# Falcon Drilling LLC v. Omni Energy Group LLC

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · November 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10379060

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

FALCON DRILLING LLC,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:21-cv-4316
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
OMNI ENERGY GROUP LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand which, in part, requested
attorney’s fees. (Doc. 10). Previously, the Undersigned determined that remand and an award of
attorney’s fees were warranted. (Doc. 17). To consider fully Plaintiff’s specific fee request, the
Undersigned permitted additional briefing. (Id. at 8). The parties filed their respective briefs
(Docs. 18, 19) so the matter is ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Undersigned
concludes that $11,477.61 is a reasonable fee award.
I. STANDARD
When determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, “[i]t is well settled that the
‘lodestar’ approach is the proper method[.]” Barrett v. Green Tree Serv., 214 F. Supp. 3d 670,
674 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (quoting Bldg. Serv. Local 47 Cleaning Conts. Pension Plan v. Grandview
Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995)). The lodestar approach considers “the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). While there is a “strong presumption” that this lodestar
figure represents a reasonable fee, Ousley v. General Motors Retirement Program for Salaried
Employees, 496 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433), the
movant bears the burden of proving that the number of hours expended and the rates claimed were
reasonable, Wilson v. Bridge Overlay Systems, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-156, 2016 WL 164056, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2016) (citing Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Important here, district courts have discretion “to adjust the [lodestar figure] upward or
downward.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir.

2004) (“Once the lodestar figure is established, the trial court is permitted to consider other factors,
and to adjust the award upward or downward to achieve a reasonable result.”) (citation omitted).
In determining a reasonable number of hours, the district court may “exclude excessive, redundant,
or otherwise unnecessary hours.” Shooter Const. Co. v. Wells Fargo Ins. Servs. USA, Inc., No.
3:11-CV-181, 2011 WL 6339680, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2011), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. Shooter Const. Co. v. Accordia of Ohio, LLC, No. 3:11- CV-181, 2011 WL
6370061 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2011). Where the court lowers the award, it “should state with some
particularity which of the claimed hours [it] is rejecting, which it is accepting, and why.” U.S.
Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1193 (6th Cir. 1997).

II. DISCUSSION
The starting point when determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees is the lodestar
method: the product of the number of reasonable hours worked times the reasonable hourly rate.
Easter v. Beacon Tri-State Staffing, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00197, 2020 WL 419433, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 27, 2020).
A. Hourly Rate
“The first step in the [l]odestar analysis is to determine whether Plaintiff’s counsel has

proffered a reasonable hourly billing rate for their services.” Id. Here, the parties agree that
Attorney Michael P. McCormick’s (MPM) hourly rate of $300 per hour is reasonable. (Doc. 16
at 2; Doc. 18 at 1). The same is true for Kyle W. Bickford’s (KWB) and Erik A. Schramm, Jr.’s
(EJS) rate of $250 per hour. (Doc. 16 at 2; Doc. 18 at 1). Thus, the only issue for the Undersigned
to resolve is the reasonableness of the hours expended on the Motion (Doc. 10).

B. Hours Expended
The second step in the lodestar analysis is to determine the reasonableness of the hours
spent. Hours that were not reasonably expended, including “excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary hours,” should be excluded. Bunn Enterprises, Inc. v. Ohio Operating Engineers
Fringe Benefit Programs, No. 2:13-CV-00357, 2016 WL 223717, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2016).
This is done, in part, by reviewing the billing records. Easter, 2020 WL 419433, at *2; see also
Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 552 (6th Cir. 2008). Notably, the
Undersigned’s “goal . . . is to do rough justice, not achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563
U.S. 826, 838 (2011). And “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. District courts may either make line-by-line reductions or “implement

an across-the-board reduction by a certain percentage.” Miller v. Food Concepts Int’l, LP, No.
2:13-CV-00124, 2017 WL 5247542, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2017).
Here, Plaintiff seeks $16,942.61 in fees for 68.45 hours of work done by Plaintiff’s
attorneys. (Doc. 16 at 5–10). Plaintiff’s counsel represents that the bill is already reduced by
$2,825.00 from “courtesy discounts” and the time billed on 9/1/21 and 10/7/21. (Id. at 5, 8, 10).
Below is a chart summarizing Plaintiff’s counsel’s bill (Id. at 5–10):
Attorney Rate Hours Total
McCormick (MPM) $300/hr. 53.75 $16,125
Bickford (KWB) $250/hr. 13.2 $3,300
Schramm (EJS) $250/hr. 1.5 $375
Expenses Added $12.61
Expenses Subtracted – $2,870
Total $16,942.61
Defendants argue that the bill is “clearly excessive for the amount of legal work required
to produce a competent motion to remand and [the] accompanying disclosure documents[,]” which
are a Rule 26(f) form and a corporate disclosure form. (Doc. 18 at 4). In particular, Defendants
challenge the hours spent on researching, drafting, and revising the Motion; preparing the Rule
26(f) report; and drafting the Reply in support of the Motion. (Id. at 2–3 (listing challenged

entries)). Defendants say that since the “legal issues presented in the motion to remand are not
complex,” ten hours (totaling a fee of $3,000) is more reasonable. (Id. at 4–5). Expectedly,
Plaintiff’s counsel disagrees, arguing the hours worked are reasonable and compensable. (See
generally Doc. 19).
Upon review, the Undersigned finds that 68.45 hours of work on the Motion (Doc. 10) and
other documents associated with removal is not supported. Yet, the Undersigned also finds that
Defendants’ proposed amount of $3,000 is not nearly enough to compensate Plaintiff. In order to
determine a reasonable number of hours, the Court will conduct a line-by-line analysis. To do so,
the Court considers the challenged categories of work: Work on the Motion, Work on the Rule

26(f) report, and Work on the Reply in support of the Motion.
The first and most time-intensive category is work related to the Motion, including
research, drafts, and revisions. The Motion addressed two distinct legal issues, federal diversity
jurisdiction and the forum defendant rule. (See generally Doc. 10). It is fifteen pages long. (Id.).
Counsel Bickford performed 4.6 hours researching, drafting, and revising the Motion. (Doc. 16 at
5, KWB 9/8/21 and 9/9/21). This is reasonable given the amount of research on the two legal
issues and the time necessary for an initial draft of this complexity and length. Counsel
McCormick, on 9/13/21, billed 4.95 hours, which included: “review draft of Motion to Remand
and research by KWB, conduct my own research. Review, revise, and edit drafts of Motion to
Remand . . . .” (Id. at 5–6, MPM 9/13/21). The Undersigned similarly finds this to be reasonable
given that it was Counsel McCormick’s first time considering the draft, reviewing the research,
conducting his own research, and making edits. Yet, in the days to come, it appears that Counsel
McCormick billed an additional 20.6 hours revising the Motion. (Due to block billing, the time
entry is not entirely clear.) Over 20 hours spent on revisions is unreasonable given how much time

was already spent on the Motion. Accordingly, the Undersigned deducts 7.4 hours from the total;
specifically, the Undersigned adjusts MPM’s entries on 9/14/21–9/17/21, and 9/20/21. This leaves
a total of 13.2 hours that Counsel McCormick spent, at least in part, on revising and reviewing the
Motion. (Id. at 4–5, MPM 9/22/21–9/24/21). Given the complexity of the legal issue, the length
of the Motion, uncertainty related to block billing, and variations in attorney work habits and style,
the Undersigned finds this reduction makes the total hours spent on the Motion reasonable.
The second category is work related to preparing the Rule 26(f) report. Counsel Bickford
billed 2.9 hours related to the Rule 26(f) report. (Id. at 7–8, KWB 9/23/21, 9/27/21, 9/28/21). And
Counsel McCormick billed 8.8 hours related to the report, excluding entries on 9/23/21 and

9/24/21, which do not appear to contribute significantly to the Rule 26(f) report. (Id., MPM
9/27/21–9/29/21). Based on the billing reports, 11.7 hours were spent preparing the report. Again,
the Undersigned finds the total amount to be too much. Work on a Rule 26(f) report, including
drafting, revising, meetings, and various correspondence, should take one to two hours for this
type of case. Accordingly, the Undersigned reduces the hours spent on the report by seventy-five
percent. This results in a deduction of 2.18 hours from Counsel Bickford’s hours and 6.6 hours
from Counsel McCormick’s hours. The total hours spent, at least in part, on the Rule 26(f) report
is now 2.92 hours. This total accounts for flexibility in attorney work style and block billing
inaccuracies. The Undersigned also notes that the work on the Rule 26(f) report, which is about
case management, is not for nothing. Much of it will be transferable to the state court action.
The third category is work related to the Reply in support of the Motion. The Reply
addresses several legal issues and is nine pages long. (See generally Doc. 15). Counsel Bickford
spent 0.6 hours on the Reply. (Doc. 16 at 10, KWB 10/13/21–10/15/21). This is not excessive

and is presumptively reasonable. See Ousley, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 850. Counsel McCormick spent
11.8 hours on the Reply, with 8.95 hours listing review, revise, and edit in the billing description.
(Doc. 16 at 9–10, MPM 10/8/21, 10/11/21–10/15/21, 10/18/21). The Court finds that nearly 9
hours on revisions is excessive. Thus, the Court reduces this by 2.4 hours, which corresponds to
Counsel McCormick’s billing entries on 10/14/21 and 10/15/21. (Id. at 10, MPM 10/14/21,
10/15/21). This reduction gives Counsel McCormick 9.4 hours to draft and revise the Reply. This
number of hours is more consistent with the amount of time needed to draft such a brief. This is
especially true because the Reply did not require much, if any, additional legal research on
jurisdiction or the forum defendant rule but did require more thorough briefing on the fee request.

(See generally Doc. 15).
In total, the Undersigned has excluded 18.58 hours from the bill, resulting in a total of
$11,477.61 in attorney’s fees. Below is a chart reflecting Plaintiff’s bill adjusted with reasonable
hours:
Billed Reasonable
Attorney Rate Reduction Total
Hours Hours
McCormick (MPM) $300/hr. 53.75 – 16.4 37.35 $11,205
Bickford (KWB) $250/hr. 13.2 – 2.18 11.02 $2,755
Schramm (EJS) $250/hr. 1.5 ----- 1.5 $375
Expenses Added $12.61
Expenses Subtracted – $2,870
Total $11,477.61
III. CONCLUSION
The Undersigned previously found that attorney’s fees were warranted in this case. (Doc.
17). Using the lodestar method and analyzing the reasonableness of the hours expended, the
Undersigned concludes that $11,477.61 is a reasonable fee award.
Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit
this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)( 1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 30, 2021 /s/Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10379060. Public record. Not legal advice.