# Thompson v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · January 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10379376

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** January 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10379376

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying harmless error analysis where ALJ did not misapply a legal principle but “simply erred in a factual finding”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
PRISCILLA T.,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:19-cv-644
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
v. Magistrate Judge Bowman
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s June 22, 2020,
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 11), which recommends that this Court
affirm the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) decision and close this
case. For the reasons more fully set forth below, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s
Objection (Doc. 12), ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 11) , and
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND

This case arose as a result of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
denying Plaintiff certain social security disability benefits. On February 18, 2016,
Plaintiff applied for benefits, claiming she was disabled due to a variety of conditions
including diabetes, sleep apnea, learning disabilities, anxiety, diverticulitis,
hysterectomy, high cholesterol, a navel hernia, and arthritis. (See First Certified
Admin. R. (“R.”), Doc. 4, #74–75). On June 15, 2016, the SSA denied Plaintiff’s
application. (See id. at #32). On reconsideration, the SSA again denied the claim on
August 17, 2016. (Id.).
Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, an SSA Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”)

held a hearing on April 11, 2018. (Id.). The ALJ issued a decision denying benefits on
August 23, 2018. (Id. at #29). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform
“medium work” (as defined by SSA regulations), albeit with a restriction to “simple
and complex tasks in a work environment free of fast production rate or pace work,”
and therefore was not disabled. (Id. at #37). On July 15, 2019, the Appeals Council of
the SSA declined to review the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at #18).

On August 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint asking this Court to reverse the
ALJ’s decision. (See Doc. 1). The Court assigned the matter to a Magistrate Judge
under Southern District of Ohio Civil Rule 72.2. See also Cincinnati Gen. Order No.
14-01 (referring appeals from decisions of the Commissioner of Social Security
regarding Social Security benefits to Magistrate Judges).
On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Statement of Specific Errors (Doc. 6).
Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s decision on three bases.

First, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ gave too little weight to evidence offered
by sources who had examined her, and too much weight to evidence offered by sources
who had not. (Id. at #528). Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ should have
given more weight to a Functional Capacities Evaluation (the “FCE”) by a physical
therapist. (Id. at #526). Plaintiff likewise argued that the ALJ failed to give sufficient
weight to an examination by Dr. Gary Ray which found Plaintiff capable of only light
work. (Id. at #529). On the other hand, Plaintiff maintained that the ALJ gave too
much weight to the opinions of state agency doctors who did not examine Plaintiff.
(Id. at #528).

Second, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective
reports of pain and fatigue. Plaintiff argued that the ALJ misunderstood the normal
glycated hemoglobin (“A1C”) level and therefore misinterpreted Plaintiff’s own A1C
level as undermining the credibility of her subjective complaints. (Id. at #531).
Plaintiff also argued that the ALJ improperly relied on the fact that Plaintiff does not
take insulin to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Id.). And Plaintiff objected

to the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s ability to carry out daily activities as a basis to
discount some of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Id. at #531–32).
Third, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred in crediting a vocational expert’s
testimony that jobs in the medium work category could allow Plaintiff to sit for as
much as two hours of an eight-hour day. (Id. at #533). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ
also asked the expert improper hypothetical questions based on the inapposite factual
determination that Plaintiff could do medium work. (Id. at #533–34).

On June 22, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R (Doc. 11),
recommending that this Court close Plaintiff’s case. On July 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a
timely Objection (Doc. 12). On July 9, 2020, Plaintiff further filed a Notice of Filing
Additional Authority (“Notice,” Doc. 13), bringing to the attention of this Court an
arguably pertinent case that the Sixth Circuit had decided on the previous day, as
discussed in more detail below. The Commissioner did not respond to Plaintiff’s
Objection (Doc. 12). The matter is now before this Court.

LEGAL STANDARD
If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the
Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
But that is not the only relevant standard of review here. In this case, the
Magistrate Judge was reviewing a decision by an ALJ employed by the SSA. Judicial
review of such decisions is quite constrained. In particular, courts are “limited to
determining whether the Commissioner’s decision ‘is supported by substantial
evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486

F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive[.]”). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ealy, 594 F.3d
at 512. So long as substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s conclusion, the
Court should affirm, even if substantial evidence in the record would also support a

different conclusion. Id.
However, even if supported by substantial evidence, a decision should not be
affirmed if “the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices
a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” Rabbers v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). Putting all that together, this Court’s
job is to review de novo, on those issues as to which the Plaintiff objects, whether the
Magistrate Judge was correct in determining that the ALJ’s decision applied the
correct legal standards (including the SSA’s own regulations) and was supported by
substantial evidence.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
For purposes of Social Security disability benefits, a disability is defined in
relevant part as “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which … has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). By regulation, the SSA has developed a five-step analysis to determine

whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).1 As
relevant here, to be entitled to benefits, a claimant may not be gainfully employed,
and must have a severe, medically determinable physical or mental impairment. See
id. The SSA considers some impairments, listed in a regulatory appendix, to be so
severe that they automatically entitle a claimant to benefits. See id. But if a

1 The first of these regulatory sections applies to applications for disability insurance benefits,
the second to applications for Supplemental Security Income disability benefits. Compare 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(2), with 416.920(a)(2). Their requirements are identical in all respects
relevant here.
claimant’s impairment, or its equivalent, does not appear on the SSA’s list, then the
SSA must consider whether the claimant can work, either by continuing to do the
kind of work the claimant has done in the past (if any), or by making an adjustment

to a new kind of work. See id. If so, the claimant is not disabled. See id.
Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus, obesity, mood
disorder, and anxiety disorder were all “severe impairments.” (R., Doc. 4, #35).
However, the ALJ further determined that none of these impairments were of
comparable severity to an impairment listed in the applicable regulatory appendix.
(See id. at #35–37). The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff had the capacity to make

an adjustment to performing “medium work” as defined by another pair of SSA
regulations. (See id. at #37). According to the relevant regulations, “[m]edium work
involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567 and 416.967.
The issue of whether Plaintiff can adjust to performing medium work, as
opposed to “light” or “sedentary” work, is important to the outcome of this case. If
Plaintiff can make an adjustment to medium work, she is not disabled. On the other

hand, if she can only perform “light” or “sedentary” work, then Plaintiff would be
entitled to a presumption of disability because of her age and education. See 20
C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Grid Rule 202.06. Here, the ALJ’s determination
that Plaintiff can make an adjustment to performing medium work with some
modifications also formed the basis for his determination that jobs Plaintiff can
perform exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R., Doc. 4, #42).
Although Plaintiff attacks the ALJ’s pertinent determinations on numerous
grounds, the Court considers her objections in three categories. First, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in failing to either afford controlling weight to

the results of the FCE requested by Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Samaan, or
give good reasons for declining to do so. (Obj., Doc. 12, #595–96; Notice of Filing
Additional Authority (“Notice”), Doc. 13, #603). Second, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff can perform medium work is not supported by
substantial evidence. (See Obj., Doc. 12, #597–600). Third, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ’s conclusion that jobs Plaintiff can perform exist in significant numbers in the

national economy also is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at #600–01).
A. The ALJ Properly Declined To Give Controlling Weight To The FCE
Because Dr. Samaan Did Not Co-Sign Or Otherwise Agree With It.
When a medical opinion comes from a treating physician, an ALJ of the SSA
must give that opinion “controlling weight” if it is well-supported by medically
acceptable techniques and is consistent with other substantial evidence in the record.
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). If an ALJ
determines that the opinion of a treating physician should receive less than
controlling weight, the ALJ must give “good reasons” for doing so. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2). Under the applicable version of the relevant SSA regulations, a

treating physician is “your own physician … who has, or has had, an ongoing
treatment relationship with you.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902 (June 13, 2011). A
treating physician sees the claimant “with a frequency consistent with accepted
medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for [the
claimant’s] medical condition(s).” Id.
Plaintiff faults the ALJ and Magistrate Judge for failing to give controlling

weight to the FCE requested by Plaintiff’s physician, Dr. Samaan. (Obj., Doc. 12,
#594). A week after Plaintiff’s Objection, the Sixth Circuit decided Hargett v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 964 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2020), holding that a
treating physician may adopt as his own the opinion of a non-treating source, such as
the FCE provided by the physical therapist here, by co-signing it, thereby requiring
the ALJ to treat the opinion as though the treating physician had issued it. Plaintiff

immediately brought Hargett to this Court’s attention, arguing that the FCE at issue
here, like the one in Hargett, is therefore both entitled to controlling weight and
subject to the requirement to give good reasons for affording it anything less than
that. (See Notice, Doc. 13, #602–03).
But Plaintiff skips over the dispositive difference between the FCE in Hargett
and the one at issue in the instant case: here, unlike in Hargett, Dr. Samaan did not
co-sign the FCE. See Hargett, 964 F.3d at 549 (treating physician “reviewed the FCE

and provided his signature in a designated spot”). That matters because the Sixth
Circuit in Hargett formulated the issue before it as “whether [the treating physician’s]
signature on the FCE … makes the FCE a treating-source opinion ….” Id. at 553
(emphasis added). Noting that district courts had reached “mixed conclusions” as to
that issue, with some also requiring that the co-signed opinion come from another
provider from “the same treatment team or practice,” the Sixth Circuit instead
“decline[d] to adopt a strict rule that a treating source who co-signs an opinion by a
non-treating source must be part of the same team or practice as the non-treating
source in order for the opinion to be considered an opinion of the treating source.” Id.

(emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit based its conclusion on the principle that “a
doctor’s cosignature indicates at a minimum that the doctor agrees with the other
source’s opinion.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Because “a treating physician may adopt or ratify the opinion of a non-
treating source by providing a signature,” there was no reason to limit the
applicability of the treating-physician rules to co-signed opinions given by other

providers in the same team or practice. Id. (emphasis added). And specifically, in the
case before it, “given that [the physician] was [the claimant’s] treating physician and
signed off on the results of the FCE,” the Sixth Circuit “conclude[d] that the ALJ
should have considered the FCE as a treating-source opinion.” Id. (emphasis added).
Recognizing the rationale of Hargett, as well as its limitation to situations
where the treating physician signed or otherwise adopted the opinion of the non-
treating source in question, at least one court in this circuit has already declined to

regard a non-treating source’s opinion as that of the treating physician where the
treating physician did not co-sign the opinion. See Riechman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
Case No. 1:20-cv-494, 2021 WL 3856014, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2021) (“Although
[the treating physician] referred plaintiff for a FCE, there is no indication, and
plaintiff has not presented evidence in the record, that any of plaintiff’s ‘treating’
physicians’ signatures … appear on the FCE form.”) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Dr. Samaan’s signature does not appear on the signature page of the
FCE in question. (See R., Doc. 4, #475). Instead, the space for “Physician’s Signature”
is blank. (See id.). And Plaintiff does not point this Court to anything else in the

record that indicates that Dr. Samaan otherwise adopted, approved, or even reviewed
the results of the FCE. Instead, Plaintiff nakedly asserts that “Dr. Samaan did not
disagree with the findings ….” (Notice, Doc. 13, #602). But this claim lacks either
factual or legal support. Plaintiff cites nothing in the record that establishes Dr.
Samaan’s supposed lack of disagreement with the FCE findings beyond the page of
the FCE itself where Dr. Samaan’s signature fails to appear. (See id.). It would be

strange, to say the least, for this Court to infer Dr. Samaan’s lack of disagreement
with the FCE’s findings from the absence of his signature on the page of the FCE that
provided space for him to sign.
As a legal matter, too, Plaintiff’s did-not-disagree argument gets things
backwards. Under Hargett, a treating physician’s signature justifies treating the
relevant opinion as if it came from the treating physician because it “indicates at a
minimum that the doctor agrees with the other source’s opinion.” 964 F.3d at 553

(emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit thus framed the issue as whether the treating
physician affirmatively “agrees” (and not merely fails, for whatever reason, to
disagree) with the medical opinion in question. So even if there were any support in
the record for Plaintiff’s factual assertion that Dr. Samaan “did not disagree” with
the FCE’s findings, which there is not, that alone would not be enough to invoke the
rule of Hargett and treat the FCE’s opinions as Dr. Samaan’s own. For example, if
Dr. Samaan failed to disagree with the FCE’s findings because he never reviewed
those findings at all, that would not entitle the FCE to controlling weight, because,
although arguably not disagreeing, Dr. Samaan would also have failed to agree with

the opinions expressed in the FCE. Instead, Plaintiff would at least have to show that
Dr. Samaan agreed with the FCE’s findings before they would be entitled to the
treatment afforded the opinions of the treating physician.2
True, Dr. Samaan referred Plaintiff for the FCE at issue in this case, just like
the treating physician referred the Hargett claimant for that claimant’s FCE. See 964
F.3d at 553. But, as discussed above, the Sixth Circuit in Hargett rested its conclusion

about the FCE’s status on the treating physician’s signature, not on his mere referral
of the claimant. See id. And that makes some sense. After all, the mere fact that a
treating physician refers a patient to another source does not mean that the treating
physician “agrees” with the conclusions ultimately reached by that non-treating
source, which, by definition, postdate the referral. See id. Accordingly, this Court
declines to stretch Hargett to cover situations such as this one where the treating
physician refers the claimant to a non-treating source, but where there is neither a

signature from the treating physician nor any other indication in the record that the
treating physician subsequently agreed with the conclusions reached by the non-
treating source. Cf. Riechman, 2021 WL 3856014, at *11 (referral by treating

2 The Court need not, and does not, decide which indicia other than a cosignature, if any,
might also suffice as a matter of law to support the conclusion that a treating physician
agrees with a non-treating medical source’s opinion such that that opinion is entitled to
controlling weight. Here, beyond Dr. Samaan’s mere referral of Plaintiff for the FCE, Plaintiff
has not pointed the Court to any indication that Dr. Samaan agreed with the FCE’s
conclusions, as discussed above.
physician, without signature thereof, insufficient to entitle opinion of otherwise non-
treating source to treating-physician status).
Because the FCE at issue here was not the opinion of a treating physician, the

ALJ did not err in declining to afford it controlling weight. Moreover, even if the ALJ
failed to give good reasons for affording the FCE less than controlling weight, this
failure was not error because the “good reasons” requirement applies only to the
opinions of a treating source. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The Court therefore
OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 12) to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc.
11) to the extent that Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have treated the FCE as the

opinion of a treating physician.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports The ALJ’s Conclusion That Plaintiff
Can Perform Medium Work.
Apart from her legal argument that the ALJ failed to treat the FCE as the
opinion of her treating physician, discussed above, the bulk of Plaintiff’s arguments
focus on the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff can perform medium work.
To start, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed medical opinion
evidence by assigning more weight to the opinions of state agency sources who did
not examine her than to those of sources who did. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ should have given greater weight to both the conclusion of Dr. Ray, a

consultant who examined Plaintiff, that Plaintiff could only perform light work, and
to the conclusion of the FCE that Plaintiff could only perform sedentary work. (Obj.,
Doc. 12, #595, 597). On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have
accepted the conclusions of three non-examining consultants, Drs. Edmond Gardner,
William Bolz, and Susan Clifford, that Plaintiff could perform medium work, in part
because, according to Plaintiff, Dr. Bolz’s specialization in orthopedics was less
relevant than Dr. Ray’s specialization in physical therapy. (Id. at #597).

The Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assignment
of weight to the medical opinion evidence. The ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Ray’s
conclusion that Plaintiff can perform only light work is based in part on the
inconsistency of that conclusion with Dr. Ray’s specific findings, which were mostly
normal, as well as on Dr. Ray’s reliance on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, an issue
discussed in more detail below. (See R., Doc. 4, #39). Similarly, the ALJ’s decision to

discount the FCE’s conclusion that Plaintiff could conduct only sedentary work was
based on the “extreme” character of this conclusion and the fact that even the FCE
said the restriction to sedentary work was only temporary. (See id. at #40). On the
other hand, the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the opinions of non-examining state
agency consultants who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record that Plaintiff could
perform medium work in part because the record disclosed “consistently normal
physical exam findings.” (Id. at #41). Plaintiff has failed to show that a “reasonable

mind” could not have accepted this evidence as adequate to support the relative
weight the ALJ assigned to each of the medical opinion sources, even if a reasonable
mind could also have reached a different conclusion. See Ealy, 594 F.3d at 512.
True, SSA regulations provide that an ALJ of the SSA should “[g]enerally …
give more weight to the medical opinion of a source who has examined [a claimant]
than to the medical opinion of a medical source who has not examined [the claimant].”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). They also provide that the opinion of a relevant specialist
“generally” should receive greater weight than the opinion of a source who lacks a
relevant specialization. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5). But these are only two of a

number of factors that the ALJ should consider when assigning weight to medical
opinion evidence, with others including supportability, consistency with the record as
a whole, and a residual “other factors” category that includes familiarity with the
SSA’s programs. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Here, there was substantial
evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that the supportability,
consistency, and familiarity factors weighed more heavily in favor of a determination

that Plaintiff could perform medium work than any factors that may have pointed to
a different assignment of weight. (See R., Doc. 4, #41).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred under the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408–09 (6th Cir. 2009), by giving greater
weight to the opinions of non-examining sources who did not review the FCE, since
the FCE was completed after the non-examining sources provided their opinions.
(Obj., Doc. 12, #595). In Blakley, the Sixth Circuit reversed an ALJ for insufficiently

explaining a decision to give greater weight to a non-examining source’s medical
opinion than to the opinion of a treating source. 581 F.3d at 408–09. The ALJ erred
because the non-examining sources had not reviewed the records from several
examinations by treating sources (since those treating-source examinations occurred
after the non-examining sources’ review). Id. at 409. Here, the FCE is not the opinion
of Plaintiff’s treating physician, as discussed at length above. Nevertheless, a similar
rationale may apply to examining sources even if they are not treating sources, albeit
with less strength. See Soc. Sec. Rule 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3 (July 12, 1996).
Still, the quantity and quality of materials that the non-examining sources did

not have the opportunity to review in this case, comprising the FCE and a few other
miscellaneous records (see R&R, Doc. 11, #581), is modest compared with the
situation in Blakley, where the non-examining sources missed “over 300 pages of
medical evidence,” including notes from at least four examinations by treating
sources that occurred after the non-examining sources’ review. See 581 F.3d at 409.
Moreover, Sixth Circuit case law also suggests that the ALJ’s decision should be

affirmed where the ALJ himself discusses the medical evidence that the non-
examining source did not have a chance to consider, which the ALJ did in this case.
See Gibbens v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 659 F. App’x 238, 248 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Though …
[the non-examining source’s] assessment was completed in 2008, the ALJ’s own
analysis clearly spanned the entire record.”). Accordingly, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that the ALJ did not commit Blakley error in assigning the non-
examining sources’ opinions more weight than the opinions of examining sources. (See

R&R, Doc. 11, #581). The non-examining sources had access to almost all of Plaintiff’s
medical record, and the ALJ himself addressed the modest amount of medical
evidence that the non-examining sources had not reviewed.
In short, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assignment of weight to the
various medical opinions in this case, and Plaintiff has failed to show that the ALJ
did not apply the correct legal standards in determining what weight to assign to the
various items of medical opinion evidence in the record.
Next, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to give sufficient weight to Plaintiff’s

own subjective reports of symptoms including fatigue, nausea, blurred vision, and
frequent urination from her diabetes. (Obj., Doc. 12, #599; see also R&R, Doc. 11,
#585). The ALJ found those subjective complaints to be partially inconsistent with
the weight of the objective evidence in the record. (See R., Doc. 4, #40). The ALJ again
reasoned that Plaintiff’s physician records from Dr. Samaan show mostly normal
findings over time. (Id.). The ALJ also relied on Plaintiff’s reports to Dr. Samaan that

she engaged in activities at home such as lifting objects and exercising, which in the
ALJ’s view undermined some of Plaintiff’s more extreme subjective complaints. (Id.
at #40–41). And the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s A1C level of 8, which the ALJ characterized
as indicating Plaintiff’s diabetes is “not … uncontrolled,” combined with the fact that
Plaintiff had “poor compliance with medications” and was reluctant to start insulin,
as factors tending to undermine some of her subjective complaints. (Id.).
Again, the Court concludes that substantial evidence, including the records of

Plaintiff’s own treating physician, Dr. Samaan, supports the decision to partially
discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
misunderstood the significance of an A1C of 8, which Plaintiff says is not “normal.”
(See Obj., Doc. 12, #599). But as the R&R notes, the ALJ never said it was “normal”;
instead, the ALJ reasonably described Plaintiff’s diabetes as “not uncontrolled” and
“without complications” in spite of the elevated A1C. (See R&R, Doc. 11, #583). In
similar fashion, Plaintiff faults the ALJ’s reliance on her daily activities, self-reported
to Dr. Samaan, as cherry-picking, but this was only one of several factors influencing
the ALJ’s decision to partially discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (See R., Doc.

4, #40–41). Plaintiff also notes that she has tried medicines other than insulin and
speculates that even if she took insulin, it would not have a sufficient impact on her
exertional ability to be material to the analysis of her subjective complaints. (See Obj.,
Doc. 12, #599). But Plaintiff fails to support her argument that it was somehow
impermissible for the ALJ to rely on evidence of noncompliance with medications and
reluctance to try insulin in partially discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

In the Court’s view, Plaintiff’s contentions establish, at most, that a reasonable
mind could have credited Plaintiff’s subjective complaints to a greater extent than
the ALJ did. Plaintiff fails to show that a reasonable mind could not have accepted
the record evidence on which the ALJ relied as adequate to partially discount
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Moreover, the ALJ did not selectively examine only
the portions of the record that tended to undermine Plaintiff’s complaints, as Plaintiff
argues. (See Obj., Doc. 12, #599–600 (citing Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d

235, 240 (6th Cir. 2002))). Instead, the ALJ gave consideration to the entire record.
(See R., Doc. 4, #40–41). In the same vein, the ALJ did not base his discounting of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints only on the absence of objective evidence of
symptoms, as Plaintiff asserts. (See Obj., Doc. 12, #599 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(2))). Instead, the ALJ based his evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints both on the absence of such evidence and on the presence of evidence that,
in the ALJ’s view, partially undermined the weight to be given to those complaints.
(See R., Doc. 4, #40). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to
partially discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and the ALJ did not commit any

legal error in his assessment of the weight to give those complaints.
In sum, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff can perform medium work is
supported by substantial evidence in the record, even if there are other conclusions
that could also be consistent with substantial evidence in the record. Moreover, the
ALJ applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence at issue.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 12) insofar as it

concerns the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff can perform medium work.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The ALJ’s Conclusion That Jobs
Plaintiff Can Perform Exist In Significant Numbers In The National
Economy.
Although asserted “medical errors” comprise the bulk of Plaintiff’s Objection
(Doc. 12) to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 11), Plaintiff also assigns “vocational
errors” related to the determination that jobs Plaintiff can perform exist in significant
numbers in the national economy. (See Obj., Doc. 12, #600). To the extent that
Plaintiff merely reiterates that the ALJ’s questions to the vocational expert were
premised on the finding that Plaintiff could perform medium work, a finding with
which Plaintiff disagrees, the Court has already addressed that issue at some length.
But Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s decision to credit the vocational expert’s
testimony that there are “medium work” jobs for which Plaintiff would be qualified
where Plaintiff could sit for a total of two hours in an eight-hour day. (Id.). In
Plaintiff’s view, that testimony was “not reliable.” (Id.).
The expert in question testified that his opinions were consistent with the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles and with his own professional experience. (See R.,
Doc. 4, #50–53). Plaintiff speculates that none of the jobs in the “medium unskilled”
category would allow for two hours a day of sitting, but points the Court to nothing
that either rules out this possibility as a matter of fact or suggests that the ALJ’s
reliance on such testimony constitutes legal error. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown
how any such error would be other than harmless, given that the ALJ’s finding of

restrictions on Plaintiff’s ability to perform “medium work” did not even focus on the
exact amount of time that Plaintiff would be standing, but instead on whether
Plaintiff would be subject to “fast production rate or pace work.” Cf. Ulman v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying harmless error analysis where
ALJ did not misapply a legal principle but “simply erred in a factual finding”).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination that jobs Plaintiff can perform exist in
significant numbers in the national economy is based on substantial evidence, and

the ALJ did not commit any legal error in so determining. The Court therefore
OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 12) to the extent that it contends otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc.
12), ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 11), DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Doc. 1) WITH PREJUDICE, and DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment
and TERMINATE this case on its docket.

SO ORDERED.

January 20, 2022
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10379376. Public record. Not legal advice.