# Wisdom v. Experian Information Solutions Inc.

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · April 22, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373385

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 22, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

KADIR WISDOM, ) CASE NO. 1:22-cv-01091
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
)
vs. )
)
EXPERIAN INFORMATION ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., ) ORDER
)
Defendants. )

Before the Court is Defendant Experian Information Solutions Inc’s (“Experian”) Motion
to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 10). For the
reasons that follow, the court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Kadir Wisdom (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Experian, a
consumer reporting agency, and CT Corporation System, Experian’s registered agent, alleging that
Experian willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fair Consumer Reporting Act (“FCRA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (ECF No. 1, Compl.). The complaint asserts two separate claims against
Experian. First, Plaintiff asserts that Experian furnished 16 inquiries on his consumer report
without his express, written consent, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2) (Count One). (Id. at
PageID #4–5, 11). These inquiries were deleted from the consumer report after Plaintiff initiated
Experian’s dispute process. (Id.). Second, Plaintiff asserts that Experian reported five instances
of credit card issuers approving extensions of credit to Plaintiff on his consumer report, in violation
of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(B) (Count Two).1 (Id. at PageID #4, 6, 11–12).

1 For the second cause of action, the complaint cites 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(2)(B) as the statute violated by
Experian. (ECF No. 1, PageID #3–4, 6, 11). However, this appears to be a typographical error because no
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
On November 14, 2022, Experian filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 10). First,
Experian argues that Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim under Count One because: (i) 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b(a)(2) provides six different circumstances when a consumer reporting agency is permitted
to furnish a consumer report; (ii) receiving written consent from a consumer is not the only

permissible purpose; and (iii) Plaintiff did not allege that Experian failed to comply with the five
other permissible circumstances. (ECF No. 10-1, PageID #55–56). Second, Experian argues that
Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim under Count Two because: (i) 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(B) is a
definitional statute that does not govern what can be provided on a consumer report; and (ii) 15
U.S.C. § 1681c governs what information can be provided on a consumer report and it does not
bar authorizations of credit by credit card issuers. (Id. at PageID #56–57).
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Experian’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 12).
The response does not address the pleading deficiency arguments raised in the Motion to Dismiss.
Instead, Plaintiff generally argues that Experian violated the FCRA by failing to conduct

reasonable investigations to ensure Plaintiff’s consumer report was accurate and he speculates that
the sixteen inquiries in question were the product of identity theft. (Id. at PageID #63–65).
Experian replies that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that can support his claims under the
FCRA. (ECF No. 13).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

such subsection exists. Based on the allegations in the complaint and Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court
finds that that he intended to assert a claim under 15 U.S.C § 1681a(d)(2)(B)—which concerns authorization
and approval of specific extensions of credit by the issuer of a credit card—and liberally construes the
pleadings to assert a claim under that statute.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is plausible on
its face when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The “complaint must
contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal

theory.” Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir.
2007). In assessing plausibility, the Court construes factual allegations in the complaint in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepts the allegations of the complaint as true, and draws all
reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). It is well-settled that a pro se complaint, “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. . . .” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)). However,

“the lenient treatment afforded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413,
416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 915 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit
recognizes that the Supreme Court’s “liberal construction” case law has not had the effect of
“abrogat[ing] basic pleading essentials” in pro se suits. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Count One – 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2)
Plaintiff erroneously contends that a credit reporting agency may furnish a consumer report
only with the written authorization of the consumer. The FCRA provides six different
circumstances when a consumer reporting agency may permissibly furnish a consumer report—
with only one involving consent by a consumer.2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). “In fact, the majority
of legitimate authorizations for disclosure do not require the written consent of the consumer.”
Norman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 23-CV-9245, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35419, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2024) (collecting cases).

Plaintiff asserts that Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2) solely because it furnished
a consumer report without his express, written consent. But Plaintiff does not address whether the
furnishing of his consumer report complied with the other five permissible circumstances for
furnishing a consumer report provided under the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a).
Moreover, Plaintiff has also failed to allege that Experian actually furnished his consumer report
to a third party. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state claim for relief as to Count One.
B. Count Two – 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(B)
Plaintiff alleges that Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(B) because it reported five
instances on his consumer report when a credit card issuer extended credit to him. However,

§ 1681a does not impose any requirements on consumer reporting agencies, it is merely a
definitional statute. See Jennings v. Santander Consumer USA, No. 21-02468, 2021 WL 6845248,
at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2021) (“[Section 1681a] does not govern what can be provided or
furnished on a consumer report, but instead defines what a consumer report is and is not”); Sterling
v. Ourisman Chevrolet of Bowie Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 577, 592 n.6 (D. Md. 2013) (“However,

2 The five other permissible circumstances are: (1) at the request of a court or grand jury; (2) at the request
of a person the reporting agency believes shall use the information in connection with a credit transaction,
employment purposes, insurance underwriting, license or other benefit eligibility verification, or some other
purpose; (3) in response to a request by a child support enforcement agency; (4) to an agency which
administers a State child support collection plan; and (5) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or
National Credit Union Administrator in preparation for an appointment of a conservator, receiver, or
liquidating agent for an insured institution. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(a)(1), (3)-(6).
§ 1681a is the definitional section of the FCRA, and Plaintiff cannot state a claim for a violation
of this section.”). A different provision of the FCRA governs what categories of information must
be excluded from a consumer report, and extensions of credit by credit card issuers are not within
the excluded categories. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c. In fact, nowhere in the FCRA is an extension of
credit by a credit card issuer forbidden from appearing on a consumer report. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief as to Count Two.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 10). Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 22, 2024 “adi Huse
CHARLES E.FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373385. Public record. Not legal advice.