# Armstead v. Baldwin

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · January 14, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10374600

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** January 14, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10374600

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “were aware of [the prisoner’s] diagnosis with HIV and hepatitis but completely withdrew the prescribed treatment for [his illness]”
- noting that “[a] district court abuses its discretion when it grants a preliminary injunction without making specific findings of irreparable injury”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DEMARCO ARMSTEAD,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:19-cv-4857
v. Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
BALDWIN, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Demarco Armstead’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 6) is
before the Undersigned. For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion be
DENIED. Defendants are DIRECTED to submit under seal Plaintiff’s antiviral drug
administration history records, similar to those submitted by the County Defendants, (see Doc.
40), from December 12, 2019, to the date of this Report and Recommendation by January 28,
2020.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, and is currently being detained at Franklin County
Correctional Center, has brought this suit against 24 Defendants. Plaintiff’s 35-page handwritten
Complaint asserts numerous claims, including religious discrimination, excessive use of force,
retaliation, conspiracy, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (See generally
Doc. 1-2). Since bringing this action, Plaintiff has filed 28 separate motions along with numerous
letters and exhibits. (See, e.g., Docs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 29, 38, 39, 48, 49, 51,
58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 74, 75). Currently before the Undersigned is Plaintiff’s
Motion for Restraining Order. (Doc. 6). In his Motion, Plaintiff does not describe the injunctive
relief he seeks but rather asserts broadly that Defendants have failed to administer nearly 20 doses
of his prescribed antiviral medication to treat his HIV. (See generally id.). More specifically, he
alleges:
[t]his facility and medical staff contracted to provide medical care to me has
maintained a practice of providing inefficient and questionable medical services
resulting in almost 20 missed doses of my mandatory life sustaining medication
treatment regime, failure to respond to my urgent and emergency symptoms and
chronic ailments. A custom of not addressing my health care needs [ ] physically
devastating my already compromised condition. The substandard care has caused
me to become fearful of my own survival and quality of life I will be able to enjoy.
As a pretrial detainee, I am forced to endure torture because of poverty.

(Id.).
Defendants Baldwin, Blade, Blake, Bryant, Carmen, Chambers, Fargus, Farnsworth, Holt,
Jane Doe, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Obrien, Probst, See,
and Shroder (the “County Defendants”) filed a timely response asserting that Plaintiff failed to
identify his medical condition or prescribed medication and therefore failed to meet his burden for
a restraining order. (Doc. 31). The Undersigned directed the County Defendants to do more work.
(Doc. 33). Specifically, the Undersigned directed them to address Plaintiff’s factual allegations.
(Id. at 2). The County Defendants did so. On December 16, 2019, they filed a supplemental
response along with relevant medical records, which were filed under seal. (See Docs. 35, 40, 41).
Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Lyons, Stefanko, and Jones (the “NaphCare Defendants”) also filed a
response to Plaintiff’s Motion. (See Doc. 55). Plaintiff has filed two reply briefs in support of his
Motion. (See Doc. 58 at 48; Doc. 73). Thus, this matter is now ripe for resolution.
II. STANDARD
“The standard for addressing a motion for a temporary restraining order is the same as the
standard applied to a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Ferron v. Search Cactus, L.L.C., No.
2:06-CV-327, 2007 WL 2110497, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2007) (citation omitted). Both are
extraordinary measures, and the movant must meet a high burden to show that such a measure is
justified. See ACLU v. McCreary Cty., 354 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2003); Kendall Holdings, Ltd.
v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630 F. Supp. 2d 853, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Indeed, the proof required
to obtain this relief “is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment

motion.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the movant must
show more than factual issues—he “must affirmatively demonstrate [his] entitlement to injunctive
relief.” Davis v. Caruso, No. 07-11740, 2008 WL 878878, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2008).
When considering whether to grant this extraordinary relief, a district court must balance
four factors:
(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether
the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether
issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether
the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.

City of Pontiac Retired Employees Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the first factor, to establish a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the movant
must demonstrate “more than a mere possibility” of success. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435
(2009). This means that the movant must “show, at a minimum serious questions going to the
merits” of his claims. Dodds v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The first factor is often determinative:
[C]ourts have often recognized that the first factor is traditionally of greater
importance than the remaining three. See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583
F.2d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 1978). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has held that when the
proponent of the injunctive relief has no chance of success on the merits of the
claim, the Court may dismiss the motion without considering the other three factors.
See Michigan State AFL–CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997).
Failure to do so is reversible error. See id.; Sandison v. Michigan High School
Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995).
Stanley v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. C2–02–178, 2002 WL 3140935, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
August 12, 2002) (denying motion for injunctive relief after evaluation only of chance of success
on the merits factor); see also City of Pontiac Retired Employees Ass’n, 751 F.3d at 430 (“When
a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, the

likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor.”).
Under the second factor, the movant “must show that irreparable harm absent injunctive
relief is ‘both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical.’” Kensu v. Borgerding,
No. 16-13505, 2018 WL 6540262, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV 16-13505, 2018 WL 6527782 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2018) (quoting Michigan
Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir. 1991)); see
also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (noting that “[i]ssuing a
preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our
characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy”); Friendship Materials, Inc. v.
Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that “[a] district court abuses its

discretion when it grants a preliminary injunction without making specific findings of irreparable
injury”).
Under the third and fourth factors—harm to others and the public interest—the context of
the case matters. In a prisoner civil rights case like this one, “[p]rison administrators [ ] should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 521 (1979). Consequently, “courts, especially federal
courts, should be reluctant to become involved in the internal administration” of correctional
institutions. Hanna v. Toner, 630 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1980).
Finally, in addition to the above factors, Plaintiff’s case is also subject to § 802 of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), which requires preliminary injunctive relief to “be narrowly
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary
relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

III. DISCUSSION
In his Motion, Plaintiff asserts that he has missed nearly 20 doses of his antiviral
medication. (See Doc. 6). It appears that Plaintiff is claiming that Defendants’ alleged failure to
adequately treat his HIV violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. (See Doc. 23 at 3 (asserting in his Complaint that Defendants’ failure to provide
medical care is akin to unconstitutional torture)). While Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges deliberate
indifference to his other alleged health conditions, including for example, skin allergies, prolonged
injuries from gunshot wounds, and post-traumatic stress disorder, (see generally Doc. 23 at 1–2),
his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, (Doc. 6), contains allegations regarding only his
antiviral medication. The Court will therefore limit its discussion to those claims.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
“The government runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment with respect to inmate medical care
when it is deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.” Mason v. Eddy, No. 1:18
CV 2968, 2019 WL 3766804, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2019) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 105–06 (1976)). To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, the inmate must satisfy a two-
pronged test containing both an objective and a subjective prong. Kensu, 2018 WL 6540262, at
*7. Under the objective prong, an inmate must show a “‘sufficiently serious’” medical need. Id.
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
Then, under the subjective prong, an inmate must show that defendants “possess[ed] a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, rising above negligence or even gross negligence and being
tantamount to intent to punish.” Broyles v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 478 F. App’x 971, 975 (6th
Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Put simply, “there must be a knowing failure

or refusal to provide urgently needed medical care which causes a residual injury that could have
been prevented with timely attention.” Grose v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 06-CV-15175, 2009 WL
2741797, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Grose v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 400
F. App’x 986 (6th Cir. 2010).
Applying that standard here, Plaintiff has a “sufficiently serious” medical condition, and
his Eighth Amendment claims concerning the treatment of that condition therefore satisfy the
objective prong. See, e.g., Taylor v. Naqvi, No. 3:17-CV-00920-VLB, 2017 WL 2662192, at *2
(D. Conn. June 20, 2017) (finding that HIV is a sufficiently serious medical condition under the
objective prong of the deliberate indifference test) (citing Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184
(2d Cir. 2003)). So the objection prong is satisfied.

But Plaintiff is unable to show a strong likelihood of success under the subjective prong.
To start, Plaintiff received consistent medical treatment for his HIV and other health concerns
since being detained at Franklin County Correctional Center. Indeed, the record reveals that he
has filed over 100 health care grievances against medical staff, to which medical staff generally
responded. (See generally Doc. 58; Doc. 23-3 at 19). And, while Plaintiff alleges that he has
missed nearly 20 doses of antiviral medications, the record shows that he has received over 230
doses of antiviral medication between March 2019 and December 2019. (See generally Doc. 40).
This treatment history matters because the Sixth Circuit “distinguish[es] between cases where the
complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a
prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir.
1976). “Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy
of the treatment, federal courts are reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.

Here, as noted, Plaintiff has received hundreds of doses of his antiviral medication during
2019. (See generally Doc. 40). His claims therefore concern the adequacy and not total denial of
medical care. Case law directs this Court to tread carefully before determining that such alleged
treatment inadequacy amounts to deliberate indifference. See Manley v. LNU, No. 13-13877, 2014
WL 4609129, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2014), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.
Manley v. Corizon Healthcare, No. 13-13877, 2014 WL 4609862 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2014)
(noting that, while the “interruption of a prescribed treatment plan [] or a delay in medical
treatment can establish deliberate indifference,” the court must also “consider the wide discretion
allowed prison officials in their treatment of prisoners under authorized medical procedures”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). With that gloss in mind, the Undersigned must decide

whether Plaintiff is likely to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs.
The record shows that Plaintiff did not receive his daily dose of antiviral medication 16
times between March and December 2019. In parsing the exhibits, it appears that the missed doses
fall into one of three general categories. First, Defendants concede, and the record confirms that
the jail ran out of Plaintiff’s prescription on six separate occasions. (See Doc. 40 at 5, 11, 12, 17
(listing prescription administration as “pending pharmacy delivery” on the following dates: May
3, 2019; May 4, 2019; May 5, 2019; June 24, 2019; July 18, 2019; and November 10, 2019)).
Second, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff “refused” his medication on four separate occasions.
(See id. at 11, 15, 17, 20 (documenting that Plaintiff “refused” medication on the following dates:
March 16, 2019; May 6, 2019; May 31, 2019; and July 19, 2019)). Finally, the record indicates
that Plaintiff failed to appear for his daily “medication pass” on six separate occasions. (See Doc.
40 at 10, 12, 16, 18 (documenting “no show for medication pass” on the following dates: April 8,

2019; April 9, 2019; May 16, 2019; June 29, 2019; July 2, 2019; and August 2, 2019)).
Turning first to the latter two categories of missed medication, Plaintiff asserts that he
refused his medication while fasting for Ramadan and that medical staff failed to return after
sundown to administer his medication. (Doc. 23 at 1). He also explains that he missed the
medication pass because he suffers from “excessive tiredness,” for which Defendants have
allegedly failed to accommodate. (Id. at 2). Despite these explanations, Plaintiff has failed to
allege much less establish that Defendants intentionally withheld his medicine. While medical
staff may have agreed to return to Plaintiff’s cell after sundown, their failure to do so is not
“tantamount to intent to punish.” Broyles, 478 F. App’x at 975. Nor does their alleged failure to
wake Plaintiff for his medication rise to the level of deliberate indifference. To the contrary, the

record shows, for example, that medical staff knew of and responded to Plaintiff’s concern that he
slept through the medication pass. (See Doc. 23-3 at 61 (responding to Plaintiff’s grievance and
stating that “medication pass is announced upon arrival to the unit” and “it is your responsibility
to get up for your medication”)).
Said plainly, there is nothing to suggest that Defendants, in failing to wake Plaintiff for his
medication or administering the medication after Ramadan, intentionally withheld Plaintiff’s
medication. See, e.g., Mason, 2019 WL 3766804, at *12 (noting that plaintiff “cannot attempt to
dictate the treatment he receives by refusing to take prescribed anti-viral medication and then claim
that prison officials are deliberately indifferent because they failed to provide him with a different
medication that he prefers, and his disagreement with the HIV treatment provided does not give
rise to a constitutional claim for deliberate indifference”) (quotation marks and citation omitted);
Kensu, 2018 WL 6540262, at 14 n.9 (holding that difficulty “getting to the medicine” or missing
his “call-out” for medication due to visitors did “not suggest that the defendants are actively

preventing plaintiff from receiving his daily dose”).
Turning to the remaining category of missed medication—instances when the institution
ran out of Plaintiff’s prescription—the Undersigned must decide not whether Plaintiff received
perfect treatment. The only question for the Court is whether Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Perhaps, medical staff could have exercised more
diligence in ensuring that Plaintiff’s medication did not run out. But a constitutional claim for
deliberate indifference “requires more than negligence or carelessness.” Owens v. O’Dea, 149
F.3d 1184 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding no evidence that medical treatment for plaintiff’s HIV was
deliberately or indifferently withheld). And, “[a]n alleged inadvertent failure to provide adequate
medical care, while perhaps evidence of medical malpractice, does not evidence sufficiently

harmful acts or omissions to state a cognizable claim.” Id. Rather, it reflects “questionable
medical judgment,” which at most, states “a claim for a medical malpractice, as opposed to a
constitutional violation.” Id.
Here, based on the record before the Undersigned, Plaintiff has alleged, at the very most, a
claim for negligence—not a constitutional violation. Indeed, Plaintiff filed a medical grievance
on June 27, 2019, complaining that his medication was out of stock. (See Doc. 23-3 at 79).
Medical staff responded to the grievance, stating that, “on chart review, medications have been
pending pharmacy delivery on 4 out of 9 missed doses, the remaining 5 missed doses due to no-
show to medication pass/refusal” and that nurses were “educated re: importance of medication
compliance and upkeep of stock.” (Id.). It appears therefore that medical staff were not
deliberately indifferent to the importance of medication compliance but rather were aware of the
issue and worked to resolve it.
The case law is clear that there is no constitutional violation in such instances. Compare

Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “were aware of [the
prisoner’s] diagnosis with HIV and hepatitis but completely withdrew the prescribed treatment for
[his illness]”) with Kensu, 2018 WL 6540262, at *9 (finding that “it d[id] not appear that the lapse
in the prescription was due to anything more than, at most, mere negligence or medical
malpractice,” which are insufficient to satisfy a deliberate indifference claim); Kenion v. Kiby, No.
5:15-CV-15-FDW, 2015 WL 2345653, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 14, 2015) (holding that two incidents
of plaintiff not receiving his insulin shot at the prescribed time did “not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference”); Ragland, 2012 WL 511827, at *10 (holding that “isolated incidents of
missed medications” failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference); Williams v. Turner, No.

4:10-CV-04053, 2011 WL 4633106, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 6, 2011) (finding that, while “the
medical staff could have been more diligent in ensuring there was a continuous supply of [cancer
medication] available at the facility,” there was no evidence of deliberate indifference, especially
because plaintiff often refused the medication); Steelman v. Baker, No. 9:05CV244, 2006 WL
483563, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2006) (“The jail records show that Steelman was provided with
numerous medications, for which the prescriptions were regularly renewed. While there may have
been at times a brief delay in getting some of these medications renewed, . . . he has failed to show
that these apparently isolated incidents rose to the level of constitutionally deliberate indifference
to his medical needs, rather than negligence or carelessness.”); Adams v. Feinerman, No. CIV. 03-
762-WDS, 2005 WL 1653769, at *3 (S.D. Ill. July 11, 2005) (holding that the fact that plaintiff’s
Parkinson’s medication was occasionally out of stock, “while regrettable,” did “not amount to a
constitutional claim” but “[a]t best, describe[d] negligence, which is not actionable under the
Eighth Amendment”).

In sum, Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his
deliberate indifference claim and, consequently, has not met his burden to justify a temporary
restraining order.
B. Remaining Factors
Briefly, the remaining three factors also weigh against the extraordinary relief Plaintiff
seeks. Under the second factor, whether Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive
relief, Plaintiff “must show that irreparable harm is ‘both certain and immediate, rather than
speculative or theoretical.’” Kensu, 2018 WL 6540262, at *10 (quoting Griepentrog, 945 F.2d at
154). Plaintiff’s claims, however, relate to past instances of missed medication. And, as one
district court explained, past harm does not justify a preliminary injunction:

In addition, Carter has not even alleged that he would suffer irreparable injury
without the injunction. He has not explained how he has continued to suffer adverse
effects from his medical treatment, only that he was delayed or denied in getting
[his multiple sclerosis] medication in the past. This cannot be the basis for the grant
of a preliminary injunction because it is well settled that a preliminary injunction
cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
prevent future irreparable harm.

Carter v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 12-CV-12621, 2013 WL 5291567, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19,
2013), aff’d (Sept. 26, 2014) (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). The same is
true here. Plaintiff asserts that he could develop acquired drug resistance or that his HIV could
become AIDS. (See Doc. 58 at 55). But the record shows that Plaintiff is continuing to receive
his medication and that the jail ran out of his medication only once between August 2019 and
November 2019. Given the importance of medication adherence, however, and to ensure that
Plaintiff has continued to receive his medication, Defendants are DIRECTED to submit under
seal Plaintiff’s antiviral drug administration records, similar to those submitted by the County
Defendants, (see Doc. 40), from December 12, 2019, to the date of this Report and

Recommendation by January 28, 2020.
Finally, with regard to the third and fourth factors, while a temporary restraining order in
this case is unlikely to substantially harm others, the Undersigned “must be mindful of the cautions
that apply to issuing an injunction that affects the operation of the prison system, which also shows
that the public interest would not be served by issuing the injunction.” Carter, 2013 WL 5291567,
at *6; see also Mason, 2019 WL 3766804, at *13 (denying motion for preliminary injunction
concerning treatment of plaintiff’s HIV and noting that, “[w]ith respect to the public interest factor,
in the absence of a constitutional violation ‘concepts of separation of powers and federalism
strongly discourage federal courts from entangling themselves in the administration of prison
health care systems’”) (quoting Winn v. Waugaman, No. 0:14-CV-169-HRW, 2015 WL 1606151,

at *5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 8, 2015) (declining to issue preliminary injunction ordering doctor to provide
prescription pain medication that was discontinued in lieu of over-the-counter medication)). Here,
the Undersigned will require Defendants to update the Court on medication compliance. Any
further injunctive relief would tread too heavily on the institution’s ability to manage the intricacies
of pretrial detainees’ healthcare. See id.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order (Doc. 6) be DENIED. Defendants are DIRECTED to submit under seal
Plaintiff’s antiviral drug administration records, similar to those submitted by the County
Defendants, (see Doc. 40), from December 12, 2019, to the date of this Report and
Recommendation by January 28, 2020.
V. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 14, 2020 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10374600. Public record. Not legal advice.