# Sanchez v. County of Mahoning

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 29, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373286

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 29, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
OBED I. SANCHEZ, )
) CASE NO. 4:23 CV 02249
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
v. )
)
COUNTY OF MAHONING, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) AND ORDER
Defendants. )
Pro se plaintiff Obed I. Sanchez, an inmate currently detained in the Mahoning County
Justice Center, filed this in forma pauperis civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
County of Mahoning; Mahoning County Commissioners (D. Ditzler, C. Rimedio, and
Righettitti); Mr. Kountz, Administrator; Warden Cappibianca; Deputy Warden Lieutenant
Diangelo; Jerry Greene, Mahoning County Sheriff; and Lieutenant Meyers. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of $1,500,000 against each defendant, as well as
unspecified injunctive and declaratory relief.
I. Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint concerns the conditions of his detainment at the Mahoning County
Justice Center. ECF No. 1. He identifies several conditions of his detainment that purportedly
violate his constitutional rights. Plaintiff complains about the food that is served, stating that the
Justice Center does not serve fruit or fruit juice and the facility does not use federal funds
appropriately concerning the food that is served. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 16. He claims that
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Sheriff Greene does not permit outside recreation. ECF No. |-1 at PageID #: 16. He states that
he is a federal detainee who is housed with state and county inmates, which causes disciplinary
issues because county inmates do not have to worry about losing good time credits. ECF No. 1-1
at PageID #: 17. Specifically, he alleges that his belongings were stolen and he was assaulted by
a “local county detainee,” he was forced to defend himself, and he received a disciplinary report
because of the incident and he was placed “in the hole,” which may cause him to lose good time
credits. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 17. Plaintiff raises concerns regarding overcrowding and
understaffing. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18. He contends that there are not enough deputies to
respond to fights and this “leaves [him] feeling unsafe.” ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18. He also
claims that the understaffing has resulted in Plaintiff being locked in his cell for more than 12
hours every day, causing depression and back pain. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18. Plaintiff
additionally states: the toilet in his cell is sometimes inoperable; inmates in segregation cannot
wash their clothes; the facility does not clean the shower, phones, and chairs; the mattresses are
used and old; and breakfast is not handed to the inmates. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18-19.
Additionally, Plaintiff states that he is a Muslim of the Islamic faith. ECF No. 1-1 at
PagelID #: 15-16. He alleges that Christian inmates are given privileges that are not extended to
Muslims. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 15. Specifically, he claims that Christian inmates are
provided free Bibles and they are offered Christian Sunday service, which he contends
“advanc[es] Christianity” and “restrict[s] all other services and physical religious books.” ECF
No. 1-1 at PageID #: 15. Plaintiff alleges that Christian inmates are provided with a specific
room for worship while no special area is designated for Islamic services. ECF No. 1-1 at

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PageID #: 15. Plaintiff also alleges that the Justice Center officials did not serve him hot meals
during Ramadan. He states that he was required to fast during this holy time. ECF No. 1-1 at
PageID #: 16. He claims that during this month, the facility prepared meals for all inmates at the
regular serving times but set meals aside for fasting Muslims to consume later in the day. ECF
No. |-1 at PageID #: 16. According to Plaintiff, the meals were not kept at a proper temperature,
which caused them to lose heat and potentially grow bacteria. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID # 16.
Plaintiff alleges that these actions violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”) 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). He does not direct this claim at any particular
defendant.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that when he was disciplined for the incident involving another
inmate assault, he did not have an opportunity to appeal the decision or present witnesses, nor did
he receive a copy of the disciplinary report. Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Meyers told him he does not
get an appeal. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18.
II. Standard of Review
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district court, however, is
required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.
City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law or

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fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions
are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in th{e] complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief
above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations but
must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
In reviewing a complaint, the court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
A. Individual Capacity
1. Ditzler, Rimedio, Righettitti, Kountz, Cappibianca, or Diangelo
As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the defendants in their
individual capacities. Individual capacity claims seek to hold a defendant personally liable for
damages. These claims must be based on the defendant’s own actions. A defendant cannot be
held liable simply because he or she was charged with overseeing a subordinate who may have

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violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006)). Rather,
individual liability requires some active unconstitutional behavior on the part of the defendant.
Peatross, 818 F.3d at 241 (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Consequently, unless Plaintiff affirmatively pleads the direct involvement of the defendant in the
allegedly unconstitutional action, the complaint fails to state a claim against that defendant and
dismissal is warranted. See Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
Here, Plaintiff fails to include any allegations in his complaint to suggest that Defendants
Ditzler, Rimedio, Righettitti, Kountz, Cappibianca, or Diangelo personally participated in any of
the actions giving rise to the complaint. The claims asserted against these defendants in their
individual capacities are therefore dismissed.
2. Sheriff Greene
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Greene did not allow him outside recreation. ECF No. 1-1 at
PageID #: 16. This claim concerns the general conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement. As a
pretrial detainee, Plaintiff’s constitutional protections originate from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects detainees from being “punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt,” rather than the Eighth Amendment, which applies to prisoners convicted
of crimes. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); see also Richmond v. Hug, 885 F.3d
928, 937 (6th Cir. 2018). To state a claim as a pretrial detainee for conditions of confinement,
Plaintiff must demonstrate, first, that he was held under conditions which posed an objectively
and sufficiently serious threat to his health and safety and, second, that each defendant □□□□□□

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deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of
harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14
F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Kentucky, 60
F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023).
There is no applicable precedent requiring any minimum amount of outdoor recreation for
prisoners. Kizer v. Robertson Cnty., No. 3:17-cv-00715, 2018 WL 2164557, at *1 (M.D. Tenn.
May 10, 2018) (citing Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003)). Rather, the
constitution is violated only when there is “a total or near-total deprivation of exercise or
recreational opportunity, without penological justification... .” Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082,
1086 (6th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff does not allege he was denied recreation and exercise. He alleges
only that it did not take place outdoors. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against
Sheriff Greene in his individual capacity for the purported denial of outdoor recreation.
3. Lt. Meyers
Plaintiff contends that after he was placed in segregation for a disciplinary incident, Lt.
Meyers denied him an opportunity to appeal or present witnesses. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18.
He also claims that he did not receive a copy of the disciplinary report. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID
#: 18. The Court liberally construes this claim as a denial of Due Process in connection with
Plaintiffs disciplinary action.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals against the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Damron y.
Harris, No. 21-3877, 2022 WL 4587625, at *6 (6th Cir. July 28, 2022). “[T]hose [individuals]

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who seek to invoke its procedural protections must establish that one of these interests is at
stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
Prisoners have narrower liberty interests than others because “lawful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Therefore, the question of what process is due is answered only if the inmate establishes a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at
221.
Standing alone, the Due Process Clause confers no liberty interest in freedom from State
action taken within the sentence imposed. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480. “Discipline by prison
officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the
sentence imposed by a court of law.” Jd. at 485. “[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a
liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson, 545
U.S. at 221. A prison disciplinary action does not implicate a liberty interest requiring
due-process safeguards unless the punishment imposed will inevitably affect the duration of an
inmate’s sentence, such as loss of good time credit, or inflict an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at
484, 487; Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole, v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
Placement in segregation, alone, is not an atypical or significant hardship that will implicate a
protected liberty interest. Generally, unless placement in segregation is accompanied by a
withdrawal of good time credits or is for a significant period of time that presents an unusual

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hardship on the inmate in relation to ordinary prison life, no liberty or property interest will be
found in the case. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
Here, there is no suggestion in the Complaint that Plaintiff was in segregation for a

significant period of time. And there is no suggestion in the Complaint that Plaintiff has earned
good time credits. Although Plaintiff indicates that this disciplinary action could result in a later
denial of good time credits if he earns them, this possibility, alone, is too speculative to create a
protected liberty interest. Plaintiff has therefore not alleged facts suggesting he was denied Due
Process in the course of his disciplinary action.
B. Official Capacity
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants in their official capacities. An official
capacity damages action against a state or municipal officer is the equivalent of an action against

the public entity he or she serves. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). Defendants are all employees of the County. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are
therefore asserted against Mahoning County.
Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of
respondeat superior. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978).
A plaintiff may only hold a local government entity liable under Section 1983 for the entity’s
own wrongdoing. Id. A local government entity violates Section 1983 where its official policy

or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights. Id. A
“municipal policy” includes “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted and promulgated” by the municipality’s “lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
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may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Powers vy. Hamilton County Pub, Defender
Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). A “custom” for
purposes of Monell liability must “be so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or
usage with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
To demonstrate that the county’s policies caused constitutional harm, the plaintiff must
“(1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3)
show that his particular injur[ies] w[ere] incurred due to execution of that policy.” Brawner, 14
F.4th at 598 (quoting Morgan y. Fairfield County, 903 F.3d 553, 566 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff does not identify an ordinance enacted by the County that led to the
conditions to which he objects, nor does he allege facts suggesting the conditions were the result
of an official custom of Mahoning County, as opposed the actions of individuals working within
the Justice Center. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Mahoning County.
C. Conditions of Confinement
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff’s claims can be construed to have resulted from the
County’s customs or policies, Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted
pertaining to the conditions of his confinement.
As previously discussed, a pretrial detainee’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
require that he demonstrate both subjective and objective components. Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at
316-17. To satisfy the objective component, a pretrial detainee must demonstrate that he
suffered a “sufficiently serious” condition or deprivation in the prison context. Jd. at 317. In this

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regard, it is well-established that “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 1981). Prisoners are not entitled to unfettered access to
the medical treatment of their choice, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 1992), nor can
they “expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839
F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988); see Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 1999).
Therefore, only allegations of “extreme deprivations” that deny a prisoner “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities” are sufficient to state a claim. Hudson y. McMillan, 503 U.S. at
8-9 (citations omitted).
To satisfy the subjective component, a pretrial detainee must show that a defendant □□□□
only acted deliberately (not accidentally), but also recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high
risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Brawner, 14 F.Ath at
596 (quoting Farmer y. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)); see also Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at
317.
1. Food Service
Plaintiff alleges he was not served fruit or fruit juice, the Justice Center did not properly
apportion the federal funding for federal detainees’ food, and his breakfast trays were placed on
the floor rather than being handed to him. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 16, 19. “Prisoners have a
constitutional right to meals that meet their nutritional needs...[b]ut there is no constitutional
right for each prisoner to be served the specific foods he desires[.]” Robinson v. Jackson, 615
Fed. App’x. 310, 314 (6th Cir. 2015). Nor does the Constitution require that jail food be tasty or
widely varied. See Cunningham vy. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659-60n(6th Cir. 1977). Indeed, the

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Sixth Circuit has held that a diet consisting solely of food loaf does not violate the Constitution
when nutritional and caloric needs are met. See, e.g., Payton-Bey v. Vidor, 68 F.3d 475 (6" Cir.
Oct. 12, 1995). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that the food he was provided,
absent the fruit and fish, failed to fulfill his nutritional needs or that he was denied sufficient food
on a daily basis. He has therefore not demonstrated a constitutional deprivation concerning the
food he was provided.
2. Overcrowding/Understaffing
Plaintiff also complains of general overcrowding and understaffing at the Mahoning
County Justice Center. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18. He contends that the Justice Center does
not have enough deputies to adequately handle the inmates’ fights, which causes him fear, and he
is locked in his cell for more than 12 hours each day, which causes depression and back pain.
ECE No. 1-1 at PageID #: 18. Prison overcrowding, standing alone, does not violate the
Constitution. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348; Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F. App’x 557, 560 (6" Cir.
2012) “‘Overcrowding is not, in and of itself, a constitutional violation’). Rather, a plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that the crowded conditions led to independent deprivations of
essential food, medical care, sanitation, or other necessities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. Here,
Plaintiff fails to include any factual allegations that suggest this purported overcrowding or
understaffing has deprived him of basic human needs. His allegation that he fears for his safety,
and the situation causes depression and back pain, are too general a statement to rise to the level
of a constitutional violation.

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3. Toilet
Plaintiff also claims that the cell’s toilet is sometimes inoperable. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID
#:18. The Sixth Circuit has recognized on more than one occasion that the Constitution does not
require flushable toilets in prison. See, e.g. Dellis v. Corrections Corp. of America, 257 F.3d 508,
511 (6" Cir. 2001) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (a prisoner’s claims alleging that he was
deprived of a lower bunk, subjected to a flooded cell, and deprived of a working toilet amounted
to “only temporary inconveniences and did not demonstrate that [his] conditions fell beneath the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a contemporary standard of
decency”); Abdur-Reheem-X v. McGinnis, 198 F.3d 244, 1999 WL 1045069, at *2 (6th Cir.)
(table) (the “Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners enjoy immediately available and
flushable toilets”); Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1013 (6th Cir. 1992) (“We do not agree that
it violates the Eighth Amendment to require prisoners to use nonflushable toilets on occasion.”).
Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege facts demonstrating that temporary placement as a detainee
in a cell with a toilet that does not consistently flush is an extreme deprivation of a basic
necessity, and thus, a violation of the Constitution.
4. Other Conditions
Additionally, without explanation, Plaintiff lists the following conditions he finds
objectionable: inmates in segregation cannot wash their clothes; the Justice Center does not
disinfect their showers, phones, or chairs; and the mattresses are old and used. ECE No. 1-1 at
PageID #: 19. Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated
amounts to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Huber v. McDonough, No. 4:15 CV 00915 (N.D.

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Ohio Oct. 30, 2015) (The conditions in the shower that caused Plaintiff to suffer a foot fungus
and ‘daily non-stop itching and scratching’ — though admittedly unpleasant — do not constitute
the kind of extreme deprivation required to sustain a cognizable conditions-of-confinement
claim”); McElrath y. City of Cleveland, No.1:16 CV 2907, 2017 WL 3189477, at *7 (N.D. Ohio
July 26, 2017) (finding “filthy showers and restrooms, lack of toilet paper and clean clothes” do
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); Robinson v. Middaugh, 1997 WL 567961, at *
4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997) (holding that Plaintiffs claims that he was required to sleep on an
unsanitized mattress did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation). The conditions
described by Plaintiff, while unpleasant, do not suggest a deprivation of basic food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims concerning the conditions of his confinement do not
satisfy the objective showing that the alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious to warrant
relief. He therefore fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
D. RLUIPA
RLUIPA prohibits a state or local government from imposing “‘a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution” unless the government
shows that the burden furthers “‘a compelling governmental interest” and “‘is the least restrictive
means” of doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA does not provide a cause of action
against defendants in their individual capacities. Colvin vy. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 288 (6th Cir.
2010). Under RLUIPA, the focus is on the sincerity of the prisoner’s professed religious belief.
See id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (citations omitted)). To state a

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claim for a RLUIPA violation, an inmate must allege facts reasonably suggesting that “his
‘request for an accommodation [is] sincerely based on a religious belief’ and that the
[government entity’s] policy substantially burdened that exercise of religion.’” Crawford v. Core
Civic, No. 3:18-CV-00800, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54364, 2019 WL 1440288, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 29, 2019) (quoting Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015)).
None of Plaintiff’ s allegations suggest Mahoning County substantially burdened the
exercise of his religion. A substantial burden exists when the government places significant
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs. Haight v. Thompson,
763 F.3d 554, 565 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. Meridian,
258 Fed. App’x. 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2007); see Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of
Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (a substantial burden is one which renders religious
exercise “effectively impracticable”). An isolated, inconsequential, incidental or de minimis
burden on religious practice does not rise to this level. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. vy. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 699 F.2d
303, 306 (6th Cir. 1983).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Christians were given free Bibles and a specific room in which to
worship. He claims that these actions “in effect, advanc[e] Christianity ... and restrict[] all other
services and physical religious books.” ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 15. The fact that the Justice
Center provides free Bibles, however, does not mean the Justice Center does not permit a Koran.
And Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied a Koran. Additionally, he alleges Christians
were given a specific room in which to worship, but he does not indicate he was denied a place to

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worship, only that he did not have a specific worship room. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 15.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that food for Ramadan was prepared at regular mealtimes and set aside
until sundown when he could break the fast. ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #: 16. While the food he

was served may not have been as hot as it was when it was prepared, and perhaps not to his
liking, he does not allege he was denied meals or that Mahoning County did not attempt to
accommodate the needs of its Muslim detainees. Plaintiff therefore did not allege sufficient facts
to suggest Mahoning County violated any provision of RLUIPA.
IV. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, and the Court dismisses his complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Furthermore, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 29, 2024 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373286. Public record. Not legal advice.