# Parker-Reed v. Primal Vantage Company, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · March 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10377651

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10377651

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding no abuse of discretion where the district court allowed a former police officer with twenty-eight years of experience to testify about threat assessment

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Angela Parker-Reed,
Plaintiff,
V. Case No. 2:19-cv-1745
Judge Michael H. Watson
Primal Vantage Company, Inc., Magistrate Judge Jolson
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Angela Parker-Reed (“Plaintiff’) brings this personal injury action against
Defendant, Primal Vantage Company, Inc. (“Defendant”). Defendant moves for
summary judgment, ECF No. 33, and to exclude Plaintiff's expert, ECF No. 34.
Plaintiff moves for leave to file a sur-reply. ECF No. 39.
Plaintiffs Motion, ECF No. 39, is DENIED; the Court is capable of
assessing the arguments made in the Reply brief without the assistance of a Sur-
Reply. The Court has considered the remaining motions and the briefing □
thereon. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Exclude, ECF No. 34, -

is DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, ECF No. 33, is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff suffered an injury after falling from a “stick ladder’ manufactured
by Defendant. Ex. H at 110-13, ECF No. 33-9. Defendant’s stick ladder
provides access to tree stands used during hunting. Ex. A at 2, ECF No. 33-2.
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 1 of 22

Upon purchase, the stick ladder must be assembled. /d. at 6-7, ECF No.
33-2. The product includes multiple parts with crimped tubing at the end of each
side to allow the parts to be fitted together vertically. /d. at 7, ECF No. 33-2.
Each part of the stick ladder is then strapped to the chosen tree using
deliberately placed buckle straps provided by Defendant upon purchase of the
product. /d. at 8, ECF No. 33-2. The installation instructions state that users
should “[s]ecure [each] section to the tree before climbing” onto it. /d. The
instructions also advise that the chosen “tree should . . . have a diameter
between 9 and 18 inches.” /d. at 5, ECF No. 33-2. Finally, multiple warnings are
included, urging individuals to always use a safety harness attached to the tree
with a lineman’s belt to secure the user to the tree while using the product:
“ALWAYS wear a Fall Arrest System (FAS) (Harness) consisting of a
full body safety harness with lineman’s belt after leaving the ground.
You MUST stay connected at all times after leaving the ground. If you
are not wearing an FAS that meets ASTM standards, DO NOT leave
the ground. Failure to wear an FAS may result in serious injury or
death.”
Id. at 10, ECF No. 33-2. The requisite safety harness and lineman’s belt are not
included in Defendant’s product but are included with the purchase of one of
Defendant’s tree stands. Ex. M at 80-83, ECF No. 35-4. Plaintiff had assembled
stick ladders similar to Defendant’s in the past. Ex. H at 38-42, ECF No. 33-9.
Additionally, Plaintiff owned a safety harness at the time of the accident and had
previously used it. /d. at 60-64, ECF No. 33-9.

Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 2 of 22

On the day of the accident, Plaintiff was not wearing a safety harness while
she was installing the stick ladder. /d. at 60, ECF No. 33-9. Plaintiff also
replaced Defendant's buckle straps with rachet straps. /d. at 46-48, ECF No. 33-
9. According to Plaintiff, as she was reaching to pull a ratchet strap around the
tree to secure a portion of the stick ladder to the tree, the top portion of the stick
ladder was not strong enough to hold her and thus bent under her weight at the
stick ladder’s joint causing her to fall. /d. at 109-110, ECF No. 33-9; Resp. 9-11,
ECF No. 35. Plaintiff claims that this was due to a design defect in the crimped
tubing of Defendant’s stick ladder. Id. According to Plaintiff's expert, Mr.
Munsell, if the tubing were a different shape and the brackets securing the stick
ladder to the tree were closer together, the accident would not have occurred.
Ex. M at 58-59, ECF No. 35-4; Ex. L at 69-70, ECF No. 35-3. Mr. Munsell
opined that in its current design, the joint is so weak that even a slight shift of
weight to an off-center point on an unattached portion of the stick ladder will
cause the stick ladder’s joint to bend. Ex. L at 23-25, ECF No. 35-3.
ll. MOTION TO EXCLUDE
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's fall and subsequent injury were caused by
her failure to follow the applicable safety instructions. Plaintiff asserts that her fall
was the result of both a defective design and inadequate warnings. Plaintiff
seeks to offer expert testimony by Mr. Munsell to support her claims. Defendant
has moved to exclude Mr. Munsell’s proposed testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 3 of 22

A. Mr. Munsell
Mr. Munsell is a mechanical engineer with multiple degrees. Resp. 1, ECF
No. 35-2. He has a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering; a master’s
degree in the history of science, technology, and medicine; and is currently
pursuing a Ph.D. /d. He is licensed in the state of Oklahoma as a professional
engineer. He has conducted research into safe design principles, specializes in
“failure analysis of mechanical systems,” and has investigated issues related to
the failures of hunting stands and climbing devices. /d. His writing has been
published by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and he reviews
other articles for the same organization. /d.
In his report, Mr. Munsell discussed relevant literature, Plaintiff's accident,
and the subject stick ladder. Rep. 3-4, ECF No. 35-2. He represents that he
conducted a series of tests on a stick ladder identical to the one Plaintiff used.
Id. at 4. During these tests, he measured the amount of force exerted on the
stick ladder during assembly. /d. at 5-6. He provides a detailed discussion of
his findings, opinions, and conclusions. /d. at 6-9.
B. Standard
The admissibility of expert witness testimony is governed by Federal Rules
of Evidence 702 and 703. Rule 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if:

Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 4 of 22

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. This rule reflects the well-established judicial precedent that
district courts must act as “gatekeepers” in determining the admissibility of such
testimony. Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.
2007) (discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)). “[T]he gatekeeping
inquiry must be tied to the facts of a particular case, depending on the nature of
the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” /d.
at 430 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although “not a definitive checklist or test,” some factors that may bear on
the third part of the Rule 702 analysis are:
(1) whether a theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested;
(2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) whether, with respect to a particular technique, there
is a high known or potential rate of error and whether there are
standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the
theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant
scientific community.
Id. at 429-30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, “expert
testimony prepared solely for purposes of litigation, as opposed to testimony
flowing naturally from an expert's line of scientific research or technical work,
should be viewed with some caution.” /d. at 434.
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 5 of 22

Additionally, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 permits an expert to “base an
opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or
personally observed.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. Moreover, “[i]f experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion
on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.” /d.
The proponent of expert testimony must establish its admissibility by a
preponderance of proof. Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251
(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10). Whether to admit expert
testimony is within the district court’s discretion. Johnson, 484 F.3d at 429
(citation omitted).
C. Analysis
Defendant puts forth several different arguments in favor of excluding Mr.
Munsell’s testimony. Some of these arguments, like those involving the factual
issues around what happened during the accident, are inapplicable to a motion in
limine. Defendant does appropriately assert two broad attacks on Mr. Munsell’s
Opinions. First, it contends that Mr. Munsell is unqualified as an expert. Second,
Defendant maintains that Mr. Munsell used unreliable testing to reach his
conclusions.
As an initial matter, both parties agree that Mr. Munsell does not have an
opinion regarding whether there was a manufacturing defect. Consequently, Mr.

Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 6 of 22

Munsell shall not be permitted to testify at trial on the topic of manufacturing
defect."
1. Mr. Munsell’s Qualifications
Defendant argues that Mr. Munsell is unqualified for several reasons.
First, Defendant points out that Mr. Munsell is neither a human factors expert nor
a metallurgist. Next, Defendant contends that Mr. Munsell is unqualified because
he lacks experience with tree stands and stick ladders. Finally, Defendant
argues that Mr. Munsell is unqualified to give opinions on adequate warnings
because he has never designed warning labels. These arguments are
unpersuasive.
“To qualify as an expert under Rule 702, a witness must first establish his
expertise by reference to ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”
Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
This requirement, however, “has always been treated liberally.” /d. (citation
omitted). The issue “is not the qualifications of a witness in the abstract, but
whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a
specific question.” Rose v. Truck Ctrs., Inc., 388 F. App’x 528, 533 (6th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, the Sixth Circuit

1 According to Defendant, there is a laundry list of topics on which Mr. Munsell has
stated he has no opinion. From a review of the deposition transcript, however, the
Court concludes that Mr. Munsell only unequivocally expressed that he had no opinion
as to a manufacturing defect. In all other instances, the deposition testimony is too
ambiguous for the Court to find that Mr. Mansell disclaimed having any opinion on those
topics.
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 7 of 22

has explained that courts should “take a liberal view of what ‘knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education’ is sufficient to satisfy the requirement.”
Bradley v. Ameristep, Inc., 800 F.3d 205, 209 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pride v.
BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir.2000)). Where an expert has years of
experience in a particular field, she is qualified to give testimony on topics within
that field. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 379 (6th Cir.
2012) (“Whether a proposed expert’s experience is sufficient to qualify the expert
to offer an opinion on a particular subject depends on the nature and extent of
that experience.”); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 909 (6th
Cir. 2004) (noting that the proposed expert “had considerable experience in the
field of criminology and because he was testifying concerning a discrete area of
police practices about which he had specialized knowledge, we hold that the
district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in admitting [the]
testimony’); Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 293—
94 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district court allowed
a former police officer with twenty-eight years of experience to testify about threat
assessment).
Mr. Munsell is qualified. He is a mechanical engineer who specializes in
analyzing the failures of mechanical systems. Although he does not have
experience specifically with stick ladders, he has previously investigated issues
related to the failures of hunting stands and climbing devices. This experience is
sufficient to qualify him as an expert for his proposed testimony regarding the
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 8 of 22

alleged design defect, as at least some of the principles of mechanical
engineering and failures of mechanical systems apply to stick ladders. See Berry
v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f one wanted to
explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an aeronautical engineer might
be a helpful witness. Since flight principles have some universality, the expert
could apply general principles to the case of the bumblebee.”).
Further, Defendant argues that Mr. Munsell is not qualified to give an
opinion on the adequacy of the warnings because he “has no expertise in
designing or formulating warnings and instructions.” Mot. 16, ECF No. 34-1.
However, Defendant has cited no caselaw supporting its proposition that
mechanical engineers are unqualified to give opinions on product warnings, nor
has the Court found any such authority. Contra Brewer v. Webster Cty. Coal
Corp., 145 F.3d 1330 (Table) (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s
decision to allow a mechanical engineer to offer expert testimony about an
alleged failure-to-warn). However, the Court need not address this portion of
Defendant’s arguments because the failure-to-warn claim cannot survive
summary judgment, as explained below. Accordingly, Defendant’s arguments
that Mr. Munsell is unqualified are without merit.
2. Reliability of Mr. Munsell’s Opinions
Defendant also asserts that Mr. Munsell’s opinions are unreliable. As to
the failure-to-warn opinions, Defendant contends Plaintiffs alleged negligence,
not any possibly inadequate warning, was the cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Again,
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 9 of 22

the Court need not address this argument as the failure-to-warn claim does not
survive summary judgment.
Defendant claims Mr. Munsell’s opinions regarding design defect are
unreliable because they are based on “rigged” testing. Mot. Exclude 15, ECF
No. 34. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Mr. Munsell did not “conduct any
testing of the subject stick ladder as intended to be used by the manufacturer.”
Id. Defendant also contends that even with this “rigged testing,” Mr. Munsell’s
“testing and calculations do not provide any basis for his opinion.” /d. Defendant
also argues that Mr. Munsell’s alleged failure to provide an alternative design or
to rule out other possible causes of the accident render his opinions unreliable.
Id. at 15-17.
When determining whether an expert’s proposed testimony is reliable,
courts must conduct a “preliminary inquiry as to whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”
Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 792 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing
Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2000)). However,
experts “are permitted a wide latitude in their opinions so long as ‘the expert’s
opinion [has] a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the discipline.”
Geers v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 1:06-CV-830, 2008 WL
11352627, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).

Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 10 of 22

Here, Mr. Munsell’s design-defect opinions are admissible. His alleged
failure to test the stick ladder under the conditions specified by Defendant does
not change the fact that his findings and conclusions have a reasonable factual
basis—the quantitative analysis of data produced by his stress testing of the stick
ladder. See United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1993)
(“Where an expert’s testimony amounts to ‘mere guess or speculation,’ the court
should exclude his testimony, but where the opinion has a reasonable factual
basis, it should not be excluded. Rather, it is up to opposing counsel to inquire
into the expert’s factual basis.”). Defendant’s challenge to the types of situations
in which Mr. Munsell tested the stick ladder therefore goes to weight and not
admissibility. C.f. In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 529-32 (6th
Cir. 2008). Defendant may properly address its concerns during cross-
examination. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“Vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.”) Accordingly, Defendant’s arguments against the reliability of Mr.
Munsell’s design-defect opinions are not well taken.
Having determined that Mr. Munsell’s testimony regarding design-defect is
admissible, the Court now turns to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 11 of 22

ill. © MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Standard of review
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides: “The court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Court must grant summary judgment if the opposing party fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Van Gorder v.
Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007).
When reviewing a Summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, who must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial, and the
Court must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the
evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Pittman v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children and Family Serv., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir.
2011). The Court disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the
jury would not be required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute
about a material fact is genuine, “that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 12 of 22

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th
Cir. 2009).
The Court is not “obligated to wade through and search the entire record
for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.”
InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court

may rely on the parties to call attention to the specific portions of the record that
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. LaSalle
Bank N.A., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
B. Analysis
In her Complaint, Plaintiff advanced seven claims: (1) defective design
(Count |); (2) defective manufacturing (Count (3) failure-to-warn (Count II);
(4) negligent design and manufacturing defect (Count III); (5) negligent failure-to-
warn; (Count IV); (6) breach of implied warranty of fitness (Count V); and
(7) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Count VI).
As an initial matter, both parties agree that Plaintiffs common-law claims
(Counts III-VI) should be dismissed. Mot. Summ J. 31-33, ECF No. 33; Resp.
27, ECF No. 35. Plaintiff also represents that she “does not intend to maintain a
manufacturing defect claim at trial.” Resp. 21, ECF No. 35. The parties have not
indicated whether these claims are to be dismissed with or without prejudice.
Consequently, the parties are ORDERED to file a joint motion to dismiss the

? Plaintiff included both the design defect and manufacturing defect in Count I.
See Compl. Jf] 28-35.
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 13 of 22

manufacturing defect portion of Count | and Counts II-VI, indicating whether the
claims are to be dismissed with or without prejudice, by May 3, 2021.
1. Defective Design
Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant’s stick ladder has a defective design.
Plaintiff argues that the design of the stick ladder was defective because the stick
ladder bent at its joint under Plaintiff's weight while she was using the product in
a reasonably foreseeable manner. Defendant argues that it was not foreseeable
that a user would fail to follow Defendant’s instructions to wear a safety harness,
to choose a tree with a proper diameter, and to not step onto unsupported
sections of the stick ladder as Plaintiff did on this occasion. Thus, according to
Defendant, Plaintiff's negligence was the cause of her injury, not any design
defect in the stick ladder.
A product is defective in its design if the foreseeable risks caused by the
product’s design surpass the benefits of the design at the time the product left
the defendant’s control. Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.75(A). Alternatively, a product
has a defective design if it is “more dangerous than an ordinary person would
expect when used in a reasonably foreseeable manner.” Welch Sand & Gravel
v. O&K Trojan, 668 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (citing Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2307.75(B)). If the plaintiffs injury “was caused by an inherent characteristic of
the product” that is necessary to the product’s “usefulness or desirability” or no
“practical and technically feasible alternative design” existed, a product is not
defective in design. Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.75(E)-(F).
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 14 of 22

The foreseeable risks, benefits, and uses of a product are normally
questions of fact, and, thus, summary judgment is rarely granted when one of
these elements is in dispute. Welch Sand & Gravel, 668 N.E.2d at 533-34.
Summary judgment is granted for a manufacturer only when “a product is used in

a capacity which is clearly unforeseeable by the manufacturer and completely
incompatible with the product’s design.” Mitchell v. Michael Weinig, Inc., No.
2:17-CV-905, 2020 WL 5798043, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting
Welch Sand & Gravel, 668 N.E.2d at 533). Indeed, although a “manufacturer is
not responsible for all product misuses,” a “failure to design a product to prevent
a foreseeable misuse can be a design defect.” /d. at *6 (internal quotations
omitted).
Plaintiff maintains that her misuse of Defendant's stick ladder was
foreseeable to Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s
inclusion of specific warnings that users wear safety harnesses, use a tree of a
specified diameter, and not climb onto unsupported sections of the stick ladder
indicates that it was foreseeable to Defendant that users may fail to take such
precautions. The Court agrees and finds Plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence to at least show that her misuse of Defendant's stick ladder was not
“clearly unforeseeable” to Defendant. See Mitchell, 2020 WL 5798043, at *8
(denying summary judgment on the design defect claim because the plaintiff's
evidence—including the defendant's explicit warning not to walk onto the chain
conveyor—established that the plaintiff's misuse of the defendant’s product by
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 15 of 22

walking onto the chain conveyor was not “clearly unforeseeable” to the
defendant). Additionally, although Plaintiff may have misused the product, her
alleged misuses were not “completely incompatible with the product’s design.”
See Welch Sand & Gravel, 668 N.E.2d at 533. Moreover, the presence of
conflicting expert testimony presented by Plaintiff and Defendant makes
summary judgement inappropriate on the design defect claim.
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Defendant argues
that it cannot be held liable for Plaintiff's injury because she substantially altered
the product by using rachet straps instead of the included straps. Although Ohio
does not appear to have addressed whether determining if a product has been
substantially altered is a question of fact, other jurisdictions have determined that
it is an issue for the jury. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 736 F.2d
51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that “the relationship between a substantial
alteration to a machine and the causation of the injury is a jury question’);
Specter v. Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00194-TMB, 2020 WL
7360146, at **4—5 (D. Alaska Dec. 14, 2020) (concluding that whether the
alterations were substantial is a jury question); Pappas v. Ford Motor Co., 7 F.
Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1998) (“As in this case, where the defendant in a design
defect case raises an alternative theory for the cause of the accident, such as a
material alteration of the product, that is a question for the jury.”). Based on the
evidence in this case, this Court agrees it is for a jury to determine whether
Plaintiffs misuse amounted to a substantial alteration of the product.
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 16 of 22

Defendant further claims that Plaintiff's negligence, not its product, was the
proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Specifically, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff's general negligence and misuse of the stick ladder were intervening
causes to her injury. However, “[i]Jn any case where there is a question upon
which reasonable minds might differ as to the foreseeability of a particular risk or
the character of an intervening cause, the question is one for submission to the
jury under proper instructions as to proximate cause.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 543 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ohio Fair Plan
Underwriting Ass’n v. Arcara, 65 Ohio App. 2d 169, 417 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1979)).
Similarly, Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff assumed the risk of using
the stick ladder are better left to a jury. Bailey v. V& O Press Co., 770 F.2d 601,
607 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The issue of assumption of risk is ordinarily to be
determined by the jury.”); see also Simko v. CMI Terex Corp., No. 1:09CV757,
2010 WL 11681843, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2010) (observing in a defective
design claim that “assumption of the risk inherently involves a question of fact”)
(quoting Briney v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 782 F.2d 585, 590 (6th Cir.
1986)).
Finally, Defendant argues that Mr. Munsell did not provide an alternative
design. The failure to provide an alternative design could be fatal to Plaintiff's
claim. See Rees v. W.M. Barr & Co., Inc., 736 F. App'x 119, 129 (6th Cir. 2018)
(‘[T]o survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence of a
safe alternative design.”) From a review of Mr. Munsell’s Report and Plaintiff's
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 17 of 22

Response, however, the Court concludes that Plaintiff does offer an alternative
design. Resp. 18, ECF No. 35; Ex. K 7, ECF No. 35-2.
Thus, Defendant’s arguments are without merit, and, as to the defective
design claim, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2. Failure to Warn
Plaintiff also asserts a failure-to-warn claim. According to Plaintiff,
Defendant’s warnings are inadequate “because they fail to alert the user not to
apply any load to the unsupported, or unsecured, ladder sections.” Resp. 12,
ECF No. 35. Defendant asserts that this “alleged inadequacy in the warnings is
purely speculative” and that Plaintiff has failed to show that any alleged
inadequacy was the proximate cause of her injury. Mot. Summ. J. 26, ECF No.
33
Plaintiff brings this claim under OLAP, which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
(a) the manufacturer knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known about a risk that is associated with the product
and that allegedly caused harm for which the claimant seeks to
recover compensatory damages;
(b) the manufacturer failed to provide the warning or instruction that a
manufacturer exercising reasonable care would have provided
concerning that risk, in light of the likelihood that the product would
cause harm of the type for which the claimant seeks to recover
compensatory damages and in light of the likely seriousness of that
harm.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.76(A).

Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 18 of 22

To prove a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must establish that there existed
“(1) a duty to warn against reasonably foreseeable risks; (2) breach of this duty;
and (3) an injury that is proximately caused by the breach.” Graham v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 514 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Briney v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 782 F.2d 585, 587 (6th Cir.1986)). A defendant manufacturer
does not have a duty to warn “about an open and obvious risk or a risk that is a
matter of common knowledge.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.76(B). Additionally, a
defendant manufacturer has a duty “to exercise reasonable care [in giving] the
user information which [the defendant] has and which [the defendant] should
realize would be necessary to make the use of the product safe.” Miles v. Kohli
Assocs., 917 F.2d 235, 245 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hargis v. Doe, 443 N.E.2d
1008, 1010 (1981)).
The Court first considers whether there is any genuine dispute of material
fact as to proximate cause. In Ohio, “a plaintiff asserting a products liability
‘claim [ ] based on failure to provide adequate warnings not only must convince
the fact finder that the warning provided is unreasonable, hence inadequate, but
he also must establish the existence of proximate cause between the [product]
and the fact of the plaintiff's injury.” Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 226
F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Seley v. G.D. Searle Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d
192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (1981)), superseded on other grounds by Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2307.75. With respect to proximate causation in failure to warn cases, “the
Ohio Supreme Court divided proximate causation . . . into two sub-issues:
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(1) whether lack of adequate warnings contributed to the plaintiffs [use of the
product], and (2) whether [use of the product] constitute[d] a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury.” Hisrich, 226 F.3d at 451 (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Further, there are competing presumptions under Ohio law regarding the
first prong—whether the lack of adequate warnings contributed to the plaintiff's
use of a product. /d. The first presumption is “that an adequate warning, if given,
will be read and heeded.” /d. (quoting Seley, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 423 N.E.2d
831). This presumption works in favor of a manufacturer. /d.
Conversely, where the manufacturer either gives no warning or gives an
inadequate warning, a rebuttable presumption arises that the failure to
adequately warn was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs use of the product. /d.
If the manufacturer fails to present rebuttal evidence, that presumption is
sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the proximate cause element of a failure to
warn claim. /d.
A manufacturer can rebut the presumption of proximate cause that arises
upon the showing of an inadequate warning, however, by showing that a plaintiff
did not read or follow the warning. In such an instance, where the plaintiff did not
read the inadequate warning, the inadequacy of the warning could not have
proximately caused the plaintiffs use of the product. Indeed, “Ohio law is clear
that where a plaintiff fails to read and/or follow clear instructions, and where the
accident would not have happened had the plaintiff followed the instructions, the
Case No. 2:19-cv-1745 Page 20 of 22

plaintiff's failure to adequately warn claim fails for lack of proximate cause.”
Broyles v. Kasper Mach. Co., 517 F. App’x 345, 349 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Wade v. Diamant Boart, Inc., 179 F. App’x 352, 355—56 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also
Hart v. Honeywell Int'l, No. 1:15 CV 10000, 2017 WL 1235000, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
Apr. 4, 2017), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Hart v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.,
No. 1:15 CV 10000, 2017 WL 2693558 (N.D. Ohio June 21, 2017) (“A defendant
may rebut this presumption with affirmative evidence that a plaintiff either did not
read a warning that was provided, or would not have heeded an adequate
warning, had it been provided.”); Lawrence v. Raymond Corp., No. 3:09 CV
1067, 2011 WL 3418324, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2011) (finding that because
the warning was in plain view, the plaintiffs failure to read the same “prevents the
presumption of proximate cause” and dooms the plaintiff's warning defect claim);
Freas v. Prater Constr. Corp., 60 Ohio St. 3d 6, 10, 573 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1991)
(upholding judgment for the defendant in a failure-to-warn claim where the
injured party “failed to follow the . . . instructions and comply with the warnings as
provided in the manual”); Webb v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18859, 1998 WL
801944, at *5 (Nov. 18, 1998) (“Because nobody read or relied on the warning,
any alleged inadequacy in the warning was not a proximate cause for Webb’s
injury.”).
Even assuming that Plaintiff could show that the warnings were
inadequate, she cannot satisfy the proximate cause prong. Plaintiff admits that
she read the warnings and also admits that she did not follow them. See, e.g.,
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Ex. H at 44, 60. For example, Plaintiff admits that she knew the warnings said to
use a Safety harness; said that “every time” she used a tree stand, she would
also use a Safety harness; and confirmed that she owned a safety harness. /d. at
42, 55-60. However, she did not use the safety harness on the day of the
accident. /d. at60. As her own expert testified, if she had been wearing a safety
harness, she would not have fallen. Ex. G at 49. Thus, “the accident would not
have happened had the plaintiff followed the instructions,” and so Plaintiff's
“failure to adequately warn claim fails for lack of proximate cause.” Broyles, 517
F. App’x at 349 (quoting Wade, 179 F. App’x at 355-56). Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to the failure-to-warn
claim (Count II), and that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Exclude, ECF No. 34, is
DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement, ECF No. 33, is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
Sur-Reply, ECF No. 39, is DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE
ECF Nos. 33, 34, and 39 as pending motions. The sole remaining claim for trial
is Plaintiff's design-defect claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED. l i Ly
MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10377651. Public record. Not legal advice.