# Adkins v. Warden, London Correctional Institution

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 24, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378668

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 24, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378668

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
ANTHONY B. ADKINS,
Petitioner, : Case No. 2:21-cv-01203
- vs - District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN,
London Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
ORDER DENYING STAY; REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Anthony Adkins, is before the Court
for decision on the merits. The relevant pleadings are the Petition (ECF No. 1), the State Court
Record (ECF No. 7), the Return of Writ (ECF No. 8), and Petitioner’s Reply (ECF No. 11). The
Magistrate Judge reference in the case has recently been transferred to the undersigned to help
balance the Magistrate Judge workload in this District (ECF No. 12).

Shortly after filing this case, Petitioner moved for a stay of these proceedings pending
conclusion of state court proceedings on some of the claims made (ECF No. 4). Upon examination
of the State Court Record, the Magistrate Judge finds those state court proceedings have been
terminated. Accordingly, the Motion for Stay is denied as moot.
Litigation History

On July 27, 2018, a Fayette County Grand Jury indicted Adkins on twenty-seven counts
related to trafficking in cocaine (Indictment, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 1). A jury found

him guilty on fifteen of those counts and he was sentenced to an aggregated term of imprisonment
of twenty years (Judgment, State Court Record. ECF No. 8, Ex. 5; Amended Judgment, Ex. 6).
On direct appeal, the Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.
State v. Adkins, 2020-Ohio-535 (12th Dist. Feb. 18, 2020), appellate jurisdiction declined, 158 Ohio
St. 3d 1523 (2020).
Adkins filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2053.21 on
August 10, 2020 (State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 15). The Common Pleas Court denied the
petition without an evidentiary hearing (State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Exs. 16, 17). Adkins
sought to file a delayed appeal from that decision which the Twelfth District denied because
delayed appeals are not available in civil cases such as on petitions for post-conviction relief. Id.

at Ex. 22.
In September, 2020, Adkins filed an Application to Reopen his direct appeal under Ohio
R. App. P. 26(B)(State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 18) which the Twelfth District denied. Id. at
Ex. 19. The State Court Record does not show that Adkins appealed further to the Supreme Court
of Ohio.
On March 2, 2021, Adkins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Id. at Ex. 23. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed that petition sua sponte. Id. at Ex. 24.
On March 9, 2021, Adkins deposited his federal habeas corpus Petition in the prison
mailing system (ECF No. 1, PageID 31). He pleads the following grounds for relief:
Ground One: Appellant was denied his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights, pursuant to U.S. Constitution, to the effective
assistance of trial counsel, who failed to file pre-trial motions to
suppress evidence and dismiss counts 2 -7 and 10–15 of the
indictment; thereby denying him a fair trial.

Supporting Facts: On June 29, 2018, Fayette County law
enforcement followed Appellant to Dayton, Ohio, believing that he
was picking up a supply of narcotics. Fayette County Sheriff
Deputy, Havens, stopped Appellant’s vehicle after it entered Clinton
County from Dayton. Deputy Havens was originally staged in
Fayette County, and moved to intercept Appellant, when
investigators realized that he was not coming directly back to
Fayette County. The Deputy testified there was no traffic
violation(s) to substantiate a traffic stop. The officer followed
Appellant into Clinton County, Ohio, and activated cruiser lights.
Ohio Revised Code, section 2935.03, gives the Deputy authority to
detain and/or arrest outside of his jurisdiction for a felony when
certain necessary elements are present. The pursuit did not take
place without unreasonable delay, nor was the pursuit initiated in the
jurisdiction in which the Deputy was appointed. A motion to
suppress the evidence from the illegal stop would have been granted.
Trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress the cocaine seized
after the vehicle stop in Clinton County, Ohio. The Deputy testified
they witnessed Appellant throwing something out of the driver’s
side window of the vehicle.

At the close of the State’s case, the State moved and the trial court
granted, over defense objections, to amend the indictment to
conform to the evidence, as presented during the trial. Counts 25,
26, and 27 were amended by adding the words “and Clinton” after
the word “Fayette.”

Trial counsel through discovery process knew the State had only
unnotarized test results that items sold in counts 2-7 and 10-15 were
controlled substances. The evidence to support each count was not
admissible under Ohio Revised Code, 2925.51. The counts were
ultimately dismissed, after the jury heard repeated irrelevant and
prejudicial testimony. Lab test results that do not contain a notarized
signature, are inadmissible at trial. Counsel knew this prior to trial
and failed to file a pre-trial motion to dismiss those counts.

The jury saw evidence of video footage of alleged “drug buys” that
was used to support counts 2-7 and 10-15 of the indictment. Counsel
did object, but the court allowed the evidence to be presented. At the
end of the State’s case, defense counsel moved, pursuant to Crim.
R. 29, to dismiss counts 2-7 and 10-15, as the lab reports had not
been admitted into evidence, for those counts, to prove a controlled
substance. The trial court granted all motions, and those counts were
dismissed.

Ground Two: Appellant was denied his rights to due process and a
fair trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution when the trial court denied the Crim.R.29
Motion for Acquittal as the evidence presented was insufficient to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Supporting Facts: The State of Ohio contends it was working on
an ongoing drug operation investigation of Appellant-Petitioner,
Anthony Adkins, in Fayette County, Ohio. This investigation was
initiated by the Confidential Informant, in January 2018, and
continued until June 29, 2018. The CI testified he became a CI at
the bequest [sic] of Fayette County Sheriff, Deputy Larry
McGarvey.

During this investigation it is alleged that Appellant-Petitioner, sold
drugs to the CI in numerous “controlled buys,” in Fayette County,
Ohio. On two occasions the CI drove himself to the location without
a valid driver’s license. During other alleged transactions, the CI
was escorted by drug task force officers. Also the CI was wearing a
recording device. It was discovered during trial that the recording
device had a malfunction, which resulted in a partial or no recording
of some of the alleged buys.

This CI, used by the authorities, was a known drug addict and
alcoholic. He was also paid for his work, and this pay increased once
he agreed to testify at trial. At no time in any of the recording, (sic)
does the CI identify the Appellant-Petitioner or that he went to those
locations specifically to see him. One of the task force handlers, Det.
Brown, stated he observed the CI under the influence of alcohol,
when he was making a controlled buy.

The CI’s trial testimony was the only he [sic] identified (sic)
Appellant-Petitioner was the seller of the drugs. The same CI, who
is an admitted liar and an addict, being paid to buy drugs. It was
noted, all the drugs he was paid to purchase all came back to the
handler, short on weight. All the relevant video footage fails to
conclusively show the drug transactions and who is involved.

The State presented evidence, through the video footage, and CI was
permitted to testify to, portions of the video, that represented
transactions, for the counts that were later dismissed. It was not until
the State presented the entire video footage and subpoenaed the
testimony from the CI, then did not dispute the issue to dismiss the
affected counts, nor did it move to admonish the jury. This created
grounds for a mistrial. Without the dismissed counts, and the
evidence presented to support those counts, there is no material
evidence to support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The CI’s
testimony was impeached when he was paid and admitted to being
an addict.

Ground Three: Appellant-Petitioner was denied his Fifth and Sixth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, rights to a fair trial and
effective assistance of trial counsel.

Supporting Facts: The State presented a large number of
documents in response to the demand for discovery. Trial counsel
failed to reasonably investigate possible issues regarding the validity
of the search warrant(s). On May 18, 2018, Fayette County Sheriff,
Det. Larry McGarvey filed an affidavit in support of a search
warrant. Had trial counsel conducted a minimal investigation into
the alleged facts, would have discovered the facts were false (sic)
and “stale.” Counsel would have discovered the search warrant was
issued, based upon fraud, by Det. Larry McGarvey.

The search warrant was issued for the placement of a tracking
device, for a 2005 black Lincoln, which listed Petitioner, as the
vehicle owner, and a false Ohio vehicle registration, that had not
been associated on that vehicle for over 6 months.

Further reading the documents would have uncovered that Police
Reports for some officers was missing (sic), and the ones presented
were falsified and contained information that contradicts each other,
on material facts. A simple reading of the discovery documents
would have given counsel needed facts for questioning and
impeaching the testimony of the State’s witnesses.

Trial counsel failed to investigate, which lead (sic) to failures in
seeking exculpatory evidence, that could have exonerated this
Petitioner. Specifically, the missing “dash cam” video footage, that
represent the alleged pursuit and throwing of items from the driver’s
side window, could support the defense Petitioner was alleged to
have taken the police on a chase. All marked Sheriff cruisers are
equipped with the dash mounted, video recording system, and
actuated when the officer turns on his lights.

The previously mentioned issue, the inadmissible lab reports, is also
an example of counsel’s lack of being prepared. The validity of the
alleged control substance, being investigated, could have been
litigated in a pre-trial proceeding. Trial counsel made no effort to
investigate or prepare any pre-trial challenge to the illegal stop and
arrest, in Clinton County, outside the Deputy’s jurisdiction. There
was no traffic violation, or proof of any felony violation during their
surveillance.

Ground Four: Appellant-Petitioner was denied his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, rights to a fair
trial and due process, by the (sic) prosecutorial misconduct.

Supporting Facts: The misconduct by the prosecution and asst.
prosecuting attorney begins with several acts of fraud.

Several members of the Fayette County Sheriff’s office lied and
submitted false Police Reports regarding their alleged contact with
the Petitioner. The clear act of fraud is the intentional statement
alleging all criminal acts took place within Fayette County. The
Police Reports state that Petitioner’s possession of cocaine, on June
29, 2018, was in Jasper Township, Fayette County, Ohio, not in
Clinton County, Ohio. This info was presented as fact to the Fayette
County grand jury to secure an indictment.

Other acts were falsified by various members of the prosecution
team, include (sic) the suppression of “dash cam” video footage.
Without this evidence, the State witnesses (sic) could testify to
anything, unchecked, but collabarated (sic) by the testimony of other
law enforcement. The State presented testimony that Petitioner’s
alleged criminal conduct in Dayton, Ohio, was observed through
airplane surveillance, also equipped with recording system. Any
evidence of this air surveillance is material and exculpatory, and
should have been disclosed in discovery.

This prosecutorial misconduct also includes the intentional
presentation of inadmissible evidence in the video footage of the
alleged controlled buys. At no time in any video footage is the
Petitioner identified as the seller of drugs. Further, the testimony of
the CI, regarding these transactions, contradict (sic) the testimony
of the State’s law enforcement witnesses. The Prosecution team
presented affidavits to Judicial officers, which contained false
information.

(Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 10-27).
Analysis

Respondent asserts that the only claims reviewable on the merits in this proceeding are
those fairly presented to the Twelfth District on direct appeal and that all other claims are
procedurally defaulted (Return, ECF No. 9, PageID 705). Petitioner responds that ordinary
processes in the prison were disrupted by delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Reply, ECF

No. 11).

Factual Background

In the course of deciding Adkins’ direct appeal, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals made
the following findings of fact:
{¶ 2} In July 2018, the Fayette County Grand Jury indicted appellant
on 27 felony drug-related offenses. These charges arose out of an
investigation from January to June 2018 concerning crack cocaine
sales appellant made to a confidential informant. The investigation
culminated in a traffic stop and arrest by members of the Fayette
County Sheriff's Office in Clinton County, Ohio. On the day of the
traffic stop, the confidential informant had made a large purchase of
crack cocaine from appellant. Undercover officers then tracked
appellant as he travelled from his home to a suspected drug supplier
in Dayton, Ohio. As part of this operation, marked patrol units had
been staged to intercept appellant as he returned to Fayette County.
However, en route back, appellant changed course and headed into
Clinton County. Believing that appellant was heading to a friend's
house, the lead officer ordered the marked patrol units to
immediately effect a traffic stop. When deputies sought to stop
appellant a car chase ensued. Pursuing deputies apprehended
appellant after he tried to escape off-road. At no point during this
pursuit was appellant in Fayette County.
{¶ 3} Appellant entered a not guilty plea and the case proceeded to
a jury trial in February 2019. At trial, the state called nine witnesses,
including the confidential informant, the various law enforcement
officers involved, and an Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation
(“BCI”) forensic scientist. In addition to the witnesses, the state
presented BCI laboratory reports to identify the substances as
containing cocaine and video recordings of the drug buys.

{¶ 4} At the close of the state's case-in-chief, appellant objected to
the admission of several laboratory reports because the documents
lacked the notarized statement required by statute. The trial court
sustained the objection. As a result, the trial court granted appellant's
Crim.R. 29 motion for the 12 offenses (Counts 2-7 and 10-15)
involving the inadmissible laboratory reports. The jury found
appellant guilty on the remaining 15 counts, alleging engaging in a
pattern of corrupt activity, possession of cocaine, and trafficking in
cocaine.

State v. Adkins, 2020-Ohio-535 (12th Dist. Feb. 178, 2020).
Adkins takes issue with these findings and claims instead:
The so-called investigation includes crack cocaine sales by a
confidential informant ("CI"), who was an addict. Further review of
the investigation shows that the "CI" only identified Petitioner
during trial. At no time on video or recording does he acknowledge
Mr. Adkins as the person he was dealing with. On the day of the
traffic stop and arrest, Mr. Adkins was followed to his sister's home
in Dayton, Ohio. At no time did any of the law enforcement officers
verify who lived at the Dayton address. Nothing presented at trial
was ever authenticated. Petitioner was unlawfully stopped outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the Fayette County Sheriff. The record
of events has been altered to fit the Prosecution's theory. The Trial
Court permitted the amendment of the indictment to include Clinton
County, Ohio. The Sheriff did attempt to stop the vehicle in Clinton
County, however the testimony gave mistaken impression to the
Jury to believe he was pursued from Fayette County into Clinton
County.

The fact is, Defense Counsel did object prior to the end of the State's
case to the use of the Lab Reports. The Objection was Overruled by
the Court, and later the Counts related to the inadmissible lab reports
were dismissed. Petitioner was prejudiced by the fact that video
footage of those alleged transactions were already viewed by the
Jury. Without seeing that video evidence, the State lacked sufficient
evidence to convict on those counts. The Jury was permitted to view
evidence that the trial determined was inadmissible.

(Reply, ECF No. 741-42).

Findings of fact made by the state courts are presumed to be correct in later habeas corpus
proceedings unless the petitioner proves they are rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e). The evidence on which the petitioner relies for rebuttal must be already present
in the state court record. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). Here the Petitioner has given
the Court no record references to show that his version of the facts clearly rebuts the findings of
the Twelfth District, despite the fact that Petitioner has been furnished with the same copy of the
trial transcript that has been furnished to the Court. For example, where in the record is it proved
that the confidential informant was an alcoholic and an addict1?

Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In his First Ground for Relief, Adkins claims he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel when his trial attorney (1) failed to file a motion to suppress and (2) failed to move to
dismiss Counts 2-7 and 10-15 on the basis that they were supported by inadmissible laboratory
reports which had not been notarized.
Adkins presented these two claims as his first two assignments of error on direct appeal.
In deciding them the Twelfth District recited the generally applicable Sixth Amendment standard
from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). As to the first assignment of error, it found
that the underlying claim that evidence had been unlawfully seized by deputies from Fayette
County in Clinton County would not have been successful if raised by motion to suppress.

1 Presumably Petitioner intends to assert the CI was addicted to some other substance of abuse in addition to alcohol.
{¶ 13} Regarding the first assignment, the “failure to file a motion
to suppress constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel only when
the record establishes that the motion would have been successful if
made.” State v. Brown, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2002-03-026,
2002-Ohio-5455, ¶ 11. Relevant for our purposes, R.C.
2935.03(A)(1) provides that a

sheriff [or] deputy sheriff * * * shall arrest and detain, until
a warrant can be obtained, a person found violating, within
the limits of the political subdivision, * * * in which the
peace officer is appointed, employed, or elected, a law of
this state, an ordinance of a municipal corporation, or a
resolution of a township.

{¶ 14} It is with the limited “hot pursuit” exception provided in R.C.
2935.03(D) that these peace officers may conduct a warrantless
arrest and detention of an individual outside their territorial
jurisdiction. Appellant suggests that the “hot pursuit” exception is
inapplicable because the Fayette County deputies' pursuit was not
initiated within Fayette County. Nevertheless, R.C. 2935.03 does
not provide a remedy for instances when peace officers violate the
statute by effecting a warrantless arrest outside their territorial
jurisdiction and the Ohio Supreme Court has refused to adopt its
own remedy for a violation of this statute. State v. Jones, 121 Ohio
St.3d 103, 2009-Ohio-316, ¶ 21. Therefore, appellant's reliance on
R.C. 2935.03 is misplaced. A violation of R.C. 2935.03 does not
require the exclusion of evidence. Id.; State v. Weideman, 94 Ohio
St.3d 501, 2002-Ohio-1484, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v.
Dallman, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2017-11-056 and CA2017-
11-057, 2018-Ohio-2670, ¶ 32. Any motion to suppress based on
this statutory violation alone would not have been successful.

State v. Adkins, supra.
The question of whether the seizures made by these Fayette County deputies were required
to be suppressed for the reason Adkins argues – because they were acting outside Fayette County
– is a question of Ohio law. The Twelfth District decided that question adversely to Adkins’
position and its decision on this point of Ohio law is binding on this Court. Bradshaw v. Richey,
546 U.S. 74 (2005). It cannot be ineffective assistance of trial counsel to fail to file a motion to
suppress which would have been unsuccessful. Thus the first branch of Adkins’ First Ground for
Relief is without merit.
Regarding the second claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Twelfth District’s
decision is also dispositive. Adkins is correct that, as a matter of Ohio law, the lab reports in
question could not be admitted in evidence without a notarized signature, as the Twelfth District

confirmed. But as it also noted, a motion to dismiss based on the absence of the notarizations
would almost certainly have been unsuccessful because the prosecutor could easily have obtained
the notarizations. Even if it had been successful, nothing would have prevented the prosecutor
from obtaining new notarized statements and reindicting. By withholding the objection until it
was too late for the prosecutor to do either of those things, defense counsel achieved a final
dismissal of the relevant charges. Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is sworn. Martinez
v. Illinois, 134 S. Ct. 2070 (2014); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). Therefore no reindictment
was possible.
Adkins claims that dismissal before trial would have kept the jury from learning about the

conduct underlying the dismissed charges. Not so. Because these other acts were part of a course
of criminal conduct, testimony about them could have been introduced under Ohio R. Evid. 404
even if ultimately there could not have been a conviction because of the absence of the notarization.
When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a
federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is
contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the
United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.
Ct. 770, 785 (2011); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-
94 (2002); Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000). Here the Twelfth District’s
decision on Adkins first two assignments of error was a reasonable application of Strickland. On
that basis, Adkins’ First Ground for Relief should be dismissed.

Ground Two: Insufficient Evidence

In his Second Ground for Relief, Adkins claims the evidence on which his conviction is
based was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Adkins raised this claim as his
Third Assignment of Error on direct appeal which the Twelfth District decided together with his
Fourth Assignment, a manifest weight of the evidence claim. The appellate court decided those
claims as follows:
{¶ 25} In his third and fourth assignments of error, appellant argues
that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of engaging
in a pattern of corrupt activity and the multiple drug offenses,
therefore the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for
acquittal. Appellant further argues that the guilty verdicts were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of these
claims, appellant argues that it was improper for the jury to believe
the confidential informant's testimony.

{¶ 26} The standard of review for a denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion
is the same standard used for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge. State v. Robinson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-01-013,
2015-Ohio-4533, ¶ 37. On a sufficiency challenge, the reviewing
court must determine whether the prosecution has met its burden of
production. State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-06-012,
2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34. Therefore, the reviewing court must examine
the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2012-
02-017 and CA2012-02-018, 2012-Ohio-4644, ¶ 25.

{¶ 27} On the other hand, a manifest weight of the evidence
challenge requires the reviewing court to examine the “inclination
of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to
support one side of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Barnett,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. In
conducting this examination, a reviewing court must look at the
entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in
resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v.
Sizemore, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-01-006, 2019-Ohio-4400,
¶ 21. While a manifest weight of the evidence review requires this
court to evaluate credibility, the determination of witness credibility
is primarily for the trier of fact to decide. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. A reviewing court
will overturn a conviction based on a manifest weight challenge only
in the exceptional instance, to correct a manifest miscarriage of
justice, where the evidence weighs heavily in favor of acquittal.
State v. Wilson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-01-007, 2007-Ohio-
2298, ¶ 34. The determination that a conviction is supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence will be dispositive of the sufficiency
of the evidence challenge. State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2012-03-049, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 19.

{¶ 28} The jury found appellant guilty of both trafficking in cocaine
and possession of cocaine. Appellant was charged with two different
types of trafficking offenses. For six of the trafficking offenses, the
prosecution had to prove that appellant knowingly sold or offered to
sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog. R.C.
2925.03(A)(1). For the remaining trafficking offense, the
prosecution had to prove that appellant knowingly prepared for
shipment, shipped, transported, delivered, prepared for distribution,
or distributed a controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog, when the offender knew or had reasonable cause to believe
that the controlled substance or a controlled substance analog was
intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person. R.C.
2925.03(A)(2). For each of the possession offenses, the prosecution
had to prove that appellant knowingly obtained, possessed, or used
a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog. R.C.
2925.11(A). In order for these offenses to constitute more serious
felonies the prosecution had to prove a certain mass, i.e. to constitute
a fourth-degree felony the cocaine had to be at least 5 grams but less
than 10 grams and to constitute a first-degree felony the substance
containing cocaine had to be at least 27 grams but less than 100
grams. R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(c) and (f).4 Finally, appellant was
charged with a major drug offender specification on count 26,
therefore the prosecution had to prove that the transaction involved
a substance containing cocaine of more than 100 grams. R.C.
2925.03(C)(4)(g).
¶ 29} After review of the record, we find that the guilty verdicts
were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury heard
the confidential informant testify that on each occasion he met
appellant at either his home or a nearby hotel and exchanged money
for crack cocaine. The informant testified that he only received the
crack cocaine from appellant in these transactions. In addition to the
confidential informant, the jury heard from three detectives involved
in the investigation. These detectives testified that on each occasion
the confidential informant was physically searched by one of the
detectives and then driven by a detective to the sale location. During
the operation, the informant was under law enforcement supervision
except for the short time he would leave the vehicle to conduct the
purchases. Upon coming back to the vehicle, all the witnesses
involved in the operation testified that the informant would give the
crack cocaine to the detective escorting him. These detectives,
together with the detective assigned to evidence room supervision,
testified as to the chain of custody for the substances received from
these transactions. Moreover, the prosecution presented video
recordings taken from a device the informant carried into several of
his “buys.” In these videos, appellant can be identified as the person
meeting with the informant. Finally, the state presented laboratory
reports from the BCI identifying the purchased substances as
containing cocaine and their various weights. Altogether, this
evidence demonstrated that appellant knowingly possessed and sold
crack cocaine to the informant in six transactions, two of which
involved substances with a mass of 5.5 grams and 35.44 grams.
Appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the jury believed the testimony of the
prosecution's witnesses. State v. Burrell, 12th Dist. Fayette No.
CA2016-04-005, 2016-Ohio-8454, ¶ 22.

{¶ 30} For the R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) trafficking offense and major
drug offender specification, the prosecution presented testimony
from the deputies involved in the traffic stop. One deputy testified
that during the pursuit, he saw appellant dumping objects out of his
window. In searching the field, deputies discovered two bags of
suspected cocaine on the ground near the tire tracks created by
appellant's vehicle. The prosecution presented photographs taken of
the two bags at the scene. To identify the substances, the prosecution
called the BCI forensic scientist to testify, in addition to submitting
her laboratory report. The scientist testified that through her testing
she determined the substances contained cocaine and the substance
from one bag weighed around 53.78 grams and the other weighed
around 52.93 grams. Therefore, this evidence again demonstrated
that appellant knowingly trafficked cocaine in an amount of more
than 100 grams.
{¶ 31} Finally, to find appellant guilty of engaging in a pattern of
corrupt activity, the prosecution had to prove that he conducted or
participated in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of corrupt activity, or the collection of an unlawful
debt, as part of his employment or association with that enterprise.
R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). An enterprise includes an individual. R.C.
2923.31(C). Corrupt activity is defined, inter alia, as engaging in
conduct constituting a violation of R.C. 2925.03 and the proceeds
from one of the violations or a combination of the violations exceeds
$1,000. R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c). A pattern of corrupt activity means
two or more instances of corrupt activity, whether or not there is a
prior conviction, related to the affairs of the same enterprise. R.C.
2923.31(E). Here, the jury heard evidence as to the various amounts
of money the confidential informant paid for the separate
transactions of crack cocaine. In his final transaction alone, the
informant paid around $1,800 for crack cocaine, altogether the
informant paid over $2,000 for the combination of transactions.
Moreover, a detective testified that appellant admitted during an
interview to paying his supplier $4,400 on the day of his arrest.
Therefore, based on the testimony of the amounts paid and the guilty
verdicts for the multiple possession and trafficking offenses, it was
not a manifest injustice for the jury to find appellant guilty of
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.

{¶ 32} Accordingly, the jury did not clearly lose its way and create
a manifest miscarriage of justice. Given our determination that
appellant's convictions were supported by the manifest weight of the
evidence, we conclude that the there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's findings of guilt. State v. Bates, 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2009-06-174, 2010-Ohio-1723, ¶ 11. Appellant's third and
fourth assignments of error are overruled.

State v. Adkins, supra.
As noted above, when a state court decides a constitutional question later presented in
habeas corpus, the habeas court must defer to the state court unless the state court’s decision is an
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor,
supra. A claim that a verdict is supported by insufficient evidence states a claim for habeas relief
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). A weight of the
evidence claim is not a federal constitutional claim. Johnson v. Havener, 534 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir.
1986).
However, a state court finding that the verdict is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence implicitly also holds that there is sufficient evidence. Nash v. Eberlin, 258 Fed. Appx.
761, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29645 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2007); Ross v. Miller, No. 1:10-cv-1185,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65082 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2011)(White, M.J.); Hughes v. Warden, No.

1:10-cv-091, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54131 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011)(Merz, M.J.). The Twelfth
District recognized this in ¶ 32 of its decision.
In cases such as Petitioner’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and filed after
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214)(the “AEDPA”), two levels of deference to state decisions are required:
In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner
challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to
convict him, we are thus bound by two layers of deference to groups
who might view facts differently than we would. First, as in all
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine
whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for
that of the jury. See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th
Cir. 1993). Thus, even though we might have not voted to convict a
defendant had we participated in jury deliberations, we must uphold
the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the
prosecution. Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier
of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer to the state appellate
court's sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). In a sufficiency of the evidence habeas corpus
case, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact's verdict under Jackson v. Virginia and then to
the appellate court's consideration of that verdict, as commanded by AEDPA. Tucker v. Palmer,
541 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2008); accord Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)(en banc);
Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012).
The Magistrate Judge concludes the Twelfth District’s decision on the weight of the
evidence is entitled to deference because it is not an unreasonable application of the Jackson

standard. Adkins’ Petition emphasizes the many ways in which the credibility of the confidential
informant was undermined on cross-examination, but the credibility of witnesses is for the jury to
decide and they clearly decided to believe him.
Therefore Adkins’ Second Ground for Relief should be dismissed on the merits.

Ground Three: Denial of a Fair Trial and Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In his Third Ground for Relief, Adkins claims he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel because his attorney did not investigate the facts underlying Deputy McGarvey’s search

warrant affidavit and the missing dash cam footage which could have been exculpatory.
Adkins first presented this claim to the Ohio courts in his Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21 (State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 15, PageID 190-
92). That was appropriate because it depends on facts outside the appellate record. Ohio has two
mutually exclusive remedies for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. If the claim depends on
evidence in the appellate record and can therefore be decided on direct appeal, the claim must be
raised there or be barred by res judicata. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175 (1967). On the other
hand, if the claim depends on evidence dehors (outside) the appellate record, it must be presented
in a post-conviction petition.
Defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains many assertions of fact outside
the appellate record. It also refers to an affidavit from Petitioner which is not in fact attached in
the State Court Record. Assuming there was such an affidavit, it would plainly contain information
outside the appellate record, presumably relating to what Adkins knew of his attorney’s
investigation.

Respondent asserts the claims made in Ground Three are barred by Petitioner’s procedural
default in failing to timely appeal from the dismissal of the Petition by the Common Pleas Court.
Petitioner responds
Petitioner's efforts to meet certain deadlines were hindered by the
prison lock-down and the national pandemic, Covid-19. He made
several 'good faith' attempts to file every document timely.
Petitioner, was prejudiced by this extraordinary situation, that
brought this country to a halt. There are still sectors of the economy
that have not and may not come back. This court will see that
Petitioner's filings were hand written, as the prison law library was
unavailable for the first 8 months of the pandemic. Upon a slow and
limited access to material, petitioner still managed to submit most
of his filing timely. There is clear "cause' and "prejudice" here,
petitioner demonstrates that he was diligent in his efforts to meet all
scheduled filings. Petitioner can further show that external elements
dealing with Outgoing Inmate Mail during that time also prevented
timely filings. Ohio DRC requires that to apply postage to outgoing
mail, inmates must submit Check-Out slip for payment of postage
to the prison Cashier's office. During the heart of this pandemic,
petitioner waited sometimes 60+ days to have his mail processed.

(Reply, ECF No. 11, PageID 745-46).

The State Court Record shows Judge Breathard entered judgment on the post-conviction
petition on February 2, 2021, and ordered the Clerk to serve a copy on Adkins (Amended
Judgment, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 17, PageID 203-04). Adkins filed his Motion for
Delayed Appeal on March 11, 2021. Id. at Ex. 21. That Motion was filed simultaneously with the
Notice of Appeal. Id. at Ex. 20. Those simple facts seriously undermine his claim that the
pandemic prevented his timely filing of his Notice of Appeal. The content of a notice of appeal is
very simple: “I appeal from X judgment.” Adkins’ own Notice of Appeal here was prepared by
his filling in a pre-printed form and changing the court to which the appeal was taken from the
Second District to the Twelfth District. Id. No legal research or printing was required. Adkins’
Motion for Delayed Appeal is handwritten, but did not require any legal research. Nor was it

rejected because it was somehow illegible, but because Ohio appellate courts do not have
jurisdiction (authority/power) to grant a delayed appeal.
The procedural default doctrine in habeas corpus is described by the Supreme Court as
follows:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims
in state court pursuant to an adequate and independent state
procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless
the prisoner can demonstrate cause of the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 406
(6th Cir. 2000). That is, a petitioner may not raise on federal habeas a federal constitutional rights
claim he could not raise in state court because of procedural default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982). “Absent cause and prejudice, ‘a federal
habeas petitioner who fails to comply with a State’s rules of procedure waives his right to federal
habeas corpus review.’” Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 716 (6th Cir. 2000), quoting Gravley v.
Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1996); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Engle,
456 U.S. at 110; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
[A] federal court may not review federal claims that were
procedurally defaulted in state court—that is, claims that the state
court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural
rule. E.g., Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55, 130 S.Ct. 612, 175
L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). This is an important “corollary” to the
exhaustion requirement. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392, 124
S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed. d 659 (2004). “Just as in those cases in which
a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner
who has failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements for
presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an
opportunity to address” the merits of “those claims in the first
instance.” Coleman [v. Thompson], 501 U.S. [722,] 731-732, 111
S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 [(1991)]. The procedural default
doctrine thus advances the same comity, finality, and federalism
interests advanced by the exhaustion doctrine. See McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991).

Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017). “[A] federal court may not review federal claims
that were procedurally defaulted in state courts.” Theriot v. Vashaw, 982 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 2020),
citing Maslonka v. Hoffner, 900 F.3d 269, 276 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting
Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017)).
To the extent Adkins is claiming that the COVID-19 pandemic is excusing cause for his
not timely appealing the denial of his post-conviction petition, his claim is not persuasive. For the
reasons given above, preparation of a notice of appeal is a simple matter: one sheet of paper and
no legal research. Adkins claims he made several good faith efforts to file papers in a timely
fashion, but he offers no detail about what efforts he made to file the Notice of Appeal on time.
Nor does he offer any corroboration of his supposed efforts or of how the pandemic affected his
particular prison at the particular time in question.2
Time limits on appeal are an adequate and independent state law basis for denying relief.
Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 2004)(citations omitted). Lack of counsel at that
stage, lack of a trial transcript, unfamiliarity with the English language, and short time for legal
research in prison do not establish cause to excuse this default. Bonilla, citing Murray v. Carrier,

2 The Court notes that Adkins has complained loudly about the lack of corroboration of the confidential informant’s
testimony. He thereby at least implicitly confirms that uncorroborated testimony is not always completely persuasive.
477 U.S. 478, 494-95 (1986).
On this basis, the Magistrate Judge concludes Adkins’ Third Ground for Relief is barred
by his procedural default in failing to timely appeal from denial of his post-conviction petition.

Ground Four: Prosecutorial Misconduct

In his Fourth Ground for Relief, Adkins claims he was denied due process and a fair trial
by prosecutorial misconduct consisting of presenting false police reports to the grand jury,
suppressing the dashboard camera footage, not providing the results of aerial surveillance (which
is alleged to be exculpatory), presentation of inadmissible video footage of alleged controlled buys,
and presenting false affidavits to judges to obtain search warrants.
Respondent argues these claims are procedurally defaulted because they could have been
adjudicated on direct appeal but were not presented to the Twelfth District in that proceeding
(Return, ECF No. 9, PageID 735, et seq). Petitioner offers no response on this point but argues

briefly the substance of his claim that failure to disclose the dash cam footage was a violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Adkins appears to have raised some of these claims for the first time in his Application to
Reopen the Appeal under Ohio R. App. P. 26(B). For example, the claimed Brady violation about
the dash cam footage and the allegation of falsified police reports appear in that filing (State Court
Record, ECF No. 8, PageID 210). Raising these claims as ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claims, which is the sole purpose of App. R. 26(B), does not preserve the underlying
claims. The question for this Court is whether the Twelfth District’s decision of the 26(B)
Application was a reasonable application of Strickland.
The governing standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is found in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has
two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.

466 U.S. at 687. In other words, to establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both
deficient performance and prejudice. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 389 (2010), citing
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.111 (2009).
With respect to the first prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court has commanded:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at
the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
considered sound trial strategy."

466 U.S. at 689.
As to the second prong, the Supreme Court held: “The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to overcome
confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184
(1986), citing Strickland, supra.; Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 319 (6th Cir. 1998), citing
Strickland, supra; Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1987), quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”
Storey v. Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2011), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

86, 111-12 (2011).
In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether
a court can be certain counsel's performance had no effect on the
outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have
been established if counsel acted differently. See Wong v.
Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27, 130 S. Ct. 383, 175 L. Ed. 2d 328
(2009) (per curiam); Strickland, 466 U.S., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is “reasonably
likely” the result would have been different. Id., at 696, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. This does not require a showing that
counsel's actions “more likely than not altered the outcome,” but the
difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-
probable-than-not standard is slight and matters “only in the rarest
case.” Id., at 693, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The
likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable. Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-112 (2011).
The Strickland standard applies to evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. The Strickland test applies to appellate counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285
(2000); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987). To evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, then, the court must assess the strength of the claim that counsel failed to raise.
Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2011), citing Wilson v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 707 (6th
Cir. 2008). Counsel's failure to raise an issue on appeal amounts to ineffective assistance only if a
reasonable probability exists that inclusion of the issue would have changed the result of the
appeal. Id., citing Wilson. If a reasonable probability exists that the defendant would have
prevailed had the claim been raised on appeal, the court still must consider whether the claim's
merit was so compelling that the failure to raise it amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. Id., citing Wilson. The attorney need not advance every argument, regardless of merit,
urged by the appellant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-752 (1983)("Experienced advocates
since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments

on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." 463 U.S.
751-52). Effective appellate advocacy is rarely characterized by presenting every non-frivolous
argument which can be made. Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 441 (6th Cir. 2003). Williams v.
Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 971 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1003 (2005); see Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527 (1986). “Only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented will the
presumption of effective assistance of [appellate] counsel be overcome.” Dufresne v. Palmer, 876
F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2017), quoting Fautenberry v. Mitchell, 515 F.3d 614, 642 (6th Cir. 2008).
In denying Adkins’ 26(B) application, the Twelfth District held
counsel's failure to argue those issues appellant presents in his
application does not raise a genuine issue as to whether counsel was
ineffective since counsel is not required to present every imaginable
issue on direct appeal. Counsel reasonably did not raise the issues
appellant now seeks to raise because on appeal, counsel must
"winnow out weaker arguments" and focus on key issues and
arguments. State v. Monford, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-274,
2012-Ohio-5247, 1119.

(Entry Denying Application to Reopen Appeal, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 19, PageID
220). The Twelfth District specifically cited to Strickland and Jones v. Barnes as controlling
precedent. Id.
The Magistrate Judge concludes that the Twelfth District’s decision on the 26(B)
Application is a completely reasonable application of Strickland and is therefore entitled to
deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because Adkins has not shown it was ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel to fail to present the omitted assignments of error which he now
pleads under Ground Four, he cannot rely on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as excusing
cause for not presenting these claims on direct appeal. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000).
Moreover, there is no indication in the State Court Record that Adkins ever appealed to the Ohio

Supreme Court from denial of his 26(B) Application which makes any claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel procedurally defaulted. On these two bases, the Fourth Ground for
Relief should be dismissed.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends that the
Petition herein be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with
this conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and

that the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should
not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

September 24, 2021.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378668. Public record. Not legal advice.