# Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · August 28, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372414

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 28, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RENEE C BROWN, ) CASE NO. 3:22-CV-01441-CEH
)
Plaintiff, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE
) CARMEN E. HENDERSON
v. )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY )
ADMINISTRATION, )
)
Defendant, )

I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Renee C. Brown (“Claimant”), seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for Period of Disability (“POD”) and
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). This matter is before the Court by consent of the parties
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 9). For
the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of Social Security’s
nondisability finding.
II. Procedural History
Claimant filed applications for POD and DIB on April 17, 2020, alleging a disability onset
date of February 18, 2018. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 42). The applications were denied initially and
upon reconsideration, and Claimant requested a hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”). (Id.). On November 2, 2021, an ALJ held a telephonic hearing, during which Claimant,
represented by counsel, and an impartial vocational expert testified. (Id.). The ALJ issued a written
decision finding Claimant was not disabled on January 28, 2022. (Id. at PageID #: 39). The ALJ’s
decision became final on June 16, 2022, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id.
at PageID #: 28).
Claimant filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on
August 12, 2022 to challenge the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1). The parties have

completed briefing in this case. (ECF Nos. 10, 11, 13). Claimant asserts the following assignments
of error:
(1) The ALJ erred when she failed to find at Step Three of the
Sequential Evaluation that Brown satisfied the criteria of Listing
11.02B in accordance with Social Security Ruling 19-4p.

(2) The ALJ committed harmful error at Step Four of the Sequential
Evaluation when she improperly relied on the vocational witness
and found that Brown could perform her past work as a general
clerk.

(3) The ALJ committed harmful error when she failed to properly
apply the criteria of Social Security Ruling 16-3p and found that the
effect of the combination of Brown’s symptom allowed her to
engage in substantial gainful activity on a full-time and sustained
basis.

(ECF No. 10, PageID #: 893).
III. Background
A. Relevant Hearing Testimony

The ALJ summarized the relevant testimony from Claimant’s hearing:
At the hearing, the claimant testified she has chronic pain, for which
she has attended physical therapy. The claimant testified she also
has difficulty with reaching overhead. The claimant alleged that
therapy does sometimes provide some relief of symptoms. She
further testified her weight limits her ability at times to perform
prolonged walking. The claimant testified she is also taking a new
medication for pain, gabapentin, which she alleged causes
drowsiness. She also reported she takes a muscle relaxer for pain
symptoms, which also causes drowsiness.

Regarding headaches, the claimant testified she takes medications
(Imitrex) along with Aleve. She alleged she takes Imitrex twice
monthly due to migraine headaches. She alleged the medication
causes her to feel sick, so she only takes it as a last resort. The
claimant testified her insurance does not cover injections for
headaches. She testified she has headaches that occur 1 to 2 times
weekly and can last from 1 day to 4 days. The claimant testified that
laying down helps relieve symptoms to some degree, and she avoids
light and noise.

She testified that she lives at home with her 15-year-old daughter
and is able to perform some household chores and tasks. However,
she testified that her daughter has to help with sweeping or mopping.
She testified that she cooks dinner when she can and does some
laundry. She also testified she changes the bed sheets and takes her
daughter to school daily. However, she alleged sometimes she is
unable to do so because of symptoms and someone else picks her
up.

On a typical day, the claimant testified she sits or lays down, does
some housework in between resting. The claimant explained when
she is sitting, she reads mystery books or watches TV. She denied
difficulty with following along when watching TV. She also alleged
she tries to attend some of her daughter’s sporting events but alleged
she does not make it to them all. She also testified she exercise three
times weekly, up to 30 minutes, to try and help her fibromyalgia
symptoms.

(ECF No. 7, PageID #: 49–50).
A vocational expert also testified at the administrative hearing. They opined that Claimant
could work their past position as a general clerk with an occasional overhead reaching restriction.
(Id. at PageID #: 94–95). They also opined that Claimant could perform three alternative jobs with
such a restriction. (See id. at PageID #: 88, 89, 90).
B. Relevant Medical Evidence

The ALJ also summarized Claimant’s health records and symptoms:
Turning to the objective medical evidence, the record supports the
claimant has a history of chiropractic treatment for chronic
headaches and neck pain symptoms. (3F/7-8). In March 2018, the
record supports the claimant was participating in treatment with a
primary care physician. (4F/42-45). On exam, it was noted that she
had normal range of motion, no edema, and normal cranial nerve
deficit. (Id.). At her next appointment in January 2019, the claimant
reported lower right back pain and muscle tenderness of the lower
spine; however, she was noted to have had normal range of motion,
no edema, and no bony tenderness. (4F/34-37). Thus, she was
referred for physical therapy for her alleged pain symptoms. (Id.).
Physical therapy records support the claimant participated in 4 visits
in January 2019, but was discharged from therapy on February 13,
2019, when she failed to return for the remainder of her
appointments. (See 19F/1-7).

Treatment notes from September 2019 showed an assessment of
fibromyalgia and she was prescribed Ultram for pain symptoms.
(4F/32-33). Further, the record supports on September 23, 2019, the
claimant was admitted for emergency treatment related to alleged
chest pain, fatigue, and shortness of breath. (4F/12-32). The record
supports the claimant underwent testing, a stress test, and an
echocardiogram, which were normal, but on exam she reported
lightheadedness and feel extremely fatigued. (4F/9-12). In October
2019, for the claimant’s alleged pain symptoms, she underwent
chiropractic treatment. (3F/11-15).

In October 2020, the record supports the claimant was reevaluated
for chronic neck and headache pain. (10F/5-9). At the appointment,
the claimant reported headaches occurring a few times a week and
lasting all day, with pain in her head down to her shoulders. (Id.).
She was noted to have minimal response to her current treatment
(Imitrex, Norvasc, and Zanaflex) and her medications were
adjusted; specifically, Topamax was added. (Id.). It was further
noted that she had a history of rebound headaches due to
medications. (10F/5-9). On exam, the claimant was noted to have
had normal gait, intact sensation, normal muscle tone and strength,
normal memory, but with mild to moderate tenderness over the
lower cervical spine and trapezoid muscles bilaterally. (Id.). She was
also referred to physical therapy for her pain symptoms. (Id.).

Treatment record support the claimant participated in physical
therapy in November 2020 and December 2020 for her neck pain
and headaches symptoms. (12F/5-8, 14F/5-6/7-8, 15F/5-6, and
16F/20-23). On December 21, 2020, the claimant also presented for
a neurological assessment related to her headaches. (15F/6-11). On
exam, she was noted to have had no confusion or aphasia, normal
memory, normal muscle tone, no focal weakness, normal (5/5)
strength, and normal gait. (Id.). Yet, she was also observed to have
had moderate tenderness of the cervical paraspinal muscles and
trapezius muscles bilaterally and mild to moderate tenderness over
the temporalis muscles on both sides. (Id.). She was assessed with
fibromyalgia and chronic tension headaches, possibly migraines and
her medication (Zanaflex) was increased in dosage. (Id.). She also
underwent x-rays of the cervical spine on December 21, 2020 which
showed evidence of somewhat limited mobility on extension and of
the upper cervical spine on flexion; mild anterolisthesis C3 on C4
and C5 on C5, increased slightly with flexion; intervertebral disc
space narrowing C5-C6 and C6-C7; mild spondylosis seen at C4-
C7; partial facet fusion of C2-C3; multilevel facet arthropathy, most
severe at C3-T1; some impingement on the neural foramina, best
seen at C5-C6 and C6-C7 on the left; no loss of vertebral height;
mild degenerative changes of the atlantoaxial joints; and no
destructive or blastic lesion.

Further, in February 2021, the claimant was evaluated by pain
management for symptoms control related to fibromyalgia, cervical
pain, and her headaches. (16F/3-19). She reported headaches
occurring several times weekly and indicated she has ongoing
intermittent neck pain and bilateral shoulder pain. (Id.). On exam, it
was noted that the claimant had tenderness and limited range of
motion of her cervical spine; however, she was also observed to
have had normal muscle tone and strength; normal sensation; and
normal gait. (Id.). Further, it was indicated that she had mild to
moderate tenderness over lower cervical paraspinal muscles and
trapezius muscles bilaterally along with tender points on scapular
region supraspinatus and pyriformis areas. (Id.). For treatment of her
symptoms the record supports that acupuncture was provided and
her medications were adjusted (Toprol and magnesium trials started
for her headaches and Norvasc dose was cut in half). (Id.).

The record supports no further treatment until the claimant
established with a new primary care provider in September 2021.
(21F/1-8). At that time, the claimant was assessed with fibromyalgia
and she was started on new medication (gabapentin) for her pain
symptoms and Zanaflex was also continued. (Id.). On exam, the
claimant was noted to have had tenderness with multiple myalgias
present, but no edema, normal attention, normal cognition, and it
was noted that she presented as mildly anxious. (Id.).

(Id. at PageID #: 50–51).
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings relevant to this appeal:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through March 31, 2024.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
February 18, 2018, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: tension
headache/migraine/drug induced headache; fibromyalgia; and
cervical degenerative disc disease. (15/13-16); (20 CFR
404.1520(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: The
claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, crouch, kneel, stoop, and crawl.
She must be able to alternate positions, at his/her option, every 45
minutes for 1-2 minutes so long as she is not off task or has to leave
the vicinity of the workstation. With the bilateral upper extremities,
she can occasionally reach overhead. She can have occasional
concentrated exposure to unprotected moving mechanical
machinery and cannot work around vibrations or unprotected
heights. She cannot have more than occasional concentrated
exposure to noise levels that are in excess of the moderate noise
levels defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. She can
occasionally perform any commercial driving.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a
general clerk (DOT 209.562-010, svp 3, light as generally
performed and sedentary as actually performed). This work does not
require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. In the alternative, for the period prior to March 9, 2020 (prior to
the claimant turning 55 years-old), although the claimant was
capable of performing past relevant work, there were also other jobs
existing in the national economy that she was able to perform.
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge makes the following
alternative findings for step five of the sequential evaluation process
for the period prior to March 9, 2020.
8. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from February 18, 2018, through the date of
this decision. (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).

(Id. at PageID #: 44–56).
V. Law & Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council
becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott
v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986)
(en banc)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be
affirmed, “even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983)).
B. Standard for Disability
The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use in
determining whether a claimant is entitled to DIB: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination
of impairments; (3) if so, whether that impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals
any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant can
perform her past relevant work in light of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) if not,
whether, based on the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, she can perform other work

found in the national economy. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d
640, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2006). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of producing sufficient
evidence to prove that she is disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. § 404.1512(a). Specifically,
the claimant has the burden of proof in Steps One through Four. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five to establish
whether the claimant has the RFC to perform available work in the national economy. Id.
C. Discussion
Claimant raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues the ALJ erred in finding that
Claimant did not satisfy the criteria of Listing 11.02B. (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 893). Second, she
argues they committed harmful error at Step Four by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony

that Claimant could perform past work. (Id.). Finally, Claimant contends the ALJ did not properly
apply Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p. (Id.). The Court will review each assignment of error
below.
1. Listing 11.02B
Claimant first argues that the ALJ erred in finding her headaches did not medically equal
Listing 11.02B since she claims the evidence was “more than sufficient” to meet the requirements
of SSR 19-4p. (Id. at PageID #: 901 (citing Harper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 2383833, at
* 12 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2021)). In support, she cites medical records throughout the period at
issue that indicate the nature and frequency of her headaches, prescribed medications, medication
side effects, and the impact of headaches on her daily activities. (See id. PageID #: 902–04). The
Commissioner argues that Claimant has failed to produce “any of the requisite evidence” to
establish medical equivalency under SSR 17-2p and challenges her reliance on Harper. (ECF No.
11, PageID #: 929).

At Step Three, an ALJ considers whether a claimant’s impairment is severe enough to
prevent them from completing gainful activity. § 404.1525. If an impairment meets or equals a
“Listing of Impairments,” they are presumed disabled. Id.; Lee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.
App’x 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A claimant who meets or equals a listed impairment is
presumptively disabled, without consideration of her age, education, or work experience.”).
“To make a finding of medical equivalence, an ALJ must have either: 1) a prior
administrative finding from an agency doctor that supports the finding of medical equivalence, or
2) medical expert evidence; or 3) a report from the appeals council medical staff to support the
finding of equivalence.” Strittmatter v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 207907, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 17,
2023); see SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *3 (S.S.A. Mar. 27, 2017).

“Primary headache disorder is not a listed impairment in the Listing of Impairments.” SSR
19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635, at *7 (S.S.A. Aug. 26, 2019). However, “Epilepsy (listing 11.02) is the
most closely analogous listed impairment for an MDI of a primary headache disorder.” (Id.).
Listing 11, Paragraph B, “requires dyscognitive seizures occurring at least once a week for at least
3 consecutive months despite adherence to prescribed treatment.” Id.
ALJs consider the following factors in determining whether a headache disorder equals
Listing 11.02B:
A detailed description from an [acceptable medical source] of a
typical headache event, including all associated phenomena (for
example, premonitory symptoms, aura, duration, intensity, and
accompanying symptoms); the frequency of headache events;
adherence to prescribed treatment; side effects of treatment (for
example, many medications used for treating a primary headache
disorder can produce drowsiness, confusion, or inattention); and
limitations in functioning that may be associated with the primary
headache disorder or effects of its treatment, such as interference
with activity during the day (for example, the need for a darkened
and quiet room, having to lie down without moving, a sleep
disturbance that affects daytime activities, or other related needs and
limitations).

Id.; see also Snyder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-5948, 2023 WL 3673265, at *3 (6th Cir. May
26, 2023) (discussing ALJs’ consideration of Listing 11.02B headaches).
While the ALJ acknowledged Listing 11.02, they found that Claimant’s headaches did not
meet the listing. (See ECF No. 7, PageID #: 48). They explained their finding with the following
rationale:
the evidence does not provide a detailed description of typical
migraine pattern including all associated phenomena, occurring
more frequently than once weekly in spite of at least 3 months of
prescribed treatment. Moreover, there is no concrete evidence of
alteration of awareness or loss of consciousness and transient
postictal manifestations of unconventional behavior or significant
interference with activity during the day

(Id.).
This analysis is consistent with SSR 19-4p which requires ALJs to consider, in part,
whether a “detailed description . . . of a typical headache event” supports the existence of
“dyscognitive seizures occurring at least once a week for at least 3 consecutive months.” SSR 19-
4p, 2019 WL 4169635 at *7. The ALJ here found no such report in the record, nor any “concrete
evidence” that Claimant’s headaches caused any alterations of awareness, loss of consciousness,
unconventional behavior, or activity interference. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 48).
Claimant does not contest this. She does not point to any record or other evidence of
dyscognitive headaches. She also does not point to records of alterations of awareness, loss of
consciousness, or unconventional behavior. While she points to activity interference, the ALJ
discounted her subjective complaints, as discussed below, and substantial evidence supports their
decision. (See ECF No. 10, PageID #: 903).
Furthermore, the ALJ reviewed records demonstrating “normal” cognitive functioning.

They noted that a December 2020 provider found Claimant alert and oriented, demonstrating
“normal” memory, and free from confusion or aphasia. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 51 (referencing
ECF No. 7, PageID #: 793)). The same doctor also noted Claimant had no trouble concentrating
and did not experience seizures. (Id. at PageID #: 790). The ALJ noted that while Claimant’s
chiropractor reported a long history of debilitating headaches, he had only treated Claimant twice
and based this statement on her subjective reports, which the ALJ later discounted. (Id. at PageID
#: 51–52). Moreover, they found that even the chiropractor did not provide functional limitations
to accommodate Claimant’s headaches. (Id.). Finally, only one state agency consultant
recommended headache-related restrictions for the RFC. (See id. at Exs. 2A, 4A). Therefore,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s headaches did not equal Listing

11.02(B).
While Claimant cites numerous records referencing the frequency and nature of her
headaches, she neglects to point out that these points are generally based on her subjective reports
to providers. (See ECF No. 10, PageID #: 902–03). As the ALJ discounted the severity of her
allegations later in the opinion, it is clear that they questioned the legitimacy of such allegations.
(See ECF No. 7, PageID #: 53 (discounting Claimant’s allegations)). Moreover, Claimant points
to no objective records indicating any “premonitory symptoms, aura . . . accompanying symptoms”
of her headaches, as SSR 19-4p discusses.
To the extent that Claimant attempts to suggest and support an alternative reading of the
record, this argument fails. Even if substantial evidence supports an alternative finding, this is not
enough to disturb the ALJ’s finding. As long as substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court must defer to it, “‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would
have supported an opposite conclusion[.]’” Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); see Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762,
772 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because
there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.”) (citations
omitted).
Finally, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that Harper is distinguishable from this
case. (See ECF No. 11, PageID #: 929). There, the claimant challenged the ALJ’s treatment of her
subjective allegations related to migraines, an RFC challenge. 2021 WL 2383833 at *10–11. As
SSRs 17-2p and 19-4p were not implicated in the Harper court’s analysis, Claimant’s reliance on
the case is misplaced.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s headaches did not equal

Listing 11.02B. This Court therefore will not disturb the ALJ’s decision.
2. Past Relevant Work
Claimant next argues the ALJ erroneously accepted on the vocational expert’s (“VE”)
experience as a proper basis for their opinion and testimony at the administrative hearing. (ECF
No. 10, PageID #: 906). Additionally, she argues the ALJ erred in finding she could perform her
past job since it required “frequent reaching” and the RFC had an “occasional overheard reaching”
restriction. (Id.). The Commissioner admits there was a conflict between the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and the VE’s testimony but argues that the VE’s experience
reasonably resolved the issue and supplemented the DOT. (ECF No. 11, PageID #: 932).
At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE whether Claimant could perform her
past job as a general clerk with a hypothetical set of restrictions, including “occasionally reach
overhead.” (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 94). The VE testified that Claimant could perform her past work
with such restrictions and provided three additional jobs she could work as well. (Id. at PageID

#: 89, 94). Toward the end of the hearing, the VE also testified about directional reaching
restrictions. While the DOT did not contain directional reaching restrictions, such as “reaching in
any direction” or “reaching overhead,” the VE testified that they could opine on such limitations
based on their experience. (Id. at PageID #: 95). They testified that while occasional reaching in
any direction would preclude Claimant’s past work, Claimant would still be able to perform the
job with only overhead occasional reaching. (Id. at PageID #: 94–95).
A VE’s testimony about a Claimant’s work abilities constitutes substantial evidence in
support of an ALJ’s Step Four and Five findings. See Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629,
633 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The vocational expert’s testimony is directed solely to whether, given a
claimant’s age, experience, and education, along with the ALJ’s assessment of what she ‘can and

cannot do,’ there exist a significant number of employment opportunities for her in the regional
and national economies. The vocational expert is not expected to evaluate the claimant’s medical
conditions in making this determination.”). Likewise, VE testimony is not confined to the contents
of the DOT and may also encompass their personal experience. SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at
*2 (S.S.A. Dec. 4, 2000) (“Information about a particular job’s requirements or about occupations
not listed in the DOT may be available in other reliable publications, information obtained directly
from employers, or from a VE’s or VS’s experience in job placement or career counseling.”).
Here, the VE testified that Claimant could perform past work with an occasional overhead
reaching restriction. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 94–95). Their testimony was supported by their
experience—an acceptable source of information pursuant to SSR 004-p—and constitutes
substantial evidence. See Webb, 368 F.3d at 633. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s finding that Claimant could perform past relevant work, and this Court will not disturb the
finding.

Despite Claimant’s argument that the position required frequent reaching, this does not
impact the ALJ’s finding. (See ECF No. 10, PageID #: 906–07). While they limited Claimant to
occasional overhead reaching, they did not adopt any additional reaching restrictions, finding
Claimant had unlimited reaching capability outside of the overhead limit. (See ECF No. 7, PageID
#: 48–49). Again, as the VE testified that Claimant could still perform past work with an occasional
overhead reaching restriction, and Claimant is not limited in any other direction, this constitutes
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding.
3. SSR 16-3p
Claimant finally argues the ALJ “failed to articulate any supportable rationale” for
discounting her subjective complaints, including pain. (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 911–12). She

further contends that the ALJ failed to provide “specific reasons” for their finding or a logical
bridge between the evidence and their determination. (Id.). Finally, because the ALJ “ignored”
evidence of Claimant’s impairments, Claimant argues the opinion requires remand. (Id. at PageID
#: 913).
The Commissioner rejects Claimant’s argument as an attempt to reweigh the evidence or
support an alternative finding. (ECF No. 11, PageID #: 936). Reviewing the ALJ’s rationale for
rejecting the opinion, the Commissioner points out that the ALJ reviewed several SSR 16-3p
factors including the medical record, daily activities, treatment, medication, as well as mitigating
factors. (Id. at PageID #: 934–35).
The evaluation of a claimant’s subjective complaints rests with the ALJ. See Siterlet v.
Sec’y of HHS, 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248 (noting that “credibility
determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”). In evaluating a claimant’s
symptoms, the ALJ must look to medical evidence, statements by the claimant, other information

provided by medical sources, and any other relevant evidence on the record. § 404.1529(c); SSR
16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304.
Beyond medical evidence, SSR 16-3p sets forth seven factors that the ALJ should consider.
The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors but should show that she considered the relevant
evidence. See Cross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
[I]f an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of symptoms are inconsistent with the objective
medical evidence and the other evidence, we will determine that the
individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce his or her capacities
to perform work-related activities or abilities to function
independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate
manner.

SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304. The ALJ’s “decision must contain specific reasons for the weight
given to the individual’s symptoms . . . and be clearly articulated so the individual and any
subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Id.; see
also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.2d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994) (“If an ALJ rejects a claimant’s
testimony as incredible, he must clearly state his reason for doing so.”). While a reviewing court
gives deference to an ALJ’s credibility determination, “the ALJ’s credibility determination will
not be upheld if it is unsupported by the record or insufficiently explained.” Carr v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 3:18CV1639, 2019 WL 2465273, at *10 (N.D. Ohio April 24, 2019) (citing Rogers,
486 F.3d at 248-49), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3752687 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8,
2019).
Claimant states that “the ALJ failed to articulate any supportable rationale for her finding
that [her] statements . . . were broader and more restricted than was established in the medical
evidence.” (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 912).
The ALJ specified Claimant’s subjective complaints:

At the hearing, the claimant testified she has chronic pain, for which
she has attended physical therapy. The claimant testified she also
has difficulty with reaching overhead. The claimant alleged that
therapy does sometimes provide some relief of symptoms. She
further testified her weight limits her ability at times to perform
prolonged walking. The claimant testified she is also taking a new
medication for pain, gabapentin, which she alleged causes
drowsiness. She also reported she takes a muscle relaxer for pain
symptoms, which also causes drowsiness.

Regarding headaches, the claimant testified she takes medications
(Imitrex) along with Aleve. She alleged she takes Imitrex twice
monthly due to migraine headaches. She alleged the medication
causes her to feel sick, so she only takes it as a last resort. The
claimant testified her insurance does not cover injections for
headaches. She testified she has headaches that occur 1 to 2 times
weekly and can last from 1 day to 4 days. The claimant testified that
laying down helps relieve symptoms to some degree, and she avoids
light and noise.

She testified that she lives at home with her 15-year-old daughter
and is able to perform some household chores and tasks. However,
she testified that her daughter has to help with sweeping or mopping.
She testified that she cooks dinner when she can and does some
laundry. She also testified she changes the bed sheets and takes her
daughter to school daily. However, she alleged sometimes she is
unable to do so because of symptoms and someone else picks her
up.

On a typical day, the claimant testified she sits or lays down, does
some housework in between resting. The claimant explained when
she is sitting, she reads mystery books or watches TV. She denied
difficulty with following along when watching TV. She also alleged
she tries to attend some of her daughter’s sporting events but alleged
she does not make it to them all. She also testified she exercise three
times weekly, up to 30 minutes, to try and help her fibromyalgia
symptoms.
(ECF No. 7, PageID #: 49–50). The ALJ later provided a unified statement of reasons for
discounting credibility:
[W]hile the claimant has medically determinable physical
impairments that could reasonably cause some symptoms and
limitations, the undersigned finds the allegations are broader and
more restricted than is established by the medical evidence. This is
not to say that the claimant was symptom free or did not experience
difficulty performing some tasks. However, the objective evidence
does not demonstrate the existence of limitations of such severity as
to have precluded the claimant from performing all work on a
regular and continuing basis at any time from the alleged onset date
of disability

[. . .]

The onset, nature, intensity, and duration of symptoms, as well as
participating and aggravating factors, have all been factored into the
residual functional capacity assessment set forth herein for this
claimant. (SSR 16-3p). The undersigned has also evaluated whether
the claimant’s allegations and statements are consistent with other
evidence of record, including statements made by the claimant to
providers or others, and statements and observations of medical and
non-medical sources. Considering these factors, the undersigned has
also found that the claimant’s allegations are not fully consistent
with the entire record.

Specifically, the record does not fully corroborate the claimant’s
allegations of physical health symptom severity. As detailed above,
the record supports the claimant participated in outpatient
conservative treatment (pain medication, physical therapy, and
trigger point injections) for her cervical degenerative disc disease,
headaches, and fibromyalgia. No further or more aggressive
treatment is noted for these impairments during the adjudicated
period. Additionally, the record supports although the claimant was
noted to have had tenderness on exam at multiple appointments and
limited range of motion at one appointment, she was also
consistently noted to have had normal strength, normal muscle tone,
normal sensation, and normal gait. (4F/34-37/42- 45, 10F/5-9,
15F/6-11, 16F/3-19, and 21F/11). Additionally, her imaging study
of record supported multilevel degenerative changes, but did not
show evidence of significant stenosis or nerve root compromise.
(15F/13-16). Furthermore, her treatment of record was sporadic in
nature and did not show or support the level of severity that the
claimant alleged at the hearing. If her symptoms were as severe as
she alleged, one would expect to see more consistent treatment
and/or an increase in the treatments recommended. However, the
undersigned finds that the level of primarily conservative,
outpatient, intermittent treatment is generally not consistent with the
severity of symptoms the claimant has alleged for the entire
adjudicated period.

(Id. at PageID #: 52–53).
The ALJ discussed Claimant’s mental impairments and symptoms at length throughout
their opinion. (See id. at PageID #: 50–52). They noted that Claimant had a history of chiropractic
treatment for chronic headaches and neck pain and reported headaches occurring a few times every
week and lasting all day in October 2020. (Id. (citing Exs. 3F, 10F)). In December 2020, she
participated in a neurological assessment for headaches and demonstrated normal memory and no
confusion or aphasia. (Id. (citing Ex. 15F)). The ALJ observed that Claimant was evaluated for
pain management of several conditions, including headaches, in February 2021, and she reported
experiencing several headaches throughout each week. (Id. (citing Ex. 16F)).
The ALJ also reviewed Claimant’s physical impairments, including fibromyalgia and
degenerative disc disease, throughout their decision. The noted a September 2019 assessment
showed fibromyalgia, for which Claimant was prescribed Ultram for resulting fibromyalgia-
related pain. (Id. (citing Ex. 4F)). In an October 2020 record, the ALJ observed that Claimant
demonstrated “normal” gait, muscle tone, and strength, but “mild to moderate” tenderness over
the lower cervical spine. (Id. (citing Ex. 10F)). She was again observed to have “moderate
tenderness” of the cervical paraspinal musicale in December 2020 and again assessed with
fibromyalgia. (Id.). The ALJ noted that in February 2021, Claimant was evaluated for pain
management related to fibromyalgia symptoms and cervical pain. (Id. (citing Ex. 16F)). She was
again assessed for fibromyalgia in September 2021. (Id. (citing Ex. 21F)).
The ALJ also discussed Claimant’s prescription medications to treat headaches and
fibromyalgia-related pain. (Id.). As mentioned above, the ALJ noted Claimant was prescribed
Ultram for fibromyalgia pain in September 2019 and underwent chiropractic treatment by October
2019. (Id. (citing Exs. 3F, 4F)). A provider noted “minimal response” to Imitrex, Norvasc, and

Zanaflex in October 2020 and added Topomax to treat headaches, which the ALJ observed. (Id.).
The ALJ also noted that Claimant experienced “rebound headaches” in response to medications.
(Id.). In December 2020, a provider increased Claimant’s Zanaflex dosage to treat chronic tension
headaches, and by February 2021, she began Toprol and magnesium while halving her Norvasc
dose. (Id.). Aside from the medical records, the ALJ also noted that Claimant testified she takes
Gabapentin, which she alleged caused drowsiness, and a muscle relaxer to treat pain. (Id. at PageID
#: 49). For headaches, the ALJ noted that Claimant testified she takes Imitrex and Aleve, despite
Imitrex causing nausea.
The ALJ also reviewed Claimant’s general treatment throughout the period at issue. They
noted that Claimant received chiropractic care and attended at least four physical therapy sessions

to treat her pain. (Id. at PageID #: 50–51 (citing Exs. 3F, 4F)). Observing that Claimant was
admitted for emergency treatment1 in September 2020, the ALJ also referenced subsequent
chiropractic treatment in October 2020. (Id. (citing Ex. 4F)). Finally, they also discussed
Claimant’s acupuncture treatment in February 2021. (Id. (citing Ex. 16F)).
In reviewing Claimant’s allegations of symptoms, the ALJ noted factors that mitigated the
pain. They noted that laying down relieves headache pain and that Claimant avoids light and noise

1 The ALJ noted that the emergency treatment was related to alleged chest pain, fatigue,
and shortness of breath. (See ECF No. 7, PageID #: 50).
to avoid such pain. (Id.). Additionally, the ALJ found that Claimant testified that physical therapy
provided pain relief. (Id. at PageID #: 49).
Elsewhere, the ALJ noted Claimant’s testimony of daily activities including thirty minutes
of exercise three times a week, attending her daughter’s sporting events, and housework. (Id. at

PageID #: 50). Claimant also testified to reading and watching television, as well as attending
physical therapy. (Id. at PageID #: 49–50).
After reviewing the medical record and Claimant’s testimony, the ALJ provided several
reasons for discounting her allegations of disabling symptoms. They found that Claimant generally
participated in conservative outpatient treatment such as pain medication, physical therapy, and
trigger point injections to treat fibromyalgia, cervical degenerative disc disease, and headaches.
(Id. at PageID #: 53). The ALJ noted that treatment was also “sporadic” and “intermittent” and did
not support the intensity or severity of symptoms Claimant alleged she experienced. (Id.). Next,
the ALJ reasoned that Claimant was repeatedly noted to have “normal” muscle tone, strength,
sensation, and gait. (Id. (citing Exs. 4F, 10F, 15F, 16F, 21F)). Finally, as her imaging study did

not demonstrate “significant” stenosis or nerve root compromise, the ALJ found that the record
did not support the severity of her complaints. (Id.). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings and rationale for discounting Claimant’s subjective allegations. Moreover, based on the
ALJ’s recitation of the record and clear rationale for discounting the allegations, the Court finds
that a logical bridge exists between the record and their credibility finding.
Claimant specifically argues that the ALJ did not consider her symptoms from
fibromyalgia or cervical degenerative disc disease. (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 911). However, as
discussed in the review of the decision above, the ALJ frequently referenced these impairments
and their symptoms throughout the opinion and explicitly referenced each condition in discounting
the severity of Claimant’s allegations. (See ECF No. 7, PageID #: 50–51, 53 (“As detailed above,
the record supports the claimant participated in outpatient conservative treatment . . . for her
cervical degenerative disc disease, headaches, and fibromyalgia.”). The Court therefore rejects this
claim as well as Claimant’s argument that the ALJ did not consider her conditions and their

symptoms in combination with each other. (See ECF No. 10, PageID #: 911). The opinion is
littered with cross-referenced symptoms and many medical records discussed Claimant’s
combination of physical and mental symptoms throughout the period at issue. (See ECF No. 7,
PageID #: 50–51 (discussing physical and mental health symptoms from Exs. 3F, 4F, 10F, 12F,
14F, 15F, 16F, 21F)). The ALJ reviewed these records and substantial evidence supports her
assertion to this effect.
The Court also agrees with the Commissioner that Claimant attempts to reweigh the record
evidence in support of their claim. McQuade v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21CV834, 2022 WL
4375984, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2022) (“But the Court does not reweigh evidence when
reviewing an ALJ’s determination.”); Avers v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-01433, 2021 WL 4291228,

at *5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2021) (“[T]he court does not review the evidence de novo, make
credibility determinations, or weigh the evidence.”). Likewise, Claimant’s exhaustive recitation of
the record merely highlights that there may be substantial evidence to support an alternative
conclusion which is not enough to disturb the ALJ’s finding. As long as substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must defer to it, “‘even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion[.]’” Wright, 321 F.3d at
614 (quoting Key, 109 F.3d at 273); see Buxton, 246 F.3d at 772.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Claimant’s subjective
allegations. Thus, the Court will not disturb the opinion.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of Social Security’s
nondisability finding.
Dated: August 28, 2023 s/ Carmen E. Henderson
CARMEN E. HENDERSON
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372414. Public record. Not legal advice.