# Hood v. City of Columbus

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · October 28, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378950

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** October 28, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378950

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the exclusion of prior bad acts to prove the defendant officer “is the sort of person who would unjustifiably tase someone, which tends to show that his tasing of [the plaintiff] is also unjustified.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ADRIENNE HOOD,
Case No. 2:17-cv-471
JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers

v.

JASON BARE, et al.,

Defendants.

MOTION IN LIMINE ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion in Limine, (ECF No. 290,
hereinafter “Defs.’ Mot.”), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (ECF No. 294, hereinafter “Pl.’s
Resp.”), and Defendants’ Supplemental Motion in Limine (ECF No. 319, hereinafter “Def.’s Mot
II”). For the following reason, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART AND
HOLDS IN ABEYANCE IN PART Defendants’ Motions.
I.
This matter arises out of the fatal police-involved shooting of Henry Green, V by
Columbus Police Officers Jason Bare and Zachary Rosen on June 6, 2016. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No.
1.) Plaintiff, the executor of Mr. Green’s estate, commenced this lawsuit on June 1, 2017, against
Bare and Rosen, Eric Pilya, Gary Cameron, Kim Jacobs, and the City of Columbus. (Id. at ¶¶21–
26). Plaintiff brings claims of wrongful: death pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio Revised
Code § 2125.01, excessive force and unreasonable seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, racial discrimination
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
state law claims of assault and battery, and a Monell Claim against the City of Columbus. (See
Id. ¶¶181, 189, 196, 205, 211–228). On September 26, 2019, another judge of this Court granted
summary judgment to Defendants on all claims asserted in this action. (See Op. & Order at 1, 35,
ECF No. 259).

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to Pilya, Cameron, Jacobs,
and the City, but granted summary judgment only in part with respect to Bare and Rosen. (See
App. Op. at 6–15, ECF No. 263). The Sixth Circuit held that the Bare and Rosen’s “Initial Shots”
were objectively reasonable and did not violate Green’s constitutional rights, but there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to “whether the Officers continued to shoot at Green after he
was no longer a physical threat.” (Id. at 12). Consequently, this case proceeds to trial on the issue
of whether the Officers’ “Last Shots” were an unreasonable use of force in violation of Green’s
constitutional rights. (See Id. at 12, 15).
II.
Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly

authorize a court to rule on an evidentiary motion in limine. The United States Supreme Court
has noted, however, that the practice of ruling on such motions “has developed pursuant to the
district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S.
38, 41 n. 4 (1984). The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow a court to rule on issues
pertaining to evidence in advance of trial in order to avoid delay and ensure an evenhanded and
expeditious trial. See Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp.2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(citing Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir.1997)).
Notwithstanding this well-meaning purpose, courts are generally reluctant to grant broad
exclusions of evidence in limine, because “a court is almost always better situated during the
actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 2 F. Supp.2d
1385, 1388 (D.Kan. 1998); accord Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712
(6th Cir. 1975).
Evidentiary rulings are made subject to the district court’s sound discretion. Frye v. CSX

Trans., Inc., 933 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir. 2019). To obtain the exclusion of evidence under such a
motion, a party must prove that the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. See
Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d at 846; Koch, 2 F.Supp.2d at 1388; cf. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41.
“Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so
that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper
context.” Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp.2d at 846.
III.
Defendants Bare and Rosen (collectively “the Officers”) now move in limine to exclude
evidence: (1) related to Plaintiff’s dismissed Equal Protection claims; (2) related to Plaintiff’s
dismissed municipal liability claims; (3) criticizing the Officers’ approach of Henry Green and

the “Initial Shots”; (4) criticizing the medical care provided to Green; (5) relating to any other
lawsuits, complaints, investigations, discipline, or incidents involving Bare and Rosen; (6)
excluding any witnesses or exhibits not properly disclosed or exchanged in accordance with the
Court’s Pretrial Order. (Defs.’ Mot. at 1). Defendants, in their supplemental motion, move to
exclude: (7) Dr. Michael Lyman’s testimony; (8) Plaintiff’s expert reports and audio file of the
City’s investigation; and (9) Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s requests for admission (Defs.’
Mot. II at 10–11).
A. Plaintiff’s Dismissed Equal Protection Claims
Defendants argue that because the Court dismissed the Equal Protection claim and found
the Officers did not racially discriminate against Green, “Plaintiff should be precluded from
making any inquiry, comment, or argument that the incident had anything to do with race or

racial discrimination.” (Id. at 5). Defendants further contend that Plaintiff should be precluded
from mentioning “institutional racism or any historical or recent incidents involving law
enforcement and Black and Brown individuals” because these matters are “irrelevant, unfairly
prejudicial, and confusing to the jury.” (Id.)
Plaintiff responds that this “would largely prohibit Plaintiff from trying her case” because
the facts of this case are “a recent incident (a shooting) involving law enforcement (the
Defendants) and the people in the neighborhood where the shooting occurred including the
person killed, who are Black and Brown individuals.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 1–2). Plaintiffs are also
concerned that Defendants have not agreed to follow the same restrictions so that Defense
witnesses could speak on the matter while Plaintiff’s witnesses could not. (Id. at 2).

This case involves the actions of two Columbus police officers, not the entire Columbus
Division of Police. Plaintiff may, of course, present any otherwise admissible evidence relating
to the two officers. Matters of race discrimination, institutional racism, and historical and recent
incidents involving law enforcement are generally not admissible against individual defendants.
Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to preclude the
parties from discussing race discrimination, institutional racism, or other incidents outside this
case involving law enforcement, unless such matters involve the individual defendants.
B. Plaintiff’s Dismissed Municipal Liability Claims
Next, Defendants argue that because the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
City, Plaintiff should be precluded from making any inquiry, comment, or argument about the
City’s “policies, practices, customs and/or usages” related to the following:

• The City trains and authorizes its officers to act recklessly and aggressively with regard
to the use of force on citizens. (Compl. ¶ 176 (a)).

• The City hires, retains and assigns officers with demonstrably unreasonable 6 decision-
making patterns and patterns of misconduct. (Id. at ¶ 176 (b))

• The City has a policy of subjecting citizens to unreasonable uses of force and
unreasonable seizures. (Id. at ¶ 176 (c)).

• The City allows officers to violate the constitutional rights of citizens and take other
unlawful action against citizens. (Id. at ¶ 176 (d)).

• The City fails to adequately train officers regarding the use of force and the use of lethal
force. (Id. at ¶ 176 (e)).

• The City fails to adequately train officers on plainclothes tactics and negligently assigns
officers to plainclothes duty. (Id. at ¶ 176 (f)).

• The City fails to adequately supervise officers. (Id. at ¶ 176 (g)).

• The City fails to adequately discipline officers. (Id. at ¶ 176 (h)).

• The City fails to perform drug and alcohol tests on officers after their involvement in
police shootings. (Id. at ¶ 176 (i)).

• The City authorized the Summer Strike Force/Community Safety Initiative to continue on
for years while negligently assigning, supervising and retaining officers working in the
program. (Id. at ¶ 176 (j)).

• Plaintiff alleged that the officers working this program were known as “The Jumpout
Boys,” and they made a practice of jumping out of unmarked vehicles and aggressively
confronting citizens while wearing plain clothes and failing to identify themselves. (Id. at
¶¶ 5- 11, 30-43).

• The City set numbers-based goals for the Summer Strike Force/Community Safety
Initiative. (Id. at ¶ 176 (k)).
• The City fails to adequately investigate police-involved shootings and allows officers
concessions during investigations of police-involved shootings. (Id. at ¶¶ 176 (l), 226).

• The City condones and encourages officers in the belief that they can violate the
constitutional rights of individuals and that such conduct will not adversely affect their
opportunities for promotion and other employment benefits. (Id. at ¶ 176 (m)).

• The City failed to properly investigate the actions of Bare and Rosen, which, according to
Plaintiff, would have included that Bare and Rosen have participated in a pattern of
conduct that was racially discriminatory and/or unconstitutional. (Id. at ¶¶ 215–216).

• The City fails to adequately investigate and discipline police officers who exhibit 7
racially motivated and/or unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at ¶ 218).

• The City allows officers to exhibit racially motivated and/or unconstitutional conduct.
(Id. at ¶ 219).

• The City exhibits racially motivated and/or unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at ¶ 220).

• The City fails to investigate civilian complaints against officers consisting of racially
motivated and/or unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at ¶ 221).

• The City negligently retained Defendants Bare and Rosen. (Id. at ¶ 222).

• The City negligently retains police officers who exhibit racially motivated and/or
unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at ¶ 223).

• The City failed to adequately train Bare and Rosen. (Id. at ¶ 224).

• The City has a policy or practice of failing to adequately train police officers who exhibit
racially motivated and/or unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at ¶ 225).

• Civil rights investigations, previous lawsuits including, but not limited to, the City’s 1999
Department of Justice case, Matrix Consulting’s review of CPD, and any of the City’s
police reform measures, including its request for the DOJ to review CPD’s current
policies, practices, and customs. (Def.’s Mot. at 7).

Defendants further move to preclude “any statement, reference or implication that the City is still
a defendant or that the City might indemnify Bare and Rosen.” Defendants move to preclude
admission of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8, “After Action Report – 2016 Community Safety Initiative.”
(Defs.’ Mot. II at 2). Defendants claim all the allegations above and Exhibit 8 are “inappropriate,
irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial.” (Id.)
Plaintiff responds that she will not raise municipal liability claims at trial, but “it is
certainly within the realm of possibility that the City could become involved in the trial” because
the shooting was located in Columbus, the Defendants were employed by the City of Columbus
at the time, and Mr. Green and the witnesses were residents of Columbus. (Pl.’s Resp. at 2).

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to exclude City policies for purposes of
discussing the City’s liability because that claim was dismissed, and the City’s possible
indemnification of the Officers because it is unduly prejudicial to the defendants. Although the
Court does not have Exhibit 8, “After Action Report – 2016 Community Safety Initiative,” this
exhibit is inadmissible to the extent Plaintiff uses it to comment on City polices and procedures.
Defendants’ knowledge of and adherence or non-adherence to the City’s policies,
practices, and customs is, however, relevant and admissible to determine whether the Officers’
“Last Shots” were reasonable. District courts in the Sixth Circuit regularly admit evidence of
police policies as relevant to determine whether a reasonable officer on the scene would have
utilized the same amount of force. See, e.g., Kidis v. Reid, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177441 at *15

(E.D. Mich. October 16, 2018); Smith v. Jones, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14317, at *9 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 5, 2016); McDonald v. City of Memphis, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193726, at *4 (W.D. Tenn.
Aug. 26, 2016). The parties may, therefore, present evidence of the City’s policies related to
what the Officers knew about the policies and whether their conduct conformed to the policies.
C. The Officers’ Approach of Green and the “Initial Shots”
Defendants argue that because the Court granted summary judgment on all claims
regarding the “Initial Shots,” “Plaintiff should be precluded from making any inquiry, comment,
or argument regarding the “lead up to and reasonableness of the ‘Initial Shots’” including
statements that:
• Officers failed to adequately identify themselves as police officers before the “Initial
Shots” were fired.

• Officers (a) w[ore] plain clothes, (b) fail[ed] to adequately display their badges, and (c)
operat[ed] an “unmarked white 2015 GMC Acadia SUV with tinted windows and out of
state license plates.”

• Rosen had plenty of time to drive safely, i.e., not speed, toward Green and Rutledge, stop
before almost hitting them.

• The driver of the GMC (Rosen) began shooting at Green at about the same time as the
GMC stopped. No warning was given. Rosen was inside or just stepping out of the GMC
when he fired two shots, one through the window on the driver’s side door, which
shattered the glass; and then he stepped around the door and window and fired another
shot.

• At least one and maybe both of those shots hit Green while Green was walking north
toward the sidewalk and away from the GMC and Rosen with his hands down at his
sides.

• Green did not have his gun out and was not pointing his gun at Rosen when Rosen shot
him.

• Green did not pose a threat to Rosen, Bare or any bystanders at the time this shooting
began.

• Rosen was the first to shoot during the incident. Green did not pull his gun out until after
Rosen had fired the two shots at Green.

• At least one of Plaintiff’s witnesses were critical of the Officers because the gunfight put
non-parties (e.g., children and neighbors) at risk.

(Defs.’ Mot. at 7–8). Defendants contend that “these or similar matters do not relate to the
reasonableness of the ‘Last Shots’ and Green’s rights. Any evidence pertaining to these
allegations is irrelevant and confusing to the jury.” (Id.)
Plaintiff responds that these facts “set the stage for the jury to provide context and
perspective, such as how Mr. Green and Defendants got to that point.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 3). The
“Initial Shots” are relevant to show “why Mr. Green was no longer a physical threat.” (Id.)
In their supplemental Motion in Limine, Defendants argue that it is inappropriate for the
Plaintiff to reargue the reasonableness of the approach and initial shots and therefore the
following should be precluded:
• Officer Bare’s testimony that he had no prior knowledge or history with Green; (2) had
no reason to believe that Green was connected to any prior violent or gang activity; (3)
had no indication and made no allegations that Green appeared to be under the influence
of drugs or alcohol.

• Dr. Michael Lyman’s testimony that “Rosen and Bare were not properly identified.”

• Christian Rutledge’s testifying about the Officers’ approach.

(Defs.’ Mot. II at 4).
At this juncture, the Court shall permit evidence of the “Initial Shots” and the events
leading up to the “Initial Shots” so that the jury can understand the context of the “Last Shots.”
The Court will offer a limiting instruction to the jury that the Court of Appeals already decided
the “Initial Shots” segment of the case and the jury will decide only the “Last Shots” portion of
the case. The jury would be instructed to consider the events leading up to the incident and the
“Initial Shots” for the limited purpose of contextualizing the “Last Shots.” The parties should
come prepared to discuss this issue at the Final Pretrial Conference.
D. Medical Care Provided to Green
Defendants move to exclude evidence of medical care provided to Mr. Green because
“Plaintiff has neither alleged any impropriety regarding the medical care provided to Green nor
asserted any denial of medical care claims” and therefore “[a]ny such argument at trial would be
inappropriate, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) Plaintiff claims that there is
no reason to exclude this evidence because Plaintiffs are not alleging it. (Pl.’s Resp. at 4.) Since
Plaintiff avers that she will not admit evidence of the medical care or lack thereof provided to
Mr. Green, the Court DENIES as moot Defendants’ motion to exclude evidence of medical care.
E. Evidence of Lawsuits, Complaints, Investigations, Discipline, or Incidents Involving
Bare and Rosen

Defendants argue that Plaintiff should be “precluded from making any inquiry, comment,
or argument pertaining to any other uses of force by Bare or Rosen, or any other lawsuits,
complaints, investigations, discipline, or incidents other than the one at issue,” which includes
“all matters in Paragraphs 45–82 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9). This evidence
allegedly includes the following Plaintiff exhibits:
• Exhibit 9: Jason Bare Personnel File
• Exhibit 10: Zachary Rosen Personnel File
• Exhibit 12: Correspondence with City of Columbus
• Exhibit 27: Misdemeanor Citation for Bare
• Exhibit 29: Columbus Division of Police, Pre-employment Questionnaire Booklet
• Exhibits 32 and 33: Employment Action Review System documentation regarding Bare
• Exhibits 34 and 35: Intra-Divisional Use of Force Investigation of Bare and Rosen
• Exhibit 38: Citizen Complaint Investigation Rosen by Dustin Fistick
• Exhibit 39: Applicant Tracker Rosen

• Exhibit 44: Disposition of Administrative Investigation Rosen 05/08/2017
• Exhibit 45: Suspension of Rosen 06/14/2017
• Exhibit 46: Director’s Hearing 07/10/2017
(Pl.’s Exh. List, ECF No. 298; Defs.’ Mot. II at 2–3, 6–7). Defendants also move to exclude
Deputy Chief Thomas Quinlan’s proposed testimony about CPD’s post-incident administrative
review and Sgt. Traci Shaw’s proposed testimony of the use of excessive force. (Defs.’ Mot II at
3). Additionally, Defendants move to exclude Demarko Anderson’s testimony about Officer
Rosen’s alleged excessive use of force in an incident after the June 6, 2016 incident. (Defs.’ Mot.
II at 7). Defendants claim this evidence is confusing, unduly prejudicial and irrelevant to whether
the Officers’ force was unreasonable, and, if admitted, would violate Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b).
Plaintiff first contends that the Officers’ police records “reflect their inherently violent

nature and use of excessive force” and that “they again demonstrated their inherently violent
nature and use of excessive force by shooting Mr. Green while he was lying face down and not
moving.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 5). Here, Plaintiff suggests using the previous lawsuits, investigations,
and incidents as propensity evidence to show that the Officers acted in conformity with previous
bad acts when they shot Mr. Green. This is precluded by Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), which states
that “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character
in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
See Helfrich v. Lakeside Park Police Dep't, 497 F. App'x 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the
exclusion of prior bad acts to prove the defendant officer “is the sort of person who would
unjustifiably tase someone, which tends to show that his tasing of [the plaintiff] is also

unjustified.”).
Plaintiff also suggests using evidence of previous lawsuits, investigations, incidents, etc.
in the police records as evidence of the Officers’ motive “to commit violence on fellow humans”
and the Officers’ “opportunity to do so by being a police officer.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 5). Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2) permits the use of previous acts to show “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, lack of accident.” To determine
whether evidence is admissible under one of the alternative 404(b)(2) purposes, the Sixth Circuit
follows a three-part test:
First, the district court must decide whether there is sufficient evidence that the
other act in question actually occurred. Second, if so, the district court must
decide whether the evidence of the other act is probative of a material issue other
than character. Third, if the evidence is probative of a material issue other than
character, the district court must decide whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect.

United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 810 (6th Cir. 2013). “To satisfy the second part of the test,
the evidence must be offered for a permissible purpose, that purpose must be material or “in
issue” in the case, and the evidence must be probative with regard that purpose.” Simmons v.
Napier, 626 F. App’x 129, 135 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 150
(6th Cir. 2011)).
Based on this law, the Court finds no permissible 404(b) purpose for the evidence of Bare
and Rosen’s other uses of force, lawsuits, complaints, investigations, discipline, or incidents
other than the one at issue. Whether the Officers had the opportunity to fire at Mr. Green is not
“in issue” in this case. See Simmons, 626 F. App’x at 135. Additionally, the Officers’ motive for
shooting Mr. Green is not relevant to determine whether they objectively used reasonable force.
Helfrich, 497 F. App'x at 507 (“the officer’s actual motives in using a particular degree of force
are irrelevant.”).
Moreover, the Officers’ background checks and internal investigation reports (ECF No.
184, Exhs. A–EE; ECF No. 185, Exhs. A–Q) did not lead to criminal charges and are dissimilar
to the facts of this case. See Spencer v. McDonald, 705 F. App’x 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2017)
(affirming the exclusion of a sexual assault internal investigation because plaintiff failed to show
“how the sexual assault investigation, which did not result in criminal charges or discipline for
excessive force…is relevant to what occurred during the [plaintiff’s] traffic stop.”); Lucijanic v.
Ball, Case No. 2:04-cv-751, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116899, at *10–11 (S.D. Ohio August 30,
2006) (“Plaintiff has also not shown that any of these alleged incidents were sufficiently similar
to the incident in this case such that evidence of these other incidents would be admissible under
Rule 404(b)”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to exclude evidence of the
Officers’ other acts absent a foundational evidentiary basis.
F. Witnesses or Exhibits Not Properly Disclosed or Exchanged
Defendants contend that because Plaintiff failed to file witness and exhibit lists in

accordance with Court deadlines, “Plaintiff should be precluded from calling any witness or
presenting any exhibits except those properly disclosed and exchanged by the Defendants or
stipulated to by the parties.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 10). The Court extended Plaintiff’s deadline to
submit a witness list and exhibit list to October 21, 2021, and therefore DENIES as moot this
part of the motion.
Defendants also move to exclude Plaintiff’s Exhibits 17 and 22, which have not been
produced to Defendants, and Exhibit 26, which was produced for the first time on Monday,
October 25, 2021. (Defs.’ Mot. II at 10). The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to produce Exhibits 17
and 22 to Defendants immediately. The Court further HOLDS IN ABEYANCE this part of the
motion until the Court can review the exhibits at the Final Pretrial Conference. The parties

should bring and prepare to discuss Plaintiff’s Exhibits 17, 22, and 26.
E. Expert Legal Conclusions
Defendants argue that Dr. Michael Lyman’s testimony that “the use of deadly force by
officers Rosen and Bare was unnecessary, excessive and unreasonable under the circumstances”
is an inadmissible legal conclusion under Rule 702. (Defs.’ Mot. II at 9–10). Federal Rule of
Evidence 704(a) permits Dr. Lyman to offer an opinion which “embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). The ultimate issue in this case is whether the
Officers used excessive force in shooting the “Last Shots” at Green. The Sixth Circuit has held
that “[w]hen the rules [of evidence] speak of an expert’s testimony embracing the ultimate issue,
the reference must be to stating opinions that suggest the answer to the ultimate issue or that give
the jury all the information from which it can draw inferences as to the ultimate issue.”
DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 F. App’x 418, 426–427 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Berry v. City
of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir. 1994)). Thus, Dr. Lyman may not make a legal

conclusion that the Officers’ “Last Shots” were objectively unreasonable or excessive, which is
for the jury to decide. Dr. Lyman may, however, provide the remainder of his opinions related to
whether the Defendant Officers’ conduct was consistent with nationally recognized policing
standards and policing guidelines or with the policies of the Columbus Police Department. The
Court GRANTS this part of Defendants’ motion.
F. Hearsay Exhibits
Defendants move to exclude Sergeant Traci Shaw’s expert reports (Exhibit 50 and 51),
expert Matthew Noedel’s handwritten notes (Exhibit 47), and an audio recording related to the
City’s investigation of the shooting as inadmissible hearsay unless they are used for
impeachment purposes. (Defs.’ Mot. II at 11). These are out-of-court statements and therefore

inadmissible to the extent they are offered to show the truth of their contents, unless an exception
to hearsay applies. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802, 803. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to
exclude these absent an admissible basis under Fed. R. Evid. 803.
G. Requests for Admission
Defendants move to exclude the Officers’ responses to requests for admission because it
includes some requests that were denied and topics address in their motion in limine (Pl.’s
Exhibit 48 and 49). (Defs.’ Mot. II at 11). Because the requests are not denied as a whole, and
additional context would assist the Court, the Court HOLDS this part of the motion IN
ABEYANCE.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court, in accordance with this Opinion and Order,
GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART AND HOLDS IN ABEYANCE IN PART
Defendants’ Motion in Limine (ECF No. 290) and Defendants’ Supplemental Motion in Limine

(ECF No. 319). The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to produce Exhibits 17 and 22 to Defendants
immediately. As with all in limine decisions, this ruling is subject to modification should the
facts or circumstances at trial differ from that which has been presented in the pre-trial motion
and memoranda.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10/28/2021 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378950. Public record. Not legal advice.