# Prince v. Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Court Employee

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 18, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380137

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 18, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

THOMAS R. PRINCE, Case No. 1:20-cv-652

Plaintiff, Cole, J.
Bowman, M.J.

v.

SCIOTO COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff initiated a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint in this Court on or about
October 16, 2020. In his complaint, Plaintiff sought monetary damages for multiple claims
against the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, the Scioto County Sheriff’s Department,
the prosecutors and defense attorney in his case, as well as Scioto County Sheriff’s office
employees Grooms, Wynn, and Carter. In a previous Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) filed October 16, 2020,1 the undersigned recommended the dismissal of all
claims except for Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Grooms,
Wynn, and Carter in their individual capacities. The remaining Defendants now seek
summary judgment.2 For the reasons discussed, Defendants’ motion should be
GRANTED.

1The referenced R&R remains pending before Judge Cole.
2Defendants filed their motion on October 15, 2021. (Doc. 41). When Plaintiff failed to file any timely
response in opposition to that motion, the Court directed Plaintiff to “show cause” why the motion should
not be granted. (Doc. 42). On December 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a response to the “show cause” order,
asserting that he “did not know that he was required to object” to the Defendant’s motion, and that he had
been recently released from imprisonment. (Doc. 44).
I. Standard of Review
In a motion for summary judgment, “a court must view the facts and any inferences
that can be drawn from those facts ... in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Keweenaw Bay Indian Comm. v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is only appropriate ‘if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Weighing of the evidence or making credibility
determinations are prohibited at summary judgment - rather, all facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id.
After a moving party has carried its initial burden of showing that no genuine issues
of material fact remain in dispute, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present
specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). “The ‘mere possibility’
of a factual dispute is not enough.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.
1992) (citing Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986)). In order to
survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must present probative evidence that
supports its complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct.
2505 (1986). The non-moving party's evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. The court determines whether the
evidence requires submission to a jury, or whether one party must prevail as a matter of
law because the issue is so one-sided. Id. at 251-52.
Although reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the opposing
party, see id. at 255, he must present significant probative evidence tending to support
the complaint. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct.
1575 (1968). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
In other words, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's position will be insufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary

judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252.
II. Findings of Fact
Consistent with the above standard of review, the undersigned has drawn all
reasonable factual inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. In support of the facts asserted,
Defendants have filed affidavits as well as related incident reports and medical records.
In his response in opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has filed copies of several
grievances and a handful of additional records. However, none of Plaintiff’s evidence
suggests that any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial.
A central allegation in the complaint is that Plaintiff notified all three Defendants of
his serious medical need (a broken right foot) but that each Defendant prevented Plaintiff

from receiving medical treatment for that injury. Plaintiff also generally alleged that jail
officials denied him an x-ray and that he did not receive any treatment until a month
following his injury, following his transfer to a state institution. On summary judgment,
Defendants’ evidence flatly contradicts those central allegations and Plaintiff has failed to
submit any contrary evidence. Therefore, it is undisputed that: (1) No Defendant
prevented Plaintiff from obtaining treatment for his foot; (2) Plaintiff’s right foot was x-
rayed less than 72 hours after his first complaint of injury; and (3) the x-ray revealed no
acute fracture.
Plaintiff concedes that the first notice of injury that any of the three Defendants

received of his injury was at approximately 12:10 a.m. on January 1, 2020, when
Defendant Grooms was notified of his injury by the jail’s central control. (See Doc. 44 at
4, PageID 530). Responding, Defendant Grooms observed Plaintiff lying on the floor.
(Doc. 41-2, Declaration at ¶¶ 5-6). Defendant asked Plaintiff to remove his sock and
observed scars on Plaintiff’s toes, which Plaintiff advised were from a prior injury. (Id. at
¶ 8). Defendant Grooms did not observe swelling and advised Plaintiff to submit a request
for medical care through the jail’s normal system so that a nurse could evaluate him in
the morning. Defendant Grooms then provided Plaintiff with ice and ibuprofen and
advised him to stay off his foot pending further medical evaluation. (Id. at ¶10-12). When

Plaintiff requested more ibuprofen at 3:00 a.m., Defendant Grooms instructed another
officer to provide it. (Id. at ¶ 13). Defendant Grooms went off duty at 7:00 a.m. on January
1, 2020 and had no further contact with Plaintiff regarding his right foot. (Id.; see also
Docs. 41-2 at 3-4, PageID 492-493).
The next day, around 4:30 p.m., Plaintiff verbally complained to Defendant Wynn
that his toes were injured and that he had not been treated. That verbal complaint was
the first notice that Defendant Wynn was provided of Plaintiff’s foot injury. (Doc. 41-3 at
¶ 5, PageID 494). Defendant Wynn responded by checking in with medical staff, who
stated that an x-ray had been ordered. (Id. at ¶ 7). Defendant Wynn relayed that
information to Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff if he needed ice or ibuprofen. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Plaintiff declined, stating “that ice made his foot hurt worse and ibuprofen causes him to
vomit.” (Id. at ¶9; see also Doc. 44 at 9, PageID 535).
Close in time to his interaction with Defendant Wynn, at 4:32 p.m. on January 2,
Plaintiff filed a grievance with Defendant Carter that similarly complained that he had not

yet been transported to the hospital for his injury. (Doc. 44 at 10, PageID 536). At 11:03
a.m. on January 3, 2020, Captain Carter (who was Wynn’s supervisor) responded that he
had learned of the issue late the previous day, and had ordered “an x-ray of your foot to
be taken before the end of business today.” (Id.) Consistent with that order, Plaintiff was
transported to King’s Daughters Medical Center Urgent Care in the early afternoon of
January 3, 2020. Upon his arrival, he was observed to be in no acute distress. (See Doc.
41-4 at 11, PageID 509).
The examining physician recorded Plaintiff’s reported history of previous broken
toes in his right foot. (Doc. 41-4 at 11, PageID 509). The x-ray confirmed that history.

Specifically, the x-ray revealed “postoperative changes in the foot from probable prior
osteotomies and resections of the middle phalanges of the third and fourth digits and
possible osteotomy of the head of the fifth metatarsal,” as well as arthritis, a moderate
size bunion, and “a small loose body along the medial first metatarsal phalangeal joint.”
(Doc. 31-4 at 13, PageID 511). Notwithstanding the historical evidence, the x-ray showed
“no evidence of acute fracture.” (Id.) Therefore, Plaintiff was sent back to the jail with a
recommended plan to “consider repeat x-rays or bone scan” if pain persisted over time,
and to use “NSAID’s for pain control.” (Doc. 41-4 at 13, PageID 511). Plaintiff’s discharge
instructions included a prescription for Mobic, an NSAID, “as needed for Pain.” (Doc. 41-
4 at 18, PageID 516);
After his return to the jail, Plaintiff was provided crutches pursuant to a nurse’s
directive. (Doc. 41-3 at ¶ 11, PageID 495). He was then transferred to the medical pod
in accordance with jail policy that, due to the danger of crutches being used as a weapon,

inmates using crutches are to be housed in the medical pod. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13). Plaintiff
was unhappy about his transfer to the medical pod and filed grievances concerning that
transfer. However, those grievances do not relate to the “deliberate indifference” claims
presented against the three Defendants herein, insofar as Plaintiff does not complain of
the individual Defendants’ actions with respect to his medical treatment after the lack of
fracture was confirmed through x-ray.
III. Analysis
A. The Deliberate Indifference Standard
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when

construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law. Sigley v. City of Parma Hts., 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2006)
(citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). Upon
initial screening, this Court construed Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging that the three
Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const.
amend. VIII; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). On
further review, it is unclear whether Plaintiff had already been convicted of a crime at the
time of the incident, or whether he was a pretrial detainee while being housed at the jail
between December 31, 2019 and January 3, 2020. That distinction can make a
difference, insofar as a different “deliberate indifference” standard applies to pretrial
detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than the
“deliberate indifference” standard that applies to prisoners who proceed under the Eighth

Amendment.
Whereas the Eighth Amendment requires proof of both a subjective and an
objective component, in Brawner v. Scott County, Tennessee, 14 F.4th 585 (6th Cir.
2021), the Sixth Circuit recently held that a pretrial detainee may prove his or her
deliberate indifference claim by satisfying the objective component alone. Brawner re-
examined precedent in light of Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), in which
the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees may prove an excessive force claim by
satisfying an objective component alone. Brawner concluded that Kingsley should be
extended to “deliberate indifference” claims brought by pretrial detainees. Setting aside

precedent, the appellate court offered this explanation of the new “civil” deliberate
indifference standard now applicable to claims filed by pretrial detainees:
Mere negligence is insufficient. A defendant must have not only acted
deliberately (not accidentally), but also recklessly “in the face of an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should
be known.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (describing, and
rejecting as inapplicable to Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference
claims, the civil standard for recklessness). A pretrial detainee must prove
“more than negligence but less than subjective intent - something akin to
reckless disregard.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35 (“[T]he pretrial
detainee must prove that the defendant-official acted [or failed to act]
intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with
reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial
detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known,
that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.”); Griffith, 975
F.3d at 589 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that a pretrial detainee must prove that the defendant acted “intentionally to
ignore [her] serious medical need or recklessly failed to act with reasonable
care to mitigate the risk that the serious medical need posed to the pretrial
detainee, even though a reasonable official in the defendant's position
would have known, or should have known, that the serious medical need
posed an excessive risk to the pretrial detainee's health or safety”).

Id., 14 F.4th at 596–97. Summing up, Brawner held that in order to show a constitutional
denial of adequate medical care as a pretrial detainee, “Brawner needed to present
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find (1) that she had an objectively serious
medical need; and (2) that Nurse Massengale's action (or lack of action) was intentional
(not accidental) and she either (a) acted intentionally to ignore Brawner's serious medical
need, or (b) recklessly failed to act reasonably to mitigate the risk the serious medical
need posed to Brawner, even though a reasonable official in Nurse Massengale's position
would have known that the serious medical need posed an excessive risk to Brawner's
health or safety.” Id., 14 F.4th at 597.
B. The Qualified Immunity Standard
In the case at hand, all three Defendants assert that they are entitled
to qualified immunity on claims brought against them in their individual capacities.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).
Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. Qualified immunity not only insulates
government officials from individual liability for money damages, but from the burdens
and expenses of litigation and trial. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201, 121 S.Ct.
2151 (2001). The doctrine is intended to balance the following competing interests: “the
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009).
Qualified immunity “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting ‘all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341,
106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986)). See also Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 394 (6th Cir.
2008). Qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the official's error was a mistake
of law or a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and
fact. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. “To overcome a defendant's assertion
of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show both (1) that the defendant violated a
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the
violation.” Downard for Estate of Downard v. Martin, 968 F.3d 594, 599-600 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32).

C. Application of Law to Undisputed Facts
Each Defendant’s “liability must be assessed individually based on his own
actions." Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir.2010). To prove his claim,
Plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that each
Defendant had notice of his medical need and took some action that “was intentional (not
accidental)” and “either (a) acted intentionally to ignore [the] serious medical need, or (b)
recklessly failed to act reasonably to mitigate the risk the serious medical need posed to
[Plaintiff], even though a reasonable official… would have known that the serious medical
need posed an excessive risk to [Plaintiff's] health or safety.” Brawner, 14 F.4th at 597.
On the record presented, the evidence unequivocally demonstrates that the
individuals’ actions were reasonable, while Plaintiff has utterly failed to present evidence
that could overcome their assertions of qualified immunity. Even if a reviewing court were
to decide that issue differently, any such right was not clearly established at the time of
the alleged violation. This is true even if this Court considers the new deliberate

indifference standard applicable in the Sixth Circuit under the Due Process Clause. In
short, no genuine issues of material fact remain and Defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law even if the lower standard applies.
Defendant Grooms
Defendant Grooms was the first to learn of Plaintiff’s injury on January 1.
Defendant Grooms took reasonable action to assess the injury by asking Plaintiff to
remove his sock, visually examining the foot, and questioning Plaintiff about the visible
scars on his toes. Defendant Grooms did not ignore the injury, but acted reasonably in
assessing the injury as not requiring more immediate medical attention than the ice and

ibuprofen that he provided to Plaintiff, given the absence of any visible swelling at that
time. He counseled Plaintiff to stay off of his foot as much as possible and to request a
medical appointment later that same day, which Plaintiff did. It is undisputed that Grooms
had no further part in the care of Plaintiff’s foot injury. Objectively, Grooms acted
reasonably and his conduct absolves him from any liability.
Defendant Wynn
On January 2, Plaintiff notified Defendant Wynn of his injury and of his
dissatisfaction with the response to his request for medical attention. Like Grooms, Wynn
did not deny care or ignore Plaintiff’s complaint. Instead, he responded reasonably by
inquiring about the status of Plaintiff’s medical request and writing up two incident reports.
He also offered Plaintiff ice and ibuprofen, which Plaintiff refused. Medical staff informed
Wynn that Plaintiff was scheduled to receive an x-ray. Defendant Wynn reasonably relied
upon that information, which he promptly relayed to Plaintiff. "[N]onmedical jail personnel
are entitled to reasonably rely on the assessments made by the medical staff" and do not

expose themselves to claims of deliberate indifference if they do. Winkler v. Madison
Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 895 (6th Cir. 2018); McGaw v. Sevier Cnty., Tenn., 715 Fed. Appx.
495, 498-99 (6th Cir. 2017) (when “an officer responds to a substantial risk of serious
harm by asking for and following the advice of a professional the officer believes to be
capable of assessing and addressing that risk, then the officer commits no act of
deliberate indifference in adhering to that advice”).
Defendant Carter
Defendant Carter learned of Plaintiff’s request for an x-ray around the same time
frame as Wynn, at approximately 4:30 p.m. on January 2, through the submission of

Plaintiff’s written grievance. Defendant Carter responded to the grievance within 24
hours, directing medical staff to ensure that Plaintiff was transported for an x-ray on
January 3. Plaintiff was in fact transported to urgent care for an x-ray at approximately
1:30 p.m. on January 3. Defendant Carter’s actions also were objectively reasonable and
do not support a constitutional claim.
The Lack of Serious Medical Need and/or Injury
Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff had no objectively serious medical
need for treatment following the negative x-ray results and his return from urgent care.
While case law appears to support Defendants’ position, it is unnecessary to reach that
issue given that none of the three Defendants is alleged to have taken any action or
inaction relating to the medical treatment for Plaintiff’s injury following his transfer to the
medical pod with crutches.
As stated, the only “deliberate indifference” alleged against Defendants appears
to be related to Plaintiff’s initial allegations that he was denied any treatment at all and

was denied an x-ray of his “broken” foot for more than a month - allegations that have
been disproven by the record presented. Plaintiff’s foot was not broken, and he alleges
no harm that resulted from any brief “delay” in obtaining the x-ray. In any event, no clearly
established case law suggests that the 2-3 day delay between notice of a potential
fracture (12:10 a.m. on January 1), and transport for an x-ray at a nearby urgent care
facility (approximately 1:30 p.m. on January 3) is so objectively “unreasonable” that it
could constitute a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Loukas v. Gundy, 70 Fed. Appx. 245
(6th Cir. 2003) (Prison physician's failure to diagnosis inmate's broken ankle for 24 days
did not amount to deliberate indifference to inmate's serious medical needs under the

Eighth Amendment, even though inmate suffered some discomfort before proper
diagnosis was made, where break was not serious, and inmate did not suffer any
detrimental effect from delay).
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT: Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Doc. 41) be GRANTED on all claims asserted.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

THOMAS R. PRINCE, Case No. 1:20-cv-652

Plaintiff, Cole, J.
Bowman, M.J.

v.

SCIOTO COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10380137. Public record. Not legal advice.