# Premier Dealer Services, Inc. v. Allegiance Administrators, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 29, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378343

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 29, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

PREMIER DEALER SERVICE, INC.,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:18-cv-735
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
ALLEGIANCE ADMININSTRATORS,
LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Premier Dealer Service, Inc.’s (“PDS”) Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 100), Defendants Allegiance Administrators, LLC’s
(“Allegiance”) and Dimension Service Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
101), and Defendants’ Motion to Strike Exhibits and Arguments in Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 114). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. For the
following reasons, PDS’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART; Allegiance’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART; and Allegiance’s Motion to Strike is DENIED AS MOOT.
I. Background and Undisputed Material Facts
A. The Parties and the Automobile Service Contract Business
The Court set out the facts giving rise to this dispute in its November 6, 2018 Opinion
denying PDS’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties rely on the foundational testimony
from the preliminary injunction hearing in the instant motions for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Mot.
Summ. J. at 1 [“Pl.’s Mot”], ECF No. 100; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 6 [“Defs.’ Mot.”], ECF No.
101.) Thus, the Court will recount the undisputed facts established during the preliminary
injunction hearing. (Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 29.)
PDS and Allegiance compete as administrators of automobile service contracts (“Service
Contracts”). Service Contracts, commonly known as extended warranties, are agreements between

an obligor and a customer purchasing a vehicle. With any Service Contract, the obligor agrees to
repair or replace, for a specific coverage period, certain vehicle parts following a breakdown. The
Service Contracts must be backed by an insurance company, which works with the obligor and an
administrator to approve the terms and manage the risk. The total price of any Service Contract is
known as the “Dealer Cost.”
For the customers who enter a Service Contract, the lumpsum Dealer Cost is
straightforward. For the four other parties involved in any Service Contract (the obligor,
administrator, insurer, and dealer), however, Dealer Costs are comprised of several parts: first,
there is the marketing fee, which is set by the obligor and paid to the dealership that sold the
Service Contract; second, the administration fee, which is a flat fee negotiated between the obligor

and the administrator; third, the insurance fee, which a pre-selected insurer determines and
approves; fourth, the road assistance fee for which the obligor also negotiates; and fifth—and most
importantly for purposes of this case—the “Reserve,” which is the calculated amount that the
obligor and the administrator determine and then set aside to pay future claims.
The Reserve amount is critical to an obligor’s success because the obligor must market
programs at competitive prices but must also allocate an appropriate amount for future claims. If
the Reserve amount does not cover a claim, then the obligor and the insurer bear the loss. To
protect each party involved, the Dealer Costs and its five components are generally considered
confidential throughout the industry.
B. PDS Relationship With Tricor Automotive Group
Tricor Automotive Group (“Tricor”), which is not a party to this case, was the obligor in
all Service Contracts relevant to this lawsuit. Tricor offers affiliated automobile dealerships
throughout Canada various Service Contracts that those dealerships sell to customers buying new

and used vehicles. From 2001 to May 29, 2018, PDS served as Tricor’s administrator of Service
Contracts. Within that role, PDS began using its proprietary “Rating Process” in 2008 to set
Reserves for Service Contracts sold through Tricor-affiliated dealerships in Canada. PDS also
contracted with Tricor to permit Tricor to sell PDS’s “Lifetime Powertrain Loyalty Program
(LPLP) Certificate”—which are the subject of PDS’s copyright infringement claim.
1. The 2011 Marketing Agreement and PDS’s Lifetime Powertrain Loyalty
Certificates

In 2011, Tricor and PDS entered into a Private Label Marketing Agreement. (“Marketing
Agreement,” ECF No. 46-4.) Pursuant to the Marketing Agreement, PDS authorized Tricor to
market PDS’s “aftermarket automobile products and programs for automobile dealers”; “vehicle
service agreements”; “prepaid maintenance plans”; “lifetime loyalty programs”; and “limited
warranty programs[.]” (Id. at 1.) In the Marketing Agreement, Tricor agreed not “make use of or
disclose to any third parties, any Proprietary Information obtained as a result of or in connection
with the relationship contemplated herein.” (Id. at 3.) Additionally, the agreement specified that
“[a]ll forms, records and supplies including, but not limited to insurance forms and rate charts,
provided by [PDS], are and will remain the property of [PDS].” (Id. at 5.)
As the Marketing Agreement mentions, PDS agreed to let Tricor sell Lifetime Powertrain
Loyalty Program Certificates (“LPLP Certificates”) created by PDS. (Id. at 1.) PDS has two
copyrights registered with the U.S. Copyrights Office for its LPLP Certificates. The first
copyrighted LPLP Certificate was first published on May 1, 2008 and registered on May 2, 2012.
(Copyright TX 7-673-553, ECF No. 100-1.) The second copyrighted LPLP Certificate, a
derivative work of the first copyrighted LPLP Certificate, was first published on June 26, 2012
and registered on June 4, 2013. (Copyright TX 7-741-273, ECF No. 100-1.)
Importantly, an LPLP Certificate is not a warranty or a vehicle service contract. (See id.;

Dep. of Lisle Greenweller 61:9–15.) Rather, lifetime powertrain products are “dealership
giveaway products which promote customer retention and provide for mechanical coverage in the
event of breakdown upon meeting various service requirements.” (2014 Administration (Program)
Agreement at 2, ECF No. 46-1.) The composition of the copyrighted LPLP Certificates are
relevant here. Copyrighted LPLP Certificate TX 7-741-273 is a two-page form. (Copyright TX
7-741-273.) The first page contains three sections at the top—covering roughly 25% of the form—
with blank boxes for the filling in of customer information, dealer information, and vehicle and
certificate information. (Id.) The remainder of the first page and the second page contain six
additional sections with detailed information about the loyalty program. (Id.) PDS’s copyright
extends to the “text” of the LPLP Certificates. (Id.)

PDS did not use the copyrighted LPLP Certificates in its relationship with Tricor because
the copyrighted LPLP Certificates were not tailored for use in Canada. (Greenweller Dep. 61:16–
62:1.) PDS created a derivative LPLP Certificate for Tricor to market in Canada and modified
only those things specific to Canada (the “Canadian LPLP Certificate”). (Id.; Canadian LPLP
Certificate, ECF No. 100-2.) Aside from minor editing changes and Canadian-specific terms
(“kilometres” instead of “miles”; “provinces” instead of “states”), the language in the Canadian
LPLP Certificate is nearly identical to the copyrighted U.S. LPLP Certificate TX 7-741-273.
2. The 2014 Administration Agreement, the Rating Process, and the
Reserves

In 2014, Tricor and PDS executed an Administration (Program) Agreement (“2014
Agreement”) that set out the parties’ obligations regarding the administration of Service Contracts.
(2014 Agreement, ECF No. 46-1.) The preamble of the 2014 Agreement states that “[Tricor] is
the administrator of Program Contracts on behalf of [a marketing company] and/or [Tricor’s
insurer] and wishes to subcontract some of these duties including claims handling to PDS[.]” (Id.
at 1.) Furthermore, the preamble specifies that “[Tricor] also desires PDS to provide analysis and
support for pricing adjustments as well as aid in designing Program Contracts from time to time[.]”
(Id.)
In the agreement, the parties defined “Confidential Information” as:
“this Agreement and all data, trade secrets, trademarks or marks, business
information, Programs, Dealer Cost, and any other information of any kind
whatsoever that a party herein discloses, either orally or in writing, to the other
party. A writing shall include an electronic transfer of information by electronic
mail, over the Internet or otherwise.
(Id. at 3–4.). But nothing in the contract explains what qualifies as either party’s property. The
2014 Agreement defined the duties of Tricor and PDS related to development and maintenance of
the Dealer Cost, stating:
[Tricor] shall be assisted by PDS in co-ordinating Programs with [Tricor’s insurer]
and shall be responsible for development of all PROGRAMS including …
Premium, Reserves, and third party fees and commissions. These amounts plus the
Administration Fees set by PDS shall comprise the Dealer Cost.

Id. at 6.
According to the 2014 Agreement: “PDS shall manage its administrative rating systems in
strict compliance with the set Dealer Cost Amounts.” (2014 Agreement at 6.) The Agreement also
defines “Reserves” as:
"Reserves" shall mean funds required for Claims. Reserves include:
(i) "Base Reserves" which are the minimum amount of funds required
for PROGRAM claims; and

(ii) "Additional Reserves" which are reserves above the Base Reserves,
are to be determined by [Tricor] and/or [Tricor’s insurer] and may
be included on a PROGRAM for an individual Dealer or agent.

Tricor has had control over the Reserves in its relationship with “various administrators”
since 1987. (Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. 183:18–22.) In its relationship with PDS, Tricor had the final
say over the Reserve amount. (Id. at 141:22–142:4.) Tricor and its insurer bear the risks affiliated
with the Reserve amount. (Id. at 79:6–12, 132:8–11, 183:18–184:1.) Because the obligor in any
Service Contract must support its Reserves, the obligor—in this case, Tricor—carries the risk.
(Id.) Tricor also listed the Reserves as equity in its accounting records. (Id. at 144:2–12.) As of
2018, Tricor-owned companies had $160 million in shareholder equity standing behind its
Reserves. (Id.)
During the Tricor-PDS relationship, PDS used its proprietary Rating Process to develop
Reserve amounts for Tricor. (Id. at 79:24–84:6.) PDS created its own process in 2006 for coming
up with Reserve amounts based on vehicle class taking into account historical data for different
makes and models of vehicles. (Id. 11:14–14:12.) PDS’s business model is to create a Reserve
amount to help both PDS and its partner profit. (Id.) Tricor never received PDS’s proprietary
Rating Process. (Id. at 50:5–11.)
C. End of Tricor-PDS Relationship and Beginning of Tricor-Allegiance
Relationship

While still working with PDS under the 2014 Agreement, Tricor explored the prospect of
investing in its own administrative platform. (Id. at 153:4–5.) In September 2017, Tricor
approached PDS to discuss a potential deal. After PDS presented its offer, Tricor’s board of
directors sought to “find out what the real value of our business might be to somebody.” (Id. at
154:17–18.) To that end, Tricor considered Allegiance, which had been conducting business with
Tricor-affiliated companies since 2006. (Id. at 154:19–21)
In November 2017, the President of Tricor, Joseph Campbell, contacted Allegiance’s
Director of Underwriting and Actuarial Services, Paul Miles. Campbell consulted Miles because

he wanted “somebody who could assist [Tricor] in evaluating the rates” Tricor was charging. (Id.
at 155:13–16.) By December 2017, Tricor and Allegiance had entered a “quasi-general
agreement” about Tricor’s value. (Id. at 155:2–8.) Around that time, Tricor and Allegiance also
began discussing “whether [Allegiance] could admin [Tricor’s Service Contracts] knowing it was
going to disrupt [Tricor’s] business no matter what.” (Id. at 155:2–4.) Then, in January 2018,
Tricor determined that Allegiance would be able to administer the Service Contracts because
Allegiance had experience in the industry and actuarial support. (Id. at 155:9–16.)
On January 25, 2018, Campbell sent Miles Tricor’s total Dealer Costs and flat fees that
represented what the fees “would be on a go-forward business with Allegiance as administrator.”
(Id. at 195:18–20.) Miles testified, “[k]eep in mind, I don’t know what the flat fees were on the

previous arrangements, so I don’t know that that’s equal to the reserve that was currently in place,
but that’s what I’m referring to as a proposed reserve, in case those fees were different.” (Id. at
195:11–15.) With the Dealer Costs and the Reserves that Tricor provided to Allegiance, Miles
made slight changes to the Reserves for use in the Allegiance-Tricor relationship. (Id. at 198:2–
17.)
On May 29, 2018, the relationship between PDS and Tricor ended. After PDS terminated
the contract with Tricor, PDS allowed Tricor-affiliated dealers to access its database so that dealers
could adjust or cancel Service Contracts entered into prior to the termination of the PDS-Tricor
relationship. (Id. at 73:4–9.) In July 2018, PDS analyzed how Tricor dealerships were using its
portal. This analysis indicated that Tricor-affiliated dealers continued accessing PDS’s portal to
impermissibly backdate contracts, which allowed the dealers to potentially solicit PDS’s rate
information, only to then write Service Contracts on Allegiance paper. (Id. at 33:4–7.)
After the PDS and Tricor relationship ended, Tricor sent Allegiance the Canadian LPLP

Certificates that PDS created for Tricor’s use. (Dep. of Michelle DeFouw 10:6–11:17.) Tricor
employee Michelle Fish emailed Allegiance employee Michelle DeFouw the PDF documents of
the LPLP Certificates “currently in use” on April 10, 2018 and told DeFouw that the LPLP
Certificates were Tricor’s. (Id., Ex. 37, ECF No. 98-9.) In emails and in a phone conversation,
Fish requested that DeFouw make certain changes to the LPLP Certificates so that Tricor could
continue using the Certificates with Allegiance. (Id. at 19:2–21.) DeFouw took the PDF
documents, made the requested changes, and emailed the edited LPLP Certificates (the “new
Tricor LPLP Certificates”) back to Fish with outlines of the specific changes made. (Id., Ex. 37.)
For example, DeFouw made minor changes to the language in the Certificates, such as changing
the website customers were required to use and substituting a different mailing address. (Id.)

Outside of these small changes, the language and appearance of the documents remained nearly
identical to the LPLP Certificates PDS created for Tricor. (Id.) DeFouw made the changes either
from Allegiance’s offices in Dublin, Ohio or from her home in Grove City, Ohio. (Id. at 11:25–
12:8.)
In July 2018, PDS filed this lawsuit against Defendants Allegiance and Dimension (an
Allegiance affiliate) in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Allegiance removed to this
Court. PDS then filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin Allegiance from using its
alleged trade secrets. (Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 4.) Following a hearing, this Court denied
PDS’s motion for a preliminary injunction on November 6, 2018. (ECF No. 40.) On January 25,
2019, PDS filed a Second Amended Complaint for misappropriation of trade secrets and copyright
infringement. (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 46.) Allegiance answered and also filed
counterclaims for tortious interference with contract or business relationships, common law unfair
competition, and a declaratory judgment that PDS does not have a protectable copyright interest

against Allegiance regarding the LPLP Certificates. (Answer and Counterclaim, ECF No. 50.)
The parties have now filed cross motions for summary judgment, which are ripe for review.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Court may therefore grant a motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has
the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element that is essential to that party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions” of the record which

demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The burden then shifts
to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
“The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). A
genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“The requirement that a dispute be ‘genuine’ means that
there must be more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”). Consequently, the
central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Hamad v.
Woodcrest Condo. Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 234–35 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251–52).

III. Analysis
A. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment on PDS’s claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets. (Pl.’s Mot. at 9; Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) In support of their motions,
the parties rely on testimony from the preliminary injunction hearing and additional evidence
obtained during discovery following the denial of PDS’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 1
PDS claims that Allegiance misappropriated the Reserves it received from Tricor. (Pl.’s
Mot. at 10.) To prevail on a misappropriation of trade secrets claim, a plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a trade secret exists; (2) the defendants acquired the trade
secret because of a confidential relationship; and (3) the defendants used the trade secret without

authorization. Hoover Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Frye, 77 F. App’x 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2003); Ohio Rev.
Code § 1333.61. “Proof by clear and convincing evidence is required to justify relief in trade
secrets cases under O.R.C. § 1333.62.” Prosonic Corp. v. Stafford, 539 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1005
(S.D. Ohio 2008). Ohio law defines a “trade secret” as information that:
(1) It derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use;

1 Allegiance argues that the Court’s factual findings in its preliminary injunction decision are now the law
of the case. (Defs.’ Mot. at 15.) However, as “a general rule, decisions on preliminary injunctions do not constitute
law of the case and parties are free to litigate the merits.” William G. Wilcox, D.O., P.C. Employees’ Defined Ben.
Pension Tr. v. United States, 888 F.2d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 754 F.2d 830, 832 n. 3 (9th Cir.1985)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court’s preliminary findings are
not law of the case. Following the preliminary injunction decision, PDS remained free to litigate the merits and
present more evidence to the Court at the summary judgment stage.
(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.

Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.61(D).
“The law in Ohio . . . is that to bring a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, one must
either own or have possession or a right to control the trade secrets and have taken active steps to
maintain their secrecy.” RPM, Inc. v. Oatey Co., 2005-Ohio-1280, ¶ 15, 2005 WL 663057, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (citing Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden (1999) 707 N.E.2d 853
(Ohio 1999)). Whether information qualifies as a trade secret is ordinarily a question of fact.
DeBoer Structures (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Shaffer Tent And Awning Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d 934, 948 (S.D.
Ohio 2002)
Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to PDS, PDS’s trade secret claim fails
because the undisputed evidence establishes that Tricor owned the Reserves. Thus, PDS cannot
assert trade secret protection over the Reserves prepared pursuant to the 2014 Agreement between
PDS and Tricor. And even assuming PDS could assert a possessory interest in the Reserves
developed using PDS’s Rating Process, Tricor ultimately owned that information and therefore
had a right to share that information with Allegiance. Allegiance thus could not have
misappropriated the Reserves because Allegiance, as a matter of law, had consent to use the
Reserve information from the owner of that information.
Start with the 2014 Agreement between PDS and Tricor. (2014 Agreement, ECF No. 46-
1.)2 The Agreement does not expressly state that Tricor owns the Reserves, but the Agreement
expressly gives Tricor the ultimate responsibility for developing the most of the components

2 Contract interpretation is a matter of law. St. Marys v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 875 N.E.2d 561,
568 (Ohio 2007).
comprising the “Dealer Cost”—including the “Reserves”—while PDS is only responsible for
setting “Administration Fees”:
“[Tricor] shall be assisted by PDS in co-ordinating Programs with [Tricor’s Insurer]
and shall be responsible for development of all PROGRAMS including Program
Contracts, underwriting and eligibility guidelines, Premium, Reserves, any third
party fees and commissions. These amounts plus the Administration Fees set by
PDS shall comprise the Dealer Cost.”

(Id. at 6 (emphasis added).) That the parties agreed to make Tricor responsible for setting the
Reserves while expressly making PDS responsible for setting a different component of the Dealer
Cost undercuts any claim that Tricor does not have ownership of the Reserves. Furthermore,
“Additional Reserves”—which are “reserves above the Base Reserves”—are “to be determined by
[Tricor] and/or [Tricor’s Insurer] . . . .” (Id. at 4 (emphasis added).) This definition expressly
grants Tricor the responsibility for establishing “Additional Reserves”—consistent with the
agreement that “[Tricor] . . . shall be responsible for development of all PROGRAMS including
. . . Reserves[.]” (Id. at 6.)
Other undisputed pieces of evidence confirm Tricor’s ultimate ownership and control over
the Reserves. First, Tricor has had control over the Reserves in its relationship with “various
administrators” since 1987. (Prelim. In. Hr’g Tr. 183:18–22.) Second, Tricor—as the obligor—
and its insurer bear the risks affiliated with the Reserves. Because the obligor in any Service
Contract must support its Reserves, the obligor carries the risk. (Id. at 132:8–11, 183:18–184:1.)
On the other hand, while PDS’s profits depend on aiding the obligor in optimizing its Reserves,
PDS did not directly bear financial risk for the Reserves’ accuracy as did Tricor. Third, Tricor
listed the Reserves as equity in its accounting records. (Id. at 144:2–12.) As the Court concluded
in denying PDS’s motion for a preliminary injunction: this one-sided comparison of undisputed
evidence illustrates that Tricor has ownership of the Reserves. The Reserves are therefore not, as
a matter of law, PDS’s to protect.
Following discovery in this case, PDS’s evidence is insufficient to demonstrate a genuine
dispute of fact to survive Allegiance’s motion for summary judgment on this claim. PDS

characterizes the Reserves as the “fruits” of its proprietary Rating Process, making the Reserves a
protectable trade secret. (Pl.’s Mot. at 10.) However, even assuming that PDS has some
possessory interest in the Reserves created using its proprietary Rating Process, there is no genuine
dispute that Tricor had ultimate ownership of the Reserves. The 2014 Agreement expressly states
that “[Tricor] desires PDS to provide analysis and support for pricing adjustments as well as aid
in designing Program Contracts from time to time[.]” (2014 Agreement at 2 (emphasis added).)
In other words, per the Agreement, the numbers PDS produced as a result of its Rating Process
were ultimately for Tricor’s use. And Tricor never acquired—and thus did not provide to
Allegiance—PDS’s proprietary Rating Process. Therefore, even if PDS could establish that it was
entitled to assert some level of trade-secret protection over the Reserves outside of the Tricor-PDS

relationship, Allegiance could not have used those Reserves “without authorization” because it is
undisputed that Tricor authorized Allegiance to use that data. Frye, 77 F. App’x at 782.
PDS also cites to deposition testimony of Allegiance witnesses that it contends is
inconsistent from the testimony of those witnesses during the preliminary injunction hearing.
(Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n at 10–14.) This evidence, however, pertains to Allegiance’s conduct in
making slight changes to Reserves after it received that information from Tricor, which PDS
contends illustrates Allegiance’s “guilty conscience.” (See id.) This evidence does not create a
genuine dispute as to the ownership of the Tricor-PDS Reserves or whether Allegiance was legally
authorized to use those Reserves.
Lastly, PDS argues that the 2011 Marketing Agreement between Tricor and PDS
establishes PDS’s ownership over the information Tricor sent to Allegiance. (Pl.’s Reply at 6–8,
ECF No. 113.) That Agreement specified that all “forms, records and supplies including, but not
limited to insurance forms and rate charts, provided by [PDS], are and will remain the property of

[PDS.]” (Marketing Agreement at 5, ECF No. 46-4.) PDS argues that “rate charts” (as used in
the Marketing Agreement) were included in the “business information” that went from PDS to
Tricor (under the 2014 Agreement) and that Allegiance therefore misappropriated PDS’s
proprietary information. (Pl.’s Reply at 6–8.) PDS’s misappropriation claim, however, is about
Allegiance’s alleged misappropriation of the Reserves. (Pl.’s Mot. at 10.) “Reserves”—a technical
term in the industry and a defined term in the 2014 Agreement—is not mentioned at all in the
Marketing Agreement. See Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, Inc. v. Franklin County Convention
Facilities Authority, 678 N.E.2d 519, 526 (Ohio 1997) (when interpreting a contract, “[t]echnical
terms will be given their technical meaning, unless a different intention is clearly expressed.”).
The Marketing Agreement has nothing to do with the parties’ rights and obligations regarding the

Reserves or the administration of Service Contracts. (Compare 2014 Agreement, ECF No. 46-1
with Marketing Agreement, ECF No. 46-4.) The plain meaning and context of the term “rate
charts” in the Marketing Agreement do not show that the parties intended to give PDS a proprietary
interest in Tricor’s Reserves.
Accordingly, the undisputed evidence establishes that Tricor owned the Reserves
developed in the Tricor-PDS relationship. Thus, PDS’s claim for misappropriation of trade secrets
fails as a matter of law. The Court therefore grants Allegiance’s motion for summary judgment
and denies PDS’s motion for summary judgment as to PDS’s misappropriation claim.
B. Copyright Infringement
The parties next move for summary judgment on PDS’s claim for copyright infringement.
(Pl.’s Mot. at 14; Defs.’ Mot. at 21.) “The Copyright Act provides protection for original works
of authorship expressed in various media.” Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293

(6th Cir. 2004) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332)). Relevant here, the owner of a copyright has
exclusive rights to “reproduce the copyrighted work” and to “prepare derivative works.” Id. (citing
17 U.S.C. § 106)). To succeed on a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) that the defendant copied it. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d
848, 853 (6th Cir. 2003). PDS is entitled to summary judgment because PDS owned a valid
copyright and it is undisputed that Allegiance copied it.
1. PDS owns a valid copyright.
The first prong—ownership of a valid copyright—“tests the originality and non-
functionality of the work, both of which are presumptively established by the copyright
registration.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir.

2004) (internal citation omitted). The “threshold showing of originality is not a demanding one.”
Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, (1991) (“the requisite
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”)). “Original . . . means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works),
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity . . . even if the work is not a ‘novel’
one.” Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46) (internal quotations omitted). The vast majority of
works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how crude,
humble or obvious it might be.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
PDS has established the presumptive validity of its copyright by providing a certificate of
registration made “within five years after the first publication” of its U.S. LPLP Certificate.
(Copyright TX7-741-273.) Because PDS produced its copyright registration, the burden shifts to
Allegiance to rebut the copyright’s presumptive validity. Hi-Tech Video Prods., Inc. v. Cap.

Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1095 (6th Cir. 1995).
Allegiance challenges the originality of PDS’s copyright. It argues that PDS’s copyrighted
U.S. LPLP Certificate is not sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.3 (Defs.’ Mot. at
32.) Allegiance argues that (1) the “fill-in-the-blank portions of the forms at issue are not
copyrightable because they are not original”; and (2) that the text of the LPLP Certificate was
“dictated by third-parties, such as insurers, or were required by legal compliance measurers[,]” and
are thus non-protectable under the “scenes à faire” doctrine. (Defs.’ Mot. at 32–35.)
a. The copyrighted LPLP Certificate is not a generic fill-in-the blank form.
Allegiance relies on M. M. Bus. Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1973),
which held that “forms, including blank forms, which are intended to be used for recording facts

are not the proper subjects of copyright.” Id. at 1139. Allegiance also relies on Tastefully Simple,
Inc. v. Two Sisters Gourmet, L.L.C., 134 F. App’x 1, 4 (6th Cir. 2005), which held that a food
company’s “100% Satisfaction, Customer Order, and Product Return/Claim forms” were not
copyrightable because they were nothing more than a “convenient matrix to record information”
that the company required “when a consultant returns a product.” Id. Indeed, “[b]lank forms, such
as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, scorecards, address books, report

3 Allegiance argues both that PDS’s LPLP Certificate is not a “protectable work” under copyright
law but also cites to caselaw concerning the second prong—whether Allegiance copied “constituent
elements of the work that are original.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 32.) Ultimately, Allegiance argues that no portion
of the LPLP Certificate is copyrightable; thus, the Court will analyze Allegiance’s arguments under the first
element of the two copyright infringement elements.
forms, order forms and the like, which are designed for recording information and do not in
themselves convey information” are not subject to copyright protection. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1.
“[W]hether a form is a ‘blank form,’ and therefore not entitled to copyright protection, is a question
of law for the court to decide.” Tastefully Simple, 134 F. App’x at 4.

Here, the copyrighted LPLP Form is not simply a “blank form” designed for recording
information” that does not in itself “convey information[.]” Id. The form contains nine different
sections. (Copyright TX7-741-273.) The first three sections—which cover roughly 25% of the
first page of the two-page form—are blank boxes designed for the collecting of customer
information, dealer information, and vehicle and certification information. (Id.) But the remaining
six sections convey an abundance of information about the Lifetime Powertrain Program. (Id.)
Thus, the copyrighted LPLP Certificate is not like the form at issue Tastefully Simple—it is much
more than a “convenient matrix to record information[.]” Tastefully Simple, 134 F. App’x at 4.
The fact that a portion of the LPLP Certificate is designed for collecting information does
not render the entire document not subject to copyright protection. Indeed, the copyright

registration extends only to the author-created “text.” (Copyright TX7-741-273.) PDS
acknowledges that its “copyright claims are directed solely to the information conveying text found
in the LPLP Certificate and do not extend to un-protectable elements such as the blank areas
seeking information, the general layout, or the general idea of providing repair coverage as a
customer incentive.” (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n at 23, ECF No. 108.)
b. The information in the LPLP Certificate does not fall under the scenes à
faire doctrine.

Allegiance next argues that language in the LPLP Certificate is not protectable under the
“scenes à faire” doctrine. (Defs.’ Mot. at 34.) In the context of literature, this doctrine “excludes
copyright protection for ‘incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.’” Stromback, 384 F.3d at 296
(citation omitted). For example, as the court in Stromback explained, “parties, alcohol,” and “wild
behavior” are “natural elements in a story about a college fraternity.” Id. Such “common themes
and ideas throughout literature and are beyond any level of abstraction at which copyright

protection might begin to attach.” Id. The “scenes à faire” doctrine has also been applied in the
computer software context. Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d at 535. In that industry, “elements of a
program dictated by practical realities—e.g., by hardware standards and mechanical specifications,
software standards and compatibility requirements, computer manufacturer design standards,
target industry practices, and standard computer programming practices—may not obtain
protection.” Id.
Allegiance, analogizing the insurance industry to the literature and software contexts,
argues that the doctrine of “scenes à faire” applies here because the details in the copyrighted LPLP
Certificate “necessarily follow from the common requirements of insurance companies throughout
the extended warranty industry.” (Defs.’ Mot.) In support of this argument, Allegiance cites

PDS’s president’s testimony that “an insurer would always review and modify the textual terms
and conditions, and have final approval of the language.” (Id. (citing Greenweller Dep. 24:21–
25:22).) But this statement was in response to a question about the general requirements for
“vehicle service contracts” at Great American Insurance (the owner of PDS) in the early 2000s.
(See Greenweller Dep. 22:23–25:22.) Greenweller’s testimony did not pertain to the copyrighted
LPLP Certificate, which is different than a vehicle service contract. (Id. at 61:9–15; Copyright
TX7-741-273 (“This Loyalty Certificate is not a product warranty nor is it a service contract.”).)
Allegiance has not pointed to evidence that the copyrighted language in PDS’s LPLP
Certificate follow from the “requirements of insurance companies” that are so commonplace that
the certificate is not copyrightable as an original work. The language in the LPLP Certificate
might seem dull or boilerplate, but all that’s necessary for copyright protection is some “minimal
degree of creativity”—and the language need not be “novel.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46. PDS is
also not asserting copyright protection over the general idea of providing repair coverage as a

customer incentive”—but is instead asserting protection over the specific construction of language
in its LPLP Certificate. (Pl.’s Resp. at 23.) The “scenes a faire” doctrine therefore does not
invalidate PDS’s copyright.
In sum, Allegiance fails to rebut PDS’s presumptively valid copyright. The analysis of
PDS’s infringement claim therefore proceeds to the second element.
2. Allegiance copied original portions of PDS’s copyrighted LPLP Certificate
The second prong—copying by the defendant—“tests whether any copying occurred (a
factual matter) and whether the portions of the work copied were entitled to copyright protection
(a legal matter).” Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d at 534.
a. Whether copying occurred

“A plaintiff may demonstrate that original elements of its work were copied through direct
or indirect evidence.” Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532,
536 (6th Cir. 2020). This case is one of the “rare” cases with direct evidence of copying. See id.
It is undisputed that Ms. DeFouw, an Allegiance employee, copied the new Tricor LPLP
Certificates directly from the Canadian LPLP Certificates that PDS made for Tricor. (DeFouw
Dep. 19:11–22:12.) Tricor provided Allegiance with a PDF of the Canadian LPLP Certificate it
received from PDS; DeFouw then used those PDFs to make changes requested by Tricor and sent
the new Tricor LPLP Certificates back to Tricor. (Id., Ex. 37.) Thus, this claim turns on the legal
question of “whether the portions of the work copied were entitled to copyright protection[.]”
Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d at 534.
b. Whether the copied portions are entitled to copyright protection
Allegiance argues that the Canadian LPLP Certificate (from which it created the new Tricor

LPLP Certificate) is not entitled to copyright protection for several reasons. Specifically, it first
argues that the Canadian LPLP Certificate is not copyrighted in the U.S. or Canada and thus
copying from the Canadian LPLP Certificate is not an infringement. (Defs.’ Mot. at 27.) Second,
it argues PDS has no exclusive ownership in the Canadian LPLP Certificate that it provided to
Tricor and that it therefore cannot base its infringement claim on Allegiance’s copying of the
Canadian LPLP Certificate. (Id. at 30.) Third, it argues that the new Tricor LPLP Certificates
copied from the Tricor-PDS’s Canadian LPLP Certificate is not a derivative of PDS’s copyrighted
U.S. LPLP Certificate. (Id. at 31.)
None of Allegiance’s arguments is persuasive. It is undisputed that PDS owned a valid
copyright, that its Canadian LPLP Certificate was a derivative of the copyrighted U.S. LPLP

Certificate, and that Allegiance copied the “new” Tricor LPLP Certificates in the United States
directly from the derivative Canadian LPLP certificate. And, as discussed above when analyzing
the validity of PDS’s copyright, the copied language meets the low threshold for originality
required for copyright protection.
The owner of a copyright has exclusive rights to “reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies” and to “prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–
(2). A “derivative work” is “a work based upon one or more preexisting works” that is “recast,
transformed, or adapted” from the preexisting work. Id. § 101. The right to prepare derivative
works includes to right to authorize others to produce a derivative work. See Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 221 (1990). And when an authorized author creates a derivative work, the pre-
existing elements of the derivative work remain subject to the original copyright. See id. at 223;
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (“The copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed

in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.”)
Courts to consider the issue have uniformly recognized that “if a third party copies a
derivative work without authorization, it infringes the original copyright owner’s copyright in the
underlying work to the extent the unauthorized copy of the derivative work also copies the
underlying work.” DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2015); see also
Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 1 Nimmer § 3.05, at 3–34.20)
(“the better view is that if the material copied was derived from a copyrighted underlying work,
this will constitute an infringement of such work regardless of whether the defendant copied
directly from the underlying work, or indirectly via the derivative work”); Lennar Homes of Texas
Sales & Mktg., Ltd. v. Perry Homes, LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d 913, 929 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“even if

the infringer copies underlying material only from the derivative work, the copyright owner of the
underlying material has a cause of action against the infringer.”).
Here, it is undisputed that the Canadian LPLP Certificate is a derivative work of PDS’s
copyrighted U.S. LPLP Certificate. (Greenweller Dep. 61:16–62:1.) And it undisputed that
Allegiance created the new Tricor LPLP Certificate nearly verbatim from the derivative Canadian
LPLP Certificate (which was itself taken verbatim from the copyrighted U.S. LPLP Certificate).
(DeFouw Dep., Ex. 37; Greenweller Dep. 61:16–62:1.) Even drawing the inference in
Allegiance’s favor that Tricor shared ownership in the derivative Canadian LPLP Certificate
through its 2011 or 2014 contracts with PDS, the elements of the Canadian LPLP Certificate
derived from the copyrighted U.S. LPLP Certificate remain protected under PDS’s valid copyright.
See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 221–23. And it is immaterial that the Canadian LPLP Certificate was not
itself copyrighted because it is undisputed that it was a derivative work of a work subject to
copyright protection. See Towle, 802 F.3d at 1023; Lennar Homes, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 929. To be

sure, as discussed above, PDS’s copyright does not extend to the blank, information-collecting
boxes on the LPLP Certificate; it does extend to the text of the new Tricor LPLP Certificates
copied from the derivative Canadian LPLP Certificate.
Furthermore, the fact that Allegiance copied the Canadian LPLP Certificate for use in
Canada does not render its acts outside the reach of the Copyright Act. While it is true that “United
States copyright laws do not have extraterritorial effect,” Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Commcationns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1994), it is undisputed that Allegiance, without
authorization from PDS, reproduced and copied the derivative Canadian LPLP Certificate in Ohio.
(DeFouw Dep. 11:25–22:12.) These acts infringed on PDS’s exclusive rights to “reproduce the
copyrighted wok” and to “prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work[.]” 17 U.S.C.

§ 106(1)–(2). Allegiance also committed an act of infringement by exporting infringing copies of
the new Tricor LPLP Certificates for use in Canada. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2).4
Accordingly, PDS is entitled to summary judgment on its copyright infringement claim
against Allegiance as to Allegiance’s liability. PDS has not moved for summary judgment on the
issue of damages. Thus, damages on PDS’s infringement claim will be left for trial.

4 “. . . exportation from the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of
copies or phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an infringement of copyright, or which would have
constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under sections 501 and 506.” 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2).
C. Allegiance’s Counterclaims for Tortious Interference and Unfair Competition
Next, PDS moves for summary judgment on Allegiance’s counterclaims for tortious
interference with contract and business relationships, common law unfair competition, and
declaratory judgment that PDS does not have a protectable copyright interest regarding the new

Tricor LPLP Certificates. (Pl.’s Mot. at 18; Counterclaim ¶¶ 2–48.) PDS is entitled to summary
judgment on each of Allegiance’s counterclaims.
1. Tortious Interference
In Ohio, the elements of “elements of tortious interference with contract are (1) the
existence of a contract, (2) the wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract, (3) the wrongdoer’s
intentional procurement of the contract’s breach, (4) lack of justification, and (5) resulting
damages.” Fred Siegel Co, 707 N.E.2d at 858. Similarly, the elements of tortious interference
with a business relationship are “(1) a business relationship, (2) the wrongdoer’s knowledge
thereof, (3) an intentional interference causing a breach or termination of the relationship, and (4)
damages resulting therefrom.” Geo-Pro Serv., Inc. v. Solar Testing Lab’ys, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 664,

672 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted).
PDS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because “[n]o court in Ohio has held
that a lawsuit constituted a basis for a tortious business interference claim by the defendant in the
action.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 19.) Allegiance responds that its claim for tortious interference does not
relate solely to the lawsuit, but also its allegation that PDS “rapidly cut off Tricor dealers from
accessing Premier’s system after Tricor went into business with Allegiance—even though system
access was a necessity for Tricor dealers to handle their legal obligations to consumers.” (Def.’s
Resp. in Opp’n, at 18, ECF No. 109 (citing Counterclaim ¶ 22).)
PDS is entitled to summary judgment because Allegiance’s evidence, taken as true, cannot
satisfy the elements of either tortious interference with contract or tortious interference with
business relationships. Allegiance points to no evidence in the record that PDS procured a breach
of contract by Tricor, Fred Siegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 858, or that PDS’s actions caused a breach

or termination of Tricor’s relationship with Allegiance, Geo-Pro Serv., 763 N.E.2d at 672. Thus,
there is no genuine dispute on whether PDS’s acts tortiously interfered with the contract or
business relationship between Allegiance and Tricor.
2. Unfair Competition
PDS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Allegiance’s unfair competition
claim because this Court has held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 preempts Ohio common
law tort claims for unfair competition. (Pl.’s Mot. at 19.) Allegiance alleges in its counterclaim
that:
• “Premier filed the present litigation for purposes of retaliating against Allegiance
and Tricor for entering into the Servicing Agreement.”

• “This litigation is not founded in good faith, and was instituted with the intent and
purpose of harassing and injuring Allegiance.”
• “Premier commenced this litigation with a malicious purpose—to injure Allegiance
and Tricor.”
• “Premier did not bring this litigation honestly and in good faith.”
• Premier “commenced and prosecuted this litigation to harass, annoy, intimidate,
financially harm, or gain an unfair advantage over Allegiance. Such conduct
constitutes unfair competition under the common law of the State of Ohio.”

• “Premier’s lawsuit against Allegiance is objectively baseless.”
(Counterclaim ¶¶ 29–32.) PDS is correct—Allegiance’s counterclaim is the exact type of Ohio
common law unfair competition claim that this Court has held is preempted by Rule 11. See, e.g.,
Cheryl & Co. v. Krueger, No. 2:18-CV-01485, 2020 WL 5423885, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10,
2020).

A federal law may preempt a state law when “there is an actual conflict between a federal
and a state law.” Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab’ys, 385 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2004). When a party
in federal court asserts a counterclaim for Ohio common law unfair competition based on
allegations that a lawsuit against it was brought in bad faith or that the other party has made
misrepresentations to the court, this Court has held that the unfair competition claim is preempted
by Rule 11. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Am. Signature, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-427, 2015 WL
12999664, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2015). As the Court explained in Ashley Furniture:
“Value City’s unfair competition counterclaim consists largely of Ashley’s alleged
misrepresentations to this Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 expressly
governs the kind of representations Ashley made to the Court and provides for
sanctions in the case of misrepresentations concerning claims or defenses. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Rule 11 also contains a safe harbor provision that allows a litigant
to withdraw a representation within twenty-one days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
Ohio common law unfair competition does not contain such a safe harbor provision.
It therefore directly conflicts with federal law and is preempted.

Ashley Furniture, 2015 WL 12999664, at *5 (First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co., 307 F.3d 501, 529–30 (6th Cir. 2002)).
The Ashley Furniture analysis is directly on point here. Allegiance’s unfair competition
claim is premised on allegations that PDS did not bring this lawsuit in good faith and that the suit
is objectively baseless. (Counterclaim ¶¶ 28–32.) Thus, for the same reasons as the Court
described in Ashley Furniture, Allegiance’s counterclaim for Ohio common law unfair
competition is preempted by Rule 11. PDS is therefore entitled to summary judgment
3. Declaratory Judgment
Because the Court granted summary judgment in favor of PDS on its copyright
infringement claim, PDS is also entitled to summary judgment on Allegiance’s counterclaim for
declaratory judgment whether PDS has a protectable copyright interest. Accordingly, PDS is

entitled to summary judgment on each of Allegiance’s counterclaims.
IV. Motion to Strike
Allegiance filed a motion to strike several exhibits submitted by PDS in its summary
judgment briefing. (Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 114.) Allegiance also moved to strike argument
related to PDS’s copyright infringement claim that PDS raised in its reply brief, but Allegiance’s
argument appears to be nothing more than a disguised surreply to PDS’s reply brief. (Id.) Because
these exhibits and Allegiance’s improper surreply argument did not determine the outcome of the
Court’s ruling on this matter, Allegiance’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 34) will be denied as moot.
See Hughes v. Lavender, No. 2:10-cv-674, 2011 WL 2945843, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2011)
(citing Pullom v. U.S. Bakery, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1109 (D. Or. 2007)).

V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 100.) Specifically, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to its claim for misappropriation of trade secrets and
grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim
and as to Defendants’ counterclaims.
The Court also GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 101.) Specifically, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for misappropriation of trade secrets and denies
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim.
Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED AS MOOT. (ECF No. 114.)
Finally, the Court also GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue. (ECF No. 126.) This

case will proceed to trial on the issue of damages on Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim. The
parties shall comply with the Magistrate Judge’s order bifurcating damages discovery. (ECF No.
83.) Trial is RESET for Monday, November 15, 2021 and a new trial schedule will issue
forthwith. The Court will administratively stay this case during damages discovery.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

7/29/2021 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10378343. Public record. Not legal advice.