# Parker v. Zumbar

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373247

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Deborah A. Parker, Case No. 5:23cv02393

Plaintiff,
-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Alexander A. Zumbar, et al., AND ORDER

Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff Deborah A. Parker filed this in forma pauperis complaint. (Doc. Nos. 1,
3). For the following reasons, the Court dismisses this action.
I. Background
On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Application of Forma Pauperis
U.S. HUD Preliminary Injunction Parcel # 02-08416.” (See Doc. No.1). Plaintiff also filed an
application to proceed in this action in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2).
Plaintiff’s Doc. No. 1 lists as defendants Stark County Treasurer Alexander A. Zumbar and
Stark County Court of Common Pleas Judge Natalie R. Haupt, “plus 32 defendants.” (Id. at 2). On
the second page of this document, Plaintiff lists the following in the caption: “Application of Forma
Pauperis, U.S. Dept. of HUD, Motion of Preliminary Injunction of Sale of House at … Bollinger
N.E. Canton, Ohio Parcel # 02-8416, President Joe Biden COVID-19 Hate Crime Act, Violation
of Disability Title II American Disabilities Act of 1973 Section 504.” (Id.). The civil cover sheet
accompanying this document noted that the nature of this lawsuit is “Recovery of Overpayment of
Veteran’s Benefits,” and Plaintiff described the cause of action as “23 years over payment of
property tax (business …).” (Doc. No. 1-4). On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a supplemental
document that appears substantially similar to the original document filed in December. (See Doc.
No. 3). This supplemental document identifies several new defendants, including two judges,
several Stark County employees or officials, the Stark County Sheriff’s Department, Canton
Township, and other individuals. (See id.).

On January 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to file a complaint “for
medical reasons.” (Doc. No. 4). The motion states only that she has been receiving “medical
attention” since December. (Id.). As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has not filed any additional
documents, either in support of her most recent motion or in support of her purported claims. The
Court notes that Plaintiff is well versed in pro se filings in federal court, having initiated 9 cases
in this district. See Parker v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, No. 5:01-cv-01974 (filed Aug. 15, 2001) (in forma pauperis action dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Parker v. Summit County Bd. of Mental Retardation &
Developmental Disabilities, No. 5:07-cv-03601 (filed Nov. 20, 2007) (dismissed due to case
settlement); Parker v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities,

No. 5:07-cv-03602 (filed Nov. 20, 2007) (summary judgment granted in favor of defendant);
Parker v. Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, No. 5:07-cv-
03652 (filed Nov. 26, 2007) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim); Parker v. Stark County Health Dept., et al., No. 5:12-cv-02552 (filed Oct. 12, 2012)
(dismissed for failure to state a claim and pursuant to Rooker-Feldman Doctrine); Parker v. Stark
County Treasurer, et al., No. 5:14-cv-00332 (filed Feb. 14, 2014) (dismissed for failure to state a
claim); Parker, et al. v. Commissioner of Social Security, et al., No. 5:16-cv-00278 (filed Feb. 5,
2016) (in forma pauperis action dismissed); Parker v. Stark State College, No. 5:16-cv-02729
(filed Nov. 8, 2016) (in forma pauperis action dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Parker
v. Zumbar, et al., No. 5:18-cv-02285 (filed Oct. 2, 2018) (in forma pauperis action dismissed for
want of prosecution). The Court therefore construes Doc. Nos. 1 and 3 as a complaint and denies
Plaintiff’s purported motion for extension of time (Doc. No. 4).
Plaintiff’s complaint consists of disjointed sentence fragments and is difficult to follow. It

appears that Plaintiff is challenging a foreclosure judgment in the Stark County Court of Common
Pleas and a sheriff’s sale. (See Doc. No. 1-1; Doc. No. 3 at 5). As best the Court can discern,
Plaintiff appears to allege discrimination in relation to the foreclosure judgment and the sheriff’s
sale of Plaintiff’s property. (See Doc. No. 3 at 5). In a conclusory fashion, she states that the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission has failed to protect African Americans “in the thief of their properties”
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1 at 5).
In the complaint, Plaintiff states that she filed a complaint with HUD regarding housing
discrimination. Plaintiff attached as an exhibit a copy of a letter from the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, dated
July 15, 2022. (See Doc. No. 1-2). The letter appears to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint alleging that

“Respondents” illegally sold Plaintiff’s properties, failed to correctly calculate property taxes that
resulted in overcharges, and violated her constitutional, bankruptcy, property, and civil rights.
(Id.). The letter indicates that the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity does not have the
authority to open a claim of housing discrimination “because several of the issues described in
[the] claim do not constitute an illegal housing practice as defined, [she] did not file the complaint
within the one year statute of limitation, and the issues [Plaintiff] raised have already been
investigated by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.” (Id. at 2). The letter notifies Plaintiff of the
right to file a civil lawsuit notwithstanding HUD’s closure of the complaint filed under Section
813(a) of the Act. (Id.).
The complaint also makes the following unclear statements: Stark County Treasurer
Zumbar “resolved the issues of nearly 2.9 million tax payer of homes was stolen monies was stolen
by a deputy treasurer in 2010 starting from 2003-2009”; 1.5 million dollars that Stark County
“homers monies were never replaced”; Plaintiff has been “overtaxed” for more than 22 years;

Plaintiff “has experienced retaliation” from all Stark County judicial officers “and filed
discrimination constantly”; and Zumbar has no jurisdiction to file a lawsuit for residential taxes
owed by the plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1 at 4-5).
Additionally, Plaintiff appears to allege Judge Haupt has “illegally torn down” properties
located on Girard Avenue after Plaintiff filed a discrimination claim, “in retaliation to the
discrimination charges” Plaintiff filed with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. (Doc. No. 1 at 7).
Plaintiff states that certain property was “illegally torn down and broken into,” citing “criminal
damaging to the back door.” (Id.). She also appears to allege that “people next door” attempted to
steal “the group home.” (Id. at 9).
It appears that Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction “to stop the illegal sale” of Plaintiff’s

property on Bollinger Avenue in Canton, Ohio. (Doc. No. 3 at 5).
II. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(Doc. No. 2). The Court grants that application. Accordingly, because Plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis, her complaint is before the Court for initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.
Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594,
30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if
it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827,
104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when

it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading
must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to
include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal
conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading
standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
III. Law and Analysis
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the
“lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d
413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading
requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A complaint must contain either
direct or inferential allegations regarding all the material elements of some viable legal theory to

satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859
F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or questions
not presented to the Court or construct full blown claims from sentence fragments against
defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudette v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277
(4th Cir. 1985). To do so would “require … the courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims
of a pro se, … [and] would … transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the
improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies
for a party.” Id. A plaintiff’s failure to identify a particular legal theory places an unfair burden on
the defendants to speculate on the potential claims being raised against them and the defenses they
might assert in response. Wells, 891 F.2d at 594. Although specific facts are not required, to meet

the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the
defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they
rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Lillard
v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly and
Iqbal standard as her pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing
that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rather, Plaintiff’s complaint is
composed entirely of conclusory allegations and sentence fragments. The complaint fails to
include any discernible factual allegations, and it fails to support a cognizable claim with a factual
basis. The Court is not required to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. Although
Plaintiff appears to claim discrimination in housing, Plaintiff provides no facts supporting such
claim. Her statement that the Ohio Civil Rights Commission has failed to protect African
Americans is nothing more than a mere “unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me

accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint does not satisfy the minimum pleading
requirements of Rule 8. Even liberally construing the pleadings, Plaintiff’s allegations are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to reverse the state court foreclosure judgment
and stop the sheriff’s sale of the property, the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant that relief. United
States District Courts do not have jurisdiction to overturn state court decisions even if the request
to reverse the state court judgment is based on an allegation that the state court’s action was a
violation of federal law. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292, 125
S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only
occur in the United States Supreme Court. Id. Under this principle, generally referred to as the

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a party losing her case in state court is barred from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based
on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt,
688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is based on two United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct.
149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). This statute was enacted to prevent “end-runs around state court
judgments” by requiring litigants seeking review of that judgment to file a writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. The Rooker- Feldman Doctrine is based on the negative
inference that, if appellate court review of state judgments is vested in the United States Supreme
Court, then such review may not occur in the lower federal courts. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S.
at 283-84; Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Children and Family Services, 606 F.3d 301,

308-311 (6th Cir. 2010); Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies only where a party losing his or her case in state
court initiates an action in federal district court complaining of injury caused by a state court
judgment itself and seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d at 298-99; In re
Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Rooker- Feldman bars a claim,
the Court must look to the “source of the injury the Plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.”
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299; Kovacic,
606 F.3d at 310. If the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state-court judgment itself, then the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars the federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some
other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent

claim.” Id.; see Lawrence, 531 F.3d at 368-69. In conducting this inquiry, the court should also
consider the Plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, 424 Fed. App’x. 537, 2011 WL
2149547, at *1 (6th Cir. 2011).
Here, the source of Plaintiff’s purported injury is the state court judgment itself. She asks
this Court to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the judgment of foreclosure and proceeding
with the “illegal” sheriff’s sale. (Doc. No. 3 at 5). This Court lacks jurisdiction to grant this relief.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to relitigate the foreclosure action, res judicata
bars Plaintiff’s claim. The doctrine of res judicata dictates that a final judgment on the merits of a
claim precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or from raising a
new defense to defeat the prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). The doctrine bars relitigation of every issue actually brought
before the court and every issue or defense that should have been raised in the previous action. Id.
The purpose of this doctrine is to promote the finality of judgments and thereby increase certainty,

discourage multiple litigation, and conserve judicial resources. Westwood Chemical Co. v. Kulick,
656 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 1981). A subsequent action will be subject to a res judicata bar only
if there is an identity of the facts creating the right of action and of the evidence necessary to
sustain each action. Both requirements are met in this case. The claims asserted in this action could
and should have been asserted in the state foreclosure court. Plaintiff is therefore barred from
litigating these issues again.
IV. Conclusion
The Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). And
for the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). Further, the Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal

from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: March 28, 2024 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373247. Public record. Not legal advice.