 710 F.3d at
376.
The ALJ noted that Dr. Brown offered little support for his diagnosis of schizophrenia
and his opinions of impairment. The ALJ also properly noted that this family practitioner

diagnosed schizophrenia, a diagnosis that was inconsistent with the treating psychiatrist’s
diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder. R. 674. Under these
circumstances, the ALJ’s failure to accord controlling weight to Dr. Brown’s opinions enjoys
substantial support in the record.
The ALJ also properly evaluated Dr. Brown’s opinions by reference to the factors
required by the applicable regulation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6); 416.927(c)(1)-(6).
Although Plaintiff complains that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Brown’s opinions because he
is not a mental health specialist, Plaintiff ‘s Statement of Errors, ECF No. 12, PageID# 2453, the
regulations expressly require an ALJ to take the provider’s area of specialization into account

when considering such opinions. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(5) (“We generally give more weight
to the medical opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty
than to the medical opinion of a source who is not a specialist.”); 416.927(c)(5) (same).
In short, the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Brown’s opinions complied with the applicable
regulations and her findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. This Court
must therefore defer to her decision, regardless of whether there is evidence in the record that
could have supported an opposite conclusion. See Longforth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d
591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005).

15
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors, ECF No. 12, and
AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter FINAL JUDGMENT pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

Date: July 18, 2022 s/Norah McCann King
NORAH McCANN KING
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380485. Public record. Not legal advice.