# Washington v. Neil

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 30, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10374137

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 30, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10374137

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that defendant’s argument that he was a citizen of the “Republic of Idaho” and not a U.S. citizen and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the United States was “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous”
- explaining that § 2254 applies to petitioners who are held “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (emphasis in original)). 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a
- concluding that plaintiff’s argument that he was a citizen of the state of Indiana, but not a citizen of the United States and therefore not subject to its laws was “simply wrong”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Oscar L. Washington, Jr.,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:18cv00589

v. Judge Michael R. Barrett

Jim Neil, Sheriff, et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (R&R)
issued by the Magistrate Judge on October 16, 2018 (Doc. 8), as well as the Report and
Recommendation (R&R) later issued on June 27, 2019 (Doc. 11). Objections have
been filed to both R&Rs. (See Docs. 9, 12).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), determinations by a magistrate judge are subject to
review by a district judge. With regard to dispositive matters, the district judge “must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly
objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After review, the district judge “may accept,
reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The
Court has engaged in a de novo review, which is set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The October 16, 2018 R&R
As explained by the Magistrate Judge, Petitioner, a pretrial detainee, filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with civil rights claims on August 21, 2018. (See
Doc. 1).1 While he paid the $5 filing fee, he failed to sign the petition as required by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.2 Instead, the petition was signed on his behalf by Achashverosh
Adnah Ammiyhuwd as a putative next friend. (Doc. 1 at PageID 146). Ammiyhuwd is
not a licensed attorney, however, and has not met the requirements to acquire “next
friend” standing under 28 U.S.C. § 2242.3 See Tate v. United States, 72 F. App’x 265,

266 (6th Cir. 2003) (setting forth requirements for a putative “next friend” and stating
that the “putative next friend must clearly establish ‘the propriety of his status’ in order to
‘justify the jurisdiction of the court.’”) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164
(1990)). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge issued a Deficiency Order, instructing the
Clerk to return the petition to Petitioner and ordering Petitioner to sign the petition and
return it to the Clerk within thirty days. (Doc. 3). Petitioner did not return the signed
habeas petition, but, rather, Ammiyhuwd filed an objection to the Deficiency Order (Doc.
4), a motion to intervene (Doc. 6), and a notice of non-consent and application for a
three-judge court (Doc. 7). Because Ammiyhuwd failed to establish in these filings that

Petitioner was unable to sign and return the habeas petition, or the propriety of his own
status as next friend, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this civil action be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 8 at PageID 253). As
authority, she notes that district courts have the inherent power to sua sponte dismiss

1 The caption of the petition indicates that it is filed under both 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254, but,
because petitioner is a pretrial detainee, the Magistrate Judge properly construed it as being filed under §
2241. See Klein v. Leis, 548 F.3d 425, 430 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that § 2254 applies to
petitioners who are held “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)
(emphasis in original)).
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) provides: “Every pleading, written motion, or other paper must be signed
by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented. . . .The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected
after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.”
3 28 U.S.C. § 2242 specifies that an “[a]pplication for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing
signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.”
civil actions for want of prosecution “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–
31 (1962). Failure of a party to comply with an order of the Court warrants invocation of
the Court’s inherent power. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Rule 11, Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. §
2254.
Ammiyhuwd timely filed an Objection to the October 16, 2018 R&R on October
22, 2018. (Doc. 9).
B. The June 27, 2019 R&R
The Magistrate Judge reports that Ammiyhuwd filed on November 30, 2018 an
“Emergency Ex Parte Engagement for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. (See Doc. 10). She recommends that this motion, along with his pending
motion to intervene (Doc. 6) and his notice of non-consent and application for a three-
judge court (Doc. 7), be denied because Ammiyhuwd has no standing to file motions on

Petitioner’s behalf. (Doc. 11 at PageID 364).
Ammiyhuwd timely filed an Objection to the June 27, 2019 R&R on July 11,
2019. (Doc. 12).
II. ANALYSIS

Ammiyhuwd’s Objections to both R&Rs to some degree reprise his “Objection” to
the Deficiency Order. There, he argues that, as Petitioner’s “biological” father, he
should automatically qualify as Petitioner’s next friend because he “is truly dedicated to
the best interests of his biological son[.]” (See Doc. 4 at PageID 180–82). This
argument fails under Whitmore v. Arkansas, supra, which mandates “two firmly rooted
prerequisites:”
Decisions applying the habeas corpus statute have adhered to at
least two firmly rooted prerequisites for “next friend” standing. First,
a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation—such as
inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the
real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute
the action. Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the
best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate,
and it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have
some significant relationship with the real party in interest.

495 U.S. at 163. Courts will often presume that a parent acts in his child’s best
interests, but that presumption is insufficient to confer “next friend” standing when the
parent fails to set forth evidence that the petitioner “is incompetent or otherwise
incapable of pursuing the [ ] action on his own behalf.” Tate, supra, 72 F. App’x at 267.
See Helton v. Warren, No. 2:10-CV-10384, 2010 WL 457478, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8,
2010) (“Barb Helton has failed to satisfy the first prerequisite. She has neither alleged
nor established that her daughter, Julie Meyer, is incompetent or otherwise unable to
pursue a federal habeas action on her own behalf. Thus, even assuming that Helton is
acting in Meyer’s best interests, Helton’s failure to demonstrate Meyer’s inaccessibility,
incompetence, or other disability, precludes the Court from considering the [ ]
petition.”); see generally Nickerson v. Dep’t of Cmty. Health Ctr. For Forensic
Psychiatry, No. 16-cv-11151, 2016 WL 1529783, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 2016).
Ammiyhuwd alleges as “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability”
the fact that his son has “no knowledge of law, cannot appear and file the petition on his
own behalf.” (See Doc. 1 at PageID 87 (citing Whitmore)). But as the Magistrate Judge
correctly reports, this status in insufficient to establish “next friend” standing. Pinkston
v. Smith, No. 3:15cv786-CWR-MTP, 2015 WL 7289501, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 17,
2015) (assertions by brother of petitioner that petitioner has been “blocked” from the law
library and has had his “papers” stolen from him not enough). The circumstance in
Pinkston mirrors this one:

Stiles [the brother] does not claim that Chaz [the petitioner] is inaccessible or that
Chaz cannot access the Court himself. Rather, Stiles contends that Chaz cannot
access a law library or his papers. In other word, Chaz is not educated in the
law. It is not clear why it is preferable for Stiles, himself a non-attorney, to file
these habeas claims, rather than Chaz. . . . The inaccessibility Stiles complains
of simply is not the kind that warrants resort to the next friend device.

Id. (emphasis added). See Evans v. McNeil, No. 3:06-cv-379, 2008 WL 2561899, at
*10 (N.D. Fla. June 25, 2008) (“[W]hile the court considers that Petitioner’s father met
the second prong of the test outlined in Whitmore, the assertions in his father’s motion
to proceed as ‘next friend’ fail to demonstrate that Petitioner was unable to proceed
either himself or through legal counsel. Petitioner’s father alleged that Petitioner was
incarcerated at the county jail, and pursuant to jail policy, inmates who were not
represented by legal counsel were permitted to conduct legal research only by
submitting a form to jail staff requesting specific information about legal matters they
wished to research, and jail staff would then research the request but not in a timely
manner. Petitioner’s father argued that the jail’s system of research denied Petitioner
access to the courts. The circumstances alleged by Petitioner’s father are
distinguishable from those cases where courts have granted ‘next friend’ standing and
fall far short of demonstrating that Petitioner was unable to appear on his own behalf or
through legal counsel.”) (citations to the record omitted)).
Otherwise, Ammiyhuwd’s Objections challenge the Magistrate Judge’s authority
and argue that a failure to allow him to act as Petitioner’s “next friend” or to intervene in
his petition violates both his—and his son’s—first amendment guarantees to free
speech and free exercise of religion. Reduced to their essence, Ammiyhuwd’s
Objections appear to follow those made by litigants in the “sovereign citizens”
movement “who believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional

legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.” White v.
Tennessee, No. 2:14-CV-115, 2014 WL 3908203, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2014)
(quoting United States v. Ulloa, 51 F. App’x 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013)). See also
Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011) (“So-called sovereign citizens
believe that they are not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in
an attempt to, among other things, avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail
criminal proceedings.”). As noted by another district court:
Plaintiff appears to be relying on a “sovereign citizen” theory to
challenge the Court’s filing fee, which has been unsuccessfully
propounded by others. This legal theory seems to have originated
in the context of tax protests, and is generally advance to challenge
state and federal laws and judgments. The theory (in all of its
various forms) has been struck down consistently by the courts.
See United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that plaintiff’s argument that he was a citizen of the
state of Indiana, but not a citizen of the United States and therefore
not subject to its laws was “simply wrong”); United States v. Jagim,
978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that defendant’s
argument that he was a citizen of the “Republic of Idaho” and not a
U.S. citizen and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the United
States was “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous”); U.S.
v. Delatorre, 2008 WL 312647, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“This Court’s
jurisdiction over Mr. Delatorre remains valid whether his name is
written in all capital letters or a mix of capital and lower case letters,
or whether he identifies himself as: a ‘real flesh and blood man, in
his private capacity,’ a ‘sovereign secured party creditor;’ a debtor;
the ‘authorized representative of the corporate fiction-entity/debtor
identified, as Fernando Delatorre,’ or ‘third party intervenor on
behalf of Defendant/Debtor Fernando Delatorre.’ Mr. Delatorre’s
Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC’), copyright, and trademark filings
do not change his fact.”).
Rice v. City of Boise City, No. 1:13-cv-00441-CWD, 2013 WL 6385657, at *2 (D. Idaho
Dec. 6, 2013) (emphasis added). See also El-Bey v. City of Greensboro, No.
1:10CV291, 2010 WL 3242193, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (“Plaintiff is among
group of individuals, sometimes referred to as ‘sovereign citizens,’ who claim to be

immune from all state and federal laws by virtue of their supposed identities as
descendants of indigenous peoples and for other equally absurd reasons. By now, the
path of these litigants is well-traveled, and courts have repeatedly rejected their claims
as frivolous.”), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2011 WL 255719
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 25, 2011).
Ammiyhuwd denies being a sovereign citizen, and refers to himself and his son
as follows: “biblical ‘Transient foreigner’ ‘non-residence’, Sui Juris, In Propria Persona,
Rerum Natura, Sui Generis, Achashverosh Adnah Ammiyhuwd (Petitioner-Appellant or
Biblical Israelite-American national republic Ammiyhuwd), a biblical chief
Ambassador/Diplomat, Israelite-American national republic as defined in 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(14)(21), non-citizen national as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1452, and Section
101(a)(21) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Petitioner (not a so called
sovereign citizen’) a none ‘U.S.** citizen’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1401, (not a so called ‘Black
or so called African American etc., or of African nationality or descent’) but born in North
America Republic, a First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States of
America Constitution and Article I, Section 2, 3, 4, 9, 24, 27, 31, and 37 of the Indiana
Constitution biblical citizen of Heaven, domicile in the Kingdom of heaven on earth
pursuant to Philippians 3:20 (NKJV), from the tribe Judah (‘Yahadah’) of the twelve
tribes of Israel (‘Yashar’al’) of the Holy Bible[.]” (Doc. 12 at PageID 366–67).
Regardless of how Ammiyhuwd wishes to “classify” himself, however, he is subject to
the laws of the United States and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as is Petitioner.
See United States v. Leugers, No 1:16cv614, 2017 WL 393092, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan.
30, 2017).

III. Conclusion
There is no error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Ammiyhuwd has no
standing to file the motions (Docs. 6, 7, and 10) that are pending on the docket. Thus,
Ammiyhuwd’s Objections (Doc. 12) are OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the
premise of her Report and Recommendation (Doc. 11) dated June 27, 2019, but rather
than deny the motions as recommended, the Court instead will STRIKE Documents 6,
7, and 10 from the record.
There also is no error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Petitioner must
sign his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and that Petitioner has failed to comply with
the Court’s Deficiency Order issued on August 29, 2018. Therefore, Ammiyhuwd’s

Objections (Docs. 4, 9) are OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 8) dated October 16, 2018.
Accordingly, this civil action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to
prosecute.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Michael R. Barrett
Michael R. Barrett, Judge
United States District Court

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10374137. Public record. Not legal advice.