# Miller v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · April 8, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10379936

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 8, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ROSANNA L. MILLER, :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:21-cv-03973
:
v. : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, et :
al., : Magistrate Judge Vascura
Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Ohio Civil Rights Commission’s (the
“Commission”), Melody Smith’s (collectively, the “Commission Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 14); and Orthopedic One’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22). For the
reasons set forth more fully below, this Court GRANTS the Commission Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 14), and Orthopedic One’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 22).
I. BACKGROUND
The Court incorporates by reference the facts and procedural background set forth in its
previous Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 29;
Opinion & Order). The relevant procedural history follows. After this action was removed to
federal court, Plaintiff proceeding pro se filed her Complaint on July 20, 2021. (ECF Nos. 1, 7).
There, Plaintiff asserts several legal theories, including challenges to Defendants’ conduct via1 42
U.S.C. §§ 12182, 12203 and existing state law analogues, Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(G); 42
U.S.C. § 12102(A)–(C), OAC 4112-5-02(H), Ohio Revised Code 4112.01(A)(13), and 28 CFR §

1 Plaintiff cites to various sections of the relevant laws and regulations, often to sections that do not provide for a
private right of action. For example, Plaintiff liberally cites the definition section of 28 C.F.R. Part 36. This Opinion
will attempt to translate her comprehensive pleading approach.
35.108 et. seq.; federal informed consent regulations under 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; Ohio’s
promulgation of emergency mask orders under Revised Code § 119.03(G); and a relief provision
under 28 C.F.R. § 36.504.
On July 27, 2021, Orthopedic One filed its Answer. (ECF No. 9). Subsequently, the
Commission Defendants timely filed its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), and Orthopedic One

timely filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22). After retaining counsel, Plaintiff’s
attorney filed his Notice of Appearance on February 05, 2022. (ECF No. 31). This Court then
granted counsel additional time to respond to the previously filed Motion to Dismiss and Motion
for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 41).
Plaintiff timely filed her Response in Opposition to both outstanding Motions. (ECF Nos.
44, 47). Both Defendants timely filed their Replies. (ECF Nos. 46, 49). Defendants’ Motions are
now ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss based on a court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction in the federal courts is limited: it may

be based on a federal question, which is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States,” or on diversity of citizenship where the sum in controversy exceeds $75,000.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction when
it is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1). Rogers v. Stratton Indus., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986).
Where a motion to dismiss presents alternative arguments, such as improper venue or failure to
state a claim, the court must address subject matter jurisdiction first. City of Heath v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971, 975 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (citing Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit
Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint for a
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level and to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). And although the court “must accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the complaint as true,” the court “need not accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted).
Finally, “[t]he defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
relief.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Raymond v. Avectus Healthcare
Sols., LLC, 859 F.3d 381, 383 (6th Cir. 2017); Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331 (6th

Cir. 2019).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In evaluating such a motion, the evidence must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must
be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Sierra Brokerage
Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Tysinger v. Police Dep't of City of Zanesville,
463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006)). This Court then asks “whether ‘the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.’” Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if
the dispute is about a material fact that is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Evidence that is
“merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” however, is not enough to defeat summary

judgment. Id. at 249–50.
On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden rests upon the movant to present the
Court with law and argument in support of its motion as well as identifying the relevant portions
of “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). If this initial
burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing
that there remains a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss

The Commission moves to Dismiss on three bases under Rule 12(b): lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under (1); failure to state a claim under (6); and improper service of process under (5).
(ECF No. 14). The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
1. 12(b)(1)
§ 1983
First, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 USC § 1983, the Commission
Defendants argue they are either: (1) excluded by definition as to those a Plaintiff can assert a
§1983 suit against; or (2) otherwise immune from suit. The Commission construes Plaintiff’s
Complaint as potentially asserting a § 1983 claim when she states that “[r]espondents are
individually and collectively … engaged in and continue to be engaged in, a pattern and practice
of deliberately … retaliatory/coercive acts and conduct in violation of the Petitioner’s Federal
rights.” (Id. at 4) (citing ECF No. 7 at 7). Assuming that Plaintiff intended to assert a claim on
this basis, the Commission Defendants correctly states that they cannot be sued via this vehicle.
Plaintiff does not respond directly to the Commission Defendants’ arguments regarding the

applicability of §1983. Instead, she lodges a general critique that the Commission Defendants’
motion was “founded on the assumption that the claims arose out of § 1983, granting the motion
to dismiss on these grounds would be inappropriate under the applicable ADA law.” (Id.). These
non-responsive assertions, however, do little to disturb the Commission Defendants’ arguments.
The Commission Defendants correctly articulate the law: “neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“[t]he need for this court to undertake a broad sovereign immunity analysis with respect to the §
1983 claims is obviated by the fact that the defendants in their official capacities are not recognized

as “persons” under § 1983.”). Generally, absent either a waiver from the state or Congress’s
abrogation of the state’s immunity pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, such suits
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will, 491 U.S. at 66. (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of
Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472–473 (1987) (plurality opinion)). But
“[e]ven if [Ohio’s] sovereign immunity has been properly waived or abrogated for the purposes of
the federal statute the defendants allegedly violated, a § 1983 claim against the defendants in their
official capacities cannot proceed because, by definition, those officials are not persons under the
terms of § 1983.” Gean, 330 F.3d at 767 (6th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, this Court need not address
the Defendants’ arguments as to immunity because to the extent Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 against
the Commission Defendants, it fails as a matter of law. The Commission Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss on this claim is GRANTED.
Judicial Review of Commission’s Investigation
The Commission Defendants also argue that to the extent Plaintiff seeks judicial review of
its “no probable cause” decision, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not respond to this

argument.
The Commission Defendants argument is well taken. Gilbert v. Correction Reception Ctr.,
No. 2:07-CV-624, 2008 WL 4347231 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2008) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff
challenges the OCRC's “no probable cause” determination and the adequacy of the investigation
leading up to it, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider his claim.”). Under Ohio Revised Code
§ 4112.06 “Judicial Review,” the statute confers exclusive jurisdiction upon Ohio courts.
Specifically, section (A) provides:
Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final
order of the commission, including a refusal to issue a complaint,
may obtain judicial review thereof, and the commission may obtain
an order of court for the enforcement of its final orders, in a
proceeding as provided in this section. Such proceeding shall be
brought in the common pleas court of the state within any county
wherein the unlawful discriminatory practice which is the subject of
the commission's order was committed or wherein any respondent
required in the order to cease and desist from an unlawful
discriminatory practice or to take affirmative action resides or
transacts business.

Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.06(A) (emphasis added). Section (F) follows, stating “[t]he jurisdiction
of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and order shall be final subject to appellate review.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.06 (F). Federal courts in this state have held that the statutory language
above, when read together, does not allow this Court to hear such challenges. (“[F]ederal district
courts have neither original jurisdiction nor removal jurisdiction over the review proceedings.”)
Shoemake v. Mansfield City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 61 F. Supp. 3d 704 (N.D. Ohio 2014); Walker
v. Cognis Oleo Chemical, LLC, 2008 WL 2705190 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2008); Hayner v. City of
Washington Court House, 2007 WL 38136 at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2007); see also Ingram v.
OCRC, 67 Ohio App.3d 648, 588 N.E.2d 162, 163 (1990); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Ingram,
69 Ohio St.3d 89, 630 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1994).

Accordingly, the Commission Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this basis is GRANTED.
2. 12(b)(6)
Second, the Commission Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state any claim against them,
let alone one under Title II of the ADA and state analogues. Even putting aside the series of
confusing citations to the definition section of Title II as well as similar state statutes and
regulations, the Commission Defendants maintain that Plaintiff does not notify them of the
improper conduct in which they allegedly engaged. Moreover, to the extend she challenges their
internal investigation process, this is not cognizable under the statutes and regulations Plaintiff
cites.

Rather than meet Defendants’ argument with any specificity, Plaintiff asserts that her
Complaint contained sufficient factual allegations to entitle her to relief. (ECF No. 44 at 3).
Additionally, she concludes by adding the conclusory declaration that “allowing ‘telehealth
services’ upon Plaintiff whose disability is protected under the ADA [is] in violation of Title II.”
(Id.).
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to review the statutes and regulations cited by Plaintiff
in her Complaint. In Count 1, she cites various sections of federal and state statues and regulations,
including 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1)–(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35.108; Ohio Revised Code § 4112.01(A)(13);
and Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-05-02(H). Each of these citations, as the Commission
Defendants assert, are to the definition section of each statute or regulation, providing the relevant
definition of “disability.” For example, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) provides:

(1) Disability. The term “disability” means, with respect to an
individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).
42 U.S.C. § 12102.
To state a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must show:
“(1) that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that she was excluded from participation
in a public entity’s services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and
(3) that such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of her disability.” Bedford v. Michigan,
722 F. App'x 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th
Cir. 2015)).
Assuming Plaintiff is able to meet the first element above, her Title II claim fails on the
second and third elements. She does not claim she was excluded or discriminated against on the
basis of her disability. Simply put, she asserts no facts that even suggest that she was treated
differently than any other complainant that interacts with the Commission. For this reason alone,
her claim fails. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to assert that she has been “excluded from participation
… or was otherwise discriminated against” by the Commission. Rather, what Plaintiff appears to
characterize as discriminatory conduct is instead her taking issue with the investigatory process of
the Commission and its decision not to take any action against her healthcare providers.
For example, she claims that because she “clearly qualifies for a disability,” that the
Commission should have simply taken her word for it. When the Commission requested Plaintiff’s
health information to discern, in part, whether she was discriminated against on the basis of her
disability, Plaintiff rejected this request. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that she “would have gladly
agreed to a physical endurance test.” It is unclear whether Plaintiff communicated this alternative
to the Commission.
In any event, however, how the Commission gathers evidence, makes its determinations,
and ultimately decides whether to pursue legal action is a matter of Ohio law. Plaintiff’s

disagreement with these underlying processes or the Commission’s eventual decision not to sue
her healthcare providers cannot, without more, sustain a discrimination charge. Indeed, as the
Commission Defendants have asserted, there is an existing device for challenging such decisions:
seeking judicial review in Ohio’s state courts.
The federal and state law claims of discrimination are DISMISSED and Plaintiff’s
challenge of the Commission’s decision is REMANDED to the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas.
3. 12(b)(5)
Finally, the Commission Defendants move to Dismiss under 12(b)(5) for improper service

of process. Because this Court GRANTS the Commission’s Motion to Dismiss on an independent
basis, there is no need for this Court to consider its 12(b)(5) argument.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Orthopedic One moves this Court for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims, including
her ADA claims; alleged violations of federal informed consent regulations; challenge of the state
of Ohio’s mask orders; and action under 28 C.F.R. § 36.504. In her Response in Opposition,
Plaintiff responds to only one claim: her reasonable modification theory under the ADA.
There, Plaintiff devotes a significant amount of her briefing toward demonstrating she is
disabled under the ADA and that Orthopedic One is an entity covered by Title III of the ADA.
Additionally, Plaintiff demonstrates that the test the Court should employ from Access Ctr. for
Indep. Living v. WP Glimcher, Inc. is undisputed by the parties. See No. 3:15-CV-444, 2018 WL
2763453, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2018). Instead, Plaintiff disputes whether “telehealth visits”
offered by Orthopedic One are a reasonable accommodation under the test articulated in WP
Glimcher, Inc. 2018 WL 2763453, at *4.

Although it is well-settled “that a motion for summary judgment may be filed prior to
discovery,” the thrust of Rule 56(b) is to ensure that “the non-moving party has had sufficient time
to engage in discovery.” Jefferson v. Chattanooga Pub. Co., 375 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(b) and White's Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229, 232
(6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)). As identified by the Sixth Circuit, this value is reflected in
Rule 56(d): “[t]he purpose behind Rule 56(d) is to ensure that plaintiffs receive ‘a full opportunity
to conduct discovery’ to be able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment.’” Doe v.
City of Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 490 (6th Cir. 2019). Yet, it is the non-moving party’s burden to
invoke the protection of this rule. As the Sixth Circuit held in Jefferson v. Chattanooga Pub. Co.:

Furthermore, [non-movant] never indicated, as Rule 56[] requires,
that he did not have a sufficient opportunity for discovery. Rule 56[]
provides that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is
allowed to claim an inability to present facts essential to justify its
opposition to summary judgment, and in certain cases the district
court may postpone the motion and permit further discovery. It is up
to the party opposing the motion to take advantage of Rule 56[],
however, and to state why more discovery is needed.

375 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2004) (Rule 56(f) was renumbered as Rule 56(d) as a part of the 2010
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
Here, Plaintiff not only fails to invoke the protection of 56(d), she instead, affirmatively
argues against Orthopedic One’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the merits. Although this
Court is cognizant of special considerations taken for pro se litigants, Plaintiff has been represented
since the beginning of February in the matter. More importantly, it was Plaintiff’s counsel, not
Plaintiff that filed the Response in Opposition to Orthopedic One’s Motions for Summary
Judgment. As such, Orthopedic One’s Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for review.
To support its Motion, Orthopedic One contends that because Plaintiff failed to answer

Orthopedic One’s properly served Request for Admissions, this Court must treat those facts as
admitted. Rather than argue against this result, Plaintiff concedes that she already admitted these
facts. (See ECF No. 43 at 8) (citing ECF No. 22 at 3–6 and ECF No. 23-1 at 1–2) (“Since Plaintiff
admitted to these facts, and Orthopedic One acknowledged these facts as admitted by Plaintiff,
there is no disputing that Plaintiff was diagnosed and treated at Orthopedic One for Plaintiff’s
walking disability.”). Plaintiff then criticizes an apparent inconsistency between the denial of a
factual allegation in Orthopedic One’s Answer and the facts as presented in the Request for
Admissions: namely, whether Plaintiff was denied in-person medical treatment on April 24, 2020.
The purported inconsistency appears to be one of merely semantics.

In its Answer, Orthopedic One denies that it refused medical treatment to Plaintiff on the
day in question “for want of knowledge.” Orthopedic One then notes in its Motion for Summary
Judgment that it offered Plaintiff in-person medical treatment, but only if she agreed to wear a
mask. This discrepancy is entirely resolved by Orthopedic One’s Reply. There, Orthopedic One
explains it lacked knowledge of Plaintiff’s allegation because Plaintiff refers to “Resp III” as the
alleged actor in paragraph 14 of the Complaint—where Plaintiff asserts that she was denied
medical treatment—but fails to define that term. This, however, appears to be a typo by Plaintiff
as paragraph 6 of the Complaint defines Orthopedic One, among others, as “Resp II” when it likely
should have read “Resp III.” Thus, Orthopedic One’s Answer and then seemingly contradictory
Request for Admission discussing Plaintiff’s denial of service when she refused to wear a mask is
easily reconciled. For purposes of this motion, it is evident the parties do not dispute this fact.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s assertion that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the
accommodation offered by Orthopedic One is irrelevant. As is undisputed by the parties, Plaintiff
is required to show that her requested accommodation of “no mask” was “(1) reasonable; [and] (2)

necessary” under Access Ctr. for Indep. Living v. WP Glimcher, Inc. 2018 WL 2763453, at *4.
As this Court found in its Order and Opinion granting Defendants Mount Carmel’s and
Cornerstone’s Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff failed to meet this burden.2 Accordingly, absent a
genuine dispute of material fact and Plaintiff’s inability to state a claim, Orthopedic One’s Motion
for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Reasonable Modification theory under the ADA is
GRANTED.
Notably, this is the only argument Plaintiff chose to oppose in her Response. As such,
Orthopedic One is entitled to Summary Judgment on any remaining claims on two bases: (1)
waiver; and (2) because she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, “[a]

plaintiff's failure to address a claim in response to a motion for summary judgment on that claim
‘demonstrates abandonment and waiver of the claim.’” Hua v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 452 F.
Supp. 3d 698, 704 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc., 545 F. App'x 368,
372 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A] plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to
address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.”); Clark v. City of Dublin, Ohio, 178 F.
App'x 522, 525 (6th Cir. 2006) (same)); Ramirez v. Bolster & Jeffries Health Care Grp., LLC, 277
F. Supp. 3d 889, 907 (W.D. Ky. 2017); Mullenix v. Eastman Chem. Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 695, 710
(E.D. Tenn. 2017)). While a Court may not “grant summary judgment simply because the

2 Plaintiff erroneously attempts to apply this test to the alternative offered by Orthopedic One, an argument that
would shift the burden to Orthopedic One to demonstrate that its alternative was reasonable.
nonmovant has not responded,” the Court may grant such a motion when the Court “carefully
examine[s] [that motion] to ensure that the moving party has discharged its burden of showing an
absence of disputed material facts.” Mullenix, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 710. Here, the only facts relied
upon by Orthopedic One are expressly conceded by Plaintiff. Thus, Summary Judgment is
appropriate on these abandoned claims.

Next, Plaintiff’s claims fail on the merits. Though Orthopedic One moves for Summary
Judgment rather than a Motion to Dismiss like the other Resp III Defendants, the arguments are
similar. In Jefferson v. Chattanooga Pub. Co., the Sixth Circuit considered a similar scenario. 375
F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2004). There, Plaintiff opposed a similarly early Motion for Summary
Judgement: it too was within six months of the movant’s Answer and before discovery.3 Id. at
463. The Court considered Plaintiff’s three arguments in opposition. Id. Plaintiff argues initially
that Defendant’s motion “merely stated that ‘[Plaintiff] failed to state a claim ... and ... failed to
allege facts on which relief may be granted.’” Id. Then, Plaintiff asserted that “the motion lacked
documentary support and thus did not satisfy the movant's burden under Rule 56(c).” Id. And

finally, “the district court should have converted the motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because it
was filed prior to discovery.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit responded to the first two arguments by “reject[ing] [them] summarily.”
The Court stated, “to meet its burden as the moving party in a motion for summary judgment,
[Defendant] needed only to state that there is an absence of facts or evidence to support [Plaintiff’s]
claims.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) and Elkins v. Richardson–
Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir. 1993)). Because the Court found that Defendant’s

3 Here, Orthopedic One served a Request for Admissions but otherwise the party’s have not engaged in any other
Discovery.
motion for summary judgment “states that [Plaintiff] failed to allege facts on which relief may be
granted[, Defendant] satisfied its burden.” Id.
Orthopedic One’s motion states “Plaintiff did not allege facts in her Complaint that
demonstrate Orthopedic One failed to make a reasonable accommodation.” (ECF No. 22 at 2).
Orthopedic One’s Motion for Summary Judgment arguments do not materially differ from Mount

Carmel’s and Cornerstone’s Motions to Dismiss. Absent the benefit of opposition briefing by
Plaintiff to these remaining claims, this Court adopts its conclusions from its recent Order and
Opinion dismissing each of Plaintiff’s claims against the other healthcare providers. (See Opinion
and Order, ECF No. 53).4 As the Sixth Circuit recognized in Jefferson v. Chattanooga Pub. Co.,
if a Plaintiff cannot state a claim, that claim cannot survive summary judgment. See 375 F.3d 461
(6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Orthopedic One’s Motion for Summary Judgment is also
GRANTED for all remaining claims: Retaliation under the ADA; alleged informed consent
violations; the illegality of the State of Ohio’s pandemic-era Mask Executive Orders; and 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.504.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS the Commission Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 14), and GRANTS Orthopedic One’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF
No. 22). To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for judicial review of the Commission’s “no

4 This Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against both Mount Carmel and Cornerstone Therapy concerning
(1) alleged violations of informed consent laws because, among other things, she admits she never wore a mask; (2)
any action under 28 C.F.R. § 36.504 because that regulation does not provide a private right of action; and (3)
Plaintiff’s challenge of Ohio’s Executive Orders regarding mask-mandates because these Defendants are not the state.
Finally, although it does not appear that Plaintiff was asserting a Retaliation claim under the ADA against Orthopedic
One, to the extent she does, it fails because she does not allege a causal connection.
probable cause” decision, that claim is REMANDED to the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

ALGENON L. MARB
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: April 8, 2022

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10379936. Public record. Not legal advice.