# John and Jane Doe 1 v. Springboro Community City School District

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · June 8, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375680

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 8, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

JOHN AND JANE DOE NO. 1, et al., : Case No. 1:19-cv-785
:
Plaintiffs, : Judge Timothy S. Black
:
vs. :
:
SPRINGBORO COMMUNITY CITY :
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

ORDER RESOLVING THE PARTIES’
PENDING MOTIONS (Docs. 3, 12, 13)

This civil action is before the Court on three motions: a motion for leave to
proceed pseudonymously (Doc. 3); a motion to partially dismiss the first amended
complaint (the “Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. 12); and a motion for leave to amend the first
amended complaint (the “Motion to Amend”) (Doc. 13).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, the parents/guardians of 22 different first-grade students, have filed suit
against Defendants John Hopkins, Carrie Corder, and Daniel Schroer (the “individual
Defendants”). (Doc. 4 at ¶¶ 1, 3–5). Plaintiffs have also filed suit against Defendant
Springboro Community City School District (“Springboro”). (Id. at ¶ 2). Defendant
Hopkins was a physical education teacher at Clearcreek Elementary during the 2018–
2019 school year. (Id. at ¶ 7). Defendant Corder was the principal of Clearcreek
Elementary during the 2018–2019 school year. (Id. at ¶ 4). And Defendant Schroer was
the superintendent of Springboro during the 2018–2019 school year. (Id. at ¶ 3).
In their first amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, during the 2018–2019
school year, Defendant Hopkins sexually abused numerous first-grade students.1,2 (Id. at
¶¶ 1, 9–14). Plaintiffs also allege that, by allowing Defendant Hopkins’s conduct to

persist, the other Defendants failed to afford those first-grade students a safe educational
environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 25–55). Plaintiffs assert a/an: (I) Title IX claim; (II) § 1983
claim; (III) “reckless supervision/failure to monitor, discover, and report” claim;
(IV) assault and battery claim; (V) IIED claim; and (VI) injunctive relief claim. (Id. at
¶¶ 25–69). Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 15).

After Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants, the parties submitted the three
motions now before the Court. (Docs. 3, 12, 13). On September 16, 2019, Plaintiffs filed
the motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously. (Doc. 3). On October 14, 2019,
Defendants Springboro, Corder, and Schroer (the “Moving Defendants”) filed the Motion
to Dismiss. (Doc. 12). And, on November 4, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Amend.

(Doc. 13). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on
November 4, 2019. (Doc. 14). However, no other responsive memoranda were
submitted.
After the motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously was filed, but before either
the Motions to Dismiss or Amend were filed, Defendant Hopkins submitted a motion to

1 In all, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Hopkins subjected 88 different first-grade students to
inappropriate sexual contact. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 14). Plaintiffs seek to represent all such first-grade
students by way of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class action. (Id. at ¶¶ 18–24).

2 Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Hopkins engaged in misconduct during the 2017–2018
school year, while he worked at Clearcreek Elementary as a substitute teacher. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 13).
stay certain proceedings in this case, pending the resolution of a related criminal matter
(19CR035620).3 (Doc. 11). On April 8, 2020, the Court confirmed with the parties, via
email, that the jury trial in the related criminal matter had concluded, and that the motion

to stay pending in this case was now moot. (Not. Order, Apr. 13, 2020). Thereafter, the
Court issued a Notation Order terminating the motion to stay. (Id.) With the motion to
stay resolved, the Court turns to the pending motions.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Leave to Proceed Pseudonymously

First, the Court will address the motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously.
(Doc. 3). In the motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court for leave to sue Defendants under
fictitious names (i.e., as “John Does” and/or “Jane Does”). (Id. at 1). Plaintiffs argue
that it is appropriate for them to sue Defendants under fictitious names given the intimate
nature of the claims and tender age of the children involved in this case. (Id.)

Defendants have not filed a response in opposition to the motion.
On review, the motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously should be granted.
As a general matter, a complaint must state the names of all the parties. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(a). In certain circumstances, however, courts may excuse plaintiffs from
identifying themselves. Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004). The basic

consideration for determining whether a plaintiff should be allowed to proceed
pseudonymously is “whether a plaintiff’s privacy interests substantially outweigh the

3 As explained in the first amended complaint, on June 17, 2019, an Ohio grand jury indicted
Defendant Hopkins on 36 counts of gross sexual imposition. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 15).
presumption of open judicial proceedings.” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has identified several factors for courts to consider in this analysis:
(1) whether the plaintiffs seeking anonymity are suing to
challenge governmental activity; (2) whether prosecution of
the suit will compel the plaintiffs to disclose information “of
the utmost intimacy”; (3) whether the litigation compels
plaintiffs to disclose an intention to violate the law, thereby
risking criminal prosecution; and (4) whether the plaintiffs are
children.

Id. (citing Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185–86 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Here, the balance of the factors identified in Porter weigh in favor of Plaintiffs’
position. Id. In this case, challenging governmental activity (factor (1)), Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant Hopkins sexually abused numerous first-grade students, and that the other
Defendants failed to afford those first-grade students a safe educational environment.
(Doc. 4 at ¶¶ 1, 9–14, 25–55). Plainly, Plaintiffs will be required to disclose information
of the utmost intimacy in order to prosecute this case (factor (2)). And plainly, the
privacy of each of the seven- to eight-year-old children Plaintiffs represent is at-issue
(factor (4)). Thus, while this case will not require Plaintiffs to disclose any intention to
violate the law (factor (3)), there is no question that Plaintiffs’ privacy interests
substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings. Accord Porter, 370
F.3d at 561 (confirming that children are entitled to heightened protection under the
Porter analysis). Accordingly, it is proper for Plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously.4

4 The Court further notes that “Plaintiffs have disclosed their names to Defendant Springboro . . .
and [are] willing to disclose their names to the remaining Defendants after the Court has an
opportunity to enter an appropriate protective order.” (Doc. 3 at 2). Thus, allowing Plaintiffs to
proceed pseudonymously will not cause Defendants any discernable prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for leave to proceed
pseudonymously. (Doc. 3). Within 21 days of the date of this Order, the parties shall
confer by telephone, and submit a stipulated protective order to the Court, which

addresses Plaintiffs’ confidentiality concerns.5 If the parties cannot agree on the terms of
a stipulated protective order, they shall so inform the Court by the same deadline.
B. Motion to Amend
Second, the Court will address the Motion to Amend. (Doc. 13). In the motion,
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should grant them leave to file a second amended

complaint, which: (a) clarifies that Plaintiffs have sued the Springboro Board of
Education (rather than the Springboro School District); (b) clarifies that Plaintiffs have
asserted Count I against the individual Defendants in their official capacities only;
(c) clarifies that Plaintiffs have asserted Count II against the individual Defendants in
their official and personal capacities; and (d) names two additional Plaintiffs. (Id. at 2;

Doc. 13-1 at ¶¶ 1–2, 26, 39). Defendants have not filed a response in opposition to the
motion.
On review, the Motion to Amend should be granted.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), “leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given
when justice so requires.” Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 341 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Brooks

5 See, e.g., John Does 1-4 v. Snyder, No. 2:12-CV-11194, 2012 WL 1344412, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 18, 2012) (ordering the parties to submit a stipulated protective order after granting the
plaintiffs leave to proceed under pseudonyms); Doe I-VIII v. Sturdivant, No. 2:06-CV-10214,
2006 WL 8432896, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2006) (same); see also Citizens for a Strong Ohio
v. Marsh, 123 F. App’x 630, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, a plaintiff wishing to proceed
anonymously files a protective order that allows him or her to proceed under a pseudonym.”).
v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 130 (6th Cir. 1994)). Rule 15(a) embodies a “liberal policy of
permitting amendments to ensure the determination of claims on their merits.” Marks v.
Shell Oil Co., 830 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1987). In deciding a party’s motion for leave to

amend, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has instructed that district courts must
consider several elements, including “[u]ndue delay in filing, lack of notice to the
opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment .
. . .” Coe, 161 F.3d at 341 (quoting Brooks, 39 F.3d at 130). In the absence of any of

these findings, leave should be “freely given.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962).
Here, there is no indication that Plaintiffs have acted with bad faith, undue delay,
or dilatory motive. See Coe, 161 F.3d at 341. Nor does it appear to the Court that
Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments are obviously futile. (See generally Doc. 13-1); cf.

Bear v. Delaware Cnty., Ohio, No. 2:14-CV-43, 2015 WL 1954451, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 28, 2015) (“At this stage of the litigation, this Court is charged with determining
whether the futility of an amendment is so obvious that it should be disallowed.”
(emphasis added)); see also Fenley v. Wood Grp. Mustang, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-326, 2016
WL 10570260, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2016) (same). Additionally, as this case is still

in the early stages of the litigation process, and as Defendants have not filed a response in
opposition to the Motion to Amend, the Court finds it difficult to identify any prejudice at
all. Under such circumstances, leave to amend should be freely given. Foman, 371 U.S.
at 182.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Amend. (Doc. 13).
Within 21 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file a second amended complaint
with the Court. The second amended complaint shall take the form of the proposed

second amended complaint, which is attached as Exhibit A to the Motion to Amend.
(Doc. 13-1).
C. Motion to Dismiss
Finally, the Court will address the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 12). As the Court
has granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint, the Court concludes that

the Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the first amended complaint should be
DENIED without prejudice. See Mandali v. Clark, No. 2:13-CV-1210, 2014 WL
5089423, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2014) (stating that the filing of an amended complaint
generally moots a motion to dismiss the previous complaint); see also Rainey v. Patton,
No. 1:11-CV-327, 2011 WL 5239241, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2011) (confirming that,

“even though a district court is permitted to consider a motion to dismiss even after an
amended complaint has been filed, it is not required to do so, especially [where, as here,
the defendants] do[] not object to the filing of the amended complaint” (citation omitted
and emphasis added)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-CV-327, 2011 WL
5239237 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2011); see, e.g., Polk v. Psychiatric Prof’l Servs., Inc., No.

1:09-CV-799, 2010 WL 1908252, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2010) (denying a
defendant’s motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s original complaint after granting the plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-CV-
799, 2010 WL 1907586 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2010).°
II. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously (Doc.
3) is GRANTED, the Motion to Amend (Doc. 13) is GRANTED, and the Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 12) is DENIED without prejudice. Within 21 days of the date of this
Order, the parties shall comply with the procedures set forth in Sections II.A and II.B
supra, regarding the submission of a stipulated protective order and the filing of a second
amended complaint. Thereafter, Defendants shall respond to the second amended
complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 6/8/2020 " .
Timot lack
United States District Judge

© The Moving Defendants may, if/as they choose, reassert the arguments set forth in their Motion
to Dismiss in a new dispositive motion directed at Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. But
n.b. Troutman vy. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:16-CV-742, 2018 WL 6413201, at *3
(W.D. Ky. Dec. 6, 2018) (citing Baar v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 476 F. App’x 621, 623-36
(6th Cir. 2012)); Burwell y. City of Lansing, No. 1:17-CV-813, 2018 WL 10304424, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 20, 2018) (citing Baar, 476 F. App’x at 635).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10375680. Public record. Not legal advice.