# Robertson v. Taylor

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · February 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373117

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373117

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining in the context of a failure to train claim, “[t]he Court declines to accept as true formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action and supporting conclusory statements” and granting motion to dismiss

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Melvin Robertson, ) CASE NO. 1:23 CV 891
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
vs. )
)
Officer Taylor, et al., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order
)
Defendants. )
Introduction
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant City of Cleveland’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings. (Doc. 51.) This case arises from an August 2021 incident whereby Plaintiff was shot
and injured by Cleveland Police Officer Robert Taylor. For the following reasons, the City of
Cleveland’s motion is GRANTED.
Facts
Plaintiff Melvin Robertson brings this lawsuit against Officer Robert Taylor, the City of
Cleveland (the “City”), Giant Eagle, and Security Hut, Inc. In his First Amended Complaint (the
“complaint”), Plaintiff alleges the following.1
In September 2000, the City hired Robert Taylor as a police officer. Prior to August 2, 2021,
Security Hut hired Taylor to work secondary employment as a security guard, and Giant Eagle hired
Taylor through Security Hut to work at its W. 117th St. location in Cleveland, Ohio. On August 2,
1 Because the Court has considered the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of this motion, the Court
has not considered the facts set forth by Defendant.
2021, Taylor was working at the store dressed in a Cleveland Division of Police officer uniform and
carrying a taser and his police-issued firearm.
It is alleged that on that day, Plaintiff was shopping at the store with his girlfriend when he
encountered his cousin who was angry at him for a workplace incident the day earlier. Plaintiff’s
cousin tried to start an argument with Plaintiff inside the store, attracting the attention of store
employees and Taylor. Plaintiff walked away and informed his girlfriend of the confrontation and
that he was leaving the store. As Plaintiff was leaving, Taylor talked to Plaintiff’s cousin who

informed Taylor that Plaintiff had a gun.
It is further alleged that Taylor followed Plaintiff outside of the store to the parking lot and
attempted to stop him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that Plaintiff had committed a
crime. Taylor unlawfully seized Plaintiff by putting his left hand on Plaintiff’s arm and his right hand
on his gun. Frightened and confused, Plaintiff ran away with his hands in the air and his back to
Taylor. Taylor immediately took out his gun and fired at Plaintiff in the parking lot. The first shot
missed, but caused Plaintiff to trip and fall. A gun and a cell phone fell out of the waistband of
Plaintiff’s pants. Plaintiff picked up his gun and continued running away from Taylor with the gun’s
barrel pointed at the ground. Taylor fired a second time, striking Plaintiff in the hip and causing

lingering injuries.
According to the complaint, Taylor had previously used deadly force twice as a Cleveland
police officer. First, in August 2002, he shot and killed 16-year-old Ricardo Mason. After an
investigation, the Cleveland Division of Police Internal Affairs Unit found that Taylor’s use of deadly
force against Mason was justified. The City of Cleveland Police Chief agreed. A later § 1983 lawsuit
against the City and Taylor settled prior to trial for $1 million after the Sixth Circuit held that a jury

2
could find that Taylor violated Mason’s constitutional rights. Second, in January 2013, Taylor
followed an unidentified man into an abandoned building, got into a fight with him, and the two
exchanged gunshots. No other facts are alleged as to the 2013 incident.
The complaint sets forth seven claims for relief. Count One alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Taylor for unlawful seizure. Count Two alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Taylor for excessive force. Count Three alleges a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City. Count Four alleges a state law claim against Taylor for negligence, willful, wanton, and/or

reckless conduct. Count Five alleges negligence against Taylor and liability based on respondeat
superior against Giant Eagle and Security Hut. Count Six alleges premises liability against Giant
Eagle. Count Seven alleges negligent hiring, retention, and/or supervision against Giant Eagle and
Security Hut. Counts Six and Seven against Giant Eagle were dismissed on October 10, 2023.
The City moves for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Count Three of the complaint,
which is the only claim asserted against it. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
Standard of Review
A “motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is generally reviewed under the
same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”Mellentine v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 2013 WL 560515
(6th Cir. February 14, 2013) (citing EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th

Cir.2001)). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded allegations of
the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the
moving party is nevertheless entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d
577, 581 (6th Cir.2007).

3
Thus, “[w]e assume the factual allegations in the complaint are true and construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Comtide Holdings, LLC v. Booth Creek
Management Corp., 2009 WL 1884445 (6th Cir. July 2, 2009) (citing Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008)). In construing the complaint in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, “the court does not accept the bare assertion of legal conclusions
as enough, nor does it accept as true unwarranted factual inferences.” Gritton v. Disponett, 2009 WL
1505256 (6th Cir. May 27, 2009) (citing In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th

Cir.1997). As outlined by the Sixth Circuit:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Specific facts are not necessary;
the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
A plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir.2012). Thus, Twombly and Iqbal require that the
complaint contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face based on factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

4
Discussion2
1) Monell Claim
“Municipalities are not subject to respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions[.]” Peroli v.
Huber, 2021 WL 5411215, at *10 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021) (citations omitted). To prevail on a § 1983
claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she suffered a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest; and (2) the deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom,
or usage of the municipality. Hunt v. City of Toledo L. Dep’t, 881 F. Supp. 2d 854, 878 (N.D. Ohio
2012) (citing Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)).
To establish the second prong of the Monell claim, “[a] plaintiff can make a showing of an

illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official
policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal
actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a
custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726,
747 (6th Cir. 2020). Moreover, a plaintiff must show a “direct causal link between the custom and
the constitutional deprivation; that is, she must show that the particular injury was incurred because
of the execution of that policy.” Spencer v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2022 WL 2954175, at *9 (N.D.
Ohio July 26, 2022); see also D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A]
municipality is liable under § 1983 only where, through its deliberate conduct, it was the ‘moving

force’ behind the injury alleged.”).

2 Plaintiff argues the Court should deny the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings due to its timing. Rule 12(c)
provides that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made “[a]fter the pleadings are closed – but early enough
not to delay trial[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Because the pleadings are closed and there will be no delay to trial, the Court
will consider the City’s motion.

5
For purposes of this motion only, the Court will assume a constitutional violation occurred.
Plaintiff is pursuing a Monell claim against the City under the second and third theories of liability,
namely ratification and failure to train.3 The Court will consider each theory in turn.
a. Ratification
Monell liability under a ratification theory “involves a showing of an illegal policy or custom
by demonstrating that an official with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions.”
Alsaada v. City of Columbus, 536 F. Supp. 3d 216, 270 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (citing Lipman v. Budish,
974 F.3d 726, 747 (6th Cir. 2020)). “An official acting with the final decision-making authority may
ratify the unconstitutional acts of its employees in two ways”: (1) through “affirmative approval of a

particular decision made by a subordinate,” or (2) by “failing to meaningfully investigate and punish
allegations of unconstitutional conduct.” Id. at 270–71 (citing Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988
F.2d 649, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) and Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 882 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Plaintiff argues that the complaint adequately pleads ratification based on the 2002 and 2013
incidents, his own 2021 shooting, and the fact that the City generally ratifies officers’ excessive force.
(Doc. 52 at 5 citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–17, 54–78.) However, accepting all the allegations as true and
construing them most favorably to Plaintiff, the complaint does not state a claim for ratification.
As to the 2002 incident, an investigation into the matter resulted in a determination that
Taylor’s actions were justified. Therefore, no excessive force was found and there was no illegal act

to ratify. Plaintiff alleges that the action “was likely unconstitutional” because the Sixth Circuit held
that a reasonable jury could have found excessive force. However, the matter was settled and the

3 In his opposition to the City’s motion, Plaintiff abandoned the first and fourth Monell theories of liability.
6
Sixth Circuit did not make a finding of excessive force. Therefore, the City could not have ratified an
illegal act. Additionally, 19 years lapsed between the 2002 shooting and Plaintiff’s shooting.
As for the 2013 incident, Plaintiff alleges no facts as to whether Taylor was at fault. Therefore,
Plaintiff does not allege any illegal act that the City could have ratified.
Plaintiff also refers to his own shooting, including allegations that Police Chief Williams was
a final decision maker who ratified the investigation into Taylor’s conduct and approved the
recommendation to not discipline Taylor. (Compl. ¶¶ 64–71.) But this cannot form the basis for prior

ratification of an illegal act because it would have occurred after Plaintiff’s injuries and could not
have caused them. See Wright v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 962 F.3d 852, 882 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Wright
points us to Chief Meyer’s lack of investigation and discipline in the other high-profile use-of-force
cases involving Euclid police officers, but those instances occurred after Wright’s encounter with
Flagg and Williams and cannot show that Meyer’s failure to investigate and punish the officers
involved in those uses of force led in any way to Wright’s injuries.”).
Additionally, plaintiff alleges only generally that “City of Cleveland officers . . . engage in
unjustified use of excessive and unreasonable force,” that “excessive deadly force is allowed by
Defendant City’s policies, practices, and customs,” and that Taylor’s “unconstitutional actions . . .

were part of a widespread municipal policy, practice, and custom[.]” (Compl. ¶¶ 56(a), 64, 74.) These
conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a Monell claim based on ratification.
Here, absent material factual allegations that Office Taylor (or other officers) used excessive
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment prior to Plaintiff’s shooting, the City could not have
ratified unconstitutional conduct. See McPherson v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 2021 WL 2841582, at *10
(N.D. Ohio July 8, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s allegations of two prior incidents involving the use of pepper

7
spray fail to establish a policy by ratification because Plaintiff does not provide any factual detail to
permit an inference that the earlier events amounted to excessive force.”).
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to allege a Monell claim based on ratification.
b. Failure to Train
“In order to show that a municipality is liable for [] fail[ing] to train its employees, a plaintiff
must establish that: (1) the City’s training program was inadequate for the tasks that officers must
perform; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the City’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the
inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925
F.3d 793, 834 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “‘Deliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of

fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 410)
(alterations omitted).
“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 62 (2011)
(citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). See also Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“A failure-to-train claim . . . requires a showing of prior instances of unconstitutional conduct
demonstrating that the municipality had ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the
training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” (citations and alterations

omitted)). “Policymakers’ continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has
failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the
consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.”
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (citation omitted). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a

8
particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program
that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id.
Plaintiff attempts to ground his failure-to-train claim on an alleged pattern of similar
constitutional violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 16–17, 58, 63). As explained above, while Plaintiff generally
alleges that Taylor used deadly force on multiple occasions throughout his career, Plaintiff
specifically identifies only the 2002 shooting of Ricardo Mason and Taylor’s 2013 exchange of
gunfire in an abandoned building.4 However, as discussed above, the allegations do not support a

finding of an unconstitutional illegal act. In neither instance does Plaintiff include sufficient factual
allegations for the Court to infer a pattern of similar constitutional violations. Moreover, Plaintiff
relies on unsupported allegations of the City’s failure to train its officers. (Compl. ¶¶ 56(a), 56(d), 73,
77.) Here, Plaintiff has not set forth any facts of prior instances of similar misconduct so as to show
that the City was on notice that its training and supervision with respect to the use of force was
deficient. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). Thus, Plaintiff does not allege a
pattern that would support a Monell claim based on a failure-to-train theory.
Likewise, Plaintiff does not prevail under a single incident theory whereby “a plaintiff must
allege a complete failure to train the officers, training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that

future misconduct is almost inevitable or would properly be characterized as substantially certain to
result.” Campbell v. Hamilton Cnty., 2023 WL 6295803, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2023) (citations

4 Moreover, it is unlikely that two incidents occurring over a decade apart are sufficient to create a pattern for purposes
of a Monell claim. See Alphabet v. City of Cleveland, 2006 WL 3241785, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2006) (finding that
“four complaints of unconstitutional conduct by different officers over the span of four years can hardly be deemed a
‘numerosity of incidents,’ or a ‘widespread extent of practices’ that would render the risk of similar harm so obvious that
the City should have known of it.”). Additionally, the City points out that both incidents predate the City’s 2015 consent
decree with the U.S. Department of Justice and, therefore, could not have been relevant to the City’s use-of-force training
or policies at the time of the herein incident.
9
and alterations omitted); see also Connick, 563 U.S. at at 71 (requiring a plaintiff to show that “absent
additional specified training, it was ‘highly predictable’” that additional violations would result). The
conclusory allegations in the complaint (Compl. ¶¶ 56, 73–78) are factually deficient and cannot
support a Monell claim based on the City’s training programs as the “moving force” behind Taylor’s
shooting of Plaintiff.
Nor is Plaintiff’s allegation that the City’s failure-to-train “was also done with
deliberate indifference” sufficient. Sistrunk v. City of Hillview, 545 F. Supp. 3d 493, 500

(W.D. Ky. 2021) (explaining similar “conclusory allegation fails to identify either 1) prior
instances of unconstitutional conduct that put the government on notice, or 2) a single
violation stemming from an obvious potential for recurrence”) (citing Campbell v. City of
Springboro, 700 F.3d 779, 794 (6th Cir. 2012) and Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–68); Okolo v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 892 F. Supp. 2d 931, 943 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (explaining in the
context of a failure to train claim, “[t]he Court declines to accept as true formulaic recitations
of the elements of a cause of action and supporting conclusory statements” and granting
motion to dismiss).
Additionally, Plaintiff does not establish deliberate indifference through allegations of

“a complete failure to train the officers, training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that
future misconduct is almost inevitable or would properly be characterized as substantially
certain to result.” Campbell, 2023 WL 6295803, at *9. Here, the complaint “must indicate a
risk of a constitutional violation arising as a result of the inadequate training that is plainly
obvious.” Sistrunk, 545 F. Supp. 3d at 500 (citing Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725,
752 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet this standard.

10
Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege “a single fact related to the training the City
provides its police officers, any prior incidents involving comparable uses of force by local
law enforcement, or anything else that would plausibly suggest that the city maintained a
policy or custom that contributed to the alleged deprivations” of his rights. Westbrook v. City
of Cincinnati, 2023 WL 2743768, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2023) (finding allegations that
officers “have been the subject of numerous investigations including allegations of excessive
force, wrongful arrests, stealing money from citizens and other violations of law and police

procedure” insufficient) (citing Boddy v. City of Memphis, 2022 WL 12258977, at *3 (6th Cir.
Oct. 21, 2022).
Because the complaint lacks sufficient allegations to state a Monell claim against the City
under either a failure to train or ratification theory, dismissal is appropriate.
2) Qualified Immunity
Having determined that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a Monell claim against the City,
the Court need not reach the City’s qualified immunity argument.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant City of Cleveland’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings with respect to Count Three is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Dated: 2/8/24 United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10373117. Public record. Not legal advice.