# Grant v. Montgomery County

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · March 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10377601

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10377601

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that deliberate indifference “may be manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.”
- holding that, because the Sheriff is the law enforcement arm of the county, the county may be held liable where an official policy of the Sheriff’s Department inflicts a constitutional injury

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
WILLIE GRANT,
:
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:19-cv-80
:
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO, JUDGE WALTER H. RICE

,
:
Defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING MOTION OF MONTGOMERY
COUNTY, OHIO AND THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) (DOC. #13), BUT GRANTING
PLAINTIFF 30 DAYS TO SEEK LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT; OVERRULING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS CITY OF
DAYTON, OHIO, OFFICER JAMIE LUCKOSKI AND OFFICER RANDY
BETSINGER’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
(DOC. #16)

Following his arrest and indictment on felony criminal charges, Plaintiff
Willie Grant filed suit against Montgomery County, Ohio and its Board of
Commissioners (“the Montgomery County Defendants”), the City of Dayton and its
Board of Commissioners, and Dayton Police Officers Jamie Luckoski and Randy
Betsinger (“the Dayton Defendants”). Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for alleged violations of his constitutional rights.
This matter is currently before the Court on two pending motions: (1) the
Montgomery County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc.
#13; and (2) the Dayton Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute,
Doc. #16.

I. Background and Procedural History
On the evening of March 17, 2017, Dayton Police Officers Jamie Luckoski
and Randy Betsinger responded to an anonymous tip that there were two males
selling heroin from a burgundy Pontiac near 415 Negley Place. The officers found
a vehicle matching that description near that location and blocked it in so that the

occupants were not free to leave. When the officers approached the vehicle, they
observed contraband inside. They arrested Plaintiff and took him to the
Montgomery County Jail. He was indicted on criminal felony charges. On March
1, 2018, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas sustained his motion to
suppress evidence, and all charges against him were then dismissed.
Plaintiff, who was at that time represented by counsel, filed this lawsuit on

March 18, 2019. Doc. #1. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is disabled and
wheelchair bound. It further alleges that, during the time he spent at the
Montgomery County Jail, he was taken to the hospital three times. He alleges that
his wheelchair padding was taken and never returned, that his specially-modified
car was impounded and later destroyed, and that money seized at the time of his

arrest was not returned for more than one year.
In Count I, Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers
Luckoski and Betsinger for illegal search and seizure in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. He also alleges that the officers used excessive force.

In Count II, Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 against Montgomery County
and the City of Dayton for: (1) failure to adequately train, supervise and discipline
the officers; (2) implementing “customs and policies for training and supervision of
law enforcement on searches and seizures, that, on their face, violate the Fourth
Amendment” or that were facially valid but implemented “in a manner such that

constitutional violations were likely to be, and were, visited upon those inhabiting,
visiting, or otherwise within the jurisdictional limits of Montgomery County and/or
the City of Dayton”; (3) implementing “customs and policies for the training and
supervision of law enforcement on the custody and care of accused persons and/or
inmates with physical disabilities that, on their face violate the Fourteenth
Amendment” or are facially valid, but implemented “in a manner such that

constitutional violations were likely to be, and were, visited upon those inhabiting,
visiting, or otherwise within the jurisdictional limits of Defendants”; and (4)
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs while he was housed at
the Montgomery County Jail.
On October 30, 2019, noting that it appeared that service had not yet been

made on the City of Dayton Board of Commissioners, the Court issued an Order
directing Plaintiff to show cause within 20 days why the action should not be
dismissed. Doc. #8. No response was filed.
On June 2, 2020, during a conference call, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that
she planned to file a motion to withdraw as counsel. However, she did not file
that motion until October 8, 2020. Doc. #14. In the meantime, on July 31,

2020, the Montgomery County Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Doc. #13. On October 9, 2020, the Court sustained the motion to
withdraw as counsel and gave Plaintiff until November 9, 2020, to obtain new
counsel and file a response to the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Doc. #15. Nothing was filed.

On November 24, 2020, the Dayton Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of prosecution. Doc. #16. They noted that Plaintiff had not responded to the
show cause order or to the motion for judgment on the pleadings. On December
14, 2020, Plaintiff, now appearing , filed responses to the motion to dismiss
and to the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Docs. ##17, 18. On December
22, 2020, the Dayton Defendants filed a reply, Doc. #19.

II. Montgomery County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Doc. #13)

Montgomery County and its Board of Commissioners filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. #13. Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to
this motion was filed on December 14, 2020, more than a month after the
extended deadline. The Montgomery County Defendants filed no reply brief.
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
Motions for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c) are analyzed under the same standard as motions to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). “For purposes of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of
the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if
the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.”

, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). However, the court need not accept as true legal
conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. (citing , 193 F.3d
389, 400 (6th Cir.1999)).
To withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a
complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

elements under some viable legal theory.”
., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). “The factual allegations in the
complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims
are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to render the
legal claim plausible, ., more than merely possible.”

, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting , 556 U.S.
662 (2009)). A “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” need not be
accepted as true, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action
sufficient. ., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “‘is
not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” , 490 U.S.
386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting , 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)).
In order to recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant, while

acting under color of state law, violated rights secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. ., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Dayton Police Officers Jamie Luckoski and Randy Betsinger are sued in their
individual and official capacities. As the Supreme Court explained in
, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), an individual-capacity suit seeks to impose

personal liability on a government official for actions taken under color of state
law. An official-capacity suit, however, is the equivalent of an action against the
governmental entity of which the officer is an agent. at 165.
A governmental entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because it
employs an individual who engages in unconstitutional conduct. In addition to

proving that an agent of the municipality, while acting under color of state law,
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, a plaintiff must also prove that a policy
or custom of the governmental entity was the “moving force” behind the alleged
constitutional violation. ., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978).
With these general principles in mind, the Court turns to the merits of the

Montgomery County Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on both
Counts of the Complaint.
C. Count I
Count I of the Complaint asserts claims against Dayton Police Officers
Luckoski and Betsinger for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Although not expressly stated, this claim appears to be
brought against the officers only in their individual capacities. It seeks judgment
against the officers in the form of compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff seeks no explicit relief in Count I against the Montgomery County
Defendants. Nevertheless, the Complaint alleges that the officers were “employed
by Montgomery County and under contract with the City of Dayton,” and that they

acted within the scope of their employment as law enforcement officers “with
Montgomery County and the City of Dayton.” Doc. #1, PageID##3, 7.
To the extent that these allegations could be interpreted as an attempt to
hold the Montgomery County Defendants liable for the conduct of the Dayton
police officers, the Montgomery County Defendants have moved to dismiss this

Count. They note that, under Ohio law, the county has no authority to hire, train
or manage a city’s police department. Ohio Revised Code § 737.05 grants
exclusive authority over the police department to the city’s director of public
safety. Montgomery County neither employs the Dayton police officers nor
establishes police policy.
Accordingly, to the extent that Count I could be construed to assert an

official-capacity claim against the officers, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to state a plausible claim for relief against the Montgomery County Defendants and
DISMISSES any such claim WITH PREJUDICE.1
D. Count II
In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against

Montgomery County and the City of Dayton. The Montgomery County Defendants
seek dismissal of the claims brought against them.
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the Montgomery County Defendants
are liable for failing to adequately and properly train and/or supervise the
, ratifying the officers’ conduct by allowing them to return to their
duties following the illegal searches and seizures, and implementing customs and

policies for training and supervision of law enforcement officers with respect to
searches and seizures, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against
the Montgomery County Defendants. As previously noted, the Montgomery
County Defendants have no authority over Dayton police officers or over the
policies and procedures of the Dayton Police Department. This portion of the claim

asserted in Count II is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

1 This ruling does not affect the viability of Count I with respect to the Dayton
Defendants.
Count II, however, also alleges constitutional claims arising out of Plaintiff’s
stay at the Montgomery County Jail. Paragraph 44 alleges that the Montgomery
County Defendants “implemented customs and policies for the training and

supervision of law enforcement on the custody and care of accused persons and/or
inmates with physical disabilities.” Plaintiff alleges that, on their face, these
customs and policies violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In the alternative, he
alleges that these customs and policies, although facially valid, were implemented
“in a manner such that constitutional violations were likely to be, and were, visited

upon” those within Defendants’ care at the Montgomery County Jail.
Paragraph 45 alleges that the Montgomery County Defendants were unable
to properly care for Plaintiff’s special needs while he was housed at the
Montgomery County Jail, and that the County should have “reasonably known
such, but deliberately disregarded the same,” causing him to “suffer great physical
injury from the serious aggravation of his medical condition, prolonged pain and

suffering, and the serious delay of and/or complete inability to move forward with
a scheduled vital surgery” that would have “drastically improved Plaintiff’s quality
of life.”
Ohio Revised Code § 307.021 provides that the county sheriff has charge
over the county jail and is responsible for its operation. The Court notes, however,

that Plaintiff has not sued the Montgomery County Sheriff or any specific
employee of the Montgomery County Jail. Plaintiff has sued only Montgomery
County and its Board of Commissioners.
Nevertheless, the law is clearly established that the county can be held liable
for unconstitutional policies implemented at the jail. , 758
F.2d 181, 189 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that, because the Sheriff is the law

enforcement arm of the county, the county may be held liable where an official
policy of the Sheriff’s Department inflicts a constitutional injury).
, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); ,
No. 2:18cv12913, 2018 WL 6305332, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2018) (“A
county can be held liable, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for acts of the county

sheriff or other jail personnel regarding unconstitutional conditions inside of a
county jail.”).
Regardless of whether Plaintiff sues Montgomery County through its Board
of Commissioners, or the Sheriff in his official capacity, the requirements are the
same. Plaintiff must prove that an agent of the county, while acting under color of
state law, violated his constitutional rights, and that a policy or custom of the

county was the “moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violation. ,
436 U.S. at 694.
1. Constitutional Violation Adequately Alleged?
The first question is whether the Complaint adequately alleges a
constitutional violation by an agent of Montgomery County while acting under

color of state law.
a. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
Broadly construed, paragraph 45 of the Complaint alleges that officials at
the Montgomery County Jail were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs. In , 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), the Supreme Court
held that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.2 In order to succeed on this claim, Plaintiff
must show that: (1) he had a serious medical need; (2) Defendants knew about it;
and (3) they were deliberately indifferent to it. at 105-06.

A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” ,
390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges that he is physically disabled and wheelchair bound with highly special
needs. However, the mere fact that he is wheelchair bound does not necessarily

mean that he had a condition that warranted immediate medical treatment. The
Complaint does not identify any “serious medical need.”
In his response to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff
elaborates on this claim. He alleges that, while at the jail, he contracted a bladder

2 Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the time in question, his claims
are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process clause
rather than the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. As a general rule, however, the same standards apply to both.
, 273 F.3d 682, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2001).
infection. In addition, the wounds on his coccyx (tailbone) grew worse. He further
alleges that his catheter was ripped from his bladder when the catheter’s leg strap
was run over. Doc. #18, PageID#83. If Plaintiff amended his Complaint to include

these allegations, this may be sufficient to state a plausible claim that he had a
“serious medical need.” However, as currently pled, it does not. A plaintiff cannot
amend his Complaint through his memorandum in opposition to a motion to
dismiss. , 880 F. Supp. 2d 801, 842 (S.D. Ohio
2012) (Frost, J.).

With respect to the second element, the Complaint alleges that Defendants
“should reasonably have known” that they “were unable to properly care for the
special needs of Plaintiff while he was being held at the Montgomery County Jail.”
Doc. #1, PageID#9. Nevertheless, the Complaint fails to identify his “special
needs,” and fails to allege that jail employees knew of Plaintiff’s specific “serious
medical needs,” his bladder infection, the wounds on his coccyx, or the

ripped-out catheter.
Similar problems affect the third element of the claim. “Deliberate
indifference” has both objective and subjective components. From an objective
standpoint, Plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation of medical care was
“sufficiently serious . . . posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”

, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation omitted). Given that the
Complaint does not identify any particular medical condition or any serious medical
need, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the deprivation of medical care was
“sufficiently serious.”
From a subjective standpoint, Plaintiff must show that Defendants had a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” , 429 U.S. at 104-05
(noting that deliberate indifference “may be manifested by prison doctors in their
response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care.”).
Here, the Complaint generally alleges that Defendants “deliberately

disregarded” the fact that the jail was ill-equipped to properly care for his special
needs, and that, as a result, he suffered “great physical injury from the serious
aggravation of his medical condition, prolonged pain and suffering, and the serious
delay of and/or complete inability to move forward with a vital surgery for which
Plaintiff was previously in line to have completed that would have, upon
information and belief, drastically improved Plaintiff’s quality of life.,” Doc. #1,

PageID#9.
The Complaint, however, does not allege that jail officials were aware of any
of his specific medical conditions. It does not identify what “medical condition”
was aggravated, or what “vital surgery” was delayed. Moreover, there are no
allegations from which it can be inferred that any jail employees knew of the

scheduled surgery or that they intentionally denied or delayed access to treatment
for his serious medical needs.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the Complaint, as currently pled, is
insufficient to state a plausible claim that jail officials violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

b. Conditions of Confinement
The Complaint generally alleges that the Montgomery County Jail was
unable to properly care for Plaintiff’s special needs. However, there are no factual
allegations to support such a claim.
Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the motion for judgment on the

pleadings raises the possibility of a separate constitutional violation concerning the
conditions of confinement at the Montgomery County Jail. Therein, he states, for
the first time, that, because he was not provided with a colostomy bag, he was
forced to defecate on himself. He further alleges that he sometimes sat in a
saturated diaper for hours, causing his cellmates to ridicule him because of the
odor. He also states that he was not able to shower or brush his teeth. Doc. #18,

PageID#83.
Again, these allegations are not included in the Complaint. Had they been,
this may have been sufficient to state a separate Fourteenth Amendment violation.
The Constitution requires that jail officials “provide humane conditions of
confinement,” ensuring that all inmates have “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and

medical care.” , 511 U.S. at 832. Conditions of confinement may be
unconstitutional if they “transgress today’s ‘broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” , 437 U.S.
678, 685 (1978) (quoting , 429 U.S. at 102)). In , the
Supreme Court held that conditions of confinement may be unconstitutional if they
“deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981).
It would appear that the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s memorandum in
opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings may rise to this level.
Again, however, as currently pled, the Complaint does not state a plausible claim
of a constitutional violation.

2. Policy or Custom?
Even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged that an agent of Montgomery
County, while acting under color of state law, violated his constitutional rights,
either by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs or by
subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, he must also
adequately allege that a policy or custom of the county was the “moving force”

behind the alleged constitutional violation. , 436 U.S. at 694. Such a
policy or custom may consist of: “(1) the municipality's legislative enactments or
official agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making
authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of
tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.”

, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005).
Here, Plaintiff generally alleges that the Montgomery County Defendants
promulgated certain customs, policies, and practices that caused the violation of
his constitutional rights. However, he has not identified any legislative enactment
or official jail policy that resulted in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Nor
has he identified any action taken by an official with final decision-making

authority. Likewise, he does not allege that the county had a custom of tolerance
or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Rather, his claims against the
Montgomery County Defendants are based on an alleged failure to train and
supervise jail employees concerning the custody and care of individuals with
physical disabilities.

However, a plaintiff asserting a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim
must show deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the law
enforcement officers (or here, the jail employees) come into contact.
, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Proving deliberate indifference
“typically requires proof that the municipality was aware of prior unconstitutional
actions by its employees and failed to take corrective measures.”

., 408 F.3d 803, 815 (6th Cir. 2005). , 735 F.3d
462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A failure-to-train claim . . . requires a showing of prior
instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [municipality] ha[d]
ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this
particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.”) (internal quotation

omitted); , 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (holding that, in order to
succeed on a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must usually show “[a] pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.”).
Plaintiff has not alleged any previous instances of constitutional violations
against persons with disabilities who were being housed at the Montgomery
County Jail, such that it can be said that the Montgomery County Defendants

were clearly on notice of the need for training and supervision in this area.
In a “narrow range of circumstances,” a plaintiff may be able to establish
deliberate indifference without evidence of a pattern of similar violations but only if
“the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train” are “patently obvious.”
at 63-64. For example, in , the court gave a hypothetical example

of a situation in which a city armed its officers and sent them into the public to
capture fleeing felons without giving them any training on the constitutional
limitations concerning the use of deadly force. 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. Plaintiff’s
Complaint, however, is also devoid of any allegations that the unconstitutional
consequences of failing to train jail employees on the proper care of pretrial
detainees and inmates with physical disabilities was so patently obvious that the

county should be deemed deliberately indifferent.
The Court therefore concludes that, as pled, the Complaint fails to state a
plausible claim based on a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise theory of liability.

To summarize, with respect to the alleged constitutional violations that

occurred during the time that Plaintiff was housed at the Montgomery County Jail,
the Complaint, as currently pled, fails to state a plausible claim for relief against
the Montgomery County Defendants. The Court therefore SUSTAINS the
Montgomery County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc.
#13.
Nevertheless, with respect to the claims of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs and unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Montgomery
County Jail, because it appears that the deficiencies in the Complaint may be able
to be remedied, the Court will DISMISS these particular claims against the
Montgomery County Defendants WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Within 30 days of the date of this Decision and Entry, Plaintiff may seek

leave to file an Amended Complaint if he can do so within the strictures of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(b). He must attach a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint to his
motion for leave to file.
In light of Plaintiff’s previous failures to respond to the Court’s orders,
Plaintiff is further cautioned that, even though he is proceeding , he must
comply with applicable rules and deadlines. Failure to do so may result in dismissal

of this lawsuit.

III. Dayton Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Doc. #16)
On November 24, 2020, the Dayton Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Doc. #16. They noted that

Plaintiff had not responded to the October 30, 2019, Show Cause Order, or to the
Montgomery County Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
Dayton Defendants therefore asked that the Court either dismiss the action or
issue a new order giving Plaintiff one more chance to respond to the pending
motion.
On December 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to

dismiss, urging the Court to allow his case to proceed. Doc. #17. The Dayton
Defendants then filed a reply. Doc. #19. Therein, they acknowledged that it
appeared that Plaintiff now intended to proceed They asked the Court to
set this matter for a Rule 26(f) conference so that the case may move forward.
In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES AS MOOT the Dayton

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, Doc. #16.

IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court SUSTAINS the Montgomery
County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. #13. As to these
Defendants, Count I is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All claims alleging that the

Montgomery County Defendants are liable for failure to train or supervise the
Dayton police officers are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
However, claims seeking to impose liability on the Montgomery County
Defendants on theories of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Montgomery County Jail are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Within 30 days of the date of this Decision
and Entry, Plaintiff may seek leave to file an Amended Complaint to cure the
current deficiencies with respect to those claims, if he can do so within the bounds
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Plaintiff must attach a copy of the proposed Amended
Complaint to his Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint.
The Court OVERRULES AS MOOT the Dayton Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, Doc. #16.
The Court will set this matter for a Preliminary Pretrial Conference after the
expiration of the 30-day deadline for Plaintiff to seek leave to file an Amended
Complaint, or after any such motion has been fully briefed and decided.

Date: March 30, 2021 tira =. oe review) age Merete
WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10377601. Public record. Not legal advice.