# Doe 1 v. Gupta

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · September 27, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372602

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 27, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372602

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding plaintiffs’ § 1589 claim provided sufficient support for their § 1590 claim
- noting federal agency may disclose records otherwise protected by § 552a in response to a subpoena
- holding that in cases with multiple defendants, “the twenty-one day period to amend as a matter of course begins on the date of the earliest defensive action”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Jane Doe 1, et al., Case No. 3:22-cv-1122

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Manish Gupta, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 2020, Manish Raj Gupta was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and (b)(1), and one
count of illegally dispensing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(7).
See United States v. Gupta, Case No. 3:20-cr-208 (N.D. Ohio). These charges arose from allegations
that Manish had surreptitiously drugged women before engaging in sex acts with them without their
consent. Manish subsequently pled guilty to both charges and my colleague, Judge James G. Carr,
sentenced him to serve 235 months in prison.
On June 26, 2022, two of Manish’s alleged victims initiated this litigation,1 asserting claims
against Manish, his father (Raj Gupta), and his now-former wife (Shraddha Gupta) for: (1) Forced
Labor under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1595; (2) Trafficking with respect to Peonage, Slavery,
Involuntary Servitude, or Forced Labor under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1590 and 1595; (3) Human Trafficking

1 I previously granted Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed using the pseudonyms “Jane Doe 1” and “Jane
Doe 2.” (Doc. No. 42).
pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.5; (4) Action by Victim in Human Trafficking pursuant to
Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated § 41.1399; (5) Human Trafficking pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code § 2905.32; (6) Forced Labor and Labor Trafficking, Michigan Human Trafficking Victims
Protection Act M.C.L. § 752.983, § 750.462(b); and (7) fraudulent transfer, pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code § 1336.04. (Doc. No. 1).
In early October 2022, Shraddha filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, (Doc.

No. 17), and Manish filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 19). Plaintiffs responded to those
motions by filing their First Amended Complaint, which includes some additional factual allegations.
(Doc. No. 23). Shraddha and Manish each moved to strike the First Amended Complaint, arguing
its filing was procedurally improper.2 (Doc. Nos. 24 and 31). Plaintiffs opposed those motions,
(Doc. Nos. 28 and 35), and both Defendants filed briefs in reply. (Doc. Nos. 30 and 39).
There are four other motions pending. The first is Plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order,
(Doc. No. 26), to which Manish objects. (Doc. No. 32). The second is Manish’s motion for entry
of an order directing Plaintiffs to show cause why their attorneys should not be sanctioned. (Doc.
No. 33). Plaintiffs oppose this motion. (Doc. No. 36). The third motion is Manish’s motion for
the production of documents. (Doc. No. 34). And the final motion is Manish’s motion for an
extension of time. (Doc. No. 43).
II. BACKGROUND
Manish previously was a board-certified plastic surgeon and owner of Artisan Surgery

Center, LLC. Plaintiffs allege Manish began drugging and sexually assaulting women, including
women like Plaintiffs who worked as escorts, as early as 2013. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Manish allegedly
used prescription drugs he obtained through his medical practice to incapacitate the women before

2 Raj Gupta filed an Answer to both the original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint.
(Doc. Nos. 18 and 25).
filming himself performing sexual acts with them. Manish allegedly drugged and raped Jane Doe 2
in 2013, while on a business trip to Las Vegas, Nevada, and in 2017, while on a business trip to
Detroit, Michigan. (Id. at 4-5). Manish allegedly drugged and raped Jane Doe 1 in 2016, while on a
business trip to Los Angeles, California. (Id.). Plaintiffs allege Manish planned these assaults before
his trips and that he would take a bag with sex toys, lubricants, a camera, and narcotics with him
while he traveled. (Id. at 3, 7-10, 12-13).

Plaintiffs allege Raj (as Manish’s business partner in Artisan, where he kept his travel bag)
and Shraddha (as Manish’s wife and the recipient in 2016 of a letter from Jane Doe 1 accusing
Manish of sexually assaulting her) enabled Manish’s conduct when they failed to act on information
they knew or should have known. (See, e.g., id. at 14-15).
III. DISCUSSION
A. MOTIONS TO STRIKE
As I noted above, both Manish and Shraddha move to strike Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint. These Defendants first argue Plaintiffs’ filing was improper because the 21-day period
for filing without leave of court or consent had passed and because Plaintiffs did not seek leave to
amend. (Doc. No. 24-1 and Doc. No. 31 at 2-3). Plaintiffs assert they were entitled to amend their
complaint as of right under Rule 15(a)(1) because it was filed within 21 days of the date on which
the last Defendant (Raj) filed a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion. (Doc. No. 28-1 at 2). But
Plaintiffs do not cite any caselaw in support of this position and I conclude their arguments are not

persuasive.
Rule 15 provides:
(1) A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion
under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with
the opposing party’s written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Prior to 2009, some courts held the position that “[i]f there is more than one defendant, and
not all have served responsive pleadings, [Rule 15(a) permits] the plaintiff [to] amend the complaint
as a matter of course with regard to those defendants that have yet to answer.” Williams v. Savage,
569 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. 2d § 1481). But, in 2009, Rule 15(a) was amended. The Advisory
Committee Notes state:
The distinction drawn in former Rule 15(a) is changed in two ways. First, the right
to amend once as a matter of course terminates 21 days after service of a motion
under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). . . .
Second, the right to amend once as a matter of course is no longer terminated by
service of a responsive pleading. . . . Just as amendment was permitted by former
Rule 15(a) in response to a motion, so the amended rule permits one amendment as
a matter of course in response to a responsive pleading. The right is subject to the
same 21-day limit as the right to amend in response to a motion.
2009 Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Importantly, the Advisory Committee also
stated “[t]he 21-day periods to amend once as a matter of course after service of a responsive
pleading or after service of a designated motion are not cumulative. If a responsive pleading is
served after one of the designated motions is served, for example, there is no new 21-day period.”
Id.
Taken together, these changes mean that a plaintiff’s 21-day clock to amend without leave of
court applies to the case as a whole, not to individual defendants, and it begins to run with the first
responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion filed in the case. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co.,
144 F. Supp. 3d 869, 878 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding that in cases with multiple defendants, “the
twenty-one day period to amend as a matter of course begins on the date of the earliest defensive
action”) (citing cases) (subsequent history omitted); Wilkie v. CTW Acquisition, LLC, No. 16-CV-
1784, 2017 WL 10505349, at *3 (D. Minn. July 25, 2017) (“In cases that involve multiple defendants,
the 21-day period to amend the complaint begins to run when the first responsive pleading or Rule
12(b) motion to dismiss is filed, and that time limit does not reset when a different defendant files a

later response.”) (citing Kieffer v. Tundra Storage LLC, No. 14-3192, 2015 WL 5009012, at *3 (D.
Minn. Aug. 21, 2015)). See also Trujillo v. City of Newton, Kan., No. 12-2380-JAR-DJW, 2013 WL
535747, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 2013) (holding cases predating the 2009 amendments to Rule 15 are
not longer applicable to the question of when the plaintiff is required to seek leave to amend).
Shraddha filed her Answer to the Complaint on August 25, 2022. (Doc. No. 10). Rule
15(a)(1)’s 21-day clock began to run the following day and expired on September 15, 2022. Plaintiffs
did not file their First Amended Complaint until October 25, 2022. (Doc. No. 23). Therefore,
Plaintiffs were no longer entitled to amend as a matter of course and were required to seek leave to
amend. Therefore, I grant Defendants’ motions to strike on this basis.
In their briefs in opposition to the motions to strike, Plaintiffs maintain that, if I conclude
they improperly amended without leave, they should be granted leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2).
(Doc. No. 28-1 at 2-6; Doc. No. 35 at 2-4). Shraddha and Manish argue I should not grant leave to
amend because the proposed amendments are futile and would cause them undue prejudice. (Doc.

No. 30 at 2-8; Doc. No. 39 at 2-3). I conclude these arguments are best considered in the context of
the Rule 12 motions below.
B. MOTION TO DISMISS
Manish moves to dismiss Counts One and Two, arguing Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible
claim for relief in those causes of action, and that Counts Three through Seven should be dismissed
because they do not state a claim under federal law. (Doc. No. 19).
Rule 12 permits a defendant to move to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint on the ground the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When

ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accepts as true well-pleaded factual allegations. Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d
893, 896 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Factual allegations must
be sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Legal conclusions and
unwarranted factual inferences are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Courts must read Rule 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a plaintiff
need offer “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295-96
(6th Cir. 2008).
1. Count One

In Count One, Plaintiffs seek the civil remedy provided by the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (the “TVPA”), which permits “[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation of this
chapter [to] bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits . . . financially
or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should
have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter).” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiffs
allege Manish is a perpetrator of “forced labor,” criminalized by § 1589, as one who “knowingly . . .
obtain[ed] the labor or services of a person by means of force . . . [or] physical restraint . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 1589(a).
Plaintiffs allege Manish violated § 1589 when he “knowingly obtained the labor or service of
Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 by means of force, serious harm, actual physical harm, and
psychological coercion as part of a scheme to benefit from their labor without compensating them.”

(Doc. No. 1 at 14). Further, Plaintiffs allege Manish “obtained labor or services of Plaintiffs Jane
Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 by means of force through intentionally drugging them into unconsciousness
and forcefully engaging in nonconsensual sexual acts with them.” (Id.). They allege Manish planned
these assaults while corresponding with them prior to his business travel to arrange dates with them,
and brought sex toys, prescription drugs, and cameras with him so that he could record himself
having sex with Plaintiffs after drugging them. (Id. at 7-10).
Manish first contends Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief in Count One because they do
not allege “what labor or services” they were forced to perform. (Doc. No. 19 at 1-2). This
argument is not persuasive. Plaintiffs’ allegations give Manish “fair notice” that the labor or services
they allegedly were forced to perform were sexual acts. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Next, Manish asserts Plaintiffs cannot state a plausible claim for relief because caselaw does
not establish that events occurring while the victim is unconscious qualify as “labor or services”

within the contours of § 1589. (Doc. No. 19 at 3-8).
This argument also is unpersuasive, as other courts have convincingly held that forced sexual
activity falls within the scope of “labor or services” as that term is used in § 1589. In United States v.
Kelly, the court concluded the defendant had engaged in conduct that violated § 1589 when he
ordered one of his victims “to engage in sexual activity and . . . [used] physical and psychological
coercion intended to make her submit,” and when he forced another victim to perform oral sex on
him after placing a gun on the chair next to him. 609 F. Supp. 3d 85, 148-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). The
court did not identify or rely on any nonsexual “labor or services” in reaching its conclusion.
Similarly, in Gilbert v. United States Olympic Committee, several plaintiffs alleged one of the
defendants, their former taekwondo coach with the U.S. Olympic team, forced them to have sex
with him before he would perform his duties as coach. 423 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1126-27, 1135-36 (D.

Col. 2019). The court concluded the term “labor or services” as used in § 1589 “covers coerced
sexual acts such as the ‘pay-to-play sexual acts alleged’” by the plaintiffs. Id. at 1127 (citations
omitted). Further, the court concluded one of the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a forced-labor
claim based in part upon allegations that the defendant drugged her and raped her while she was
unconscious. Id. at 1135. Like the court in Kelly, the court in Gilbert did not identify or rely on any
nonsexual “labor or services” in reaching its conclusions.
Implicitly, Manish’s argument is that, because the typical forced labor case involves active
conduct by the victim (whether sexual or nonsexual), § 1589 claims must always involve active
conduct. (See Doc. No. 19 at 3-8). But this argument is not consistent with the plain language of
the statute. Section 1589, in part, prohibits anyone from “knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the
labor or services of a person . . . by means of . . . physical restraint . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1).
The statutory language does not differentiate between external apparatuses of restraint, such as
ropes or handcuffs, and other methods of restraint, such as chemical restraints. Manish fails to

show Congress intended to prohibit the former and not the latter.
Plaintiffs have alleged Manish knowingly obtained sex from them after intentionally
drugging them into a state of unconsciousness. Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs, I conclude Plaintiffs plausibly allege Manish engaged in forced labor in violation of §
1589(a) and § 1595. Therefore, I deny Manish’s motion to dismiss as to Count One.
2. Count Two
In Count Two, Plaintiffs assert a § 1595 claim alleging Manish engaged in trafficking with
respect to forced labor in violation of § 1590. Section 1590 states that “[w]hoever knowingly
recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in
violation of [the TVPA]” may be fined or imprisoned. 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a). “[I]f a defendant
violates [the prohibition against forced labor in] section 1589, he also violates section 1590 if he

recruited the person to perform forced labor.” Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt., Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir.
2019).
Manish argues Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible § 1590 violation because they did not
first allege a plausible § 1589 violation. (Doc. No. 19 at 8). Because I have concluded Plaintiffs’
claim alleging violation of § 1589 is plausible, this argument is unpersuasive.
Plaintiffs allege Manish knowingly recruited them for the purpose of forced labor when he
corresponded with them via email “to coordinate and plan out the details of the visits knowing that
his intention was to drug [them] into unconsciousness and rape them.” (Doc. No. 1 at 15). I
conclude Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim of trafficking into forced labor. See Adia, 933 F.3d
at 94; Martinez-Rodriguez v. Giles, 31 F.4th 1139, 1157 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding plaintiffs’ § 1589 claim
provided sufficient support for their § 1590 claim). Therefore, I deny Manish’s motion to dismiss
Count Two.
3. Motion to Amend

As I noted above, Rule 15 provides a party may amend its pleadings once as a matter of
course within 21 days of serving the pleading or, if a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after
service of a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “In the absence of any apparent or
declared reason – such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. – the leave
sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see
also Head v. Jellico Hous. Auth., 870 F.2d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1989). “Notice and substantial prejudice
to the opposing party are critical factors in determining whether an amendment should be granted.”

Hageman v. Signal L. P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1973).
Manish argues Plaintiffs should not be granted leave to amend because their proposed
amendments would be futile. (Doc. No. 31 at 3; Doc. No. 39 at 2-3). A proposed amendment “is
futile only if it could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Rose v. Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments do not substantively
affect any of their original allegations against Manish. And I already have concluded Plaintiffs allege
plausible claims for relief against Manish in Count One and Count Two. Therefore, I deny Manish’s
motion to strike and grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
4. Summary
I conclude Plaintiffs have stated plausible claims for relief under § 1595 by pleading
sufficient factual allegations to show Manish engaged in conduct prohibited by §§ 1589 and 1590.
Therefore, I deny Manish’s motion to dismiss Counts One and Two.
Manish also moves to dismiss any claim Plaintiffs may have asserted under § 1591. (Doc.

No. 19 at 8-10). As Manish concedes, Plaintiffs reference § 1591 in the original Complaint only as
an alleged basis for jurisdiction and not as an independent claim. (Id. at 8 (“Although there is no
‘claim for relief’ made in the Complaint pursuant to Section 1591, the section is mentioned once and
alluded to more than once.”)). Plaintiffs’ citation to § 1591 appears to be intended to establish they
have standing as victims to sue following Manish’s § 1591 conviction. (Doc. No. 23 at 4-5).
Because Plaintiffs do not allege a claim for relief under § 1591, I deny Manish’s motion to dismiss
on this basis as moot.
Manish’s arguments regarding Counts Three through Seven are based upon his assertion that
Plaintiffs have not stated a federal cause of action and that I therefore should dismiss their state law
claims. Federal law provides that “in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This court
has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based upon Plaintiffs’ claims
for relief asserted under federal law. Because I have rejected his motion as to Counts One and Two,
I also reject his argument as to Counts Three through Seven.
Finally, I deny Manish’s motion to strike, and I grant Plaintiffs leave to file their First
Amended Complaint with respect to their claims against Manish.
C. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Shraddha filed a partial motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing she is entitled to
judgment in her favor on Counts One, Two, and Five. (Doc. Nos. 17 and 17-1). She contends
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief under § 1595 against her for violations of §§ 1589 and 1590
because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that she participated in or benefitted from Manish’s
conduct. She also argues Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against her under Ohio Revised Code §

2905.32 because that statute creates a cause of action only against a trafficker.
Motions for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are subject to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). The pleadings must demonstrate
sufficient factual matter that, when taken as true, states a claim which is “plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accepts as true well-pleaded factual allegations. Daily Servs., LLC, 756 F.3d at 896
(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Legal conclusions and unwarranted factual inferences are not entitled
to a presumption of truth. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The moving party must show there is no
material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Paskavan v. City
of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm’n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).

1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1595
In addition to claims against perpetrators, § 1595 permits victims to bring a civil action
against “whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving
anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPA].” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
Shraddha argues she is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Counts One and Two
because Plaintiffs have not alleged she knowingly benefitted financially from Manish’s actions or
participated in any venture Manish maintained that violated § 1589 or § 1590. I agree.
Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Complaint regarding Shraddha’s conduct are the same for
Counts One and Two. Plaintiffs allege:
As Manish Gupta’s wife, Shraddha Gupta received a letter from Jane Doe 1 in 2016
detailing the horrific acts that Manish forced upon her. Upon receipt of this letter,
Shraddha did nothing. She kept the letter, but did nothing to uncover the realities of
Manish’s behavior. Her inaction enabled Manish Gupta to continue his trafficking
of women, which led to his second rape of Jane Doe 2 in 2017.

(Doc. No. 1 at 15, 16). In other words, Plaintiffs allege Shraddha is liable because she learned of
Jane Doe 1’s allegations against Manish and, as his wife, did not investigate or intervene in his
conduct. But neither the statutory language nor caselaw supports Plaintiffs’ contention that
Congress intended for §§ 1589 and 1590 to impose liability on a defendant simply based upon a
spousal or familial relationship.
Instead, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege Shraddha knew she was receiving something of value
from engaging in a business or commercial relationship. Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714,
725 (11th Cir. 2021) (concluding “the phrase ‘participation in a venture’ requires that the Does allege
that the franchisors took part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential
profit”) (emphasis added). See also M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 970
(S.D. Ohio 2019) (“In the absence of a direct association, Plaintiff must allege at least a showing of a

continuous business relationship between the trafficker and the hotels such that it would appear that
the trafficker and the hotels have established a pattern of conduct or could be said to have a tacit
agreement.”) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’ allegations of liability based upon the marriage relationship fall short of stating a
plausible claim for relief. It may be sufficient to observe generally that the nature of a shared
financial relationship in the context of a marriage is different in kind from a shared financial
relationship in business. To that point, Plaintiffs did not cite to any case in which a court held a
spousal or familial relationship alone was enough to impose liability on an alleged beneficiary.
But even if marriage conceivably could provide part of the required connection between a
perpetrator and a beneficiary, Plaintiffs could not stand on this allegation alone. In A.D. v. Choice
Hotels International, Inc., the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against a hotel franchisor because
the plaintiff did “not sufficiently plead that [the franchisor] participated in a sex trafficking venture
beyond participation in shared revenue as part of its normal role as a franchisor.” A.D. v. Choice

Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-646-JES-NPM, 2023 WL 5510090, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2023)
(citing Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 726-27) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs have not alleged Shraddha had any participation in Manish’s alleged venture other
than that the two were married. This allegation is not sufficient to establish Shraddha is liable for
Manish’s actions.
Plaintiffs seek to bolster their allegations in the proposed First Amendment Complaint.
There, they add the allegations that:
Based upon the letter and other indicators Shraddha Gupta knew or should have
known that Manish was engaging in human trafficking. . . . Shraddha Gupta and
Manish Gupta co-mingled their assets and Shraddha retained control over Manish’s
earnings and assets from Artisan and benefit[ted] from them. . . . The extensive co-
mingling and cooperation between the two made Shraddha a participant in Artisan. .
. . Indeed, Shraddha received such extensive benefit from the ventures that the Court
in case 3:20CR208 understood that Shraddha would be responsible for paying
restitution to Jane Doe 1. . . . Shraddha Gupta accepted approximately 9 million in
assets from Manish during their divorce knowing that many of those assets were
proceeds were from the venture through which Manish conducted his illegal
activities.
(Doc. No. 23 at 15-16, 17-18).
These new allegations do not change the outcome. Plaintiffs offer no basis upon which to
infer that the alleged “extensive co-mingling and cooperation” had a business purpose, rather than a
marital purpose. Other than the fact of her marriage to Manish, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts
which connect Shraddha to Artisan. Nor does Judge Carr’s restitution order compel a different
conclusion. Shraddha’s receipt of the couple’s assets in the divorce proceedings, after Manish pled
guilty to the criminal charges against him, does not establish Shraddha knowingly participated in a
venture within the scope of the statute.
I conclude Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments would not state a plausible claim for relief and
therefore deny as futile their motion to amend the Complaint as to Counts One and Two against
Shraddha.3
2. Ohio Revised Code §§ 2307.51 and 2905.32
In Count Five, Plaintiffs assert a claim for human trafficking pursuant to §§ 2307.51 and
2905.32. Section 2905.32 provides for criminal sanctions for human trafficking. That statute

3 Because I have concluded Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments to these Counts would be futile, I do
not consider Shraddha’s other arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. (See
Doc. No. 24-1 at 5-6, 8; Doc. No. 30 at 5-8).
provides in part that “[n]o person shall knowingly recruit, lure, entice, isolate, harbor, transport,
provide, obtain, or maintain, or knowingly attempt to recruit, lure, entice, isolate, harbor, transport,
provide, obtain, or maintain, another person” for purposes of involuntary servitude or to be
compelled to engage in sexual activity. Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.32(A). Section 2307.51 permits
victims of violations of § 2905.32 to bring civil actions for damages against “the trafficker.” Ohio
Rev. Code § 2307.51(A).

Shraddha argues she is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, and also that Plaintiffs should
not be granted leave to amend their Complaint, as to Count Five, because unlike the TVPA, Ohio
law does not provide for beneficiary liability and because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that
she is a “trafficker” under the statutes. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 8-9; Doc. No. 30 at 4).
Plaintiffs contend they should be permitted to proceed with this claim because the Ohio
“definition of ‘trafficker’ is sufficiently broader than under the federal statute. Specifically, the
statute reaches those who ‘provide, obtain, [or] maintain’ another knowing the other will be
subjected to sex or labor trafficking.” (Doc. No. 28-1 at 6).
But Plaintiffs’ allegations about Shraddha’s conduct do not match up with the statutory
provisions. This point is clearest in the original Complaint, where Plaintiffs allege Shraddha “did
nothing” after learning of Jane Doe 1’s allegations about Manish’s actions. (Doc. No. 1 at 21).
Section 2905.32 is a criminal statute which requires an individual act “knowingly” and “as a
principal.” State v. White, 118 N.E.3d 410, 428-29 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). See also State v. Brown, 134

N.E.3d 783, 798 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (noting § 2905.32 defendant must take “an affirmative
action” or be “actively involved” in trafficking another person). Plaintiffs do not explain how their
allegations about Shraddha’s “inaction,” (Doc. No. 1 at 21), plausibly suggest she took any action to
“provide, obtain, [or] maintain” either of the Plaintiffs as required by the statute.
Nor do Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments help, as Ohio law only provides a civil cause of
action against “the trafficker.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.51(A). None of Plaintiffs’ new allegations
support the necessary inference that Shraddha knowingly took any active steps to compel either of
the Plaintiffs to engage in sexual activity. Therefore, I deny as futile their motion for leave to amend
the Complaint as to Count Five.
D. Motion for Protective Order

On November 16, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of a proposed protective order
covering the production by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) of FBI records pertaining to
its criminal investigation into Manish’s actions. (Doc. No. 26). Plaintiffs designated this motion as
“stipulated” – a designation I noted was inaccurate because there was no indication of service of the
motion on Manish, who is proceeding pro se. (Doc. No. 27). I ordered that Manish file any
objections to the protective order by December 23, 2022. Manish then filed his objections on
December 6, 2022. (Doc. No. 32).
Manish indicates he does not object to a protective order regarding the production of
information about the investigation of Plaintiffs’ allegations. (Id. at 2). But Manish objects to the
production of records which describe the FBI’s investigation into any other alleged victims. (Id. at
2-4). He contends this production would violate the privacy rights of those individuals and that the
FBI should have to first obtain the consent of those individuals before producing the records. (Id.).
These arguments are not persuasive.

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, prohibits federal agencies like the FBI from
disclosing any record without the prior written consent of “the individual to whom the record
pertains” except in certain circumstances. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Pertinent here is the subsection
permitting disclosure pursuant to “the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id., 552a(b)(11).
This subsection permits the FBI to disclose the records pursuant to Plaintiffs’ subpoena. See, e.g., In
re Barrett, 487 F.3d 353, 363 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting federal agency may disclose records otherwise
protected by § 552a in response to a subpoena).
Moreover, Manish fails to show he has standing to object to the disclosure of these records
based upon the privacy rights of other victims. And the proposed protective order, which restricts
who may view the records and the purpose for which they may be used, adequately protects any
relevant privacy interest. Therefore, I overrule Manish’s objections and grant Plaintiffs’ motion for

entry of a protective order. (Doc. No. 26).
E. Motion to Show Cause
Manish has filed a motion for an order directing Plaintiffs to show cause why Plaintiffs’
counsel should not be sanctioned. (Doc. No. 33). Manish asserts Plaintiffs’ counsel should be
sanctioned for failing to properly serve certain filings on him as a pro se party. (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiffs
acknowledge there have been several issues with service and represent they “have undertaken the
remedial measure of mailing [Manish] all pleadings they have filed.” (Doc. No. 36 at 2). They
contend sanctions are not appropriate.
A court’s ability to impose sanctions in civil cases is derived from statute, from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and from the court’s own implied powers. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). Generally, courts may impose sanctions when a party or an attorney
engages in litigation for improper purposes, knowingly makes untrue factual representations, or
otherwise engages in bad-faith conduct. Id. at 42-44. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Any attorney . . .

who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because
of such conduct.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (permitting courts to impose sanctions on attorneys or parties
for violations of Rule 11).
I conclude Manish has not shown sanctions are appropriate and deny his motion. Counsel
are reminded of their obligations regarding service of filings upon pro se parties, and I expect
compliance with those obligations throughout the remainder of this litigation.
F. Motion for Extension of Time
Finally, Manish has filed a motion for “an extension of time to file” because he is being
transferred to another federal prison in the near future. (Doc. No. 43 at 1). Manish does not

explain what document he may need more time in which to file, because all other pending motions
have been fully briefed and there are no current deadlines for any other filings. Therefore, I deny
Manish’s motion without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I grant the motions to strike, (Doc. Nos. 24 and 31), to the
extent they challenge Plaintiffs’ ability to file their First Amended Complaint as a matter of course. I
deny Manish’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to Counts One and Two, (Doc. No. 19), and his motion to
strike to the extent he argues Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend their Complaint should be denied
as futile. (Doc. No. 31). I grant Shraddha’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings on
Counts One, Two, and Five, (Doc. No. 17), and grant her motion to strike to the extent she argues
Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend the Complaint as to those Counts should be denied as futile.
(Doc. No. 24).
I overrule Manish’s objections, (Doc. No. 32), and grant Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of a

protective order. (Doc. No. 26). I deny Manish’s motion for entry of a show cause order. (Doc.
No. 33).
Finally, I deny without prejudice Manish’s motion for production of documents, (Doc. No.
34), and his motion for an extension of time, (Doc. No. 43), because those motions are premature.
So Ordered.

s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372602. Public record. Not legal advice.