# Goldwire v. Chambers-Smith

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · June 29, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375776

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 29, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375776

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT F. GOLDWIRE

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:20-cv-2673
v. Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

ANNETTE SMITH-CHAMBERS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Robert F. Goldwire, an inmate at Marion Correctional Institution (“MCI”) who
is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action asserting a variety of unrelated
claims against twenty defendants in their individual capacities, all of whom are employed
directly by Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) or at one of the
following ODRC correctional facilities: Chillicothe Correctional Institution (“CCI”), Lebanon
Correctional Institution (“LCI”), Trumbull Correctional Institution (“TCI”), and Marion
Correctional Institution (“MCI”). This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of
Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims
and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997).
Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims arising from events that occurred
during his incarceration at CCI pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. In addition, the Court SEVERS Plaintiff’s remaining claims and
DISMISSES those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE as set forth herein.
I.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is difficult to decipher. In his “Introduction” section to the
Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is bringing claims premised upon Defendants’ retaliation,

falsification of records, due process violations, theft and obstruction, religious discrimination,
equal protection violations, and failure to train and/or deliberate indifference and authorization.
(Compl., ECF No. 1 at PAGEID # 8.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth allegations relating to a variety of incidents or conditions
spanning from 2015 through 2020, many of which are unrelated and occurred at different
corrections facilities. For example, Plaintiff alleges that in 2015, while housed at CCI, his
request for a specific meeting time and place to practice his faith as a member of the 5% Nation
of Gods and Earth (“NGE”) was unlawfully denied. Plaintiff further alleges that he then suffered
various forms of retaliation (also during 2015) at CCI after filing a written complaint against the
Imam, as well as other grievances.

Plaintiff was transferred to LCI in December 2015, where he remained incarcerated until
September 2018, when he was transferred to TCI. Plaintiff alleges that while at LCI, Defendant
Shanklin, the Disruptive Security Threat Group (“STG”) coordinator at LCI, “implicitly
authorized” STG officers to “target” Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff’s “helping of the less
literate prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies . . . .” (Id. at PAGEID # 14.) In
particular, Plaintiff alleges that during his time at LCI, LCI officers: disrupted his sleep by
kicking his door when they made their rounds; routinely destroyed his property; conducted
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frequent cavity and strip searches in public areas; subjected Plaintiff and other prisoners “with
high intensity chemical sprays”; interfered with his outgoing kites and mail and the grievance
process generally; and threatened to harm or kill him. (Id. at PAGEID ## 14, 16, 18.) Plaintiff
alleges that on September 4, 2016, he learned from LCI STG Officer Brown that Defendant
Reese, a CCI corrections officer, had identified him within the STG database as a “disruptive
black supremacist.” (Id. at PAGEID # 15.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Brown told him that it

was “dangerous” to file grievances against people and that he could not be removed from the
STG database, only designated as inactive. (Id.)
After his transfer to TCI in September 2018, Plaintiff alleges that the TCI chaplain did
not respond to his kites for religious accommodations and that the TCI librarian refused to make
copies of his grievance materials for him.
Plaintiff was transferred to MCI in January 2019. He complains that MCI personnel
likewise failed to process his requests for religious accommodations. Plaintiff also alleges that
he was improperly designated as an STG member based upon a picture of a tattoo that was not
his tattoo. He alleges that he suffered religious discrimination while at MCI because the NGE
flag was improperly listed in the STG database as an STG symbol. Plaintiff again complains

about his designation as an STG member.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 26, 2020. He seeks monetary damages as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.
II.
A. Misjoinder and Severance of Claims
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, which governs persons who may be joined in one
action, provides in pertinent part as follows:
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Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). This means that a plaintiff may not “combine into one lawsuit unrelated
claims against different defendants.” Robinson v. Rodarte, 2017 WL 1017929, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 6, 2017), report and recommendation adopted at 2017 WL 994350 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 15,
2017). In the context of claims brought by inmates, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has also observed that, “[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in
different suits . . . to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation
Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file
without prepayment of the required fees.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 506 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides the remedy for such misjoinder and states as
follows:
Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion
or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The
court may also sever any claim against a party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. “Where parties have been misjoined, a district court may drop a party or
sever a claim against a party, but may not dismiss the action on that basis.” Roberts v. Doe, No.
16-2082, 2017 WL 3224655, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2017); see also Cage v. Mich., No. 16-cv-
11679, 2018 WL 3729062, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21) (“[T]he
proper remedy for such misjoinder is to sever the claims against the unrelated parties and dismiss
those claims without prejudice.”); Prince v. Elum, No. 12-15526 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2013) (sua
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sponte severing and dismissing claims without prejudice under Rule 21 in prisoner civil rights
case for misjoinder).
This case presents a classic example of misjoinder given that Plaintiff advances unrelated
claims against a variety of Defendants based upon events that occurred at different times (in fact,
spanning over 5 years) and at different locations. That is, Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. For example,

Plaintiff’s claims relating to the CCI officials’ 2015 denial of his accommodation to practice his
NGE faith are unrelated to his claims premised upon his allegations that years later, LCI officers
subjected him to retaliation for filing grievances or that TCI officials and officers refused to
process his grievances or make copies of his grievance materials.
In accordance with Rule 21, this action will proceed solely on those claims arising
from events that occurred during Plaintiff’s incarceration at CCI, which are also the only claims
that are properly venued in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1391; S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 82.1.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims arising from the conditions or incidents occurring during his
incarceration at LCI, TCI, and MCI are SEVERED and DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to Plaintiff re-filing a separate complaint in a separate action. The undersigned

finds this result to be more just than directing the Clerk to automatically open cases for the
severed claims (several of which likewise appear to lack merit or be time barred) because this
approach allows Plaintiff the opportunity to consider whether he would like to pursue separate
actions, which could subject him to paying additional filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
B. Review of Claims Arising During Plaintiff’s Incarceration at CCI

1. Standard of review

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
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“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the
statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ .
. . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
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cause of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, a complaint will not “suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. In considering whether this facial plausibility standard is met, a Court must
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual
allegations as true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total
Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir.
2008) (citations omitted). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal
conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555). In addition, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 08-3978,

2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
2. Application

It is RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims as time
barred. “In § 1983 suits, the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state law, while
the ‘date on which the statute of limitations begins to run . . . is a question of federal law.’” King
v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of
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Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)). Ohio Revised Code
§ 2305.10 sets forth a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. Browning v. Pendleton,
869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989). That statute of limitations “begins to run when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Scott v. Ambani, 577
F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 26, 2020. Thus, claims accruing prior to May 26,

2018, would generally be untimely. As set forth above, Plaintiff was transferred from CCI to
LCI in December 2015. Defendant alleges, however, that he did not learn of Defendant Reese’s
identification of him in the STG database as a “disruptive black supremacist” until September 4,
2016, after he had been transferred to LCI. (See Compl, ECF No. 1 at PAGEID # 15.) Thus, any
claim Plaintiff had against Defendant Reese arising from Defendant Reese’s inclusion of him in
the STG database would not accrue until September 4, 2016, given that is the date when Plaintiff
had reason to know of the injury upon which he bases his claim against Defendant Reese. See
Scott, 577 F.3d at 646. Consequently, all of Plaintiff’s claims arising from his incarceration at
CCI, including his claim against Defendant Reese, must be dismissed as time barred by the
applicable two-year statute of limitations pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).

C. Other Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
to re-filing at a later stage of this case. (ECF No. 2.) Although this Court has the statutory
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to appoint counsel in a civil case, appointment of counsel is
not a constitutional right. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted). Rather, “[i]t is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances.” Id. at
606. The Court has evaluated the factors used to assess whether such circumstances exist in this
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case and has determined that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this juncture.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reduction of Copies (ECF No. 3) is also DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUCICE in view of this Order and Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff may renew his
motion should this action survive the initial screen.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s claims premised upon conditions he

experienced or events that occurred during his incarceration at LCI, TCI, and MCI are
SEVERED and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff re-filing a separate
complaint against these Defendants in a separate action. In addition, it is RECOMMENDED
that Plaintiff’s claims premised events that occurred during his incarceration at CCI be
DISMISSED pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Finally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel
(ECF No. 2) and his Motion for Reduction of Copies (ECF No. 3) are DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
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The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375776. Public record. Not legal advice.