# Hester v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · November 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372800

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372800

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JODY MICHELLE HESTER, ) CASE NO. 5:22-CV-01996-CEH
)
Plaintiff, ) CARMEN E. HENDERSON
) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
v. )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION &
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) ORDER
)
Defendant, )
)

I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Jody Michelle Hester (“Hester” or “Claimant”), seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). This matter is before me by
consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. (ECF No. 21). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of Social Security’s nondisability
finding and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint.
II. Procedural History
On April 30 and May 1, 2020, Claimant filed applications for SSI and DIB, alleging a
disability onset date of July 22, 2014—the date after a prior ALJ decision denying previous
applications. (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 51). The present applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration, and Hester requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id.).
On July 26, 2021, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Hester, represented by counsel, and an
impartial vocational expert testified. (Id.). On September 28, 2021, the ALJ issued a written
decision finding Claimant was not disabled. (Id. at PageID #: 51-66). The ALJ’s decision became
final on September 15, 2022, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id. at PageID #:
39).
On November 3, 2022, Claimant filed her Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final
decision. (ECF No. 1). The parties have completed briefing in this case. (ECF Nos. 12, 14, 16).

Claimant asserts the following assignments of error:
(1) The ALJ’s RFC determination is the product of legal error and therefore not
supported by substantial evidence because he failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints.

(2) The ALJ’s RFC determination is the product of legal error where, after
concluding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were severe, his RFC determination
is not properly reconciled with the evidence and the opinions of record he
determined were generally persuasive.

(ECF No. 12 at 1).
III. Background
A. Relevant Hearing Testimony

The ALJ summarized the relevant testimony from Claimant’s hearing:1
In written reports and testimony, the claimant alleged disability primarily due to
mental impairments. She reported limited ability to interact with others. Her ability
to follow social cues is limited. It is difficult to talk and interact with others. Her
ability to express emotion is limited. She has difficulty staying on task and
maintaining pace. There is limited ability to withstand work pressures. The claimant
has frequent panic attacks and symptoms of PTSD. There are 1-2 panic attacks per
day. The panic attacks can last a few hours or a whole day. They are triggered by
people and loud noises. Panic attacks occur at home from stress, worry, and
nightmares. Counseling has been helpful. The claimant has not had suicidal ideation
since late 2020. The claimant takes one psychiatric medication, for anxiety. This
medication is a “major help.” Methadone helps, but the claimant had a relapse a
few months before the hearing. Prior to that, she had a few years of sobriety.

(ECF No. 10, PageID #: 56).

1 Because Claimant only challenges the ALJ’s decision with respect to her mental impairments, her testimony
concerning her physical symptoms is not included here.
B. Relevant Medical Evidence

After noting that there was “no medical evidence from the July 22, 2014 alleged onset date
through June 2019,” the ALJ summarized Claimant’s health records and symptoms:
In June 2019, the claimant was treated in the emergency department for hepatitis C
and right upper quadrant pain. She followed up with a primary care source for
hepatitis C and mental health symptoms. She reported depression, anxiety and panic
attacks. She described past mental health treatment and medication, but denied any
current treatment. She stated, “I just deal with it.” An exam was positive for
abdominal tenderness. There was also a skin infection. Physical exam was
otherwise normal. The physician reviewed abnormal liver function tests and
abnormal abdominal imaging from 2018. The claimant was prescribed Tylenol and
referred to a gastroenterologist for hepatitis C. She was prescribed Celexa and
Buspar and referred to counseling for mental symptoms. The claimant said she did
not plan to fill her medications. (B4F/1-6) Testing remained consistent with a
hepatitis C diagnosis at subsequent visits. (B9F/1- 16) However, there is no
significant treatment for this condition.

In March 2020, the claimant followed up with her primary care provider. She
denied seeing any specialists since her last visit. She had an emergency visit for an
infection. She was referred to psychiatry and psychology after reported a history of
Asperger’s syndrome. No psychiatric medications were prescribed. (B4F/8-13) The
claimant’s provider, Carolyn Kwan, MD, gave her a letter on March 10, 2020. She
noted, “Jody Hester was seen in my clinic on 3/10/2020. She may return to work
on 3/17/2020 for full activity. She should be limited to wiping tables, cash register,
and delivering food. No mopping, cleaning washrooms, washing dishes, or food
preparation.” (B4F/17) This assessment is consistent with, and supported by, the
record at that visit, when the claimant was treated for a wound infection. However,
it is not persuasive for purposes of this decision because the work-related limits
lasted only one week, far less than the 12 months required under the regulations.

In July, August, and September 2020, the primary care provider prescribed
Hydroxyzine for anxiety and referred the claimant to psychiatry. (B9F/209, 220,
229) In October 2020, the claimant told her primary care source that anxiety was
better with medication and counseling. There were no acute complaints. She was
referred to psychiatry for medication. (B9F/183) In November 2020, the claimant
was again referred to psychiatry for Asperger’s syndrome. (B9F/162)

The claimant briefly treated at Coleman Professional Services. She had an intake
visit in September 2020, followed by three counseling sessions. (B7F) At the intake
visit in September 2020, she reported that she last treated with a psychiatrist in
2008. She received substance addiction treatment in Florida from 2016-2017, and
again in Ohio since 2019. She reported a history of using benzodiazepines, alcohol,
cocaine, hallucinogens, pain pills, amphetamine, benzodiazepines, cannabis,
methamphetamine and inhalants. She was on methadone treatment. The claimant
reported past felonies convictions for fraud. She reported she could use public
transportation. A mental status exam was normal except for flat affect and avoidant
eye contact. The claimant was diagnosed with opiate use disorder in remission. She
reported an Asperger’s diagnosis, but she did not meet the diagnostic criteria for
any autism spectrum disorder. (B7F/1- 23) Mental status exams were normal except
for flat affect at counseling sessions in September, October and November 2020.
(B7F/24-38) She has not returned since November 2020. (B7F)

Neuropsychologist Delphi Toth, PhD evaluated the claimant in late October and
early November at the request of counselor Matt Brown of Coleman Professional
Services. The claimant reported that she served in the military. As part of the
service, she aided FEMA in the Hurricane Katrina rescue efforts. She experienced
traumatic events during this work, leading to PTSD. Afterwards, she used drugs
and committed non-violent crimes to pay for drugs, especially during a period of
homelessness. She served time in prison for four felony charges arising from using
a credit card stolen from her grandmother.

After prison, she worked in a series of jobs but each ended with her quitting in
frustration after she was bullied. She attributed her social limits to an Asperger’s
syndrome diagnosis. A mental status exam was normal. The claimant had no
impairment of attention. Her IQ score of WAIS-R testing was 107, in the upper end
of the average range. Memory was intact. The results of the psychological testing
showed significant anxiety with panic attacks, depression, a need for structure and
predictability, distrust and suspicion of other people, extreme social discomfort and
social withdrawal, and the likelihood of an aggressive response to threats. Dr. Toth
noted, “Regarding her ability to work. it is clear that Ms. Hester has tried repeatedly
and unsuccessfully. With each job, she was uncomfortable with her co-workers,
was taunted and bullied, then she was overwhelmed and collapsed in tears, unable
to go on. Her inability to function in successive jobs is most likely a reflection of
her having more difficulty dealing with her Autism symptoms and extreme
difficulty interacting with others. Given the timeline of her life and the results of
the testing, It appears that her ability to function well, with her Asperger’s, ended
after her experience the military working with the victims of Hurricane Katrina.
Unfortunately, the military did not treat her for PTSD, despite her repeated requests
for treatment and help. After discharge, she had such severe unresolved
psychological problems from the PTSD that she could no longer manage to function
and she spiraled downhill into drugs. Currently, the PTSD remains unresolved, the
Anxiety, Panic and Depression remain high, and her Autism is more of a problem
that it had been in the past. Based on the current evaluation, it is my professional
opinion that Ms. Hester should be approved for Disability based on multiple
psychological diagnoses: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, unresolved Generalized
Anxiety, severe Panic Disorder, severe Major Depression, moderately severe
Autism Spectrum Disorder, high functioning, Asperger's. Note that any of these
diagnoses, alone, if severe enough, could be sufficient for a recommendation for
disability. This woman has truly been struggling and I urge that she be approved
for Disability so she does not end up homeless again, without help.” (B8F/1-2)

. . . .

The claimant had a hospital visit for right upper quadrant pain and nausea on
December 2, 2020. She declined liver function tests, stating that she just needed a
work note. She asked for Clonazepam/Klonopin, and indicated she was off this
medicine for “a very lengthy time.” She was given one dose, but the physician
declined to give a prescription. (B10F/22-28) She returned to the emergency
department on December 4, 2020. She stated that she had a hard time getting
psychiatric medications and asked for a refill. She said that her psychologist was
unable to prescribe, and her primary care source was unwilling to prescribe the
requested medication. She denied any suicidal or homicidal ideation. The physician
noted, “I did have a long discussion with patient that we cannot continue to
prescribe [Klonopin] for her after today’s visit. I did give her a prescription for 4
doses to get her through (un)til Monday when she can follow up with her
psychiatrist as planned. The patient appears generally well. She is calm and
pleasant.” (B10F/33- 41) She returned to the emergency department on December
7, 2020, and again asked for Clonazepam/Klonopin. Vital signs were normal. She
appeared well and was not suicidal. She was given a short refill of the requested
medication. (B10F/45-48)

At a December 10, 2020 primary care visit, the claimant asked for a Klonopin refill.
She reported that Cymbalta and Amitriptyline were not helpful. This request was
denied, and the claimant was again referred to psychiatry. The claimant stated,
“Thanks for nothing,” then hung up before the telehealth visit was done. (B9F/135-
137) On December 13, 2020, she returned to the emergency department and asked
for Klonopin. Psychiatric clinical exam was normal. She stated she could not sleep
and needed medication for anxiety and PTSD. She was given a prescription of
Xanax to last until December 22nd . (B10F/53-59)

On January 3, 2021, there was another emergency department visit with a request
for benzodiazepines. Clinical psychiatric exam was normal. The claimant was
given one dose of medication. The physician noted that she had been filling
multiple prescriptions of benzodiazepines from multiple providers. He advised the
claimant to follow up with psychiatry and primary care, and educated her on why
she would not be given further benzodiazepines. (B10F/66-71) The claimant
returned the next day and asked for Xanax. Mood, affect, behavior, thought content
and judgment were normal. She was denied the medication, and advised she could
no longer obtain controlled substances in the emergency department. (B10F/76-84)

There are treatment records from New Horizons dated January, June and July 2021.
(B11F) The claimant had a psychiatric evaluation in January 2021. She reported
that she was recently fired from her job after two years. She wanted to wean off
methadone and start Klonopin. Mental status exam was normal except for anxious
mood. Dr. Ikemefuna Nkanginieme diagnosed PTSD, agoraphobia with panic
disorder, opioid dependence, generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, autistic disorder, and mood disorder. He prescribed Klonopin. (B11F/8-
15) The next record from Horizons was in June 2021. The claimant had irritability
and nightmares, but no panic attacks. Medication was “working well.” She used
breathing exercises. (B11F/7-8) In July 2021, symptoms were of a moderate
severity. The claimant was pleasant, cooperative and friendly. She has intermittent
panic attacks. She was “pleased with her medication regimen.” No side effects were
documented. She got along with family. She had a job interview, but she was not
able to work the long hours required at the job. (B11F/5-7) There are no further
records from this provider.

(ECF No. 10, PageID #: 57-60).
C. Opinion Evidence at Issue
Two opinions are at issue on appeal—the June 2013 opinion of consultive examiner Dr.
Gerald Hodan and the October 2020 opinion of consultive examiner Dr. Joshua Magleby. Of
relevance, Hodan opined that Claimant was “capable of understanding and remembering
instructions being given to her,” but they “need to be brief, simply stated, or she will start to
become anxious and not be able to maintain her focus of concentration in order to take in more
detailed information;” she was “best suited for working by herself or with only a couple of other
people in a work setting where stress and noise are kept at a minimum and she does not have to
deal with the public on a regular basis;” and if forced to be around many people, she would “either
not perform and get fired or just not show up for work anymore.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID #: 359).
Magleby opined that Claimant’s “ability to understand, remember and carry out simple oral
instructions is similar compared to other adults of the same age;” her “ability to relate to others,
such as, peers, fellow workers and/or supervisors has been at least somewhat impaired;” and her
“ability to withstand the mental stress and pressures associated with day-to-day work activity
appears at least somewhat impaired.” (Id. at PageID #: 499).
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings relevant to this appeal:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2024.

2. The claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity at times since July 22,
2014, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Hepatitis C, Autism
Spectrum Disorder, Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD), and Major Depressive Disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and
416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: She can frequently handle and finger with the
bilateral upper extremities. She can frequently climb ramps and stairs, but can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant is able to perform simple routine
tasks and make simple workrelated decisions. She is limited to occasional
interactions with supervisors, and occasional and superficial interactions with
coworkers and the general public. The claimant could tolerate few changes in a
routine work setting.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and
416.965).

. . . .

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969,
and 416.969a).

11. Substance addiction is not material to a finding of disability.

12. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from July 22, 2014, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and
416.920(g)).

(ECF No. 10, PageID #: 54, 56, 63-65).
V. Law & Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council
becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott
v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986)
(en banc)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be
affirmed, “even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §

405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983)).
B. Standard for Disability
The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use in
determining whether a claimant is entitled to supplemental-security income or disability-insurance
benefits: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether that
impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work in light
of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) if not, whether, based on the claimant’s age,
education, and work experience, she can perform other work found in the national economy. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642–43 (6th Cir.
2006). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of producing sufficient evidence to prove that she
is disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Specifically, the claimant has

the burden of proof in steps one through four. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529
(6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to establish whether the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform available work in the national economy.
Id.
C. Discussion
Claimant raises two issues on appeal, arguing (1) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her
subjective complaints and (2) the ALJ’s RFC determination is not properly reconciled with the
evidence and the opinions of record that he determined were generally persuasive. (ECF No. 12
at 1).
1. The ALJ properly evaluated Claimant’s subjective complaints.

Claimant asserts that the ALJ made a “boilerplate statement” that her “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms”
but Claimant’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and the other evidence in the
record.” (ECF No. 12 at 16). Claimant argues that “[t]his boilerplate statement explains the extent
to which the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony, but critically fails to give his reasons for doing
so,” and the ALJ also “fails to give any explanation throughout the rest of his decision which could
be construed as an explanation of this finding.” (Id.). Claimant argues that “the ALJ has not
explained why Plaintiff’s gap in treatment or her ability to work at a sub shop demonstrates an
ability for her to engage in work activity on a sustained and continuing basis.” (Id. at 20). She
asserts the ALJ’s error was harmful “as he violated SSR 16-3’s ‘procedural safeguard’ by failing
to explain how he evaluated Plaintiff’s symptoms.” (Id.).
The Commissioner responds that “reading the decision in in [sic] its entirety with common

sense makes apparent that, while the ALJ included some boilerplate language in the decision, he
also provided specific reasons for why Plaintiff’s allegations were not fully credited.” (ECF No.
14 at 14). The Commissioner asserts that “[t]hose reasons, which included the lack of support
found in the medical signs documented in the medical evidence; Plaintiff’s daily activities,
including her work activities; and the persuasive medical opinion evidence (Tr. 19-25), complied
with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c) and 416.929(c) and SSR 16-3p and are
supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.).
Claimant replies that the ALJ’s “boilerplate statements regarding Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints does not satisfy the articulation requirements” because the ALJ “engaged in no
discussion of the ‘other’ factors contemplated [by] the agency’s own two-step framework.” (ECF

No. 16 at 1).
The evaluation of a claimant’s subjective complaints rests with the ALJ. See Siterlet v.
Sec’y of HHS, 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248 (noting that “credibility
determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”). In evaluating a claimant’s
symptoms, the ALJ must look to medical evidence, statements by the claimant, other information
provided by medical sources, and any other relevant evidence on the record. § 404.1529(c); SSR
16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304.
Beyond medical evidence, SSR 16-3p sets forth seven factors that the ALJ should consider:
daily activities; location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain or other symptoms; factors
that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medication to alleviated pain or other symptoms; treatment other than medication; any measures
other than treatment the individual uses to relieve symptoms; and any other factors concerning the
individual’s functional limitations and restrictions. 2017 WL 5180304 at *7-8. The ALJ need not

analyze all seven factors but should show that she considered the relevant evidence. See Cross v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005). SSR 16-3p states:
[I]f an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of symptoms are inconsistent with the objective
medical evidence and the other evidence, we will determine that the
individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce his or her capacities
to perform work-related activities or abilities to function
independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate
manner.

The ALJ’s “decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s
symptoms . . . and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess
how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304; see
also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.2d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994) (“If an ALJ rejects a claimant’s
testimony as incredible, he must clearly state his reason for doing so.”). While a reviewing court
gives deference to an ALJ’s credibility determination, “the ALJ’s credibility determination will
not be upheld if it is unsupported by the record or insufficiently explained.” Carr v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 3:18CV1639, 2019 WL 2465273, at *10 (N.D. Ohio April 24, 2019) (citing Rogers,
486 F.3d at 248–49), report & recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3752687 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8,
2019).
Here, the ALJ concluded “that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence in the record.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID #: 57). The ALJ
specifically noted that there was no medical evidence from the July 22, 2014 alleged onset date
through June 2019 and this “lack of any treatment records for greater than five years . . . and work
activity both above and below SGA levels during this period of no treatment is inconsistent with

allegations of disabling symptoms.” (Id.). In summarizing Claimant’s medical records, the ALJ
cited a June 2019 emergency visit where Claimant indicated she was not receiving mental health
treatment because she “just deal[t] with it;” an October 2020 visit where she told her primary care
source that her anxiety was better with medication and counseling; mental status exams that were
“normal except for flat affect” in September, October, and November 2020; and emergency room
visits where Claimant requested Klonopin but had normal psychiatric exams or “appeared well.”
(Id. at PageID #: 57-60).
Additionally, the ALJ noted that Claimant’s work at a sandwich shop “where she interacted
with the public and delivered food on changing routes to different customers,” her “ability to
generally get along with treating sources, and the mental status exams throughout treatment” were

consistent with “moderate limitations in interacting with others, concentration, persistence and
pace, and adapting or managing oneself.” (Id. at PageID #: 59). Elsewhere in the decision, the
ALJ considered Claimant’s daily activities, including caring for herself and her grandmother;
walking her parent’s dog; working six hours a day; cleaning, doing laundry, and preparing
sandwiches; attending church; and shopping in stores. (Id. at PageID #: 55).
Further, the ALJ specifically explained his decision to only include mild limitations in the
RFC:
The limited specialized mental health treatment, delay in following up with
referrals, and relatively normal mental status exams are not consistent with the level
of limitations alleged. The claimant worked off and on since the 2014 alleged onset
date, despite having a gap in treatment from 2014 until mid-2019. When she did
seek mental health treatment, her condition improved without reported side effects.
Overall, no more than mild limitations are supported.

(Id. at PageID #: 60).
Considering the record as a whole, the Court is satisfied that the ALJ considered the
relevant evidence in accordance with SSR 16-3p and that a reasonable mind might accept that
evidence as adequate to support the ALJ’s credibility finding. As the Court will not reweigh the
evidence when reviewing an ALJ’s decision, no compelling reason exists for the Court to disturb
the ALJ’s credibility finding. Cross, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
2. The RFC is consistent with the opinions the ALJ found persuasive.
Claimant argues the ALJ’s RFC determination “is the product of legal error where, after
concluding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were severe, his RFC determination is not properly
reconciled with the evidence and the opinions of record he determined were generally persuasive.”
(ECF No. 12 at 22). Claimant asserts that while the ALJ “concluded that the opinions of consultive
examiners, Dr. Hodan and Dr. Magleby were generally persuasive,” “his RFC does not truly
account for the limitations identified by either physician.” (Id. at 23, 25). Claimant points
specifically to the RFC’s failure to include limitations that she works alone or only with a few
coworkers, in an area where noise is kept to a minimum, and with social interaction that does not
require her to relate to others or interact with the general public. (Id. at 25).
The Commissioner responds that, contrary to Claimant’s argument, “the ALJ did not find

Dr. Hodan’s opinion persuasive” but rather found that “the 2013 opinion was not persuasive for
purposes of evaluating Plaintiff’s RFC on the current claim, in which Plaintiff only alleged
disability since mid-2014.” (ECF No. 14 at 17). The Commissioner argues that “the RFC accounts
for the persuasive limitations identified by Dr. Magleby” because Dr. Magleby opined that
Claimant’s “abilities to relate to others and withstand the mental stress of pressures associated with
day-to-day work activity appears at least ‘somewhat’ impaired” but Claimant’s mental capabilities
were otherwise similar to other adults. (Id.). Overall, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ
“considered and evaluated the medical, non-medical, and medical opinion evidence to formulate
the RFC and Plaintiff has not shown that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.

at 18).
Claimant replies that “[a]t the end of the day, the ALJ has an affirmative obligation to
explain why limitations contained within an opinion he found persuasive were not incorporated
into a claimant’s RFC” and the ALJ’s failure to do so here “renders his RFC determination the
product of legal error.” (ECF No. 16 at 4).
Concerning Hodan, the ALJ noted that this opinion was initially obtained in connection
with Claimant’s previous application. (ECF No. 10 at PageID #: 63). Contrary to Claimant’s
argument, the ALJ did not find this opinion persuasive, specifically indicating:
These assessments are consistent with, and supported by, the record and findings at
the time of the evaluations. However, they are not persuasive for the current
application because they occurred a year or more before the current alleged onset
date, and they do not address the claimant’s functioning during the period relevant
to the current decision.

(Id.). Because the ALJ did not find Hodan’s opinion persuasive for this claim, he was not required
to include Hodan’s opined limitations in the RFC. See Gasiewski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
4:22-CV-002194, 2023 WL 5673034, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2023) (collecting cases), report
& recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5671936 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2023).
The ALJ considered Magelby’s opinion that Claimant’s ability to understand, remember,
and carry out simple instructions was “similar compared to other adults the same age;” her ability
to maintain attention and concentration was fairly average; but her ability to relate to others and
withstand the mental stress and pressures associated with day-to-day work activity was “at least
somewhat impaired.” (/d. at PageID #: 62). The ALJ found the opinion “generally persuasive and
supportable, because it is consistent with the clinical exam, the activities reported on exam, and
work after the alleged onset date.” (/d.). While Claimant argues that the “RFC does not truly
account for the limitations identified by either physician,” she fails to point to any specific
limitations that were included in Magelby’s opinion.” See Perrine v. Berryhill, No. 1:18-cv-49,
2019 WL 1331597, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2019) (“Although an ALJ is not required to discuss
every piece of evidence in the record to support her decision, an ALJ must explain why she did
not include the limitations from an opinion of a medical source in her determination of the
claimant’s RFC.”). Nor does she present any argument as to how the RFC—which limited
Claimant to simple routine tasks, occasional interactions with supervisors, and occasional and
superficial interactions with coworkers and the public and indicated she could tolerate few changes
in a routine work setting—is inconsistent with Magelby’s opinion.
The ALJ’s decision makes clear that he considered all the evidence before him in crafting
an RFC that incorporated limitations from the opinions that he found persuasive. The Court agrees
with the Commissioner that the decision is supported by substantial evidence. As such, the Court
must defer to the ALJ’s decision.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration’s final decision denying Plaintiff benefits. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED.
Dated: November 30, 2023
s/ Carmen E. Henderson
CARMEN E. HENDERSON
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 Notably, all the specific limitations Claimant argues about correlate to opinions expressed by Hodan. (Compare
ECF No. 12 at 25 with ECF No. 10 at PageID #: 359).
15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372800. Public record. Not legal advice.