# Smith v. State of Ohio

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 20, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375987

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 20, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375987

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “failure to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the district court’s ruling”
- holding that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CARLOS M. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:20-cv-784
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

STATE OF OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a state inmate at the Fairfield County Jail, brings this prisoner civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 1-2.) This matter is before the Court for an initial
screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify cognizable claims
and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Having performed the
initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants for failure to state a claim or to assert any claim over which
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
1
I.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the
statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

1Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on
a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court
holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April
1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however,
has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v.
Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,
594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
II.
Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations in his Complaint:
1. On 10/28/2019 Judge J. Fields Gave the Plaintiff Carlos Montez Smith a
Recognizance bond. Once the Plaintiff was returned to the Fairfield County Jail
that order was not followed. The Plaintiff was told that he was being held for the
Prosecuting Attorney. Once the Plaintiff ask[ed] the Fairfield Sherriff department
to show a warrant or cause for detainment against court order they did not have a
reason but that for a favor of the Prosecutor’s office. (See Attachment A)1

2. There was not a warrant or any other legal reason for the unconstitutional
Detainment. There was not a warrant issued until 10/29/2019 at 2:11 pm. (See
Attachment B)2

Therefore, the court documents clearly show that these parties knowingly deprived
the Plaintiff of his constitutional and statutory right, and did not follow the direction
of the courts, to be released which is illegal.

(Complaint, ECF No. 1-1 at p. 5.)

Plaintiff asks for the following relief:

I am requesting that the courts will uphold the Law and GRANT RELEASE
IMMEDIATELY and to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE any and all actions that
transpired action [sic], because they are “Fruits of a Poisonous Tree.” For all parties
to be charged according to Law for using a sham legal process and Interfering with
Civil Rights. That the amount of the Demand of [$]2.8 million be GRANTED
without DELAY.

(Id. at p. 6.)

1 Attachment A appears to be a Journal Entry from the Fairfield County Municipal Court
following Plaintiff’s arraignment on October 28, 2019 on a misdemeanor charge of obstruction
of justice. It indicates that the Court issued a recognizance bond and Plaintiff could be released.
The Fairfield County Municipal Court docket reflects that this case was dismissed without
prejudice after Plaintiff was indicted on felony charges out of this incident. State of Ohio v.
Carlos M. Smith, Case No. CRB1902057.
2 Attachment B appears to be a Warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest on a Complaint issued by the Court
of Common Pleas on October 29, 2019. The Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas docket
for this case reflects that Plaintiff was charged with tampering with evidence. State of Ohio v.
Carlos Montez Smith, Case No. 2019 CR 00636.
III.
A. State of Ohio
As an initial matter, although Plaintiff names the state of Ohio as a Defendant, he fails to
make any allegations directed toward it in his Complaint. Even if he had made any assertions
against the state of Ohio, Plaintiff’s claims would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The

Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes a private party from bringing
suit against a state or any of the state’s agencies unless the state has expressly consented to the
suit or Congress has properly abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 , 782 (1978). “Ohio has not
waived its sovereign immunity in federal court.” Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F. 3d 389, 397 (6th Cir.
1999). And “Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under
the common law” by enacting § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67
(1989). Accordingly, there are very limited exceptions to state and state actor immunity here.
Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009). First, a plaintiff may bring a claim

against a state official acting in his or her official capacity if the plaintiff seeks only “prospective
injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1986)).
Second, a plaintiff may bring a claim for monetary damages against a state official in his or her
individual capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165- 68 (1985); Turker v. Ohio
Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1998).
Because none of the limited exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply here,
the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted
against the state of Ohio.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff does mention the Prosecuting Attorney, Defendant Mark A. Balazik in his
Complaint. Defendant Balazik, however, is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. “[A]
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when he [or she] acts
within the scope of his [or her] prosecutorial duties.” Imbler v. Patchtman, 424 U.S. 409,

420 (1976); Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993). A prosecutor must
exercise his or her best professional judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in
prosecuting them in court. Skinner v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006).
Prosecutors could not properly perform this duty if every decision carried the potential
consequences of personal liability in a suit for damages. Id. Prosecutors, therefore, are
extended absolute immunity when the challenged actions are those of an advocate. Spurlock
v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 798 (6th Cir. 2003). Immunity is granted not only for actions
directly related to initiating and prosecuting a criminal case, but also for activities undertaken
“in connection with [the] duties in functioning as a prosecutor.” Id. at 431; Higgason v.

Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2002). “‘Absolute prosecutorial immunity is not
defeated by a showing that the prosecutor acted wrongfully or even maliciously, or because
the criminal defendant ultimately prevailed on appeal or in a habeas corpus proceeding.’”
Grant v. Holenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting M. Schwartz & J. Kirklin,
Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees § 7.8 (1986)). Plaintiff does not assert
that Defendant Balazik was acting outside of his prosecutorial duties he allegedly told the
Sherriff’s Department to keep Plaintiff in detention. Defendant Balazik is therefore immune
from Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim based on conduct related to the charges. Imbler,
424 U.S. at 420; Grant, 870 F.2d at 1138.
C. Defendants Sherriff Phalen and Fairfield Sheriff Department
The Undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim over Defendants Phalen and
Fairfield Sherriff Department. Other than naming him in the caption of the Complaint, Plaintiff
fails to mention Defendant Phalen even tangentially in his allegations. Moreover, although
Plaintiff asserts that he asked “the Fairfield Sherriff department to show a warrant or cause for

detainment against court order,” (Complaint, ECF No. 1), presumably he is referring to an
unnamed deputy sheriff. Plaintiff attributes no specific wrongdoing on the part of the Fairfield
County Sherriff’s Office.
D. Relief Requested
Plaintiff purports to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, however, seeks
immediate release from custody. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks release, Plaintiff must proceed
by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A civil rights action is not
a substitute for habeas corpus. When a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his
confinement, his sole federal remedy is habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 787

(1994); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (“Habeas is the exclusive remedy . . . for a
prisoner who seeks immediate or speedier release from confinement.”). Consequently, the
Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this regard. To the extent
that Plaintiff seeks release from confinement, his appropriate remedy is a petition for habeas
corpus relief.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Complaint in its entirety be
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A for failure to state a claim for
relief on which relief can be granted. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court
certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order

adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore, if
Plaintiff moves for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, that such request be denied. See McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge
and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l
Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the
magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the
district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,
appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d
981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to
specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation
omitted)).

Date: July 20, 2020 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers_____
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375987. Public record. Not legal advice.