# Harmon v. Warden, Lebanon Correctional Institution

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 8, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378553

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 8, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

TONY L. HARMON,

Petitioner, : Case No. 2:21-cv-2745

- vs - District Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

WARDEN,
Lebanon Correctional Institution,

:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Tony Harmon under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, is before the Court for decision on the merits. The relevant pleadings are the Petition (ECF
No. 1), the State Court Record (ECF No. 4), and Respondent’s Answer/Return of Writ (ECF No.
5). The Court set a date for Petitioner to file a reply/traverse of twenty-one days after the Return
was filed (Order, ECF No. 2, PageID 25). That time expired August 16, 20211, but Petitioner has
filed no reply.
The Magistrate Judge reference in this case was recently transferred to the undersigned to
help balance the Magistrate Judge workload in this judicial district.

1 Twenty-one days from July 22, 2021, plus three days because Petitioner was served with the Return by mail.
Litigation History

On September 9, 2017, the Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on one count of
attempted murder in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2923.02/2903.02 (Count 1); one count of
felonious assault in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.11 (Count 2); and one count of kidnapping
in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2905.01 (Count Three). Each count carried a specification that

Harmon was a repeat violent offender (Indictment, State Court Record, ECF No. 4, Ex. 1).
The case was tried to a jury and both Harmon and the victim testified. On September 28, 2018,
the jury found Harmon guilty on all counts and specifications. The trial court then merged the
attempted murder and felonious assault counts under Ohio Revised Code § 2941.25 and sentenced
Harmon to eleven years in prison for attempted murder; three years in prison for kidnapping; and two
years in prison as a repeat violent offender. All sentences were to be served consecutively for an
aggregate prison term of 16 years. (Sentencing Entry, Case No. 17CR-4910, Exhibit 7, ECF No. 4,
PageID 60).
Through new counsel, Harmon appealed, but the conviction was affirmed. State v. Harmon,
2020-Ohio-590 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Feb. 20, 2020), appellate jurisdiction declined, 158 Ohio St. 3d
1523, 2020-Ohio-3018, 145 N.E.3d 316 (2020).
Petitioner pleads the following grounds for habeas corpus relief:
Ground One: The verdicts were not supported by sufficient
evidence. Mr. Harmon’s protected rights of due process and equal
protection were violated Fifth and Fourth Amendment. U.S.C. (sic).

Supporting Facts: Harmon demonstrated by the preponderance of
the evidence that his actions were made in self-defense. That is, he
showed at trial that the victim arrived at Harmon’s apartment
unannounced and started threatening Harmon about not having the
money owed. Harmon demonstrated that the victim is known to
carry a gun on his person. The victim has a reputation as understood
by Harmon to use a gun when people don’t pay the money owed.
Harmon witnessed the victim reach for what he believed to be a gun.
Harmon used only the force which was necessary to repel the threat.
The State convicted Harmon on insufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction of attempted murder and repeat violent offender
specification. As self-defense negates a criminal conviction as it is
a affirmative defense, yet the State denied Harmon the equal
protection treatment of R.C. 2901.05

Ground Two: Ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Harmon’s
Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense was violated.

Supporting Facts: Counsel was ineffective because he could not
have been paying attention throughout the whole testimony of
Lavandon Smith.

Bryan Potts, defense counsel let the witness mention Mr. Harmon’s
prior incarceration five consecutive times before Richard Schanz,
the prosecutor stopped it. No competent attorney would have needed
the prosecutor to slow the things down so he could remember to
object. We know it is legitimate trial strategy not to draw more
attention to testimony with a curative instruction, but it cannot be
believed that this was strategic. The court asked counsel, “Do you
want me to tell the jury that we’re specifically striking that (any
reference to prison) and that they are to disregard it.” Mr. Potts
stated yes. At this point the mentioning of jail is still allowed. The
court, not Mr. Potts offered to strike the entire answer, counsel
agreed in an attempt to cure the potential error.

Ground Three: Trial court committed plain error when it did not
sua sponte declare a mistrial after a witness repeatedly mentioned
Mr. Harmon’s criminal record. Violated Fifth and Sixth
Amendment.

(Petition, ECF No. 1, PageID 5-7).
Analysis

Ground One: Conviction on Insufficient Evidence

In his First Ground for Relief, Petitioner asserts he was convicted on insufficient evidence.
From the supporting facts recited, it is clear Harmon believes he proved, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that he acted in self-defense, thus preventing a conviction for attempted murder.2
Harmon’s sufficiency of the evidence claim on direct appeal referred only to the
kidnapping conviction. State v. Harmon, supra, at ¶¶’s 29-33. Harmon presented his self-defense
argument to the Tenth District as a claim that his attempted murder conviction was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
An allegation that a verdict was entered upon insufficient evidence states a claim under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d
987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1990)(en banc). On the
other hand, a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence does not present a
federal constitutional claim. Johnson v. Havener, 534 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1986).
In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380 (1997), the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed
the important distinction between appellate review for insufficiency of the evidence and review on
the claim that the conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. It held:
In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence
is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v.

2 Harmon also pleads there was insufficient evidence to convict him of being a repeat violent offender. However, his
own admission about his prior convictions for attempted involuntary manslaughter and attempted aggravated robbery
are certainly sufficient under Ohio Revised Code § 2929.01(CC).
Robinson (1955), 162 Ohio St. 486, 55 O.O. 388, 124 N.E.2d 148.
In addition, a conviction based on legally insufficient evidence
constitutes a denial of due process. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,
45, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2220, 72 L.Ed.2d 652, 663, (1982), citing
Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560. Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment of
a trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may
nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the weight of the
evidence. Robinson, supra, 162 Ohio St. at 487, 55 O.O. at 388-
389, 124 N.E.2d at 149. Weight of the evidence concerns "the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a
trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It
indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof
will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their
minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence
sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is
not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing
belief." (Emphasis added.)

When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the
basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the
appellate court sits as a " 'thirteenth juror' " and disagrees with the
factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Tibbs, 457 U.S.
at 42, 102 S.Ct. at 2218, 72 L.Ed.2d at 661. See, also, State v. Martin
(1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 219, 485 N.E.2d
717, 720-721 ("The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new
trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be
exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.").

78 Ohio St. 3d at 387. In State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172 (Hamilton Cty. 1983)(cited
approvingly by the Supreme Court in Thompkins), Judge Robert Black contrasted the manifest
weight of the evidence claim:
In considering the claim that the conviction was against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the test is much broader. The court,
reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. …

Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, ¶3 of the syllabus.
Applying this distinction, the Magistrate Judge concludes Harmon has procedurally
defaulted on his First Ground for Relief because he never claimed in the Tenth District that there
was insufficient evidence to convict of attempted murder, but merely that the manifest weight of
the evidence was against conviction of that count.
To preserve a federal constitutional claim for presentation in habeas corpus, the claim must
be "fairly presented" to the state courts in a way which provides them with an opportunity to
remedy the asserted constitutional violation, including presenting both the legal and factual basis
of the claim. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006); Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d
1506, 1516 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 907 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds by
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Riggins v. McMackin, 935 F.2d 790, 792 (6th Cir.
1991). The claim must be fairly presented at every stage of the state appellate process. Wagner v.
Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir. 2009).
A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner
(1) relied upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis;
(2) relied upon state cases employing federal constitutional
analysis; (3) phrased the claim in terms of constitutional law or
in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific
constitutional right; or (4) alleged facts well within the
mainstream of constitutional law.

Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 418 (6th Cir. 2017). Harmon clearly did not present his self-defense
argument as a constitutional claim, but rather as a non-constitutional manifest weight claim.
On the other hand, if Harmon’s Third Assignment of Error on direct appeal were to be
treated as fairly presenting the sufficiency of the evidence argument, this Court would be bound
to defer to the Tenth District’s ruling unless it was an unreasonable application of clearly
established Supreme Court precedent. A state court finding that a verdict is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence implicitly also holds that there is sufficient evidence to support
the verdict. Nash v. Eberlin, 258 Fed. Appx. 761, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29645 (6th Cir. Dec. 14,
2007); Ross v. Miller, No. 1:10-cv-1185, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65082 (N.D. Ohio May 10,

2011)(White, M.J.); Hughes v. Warden, No. 1:10-cv-091, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54131 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 27, 2011)(Merz, M.J.).
In deciding the Third Assignment of Error, the Tenth District found:
{¶ 36} Harmon argues the jury's verdicts were against the manifest
weight of the evidence because he established he acted in self-
defense. Under the law at the relevant time, self-defense is an
affirmative defense that requires an accused to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he was not at fault in
creating the situation that gave rise to the altercation, (2) he had a
bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm and his only means of escape was the use of force, and
(3) he did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State
v. Reynolds, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-560, 2019-Ohio-2343, ¶ 34. These
elements are cumulative and if an accused fails to prove any one of
the elements by a preponderance of the evidence, he fails to
demonstrate that he acted in self-defense. Id. Harmon argues his
testimony established all of these elements by a preponderance of
the evidence and the jury lost its way in finding him guilty of the
charges against him.

{¶ 37} With respect to the third element of self-defense, the
evidence was undisputed that the altercation occurred in Harmon's
apartment. There is no duty to retreat from one's own home before
using force in self-defense. State v. Shine-Johnson, 10th Dist. No.
17AP-194, 2018-Ohio-3347, ¶ 11. However, with respect to the
other two elements of self-defense, we conclude the jury could
reasonably have concluded Harmon failed to establish he was not at
fault in creating the situation or had a bona fide belief that he was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and could only
escape through use of force. Harmon argues he was not at fault for
creating the situation giving rise to the altercation, asserting that
Smith's history of carrying a handgun and making threatening
statements led to the altercation. However, Smith denied threatening
Harmon and testified Harmon attacked him shortly after he entered
the apartment, while Smith was looking down at his phone.
Likewise, although Harmon argues he legitimately believed Smith
was carrying a gun and charged Smith as he was reaching for it, he
admitted at trial that he did not actually see a gun on Smith at the
time of the incident. Smith testified he was not carrying his gun
when he entered Harmon's apartment on June 23, 2017. The two
apartment complex employees who aided Smith after the incident
and Officer Callender who responded to the emergency call all
testified they did not see any weapons on Smith. The jury was in the
best position to determine the credibility of Harmon, Smith, and the
other witnesses, and was free to believe or disbelieve any or all of
the testimony relating to these issues. Reynolds at ¶ 36. Based on the
record before us, we cannot conclude the jury clearly lost its way in
rejecting Harmon's self-defense claim and concluding he was guilty
of the charges against him.

State v. Harmon, supra. As the Tenth District found, there was competent evidence from which
the jury could reasonably have rejected the self-defense claim.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), provides the standard for deciding a sufficiency
of the evidence claim:
[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . . This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; Smith v. Nagy, 962 F.3d 192, 205 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Jackson). There was indeed competent evidence from the victim himself to support Harmon’s
conviction. It is clear from the verdicts that the jury believed Smith and did not believe Harmon.
Questions of the credibility of witnesses are for the jury to resolve. Harmon has not persuaded
this Court that no reasonable juror could have believed Smith.
Accordingly, Harmon’s First Ground for Relief should be dismissed as procedurally
defaulted because it was never presented to the Tenth District as a federal constitutional claim.
Alternatively it is without merit because the Tenth District’s implicit decision that there was
sufficient evidence is not an unreasonable application of Jackson.

Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel: Failure to Object to Testimony
Referring to Harmon’s Prior Criminal Conduct

In his Second Ground for Relief, Harmon complains that his trial attorney did not object to
references to his prior criminal record. Harmon presented this claim to the Tenth District Court of
Appeals as his Second Assignment of Error and the Court decided it as follows:
A. Alleged Errors Resulting from References to Harmon's Prior
Criminal Record

{¶ 13} Harmon's first two assignments of error relate to statements
Smith made about Harmon's prior criminal record. On direct
examination at trial, Smith provided the following description of his
relationship with Harmon:

Q: Can you describe your relationship with Mr. Harmon a
little bit more in depth?

A: Yeah. Well, basically, he has a brother, his name is Eric.
Me and him grew up together since we were five. He plays
basketball, as well. Basically my mom getting in a
relationship with his uncle made us family. Me and Eric
was best friends 20 years, until this incident, basically at
this point.

He was in prison my whole time throughout our friendship,
and I would be over at Eric's house, playing video games,
things of that nature. He'll get a call from jail to talk to his
brother, or I might not come over on a certain weekend - -
I'm there every weekend - - because he had to go for a visit
to see his brother in prison. So I always knew his brother
was in prison. So we never had a relationship to that extent.
Recently, when he got out of prison, of course, when you
come home you want to be able to enjoy your life. Of
course, we're guys, we want to go to the bar, hang out,
things of that nature.
(Sept. 26, 2018 Tr. at 87-88.) Harmon's trial counsel objected to
Smith's testimony. The trial court then held a conference with
counsel outside the hearing of the jury. Harmon's trial counsel
moved to strike any references to prison. The prosecutor did not
object to the motion. The judge noted that instructing the jury that
any reference to prison would be stricken might serve to emphasize
the reference to Harmon's time in prison and suggested the entire
answer be stricken; Harmon's trial counsel agreed with the
suggestion. When the conference ended, the trial court instructed the
jury to disregard Smith's entire response.

{¶ 14} Smith made a second reference to Harmon's criminal record
in response to a question on cross-examination:

Q: Now, at the time you - - when did you first meet Mr.
Harmon?

A: It would be when he first got out of prison. I would say
- -
(Sept. 26, 2018 Tr. at 142.) At that point, the prosecutor objected
and the trial court struck Smith's response to the question.

{¶ 15} Harmon subsequently testified on his own behalf; during
direct examination Harmon stated he pled guilty to charges of
attempted involuntary manslaughter and attempted aggravated
robbery when he was younger. No further references to Harmon's
criminal record were made during trial.

* * *

{¶ 22} In his second assignment of error Harmon asserts his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a
mistrial or request a curative instruction in response to Smith's
references to Harmon's criminal record.

{¶ 23} Harmon must satisfy a two-prong test to prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he must demonstrate that
his trial counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio
St.3d 136, 141-42 (1989). Second, he must establish that the
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland at 687;
Bradley at 141-42. “To show that a defendant has been prejudiced
by counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that
there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” Bradley at
paragraph three of the syllabus. In considering claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we indulge in a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Strickland at 689; Bradley at 142.
“Decisions on trial strategy and tactics are generally afforded a wide
latitude of professional judgment, and it is not the duty of a
reviewing court to analyze trial counsel's legal tactics and
maneuvers.” State v. Phillips, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-79, 2014-Ohio-
5162, ¶ 86.

{¶ 24} Harmon argues his trial counsel's failure to request a curative
instruction in response to Smith's testimony cannot be considered
trial strategy. The record reflects that both times Smith referred to
Harmon's criminal record there was an objection to the testimony
and the trial court specifically instructed the jury to disregard the
statements. Additionally, when counsel and the trial court discussed
the final jury instructions to be given at the close of trial, the
prosecutor noted that Harmon's criminal record had been mentioned
during Smith's direct testimony and suggested Harmon's trial
counsel might want a curative instruction. Harmon's trial counsel
declined this suggestion and the trial court noted the jury had been
instructed to disregard the testimony at the time of the original
objections. Harmon appears to argue his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to request curative instructions that
went beyond telling the jury to disregard the statements.

{¶ 25} Although Smith's references to Harmon's criminal record
were inadmissible, the jury ultimately became aware of Harmon's
record through his own testimony. Under Evid.R. 609(A)(2),
evidence that an accused has been convicted of a crime is admissible
for purposes of attacking his credibility if the crime was punishable
by death or more than one year of imprisonment if the court finds
that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.
While Harmon argues he was effectively forced to testify because
of Smith's references to his prior criminal record, it is clear from the
opening statement of Harmon's trial counsel that self-defense would
form the crux of Harmon's defense against the charges. Because
Harmon and Smith were the only two witnesses to the altercation,
Harmon's testimony was necessary to establish his claim of self-
defense. In the final jury instructions, the trial court reiterated its
prior instruction that the jury was not permitted to consider
statements stricken by the court. The court also instructed the jury
that testimony related to Harmon's prior convictions could only be
considered to judge his credibility and the weight to be given to his
testimony.
*6 {¶ 26} Because the fact that Harmon had a criminal record would
ultimately become known to the jury, Harmon's trial counsel could
have reasonably concluded that a more specific curative instruction
that went beyond telling the jury to disregard Smith's statements
would only serve to draw further attention to Harmon's criminal
record. See, e.g., State v. Crowley, 2d Dist. No. 2009 CA 65, 2009-
Ohio-6689, at ¶ 15 (“Crowley's counsel properly objected to
Hopping's testimony regarding Crowley's history of domestic
violence against her. Although he did not request a limiting
instruction when that testimony was introduced, as discussed above,
counsel could have reasonably concluded that a limiting instruction
would merely emphasize the prejudicial testimony. Counsel's
conduct with respect to Crowley's 'other acts' was not ineffective.”).
Applying the appropriate standard of broad latitude for determining
what constitutes professional judgment, we cannot conclude
Harmon's trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to request a
more specific curative instruction.

{¶ 27} Harmon also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a mistrial following Smith's comments. As
explained above, we presume the jurors were able to follow the trial
court's instructions to disregard Smith's statements. Those
instructions effectively cured any error arising from Smith's
statements in the context of ineffective assistance. State v. Sullivan,
10th Dist. No. 10AP-997, 2011-Ohio-6384, ¶ 82. As such, a motion
for mistrial by Harmon's counsel would have been futile because the
trial court had cured the error and would not have been required to
grant the motion. Id. Failure to take a futile act cannot form the basis
for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor can such a failure
be prejudicial. Id. Therefore, we cannot conclude Harmon's trial
counsel performed deficiently by failing to move for a mistrial in
response to Smith's testimony.

{¶ 28} Accordingly, we overrule Harmon's second assignment of
error.

State v. Harmon, supra.
When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a
federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is
contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the
United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.
Ct. 770, 785 (2011); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-
94 (2002); Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000).
The governing standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is found in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has
two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel was
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.

466 U.S. at 687. In other words, to establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both
deficient performance and prejudice. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 389 (2010), citing
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.111 (2009).
With respect to the first prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court has commanded:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at
the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
considered sound trial strategy."

466 U.S. at 689.
As to the second prong, the Supreme Court held: “The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to overcome
confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184
(1986), citing Strickland, supra.; Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 319 (6th Cir. 1998), citing
Strickland, supra; Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1987), quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”
Storey v. Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2011), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 111-12 (2011).
In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether
a court can be certain counsel's performance had no effect on the
outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have
been established if counsel acted differently. See Wong v.
Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27, 130 S. Ct. 383, 175 L. Ed. 2d 328
(2009) (per curiam); Strickland, 466 U.S., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is “reasonably
likely” the result would have been different. Id., at 696, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. This does not require a showing that
counsel's actions “more likely than not altered the outcome,” but the
difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-
probable-than-not standard is slight and matters “only in the rarest
case.” Id., at 693, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The
likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable. Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-112 (2011).
In this case the Tenth District expressly relied on Strickland. It found that Harmon’s trial
attorney did object to Smith’s mention of Harmon’s criminal record and the trial judge did give an
appropriate curative instruction. As the Tenth District noted, a curative instruction which
expressly told the jury not to consider Harmon’s prior record would have called the jury’s attention
to that very fact. It was accordingly acceptable trial strategy to leave well enough alone.
Harmon argued to the Tenth District that Smith’s testimony about his prior prison time
virtually forced Harmon to testify. This is a completely unpersuasive argument. There were only
two eyewitnesses to the confrontation, Smith and Harmon. There was no conceivable way for
Harmon to establish the affirmative defense of self-defense, on which he had the burden of
production, without testifying himself. Once he took the stand, his prior felony record was fair
game on cross-examination. Presumably that is why he volunteered the prior conviction on direct

(See ¶ 15) rather than having it “exposed” on cross-examination.
The Tenth District’s decision on this ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is a
completely reasonable application of Strickland. Harmons’ Second Ground for Relief should
therefore be dismissed on the merits.

Ground Three: Failure of the Trial Court to Declare a Mistrial Sua Sponte

In this Third Ground for Relief, Harmon claims the trial judge violated his rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments when he did not sua sponte declare a mistrial after mention of

Harmon’s criminal record.
Harmon also raised this claim on direct appeal as his First Assignment of Error and the
Tenth District decided it as follows:
¶ 17} We review a trial court's failure to grant a mistrial sua sponte
under the plain error standard. State v. Griffin, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-
902, 2011-Ohio-4250, ¶ 13. Plain error exists when an error is plain
or obvious and affects a substantial right. Id. “In order to
demonstrate plain error, the defendant must show: (1) an error that
is plain on the record, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule that
constitutes an obvious defect in the trial proceedings; and (2) that
such error affected substantial rights, i.e., there was a reasonable
probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” State v.
Barrie, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-848, 2016-Ohio-5640, ¶ 32. Appellate
courts find plain error with the utmost caution, under exceptional
circumstances to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.
{¶ 18} “A mistrial should not be ordered in a cause simply because
some error has intervened. The error must prejudicially affect the
merits of the case and the substantial rights of one or both of the
parties.” Tingue v. State, 90 Ohio St. 368 (1914), paragraph three of
the syllabus. “Mistrials need be declared only when the ends of
justice so require and a fair trial is no longer possible.” State v.
Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127 (1991). “A trial court may grant a
mistrial sua sponte when there is manifest necessity for the mistrial
or when the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”
State v. Johnson, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-652, 2009-Ohio-3383, ¶ 30.

{¶ 19} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a trial court does
not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for mistrial based on an
isolated reference to a defendant's other criminal acts, when there is
an objection to the statement and a curative instruction is given. See
State v. Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 175 (“In
this case * * * the reference to Trimble's prior conviction was a brief
and isolated remark that was followed by a curative instruction. The
mere mention of Trimble's conviction, without more, did not
unfairly prejudice Trimble so as to require a mistrial.”); State v.
Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59 (1995) (“In this case, the reference to
the defendant's prior arrests was fleeting and was promptly followed
by a curative instruction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in failing to order a mistrial.”). This court has similarly found no
abuse of discretion in denial of a motion for mistrial when an
isolated reference to a defendant's other criminal acts draws an
objection that is sustained and followed by a curative instruction.
See State v. Brown, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-935, 2016-Ohio-7944, ¶ 21
(“[T]he trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to the
improper question [about the circumstances of a prior conviction]
before appellant responded and then struck the question from the
record. The trial court followed up with a short authoritative
instruction to the jury that they could not consider the prosecutor's
question ‘for any purpose in deciding this case.’ ”); State v.
Walburg, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1087, 2011-Ohio-4762, ¶ 53
(“Because the victim's reference to defendant's criminal occupations
was an isolated reference, the trial court immediately sustained
defendant's objection, and the court instructed the jury to disregard
the question and response, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial.”). In Walburg and
Brown, this court noted that a jury is presumed to follow a trial
court's curative instructions. Walburg at ¶ 53; Brown at ¶ 21. Thus,
where a brief reference to a defendant's other criminal acts is
immediately addressed through an objection and curative
instruction, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by concluding
a mistrial is not warranted.

{¶ 20} Although Harmon's trial counsel did not move for a mistrial,
we find this case to be similar to Trimble, Garner, Walburg, and
Brown. As in those cases, the references to Harmon's criminal
history were brief and were immediately addressed through
objections from counsel and curative instructions from the trial
court. The jury was presumed to follow those curative instructions.
Under these circumstances, the brief references to Harmon's
criminal record did not prevent him from having a fair trial, and the
trial court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte grant a mistrial
in response to Smith's statements.

{¶ 21} Accordingly, we overrule Harmon's first assignment of error.

State v. Harmon, supra.
While the Tenth District did not expressly rely on any Supreme Court precedent in deciding
this claim, its decision is completely consistent with relevant precedent. “There is no clearly
established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a state violates due process by permitting
propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence.” Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512
(6th Cir. 2003), noting that the Supreme Court refused to reach the issue in Estelle v. McGuire. 502
U.S. 62 (1991). Thus the Tenth District’s conclusion on this claim is neither contrary to nor an
objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Ground Three should be
dismissed on the merits.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the
Petition herein be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with
this conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and
that the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should
not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

September 8, 2021.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is recetved. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. #

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378553. Public record. Not legal advice.