# Doe 1 v. Varsity Brands, LLC

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · August 2, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372330

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 2, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372330

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to follow Butcher’s Union because “[n]owhere in section 1965(b) does it say that there must not be some other appropriate forum.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

JOHN DOE 1, Case No. 1:22-CV-02139

Plaintiff,

-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

VARSITY BRANDS, LLC, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Defendants.

Plaintiff John Doe 1 filed a Complaint in this matter on November 28, 2022 against 11
defendants. (Doc. No. 1.) Before the Court are three motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) filed by three separate defendants in this case. The motions to dismiss presently
before the Court are as follows: (1) Defendant Charlesbank Capital Partners, LP’s (“Charlesbank”)
Motion (Doc No. 53); (2) Defendant Jeff Webb’s (“Webb”) Motion (Doc. No. 54); and (3) Defendant
Bain Capital, LP’s (“Bain”) Motion (Doc. No. 56). Doe filed Oppositions to all three Motions. (Doc.
Nos. 75, 76, 77.) Webb, Charlesbank, and Bain filed Replies in Support of their Motions to Dismiss.
(Doc. Nos. 85, 88, 89.) Charlesbank and Bain filed a joint Notice of Supplemental Authority on June
28, 2023. (Doc. No. 99.) Webb filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority on July 19, 2023. (Doc.
No. 107.)
For the following reasons, Charlesbank’s, Webb’s, and Bain’s Motions are GRANTED.
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Doe is a former competitive cheerleader. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 1.) Doe alleges that when
he was 17 years old, he was sexually abused by two cheerleading choreographers, Defendants
Brandon Hale and Taji Davis, who were allegedly affiliated with the Varsity Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
In addition to pursuing claims against Hale and Davis, Doe also seeks to hold the Varsity Defendants,
Varsity Spirit founder Jeff Webb, Charlesbank Capital Partners, LP, Bain Capital, LP, USA Cheer,
and USASF liable for misrepresenting the safety of Varsity-affiliated gyms and competitions, and for
failing to adopt and/or enforce adequate policies to prevent and/or investigate sexual abuse of minor
athletes by adults affiliated with various cheerleading organizations. (Id. at ¶ 3, 5-8.)
A. All-Star Cheerleading

This case involves myriad organizations and individuals associated with the sport of all-star
cheerleading. (Doc. No. 1.) Private all-star cheerleading is a highly competitive and fast-paced sport
that incorporates elements of cheer, dance, and tumbling. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.) All-star cheerleading
demands that its young athletes and their families invest significant amounts of time and money. (Id.
at ¶ 38.) Competitive cheerleading is not subject to traditional “seasonal” limitations but can take
place year-round. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Doe alleges that athletes can expect to spend between $3,000 to
$7,000 per season, and that some families may spend up to $20,000 per year for transportation,
lodging, membership and entrance fees, merchandise, uniforms, and accessories related to training
for, and competing in, multiple all-star competitions throughout the year. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-38.)
According to Doe, the competitive cheer industry generates billions of dollars in annual revenue and

may serve up to four million athletes. (Id. at ¶ 51.)
Doe alleges that Webb began his career in cheerleading in the early 1970s, and began
monetizing the operation of cheerleading camps throughout the 1970s and 1980s. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-43.)
In the 1980s, Webb founded an organization called the Universal Cheerleaders Association, which
eventually became Varsity Spirit. (Id. at ¶ 42-43.) Initially, Varsity Spirit began as a cheer camp
provider, but gradually expanded its operations to include hosting competitions, merchandising,

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branding, social media, and gym ownership and/or management. (Id. at ¶¶ 44-45.) By the early
2000s, Varsity Spirit’s parent corporation, Varsity Brands, represented that it was the country’s
largest designer, marketer, and supplier of cheerleading and dance team uniforms and accessories,
the largest operator of cheer and dance team training camps and clinics, a leading organizer of
extracurricular activity special events, a major provider of studio dance conventions and
competitions, and producer of studio dance apparel for studio dance competitions. (Id. at ¶ 46.)

However, even as early as 2002, Varsity Brands’ largest source of revenue allegedly came from its
connection with all-star cheer, through its subsidiary Varsity Spirit. (Id. at ¶ 47.)
Doe alleges that from 2014 through 2018, Charlesbank, a private equity firm, wholly owned
the Varsity Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 125.) Doe alleges that in 2018, Bain Capital, another PE firm,
purchased the Varsity Defendants from Charlesbank for $2.8 billion, although Charlesbank retained
a minority stake in the business. (Id. at ¶ 127.)
According to Doe, there are two non-profit organizations that oversee competitive
cheerleading in the United States: USASF and USA Cheer. (Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24.) According to Doe,
Webb and the Varsity Defendants were heavily involved in the creation of USASF and USA Cheer,
and remain involved in the operation of both organizations. (Id.) For example, the Varsity

Defendants allegedly created USASF through a $1.8 million interest-free loan, and the USASF’s non-
profit charter certificate lists the Varsity Defendants’ address as USASF’s address. (Id. at ¶ 90.)
Likewise, Doe alleges that in 2007, Webb and Varsity Spirit founded USA Cheer through another
interest-free loan from the Varsity Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 99-100.) Allegedly, USA Cheer shared an
address with the Varsity Defendants. (Id.) Doe further alleges that the Varsity Defendants submitted
the original trademark application for the marks “U.S. All Star Federation” and “USASF.” (Id. at ¶

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103.) Doe further alleges that for the first 15 years of USASF’s existence, its offices were located at
Varsity Spirit’s corporate address, a Varsity representative answered USASF’s phones, USASF
employees were paid by Varsity, Varsity cashed checked issued to USASF, and Varsity Spirit was
listed as the owner of USASF. (Id. at ¶ 104.) Doe alleges that the Varsity Defendants also exerted
control over the USASF and USA Cheer by maintaining control over the organizations’ respective
boards of directors. (Id. at ¶¶ 106, 109-110.)

Due to Webb’s and the Varsity Defendants’ alleged total control over USASF and USA
Cheer, Webb and the Varsity Defendants are able to control all aspects of all-star cheerleading,
including the following alleged examples:
• All athletes cheering on behalf of Varsity-affiliated gyms are required to purchase
USASF memberships to compete at Varsity-sponsored events;

• All gyms, coaches, and vendors who wish to compete at and/or attend and/or offer
products/services at Varsity events must also become members of USASF and pay
monthly and/or annual fees to USASF, USA Cheer, and the Varsity Defendants;

• The Varsity Defendants require gyms to sign multi-year supply contracts whereby the
gyms are paid cash rebates from Varsity Spirit for buying Varsity-branded
merchandise, participating in Varsity-sponsored events, and working with Varsity-
approved vendors;

• All athletes must pay annual fees to the Varsity Defendants for music, training,
competition attendance, uniforms, and accessories;

• Athletes who compete at one Varsity-affiliated gym are prohibited from transferring
to another Varsity-affiliated gym without permission;

• Athletes and their families attending Varsity events are required to stay at Varsity-
approved hotels (a policy Varsity has dubbed “stay to play”), allegedly at inflated
rates, and any failure to comply with the stay-to-play policy could subject the entire
team to disqualification;

• Webb has publicly stated that teams performing at Varsity competitions in full Varsity
uniforms and accessories received higher scores; and

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• Following the highly publicized Jerry Harris sex abuse scandal in 20201, USASF and
USA Cheer began offering risk and safety training to member gyms and personnel,
but the Varsity Defendants required members to pay additional fees to access this
USASF/USA Cheer safety training.
(Id. at ¶¶ 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 68, 113, 174-75.)
B. Doe’s Allegations of Abuse
Doe alleges that, at the time of the alleged abuse, he was a citizen and resident of Lorain
County, Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 14.) In 2014, when Doe was 15 years old, Defendants Brandon Hale, Taji
Davis, and ShowPro Choreography, contracted with Doe’s gym in “Avondale, Ohio”2 to provide
choreography services to the gym’s all-star cheerleading team. (Id. at ¶ 188.) Doe alleges that during
this initial meeting, Hale and Davis accompanied Doe, his gym owners, and other minor athletes on
a day trip to Cedar Point amusement park. (Id. at ¶ 189.)
In April 2015, Doe transferred to a new cheerleading gym in Brecksville, Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 190.)
Doe alleges that his new gym would also contract with Hale, Davis, and ShowPro for choreography
services. (Id.)
Doe alleges that, “[b]eginning in 2016, Defendants Hale and Davis began to exchange
messages with . . . Doe using an App.” (Id. at ¶ 191.) Doe alleges that on or around July 28, 2016,
when Doe was 17 years old, Hale and Davis returned to Ohio to provide “cheer training and
choreography services to [Doe’s] former gym.” (Id. at ¶ 192.) Doe alleges that during this July 2016
trip to Ohio, “Davis and Hale once again exchanged messages with” Doe. (Id. at ¶ 193.) Doe alleges

1 In 2020, Jerry Harris, a former Varsity-affiliated coach and star of the Netflix docuseries “Cheer,” was accused of
soliciting sex from two minor all-star cheerleaders. (Id. at ¶ 132.) In 2022, Harris pleaded guilty to and was sentenced
on two counts related to soliciting sex from a minor. (Id.)
2 The Court observes that there is no such town in Ohio as “Avondale.” Doe does not otherwise identify the name of his
former gym.
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that, at that time, Hale and Davis knew that Doe was under 18 years old and a USASF member athlete.
(Id.)
Doe alleges that, despite their knowledge of Doe’s age and status as a USASF member, Hale
and Davis “pressed” Doe to visit them at their hotel room in Westlake, Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 194.) Doe
alleges that he “was hesitant and initially refused” their invitation. (Id. at ¶ 195.) However, Doe
ultimately went to Hale’s and Davis’s hotel room. (Id.) Upon arrival, Doe learned that Hale and

Davis were also going to provide a cheerleading skills clinic for his current gym during their visit to
Ohio. (Id.) Hale and Davis offered Doe liquor, which he refused. (Id. at ¶ 196.) Thereafter, Hale
and Davis commenced to have sex with Doe. (Id.) Doe alleges that, according to his eventual police
report, he told law enforcement that Hale and Davis had sex with Doe “multiple times despite the fact
that [Doe] demonstrated his reluctance and attempted to leave.” (Id. at ¶ 197.) At the time of the
incident, Hale was 25 and Davis was 24. (Id. at ¶ 198.)
Doe alleges that after Hale’s choreography contract with Doe’s current gym ended, Doe was
called into a meeting by his current gym’s owner “to discuss potential inappropriate conduct between”
Doe and Hale. (Id. at ¶ 199.) Doe alleges that he “was made aware of accusations that . . . Hale was
giving [Doe] preferential treatment.” (Id.) Other than the gym owner’s meeting to question Doe

about the anonymous complaint regarding Hale’s “preferential treatment,” Doe’s gym made no other
inquiries and took no other action, and Hale continued to work as a USASF choreographer. (Id.)
Four years later, around June 20, 2020, and knowing that Hale and Davis still regularly
worked with minors in the competitive cheer community, Doe sent an anonymous e-mail to two all-
star gyms, one in California and one in North Carolina, reporting Hale’s and Davis’s abuse. (Id. at ¶
200.) Only the gym in California responded to Doe’s anonymous e-mail. (Id. at ¶ 202.) The

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California gym alerted California law enforcement to Doe’s report and requested that Doe provide
more information. (Id.) On June 23, 2020, USASF case manager Ginger Wilczak contacted Doe’s
anonymous e-mail address, asking him to reveal his identity. (Id. at ¶ 203.) On June 25, 2020, Doe
came forward to make a formal report to USASF. (Id. at ¶ 204.) Thereafter, Wiczak notified Doe
that local Ohio law enforcement had been contacted and that she would meet with USASF’s vice
president of membership, Amy Clark, about Doe’s allegations. (Id. at ¶¶ 205-06.)

On June 28, 2020, Clark e-mailed local Ohio law enforcement and explained that Doe met
Hale and Davis through the sport of all-star cheerleading. (Id. at ¶ 208.) Clark explained that the
“older person” asked a 17-year-old minor to come to his hotel room at 1:30 a.m., and that this older
person “held, what could be argued, as [sic] a position of power over him.” (Id.) Clark expressed
concern that though she understood Ohio’s age of consent to be 16 years old, there was a seven-year
age difference. (Id.) Then Clark wrote as follows:
At minimum, we have an alleged perpetrator, who used his position of power and age
differential to “encourage” a 17 year old to come to his hotel room. At worse [sic], we
have an alleged perpetrator who has demonstrated his modus operandus [sic], and may
have done the same thing to additional minor athletes in our sport.

And, is there a legal, moral, or ethical duty to investigate this situation even if the
victim does not want to press charges?...I just have concerns that if it is not pursued –
someone may find all of us negligent in our duty to protect minor athletes.

(Id.)
On July 30, 2020, local law enforcement notified Doe that they would not pursue charges
against Hale and Davis because Doe was over 16 years old at the time of the alleged assault. (Id. at
¶ 210.) Doe alleges that the detective handling the investigation nevertheless opined to Doe “what
happened with Defendants Hale and Davis was inappropriate.” (Id.)
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Doe continued to follow up on his report to USASF. (Id. at ¶ 211.) On September 18, 2020,
USASF’s SafeSport administrator confirmed that USASF had initiated a third-party investigation into
Doe’s allegations regarding Hale and Davis. (Id.) On September 23, 2020, Doe met with the third-
party investigator via Zoom and provided the names of two former teammates to serve as character
witnesses. (Id. at ¶ 213.) During the investigation, Hale and Davis were temporarily suspended from
USASF eligibility, but on November 19, 2020, Hale and Davis were removed from the suspended

list. (Id. at ¶ 214.) On November 20, 2020, Doe e-mailed Clark to discuss Hale’s and Davis’s
reinstatement, but she notified Doe that he would be speaking with USASF’s counsel instead. (Id. at
¶¶ 215-16.) According to Doe’s transcript of his call with USASF’s counsel, which he included in
his Complaint, USASF’s counsel informed him that USASF believed the evidence did not turn out
in Doe’s favor and that there was no proof the alleged “violation” had occurred. (Id. at ¶ 218.) Doe
alleges that after his call with USASF’s counsel, Hale and Davis were permitted to continue working
with minor athletes at USASF member gyms. (Id.)
II. Procedural History
Doe filed this case on November 28, 2022. (Doc. No. 1.) In his Complaint, Doe alleges seven
counts against both Bain and Charlesbank: Count 1, violation of the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights

Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2255; Count 2, civil conspiracy in violation of the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1962(c) and (d); Count 3, gross negligence; Count 7, unjust enrichment; Count 9, negligent
security; Count 10, civil conspiracy; and Count 12, intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.)
Doe also alleges five counts against Webb: Counts 1, 2, 3, 10, and 12. (Id.)
In his Complaint, Doe alleges two bases upon which this Court may exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction. First, Doe alleges that the Court has federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

8
§ 1331, because “[t]his action arises pursuant to, and involves questions requiring the interpretation
of[,] the law of the United States . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 12.) Second, Doe alleges that “[s]upplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims is conferred upon the Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).” (Id. at ¶ 13.)
Notably, Doe’s Complaint does not invoke diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as a basis
for subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.3
Charlesbank, Webb, and Bain filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on February 24, 2023.

(Doc. Nos. 53, 54, 56.) Doe filed his Oppositions to these defendants’ Motions on March 24, 2023.
(Doc. Nos. 75, 76, 77.) Webb, Charlesbank, and Bain filed their respective Replies on April 7, 2023.
(Doc. Nos. 85, 88, 89.) Charlesbank and Bain filed a joint Notice of Supplemental Authority on June
28, 2023. (Doc. No. 99.) Webb filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority on July 19, 2023. (Doc.
No. 107.) These Motions are now ripe for a decision.
III. Legal Standards
A. Rule 12(b)(2)
Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he party seeking to establish
the existence of personal jurisdiction bears the burden to establish such jurisdiction, ‘over each
defendant independently.’” Beydoun v. Wayaniya Rests. Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 504 (6th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 2006)). If a court
rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction prior to trial, “it has the
discretion to adopt any of the following courses of action: (1) determine the motions based on

3 Indeed, Doe does not allege the citizenship of the limited liability company defendants at all. Although Doe alleges the
states in which the defendant-LLCs are incorporated and the states in which they maintain their principal places of
business (see Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 19, 20, 22), the citizenship of an LLC is not determined by its states of organization and
principal place of business. Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009). Instead, an LLC
has the citizenship of each of its members. Id. Doe alleges no facts regarding the citizenship of the LLC members.
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affidavits alone; (2) permit discovery, which would aid in resolution of the motion; or (3) conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.” Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 614 n.7
(6th Cir. 2005). “[T]he decision whether to grant discovery or an evidentiary hearing before ruling
on a 12(b)(2) motion is discretionary.” Burnshire Dev., LLC v. Cliffs Reduced Iron Corp., 198 F.
App’x 425, 434 (6th Cir. 2006).
When a district court rules on a jurisdictional motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule

12(b)(2) without conducting an evidentiary hearing, as is the case here, the court must consider the
pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89
F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). To defeat such a motion, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction, which can be met by “establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient
contacts between the defendant and the forum state to support jurisdiction.” Neogen Corp. v. Neo
Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002). A court disposing of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion
does not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal but may consider a
defendant’s undisputed factual assertions. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262; Theunissen, 935 F.2d
at 1459; NTCH-West Tenn, Inc., v. ZTE Corp., 761 Fed. Appx. 485, 488 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2019)
(citing Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Industries, Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 153 (6th Cir. 1997)). “Dismissal

in this procedural posture is proper only if all the specific facts which the plaintiff . . . alleges
collectively fail to state a prima facie case for jurisdiction.” Id. See also Kerry Steel, Inc., 106 F.3d
at 149.
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts Doe’s factual allegations as true and construes the
Complaint in the light most favorable to Doe. See Gunasekara v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.

10
2009). To survive a motion to dismiss under this Rule, “a complaint must contain (1) ‘enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s
elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative level.’” Tackett v. M
& G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge—whether the Complaint raises a right to relief

above the speculative level—“does not ‘require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Bassett v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a “context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. at 679.
Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in
conjunction with the “well-established principle that ‘Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific
facts are not necessary; the statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Gunasekera, 551 F.3d at 466 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). Nonetheless, while “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from
the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

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IV. Analysis
A. Personal Jurisdiction
The Court begins with Bain’s, Charlesbank’s, and Webb’s personal jurisdiction arguments
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
All three defendants argue that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. (Doc.
No. 53-1, PageID# 436; 54-1, PageID# 464; 56-1, PageID# 515.) First, the defendants argue that the

Court does not have general personal jurisdiction over them, as none of these defendants are “at
home” in Ohio, and it does not have specific personal jurisdiction over them, as none of these
defendants have had any contacts with the forum state (i.e., Ohio). (Id.) Webb also argues that his
role as a former executive within the Varsity Defendants’ organization cannot serve as a basis for the
Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him because the fiduciary shield doctrine prevents this
Court from doing so. (Doc. No. 54-1, PageID# 463.) Second, the defendants argue that the
nationwide service of process provisions found in the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986
(“CAVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and in the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964, do not support exercising personal jurisdiction over them because Doe’s
federal claims fail as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 53-1, PageID# 440; 54-1, PageID# 464; 56-1,

PageID# 522 n.2.)
There are two ways Doe can establish personal jurisdiction over Charlesbank, Bain, and
Webb: (1) through a “traditional” personal jurisdiction analysis under Ohio’s long-arm statute and
the Due Process Clause; or (2) through the nationwide service of process provisions of RICO and/or
CAVRA, and then pendent claim personal jurisdiction over the state causes of action. See Jane Doe
1, et al. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., No. 6:22-cv-2957, 2023 WL 4209799, at *6 (D.S.C. June 27,

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2023). If Doe establishes personal jurisdiction through the “traditional” personal jurisdiction
analysis, then the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb as to
both Doe’s federal and state-law claims. If Doe establishes personal jurisdiction via the federal
statutes’ nationwide service of process provisions, then the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb as to Doe’s federal claims only, and could exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendants as to Doe’s state-law claims only so long as Doe’s federal “anchor”

claims remain viable. The Court begins by examining whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendants pursuant to the “traditional” personal jurisdiction analysis.
1. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction
“Where a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case stems from the existence of a
federal question, personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists ‘if the defendant is amenable to service
under the [forum] state’s long arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny
the defendant[] due process.” Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
Jurisdiction under Ohio’s long-arm statute is governed by Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382. A.B. Pratt &
Co. v. Bridgeport Grp., LLC, No. 22-cv-1579, 2023 WL 2865640, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2023)
(citing Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1459 (6th Cir. 1991)). The due process inquiry

requires determining “whether the facts of the case demonstrate that the non-resident defendant
possesses such minimum contacts with the forum state that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport
with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
a) Ohio’s Long-Arm Statute
The Ohio General Assembly amended Ohio’s long-arm statute in April 2021 to extend the
reach of Ohio’s long-arm statute to the limits of the U.S. Constitution. Before the amendment,

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“Ohio’s long-arm statute consisted of a list of enumerated acts set forth in § 2307.382(A), followed
by an admonition in § 2307.382(C) that ‘[w]hen jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this
section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against
him.’” AmaTech Grp. Ltd. v. Fed Card Servs., LLC, 2022 WL 44674, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2022)
(quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382 (West 2019)). Based on that language, “courts routinely
noted that Ohio’s long-arm statute did not extend jurisdiction to the fullest extent that the Due Process

Clause allows.” Id. The amendment, however, revised subsection (C) to read: “In addition to a
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction under subsection (A) of this section, a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person on any basis consistent with the Ohio Constitution and the United
States Constitution.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(C).
“Since the amendment, neither the Supreme Court of Ohio nor any Ohio appellate court has
addressed the effect of this new language.” A.B. Pratt, 2023 WL 2865640, at *7 (collecting post-
amendment Ohio cases that did not address the amendment and conducted the two-step analysis of
Goldstein). Several federal district courts, however, have interpreted the amendment and the courts
disagree as to the effect of the amendment. Some courts “have concluded that Ohio’s long-arm statute
now extends personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent that the U.S. Constitution permits.” AmaTech

Grp. Ltd., 2022 WL 44674, at *5; see e.g., Bren Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Envision Pharm. Servs., LLC,
2022 WL 5160716, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2022) (“[T]he Ohio General Assembly extended Ohio's
long-arm statute to the limits of the United States Constitution.”); see also Zahara Ariel, et al. v.
Lionsgate Ent. Corp., et al., No. 2:23-cv-1916, 2023 WL 4706188, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 14, 2023)
(“After a 2020 revision, Ohio's long-arm statute became co-extensive with the limits of the federal
Due Process Clause.”). Other courts “have concluded that the purpose of the new language in

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§ 2307.382(C) is merely to allow for ‘general jurisdiction’ over non-resident defendants in
appropriate circumstances.” AmaTech Grp. Ltd., 2022 WL 44674, at *5; see e.g., Spyglass Grp., LLC
v. Genesis Health Clubs Mgmt., Inc., 2022 WL 17251820, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2022) (“This
amended language appears to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants
where the Constitution permits. But it does not collapse the specific-jurisdiction analysis into a single
due-process inquiry.”) (citations omitted).

Because it is unclear whether Ohio’s long-arm statute is coterminous with federal
constitutional limits, the Court will analyze jurisdiction under Ohio’s long-arm statute and the Due
Process Clause. See EHPLabs Research, LLC v. Smith, 2022 WL 3139604, at *4 (Aug. 5, 2022).
“After all, the statute on its face still contains the list of nine enumerated bases for exercising personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.” Spyglass Grp., LLC, 2022 WL 17251820, at *4.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382 provides:
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by
an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s:
(1) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state
if the person regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered in this state;
(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly
or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when the person might
reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods in this state, provided that the person also regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this
state;
15
(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this
state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when the person might
reasonably have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this
state;
(7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any element of
which takes place in this state, which the person commits or in the commission
of which the person is guilty of complicity.
(8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state;
(9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state
at the time of contracting.
Charlesbank and Bain argue that Ohio’s long-arm statute does not authorize exercising
personal jurisdiction over them because Doe has not alleged that Charlesbank or Bain engaged in any
activity within Ohio that would satisfy any of § 2307.382’s nine subsections. (Doc. No. 53-1,
PageID# 439; Doc. No. 56-1, PageID# 519-20.) Doe does not argue that any particular subsection
under § 2307.382 applies to the instant case, but argues generally that Charlesbank’s and Bain’s
arguments fail “in light of the pervasive relationship” between Charlesbank and Bain and the Varsity
Defendants, Hale, Davis, and ShowPro. (Doc. No. 76, PageID# 821; Doc. No. 77, PageID# 857.)
Doe argues that Charlesbank and Bain had a “vested interest” in the financial success of Varsity
Brands. (Id.) Doe further argues that all of the money that he paid to USASF and the Varsity
Defendants ultimately benefitted Charlesbank and Bain. (Id. at PageID# 822; Id. at PageID# 858.)
The Court concludes that Doe fails to establish that any of the nine enumerated bases in Ohio’s
long-arm statute apply to either Charlesbank’s or Bain’s activities. First, Doe does not identify—let
alone argue—which of § 2307.382’s nine enumerated bases apply to Charlesbank and/or Bain. (See
Doc. No. 76, PageID# 821; Doc. No. 77, PageID# 857.) Second, Doe does not allege any facts
whatsoever in his Complaint that suggest that Charlesbank and/or Bain ever transacted any business,
supplied goods or services, caused injury, or had any dealings at all in Ohio. (See Doc. No. 1.) Third,
16
with respect to Bain, Doe alleges that Bain acquired Varsity Brands in 2018, two years after the
alleged abuse occurred. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 127.) Doe does not allege any connection between Bain’s
2018 acquisition of Varsity Brands and Ohio or explain how any conduct alleged to have occurred
prior to 2018 may be attributable to Bain at all. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Doe fails to
demonstrate that any of § 2307.382’s nine enumerated bases apply to either Charlesbank or Bain.
Regarding Webb, in his Motion, he asserts that Ohio’s long-arm statute is now coterminous

with the Due Process Clause and therefore, he does not address § 2307.382 or its subsections. (Doc.
No. 54-1, PageID# 460.) Doe does not address Webb’s assertion that the specific-jurisdiction
analysis is collapsed into a single due-process inquiry. (See Doc. No. 75.) Thus, neither party
addresses whether Webb’s activities fall under one or more of the nine enumerated bases in Ohio’s
long-arm statute. However, assuming arguendo that the two-step jurisdictional analysis does apply
in Ohio, Doe must establish that exercising personal jurisdiction over Webb comports with the Due
Process Clause. Thus, if Doe’s Due Process Clause arguments fail, the Court may not exercise
personal jurisdiction over Webb, irrespective of the § 2307.382 analysis. Therefore, the Court must
now examine whether it comports with the Due Process Clause to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.

b) Due Process Clause
“Personal jurisdiction falls into two categories: general and specific.” Malone v. Stanley
Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). As the Sixth Circuit has explained,
Personal jurisdiction comes in two flavors: “general” jurisdiction, which depends on
a showing that the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with the forum
state sufficient to justify the state’s exercise of judicial power with respect to any and
all claims the plaintiff may have against the defendant, and “specific” jurisdiction,
17
which exposes the defendant to suit in the forum state only on claims that “arise out
of or relate to” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.

Kerry Steel, 106 F.3d at 149 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414-15 & fns. 8-10 (1984)). Here, there is no dispute that Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb are not
subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio, and the Court need only consider whether they are subject to
specific personal jurisdiction.
The Sixth Circuit has established the following three-part test for determining whether
specific personal jurisdiction exists:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the
forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action
must arise from the defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with
the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1263; see also Calphalon v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2000);
S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).
First, the question of whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself or himself of the
privilege of doing business in the forum state is “the sine qua non for in personam jurisdiction.”
Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d at 381-82; see also Calphalon, 228 F.3d at 721 (“The purposeful availment
prong . . . is essential to a finding of personal jurisdiction.”). The “purposeful availment” requirement
is satisfied when the defendant’s contacts with the forum state “proximately result from actions by
the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State,” and when the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum are such that he “should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)); see also Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur
Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1116 (6th Cir. 1994).
18
Courts require purposeful availment to ensure that “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated”
contacts do not cause a defendant to be haled into a jurisdiction. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citing
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). In this regard, the Supreme Court has
explained that, in examining a defendant’s contacts, courts “look[] to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). In other words, “[d]ue process requires that a defendant be haled into court

in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or
attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with persons affiliated with the State.” Id. at 286.
Second, for specific jurisdiction to attach under the second factor, “the cause of action must
arise from the defendant’s activities” in the forum state. Mohasco, 401 F.2d at 381. “To meet this
requirement, a plaintiff must establish at least a ‘causal connection’ between a defendant’s activities
in the forum state and the harm to the plaintiff.” Opportunity Fund, LLC, v. Epitome Sys., Inc., 912
F. Supp. 2d 531, 540 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting Neogen, 282 F.3d at 892). “If a defendant’s contacts
with the forum state are related to the operative facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed
to have arisen from those contacts.” CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267 (citing Reynolds, 23 F.3d 1116-
17).

Third, the Court must consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants
would “comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 1267-
68 (quoting Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1117). If the Court finds that the first two requirements of the test
are met, “an inference arises that this third factor is also present.” Id. at 1268 (citing American
Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir. 1988)). When deciding this third element,
the Court must consider “the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum state, the plaintiff’s

19
interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of other states in securing the most efficient resolution of
controversies.” Id. (quoting Am. Greetings, 839 F.2d at 1169-70).
“Failure to meet any one of the three prongs means that personal jurisdiction may not be
invoked.” Maclin v. Reliable Reps. Of Tex., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 845, 849 (N.D. Ohio 2018).
The Sixth Circuit recognizes the fiduciary shield doctrine in the context of personal
jurisdiction, “under which ‘if an individual has contact with a particular state only by virtue of his

acts as a fiduciary of the corporation, he may be shielded from the exercise, by that state, of
jurisdiction over him personally on the basis of that conduct.’” Zobel v. Contech Enters., 170 F.
Supp. 3d 1041, 1045 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (quoting Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204
F.3d 683, 697 (6th Cir. 2000)). However, “the Sixth Circuit has also enumerated circumstances under
which the fiduciary shield doctrine does not apply.” Id. When an out-of-state agent “is actively and
personally involved in the conduct giving rise to the claim, the exercise of personal jurisdiction should
depend on the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; i.e., whether [the agent]
purposely availed herself of the forum and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of that
availment.” Balance Dynamics Corp., 204 F.3d at 698. In such situations, a court must conduct a
traditional due process analysis to determine if the out-of-state agent’s “contacts with the [forum

state] were such that due process permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.” Id.
Applying these principles to Charlesbank and Bain, the Court finds that Doe fails to satisfy
the first prong of the specific personal jurisdiction analysis. Doe fails to allege any facts that remotely
suggest either defendant purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio. Doe does
not allege that either defendant maintains offices or agents in Ohio, owns property in Ohio, reached
into Ohio to solicit, initiate, or transact business, engages (or previously engaged) in significant or

20
long-term business activities within Ohio, or is bound to litigate in Ohio pursuant to a valid choice-
of-law provision. (See Doc. No. 1.) Though Doe argues that Charlesbank’s and Bain’s ownership of
Varsity Brands “creates an inference” that Charlesbank and Bain “had a vested interest in the
profitability of the Enterprise,” Doe cites no caselaw to support his proposition that an organization’s
ownership stake in another subsidiary company constitutes purposeful availment. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit is clear that “a company does not purposefully avail itself merely by owning all or some of a

corporation subject to jurisdiction.” Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1274 (6th Cir.
1998) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n. 13 (1984); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977); American Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir. 1988)).
Further, Doe offers no facts to show that Charlesbank or Bain controlled the operation of the Varsity
Defendants such that any activities on the part of the Varsity Defendants could be imputed to
Charlesbank or Bain—especially since Bain did not invest in the Varsity Defendants until 2018, two
years after the alleged abuse occurred. See Roberson v. Waste Man., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00107-GNS,
2016 WL 270458, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing Dean, 134 F.3d at 1274). (Doc. No. 56-1,
PageID# 513.)
Likewise, the Court concludes that Doe fails to satisfy the first prong of the specific personal

jurisdiction analysis as to Webb. Doe does not allege any facts that suggest that Webb purposely
availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio. There is no indication from Doe’s
Complaint that Webb maintains offices or agents in Ohio, owns property in Ohio, reached into Ohio
to solicit, initiate, or transact business, engages (or previously engaged) in significant or long-term
business activities within Ohio, or is bound to litigate in Ohio pursuant to a valid choice-of-law
provision. (See Doc. No. 1.)

21
Additionally, the Court concludes that the fiduciary shield doctrine bars the Court from
exercising specific personal jurisdiction over Webb based on his former leadership roles within the
Varsity organization. The Court disagrees with Doe’s assertion that Balance Dynamics dictates that
the Court find it may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Webb based on his previous
leadership positions within the Varsity Defendants’ organizations. (Doc. No. 75, PageID# 783.) In
Balance Dynamics, the Sixth Circuit explained that “where an out-of-state agent is actively and

personally involved in the conduct giving rise to the claim, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
should depend on traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . .” Balance Dynamics,
204 F.3d at 698 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in
dismissing two defendants simply because they acted as agents for the corporation and remanded the
case for a determination of whether their contacts with the forum state were such that due process
permitted exercising personal jurisdiction over them. Id. Here, Doe does not assert any allegations
about Webb that suggest he was “actively and personally involved in the conduct giving rise” to
Doe’s claims, such that the fiduciary shield doctrine would not apply to Webb. Id. Instead, most of
Doe’s allegations about Webb relate to his work in cheerleading in the 1970s and 1980s, including
founding the organization that became Varsity Spirit. (Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 40-45.) Otherwise, Doe’s

allegations relate to the Varsity Defendants generally, not to Webb. (See, e.g., id. at ¶ 48, alleging
that “the Varsity Defendants have controlled 80-90% of the market” for all-star cheerleading.)
Further, though Doe alleges that “the Varsity Defendants” control the world of all-star cheer (Id. at
¶¶ 89-186), Doe notably does not affirmatively allege that Webb himself controls (or controlled) the
Varsity Defendants or all-star cheer. (Id.)

22
Finally, the Court disagrees with Doe that limited jurisdictional discovery is appropriate here.
(Doc. No. 75, PageID# 784.) In Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., a group of former
all-star cheerleaders brought nearly identical federal and state-law claims against Webb, among other
defendants. Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., No. 6:22-cv-2957, 2023 WL 4191600,
at *16 (D.S.C. June 26, 2023). (See also Webb Notice of Supp’l Auth., Doc. No. 107-1.) The district
court concluded that formal jurisdictional discovery was appropriate as to “the extent of Webb’s

involvement in Varsity’s contacts with South Carolina and Foster [a disgraced, former all-star
cheerleading coach from South Carolina].” Id. However, the relevant complaint in Jane Doe 1
included several allegations absent from this case. For example, in Jane Doe 1, the plaintiffs alleged
that Webb “exercised control over all aspects of All-Star cheer, including rulemaking,” and “was at
the forefront of the conception and execution of the alleged unlawful conspiracy.” Id. The court also
noted that “[j]ust as importantly, Plaintiffs contend that Webb, through Varsity, has had significant
contacts with South Carolina and Scott Foster in particular.” Id. (emphasis added). No such
allegations exist in this case, nor is there any indication in the Complaint that Webb, through Varsity,
had significant contacts with Ohio, or Hale and Davis. Doe also does not suggest in his Opposition
that discovery may reveal any facts related to any contacts between Webb and Ohio. Accordingly,

the Court declines to exercise its discretion to open limited jurisdictional discovery in this case.
In short, Doe fails to establish through the “traditional” specific personal jurisdiction analysis
that this Court should exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Charlesbank, Bain, or Webb. The
only remaining avenue for Doe to establish personal jurisdiction over these defendants is through the
nationwide service of process provisions in CAVRA and/or RICO.

23
2. Nationwide Service of Process Pursuant to Federal Statute
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C), serving a summons or waiver of service will establish
personal jurisdiction over a defendant when authorized by federal statute. Here, there are two federal
statutes at issue: (1) CAVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and (2) RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1965.
The defendants concede that both statutes allow for nationwide service of process. (Doc. No.
53-1, PageID# 441; Doc. No. 54-1, PageID# 464; Doc. No. 56-1, PageID# 522.) However, they

nevertheless contend that the Court should not exercise personal jurisdiction under either statute
because a plaintiff cannot avail himself of the nationwide service of process provision of a federal
statute if the statutory claim fails as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 53-1, PageID# 441; Doc. No. 54-1,
PageID# 464; Doc. No. 56-1, PageID# 522.)
In response, Doe argues that both statutes provide for nationwide service of process. (Doc.
No. 75, PageID# 779; Doc. No. 76, PageID# 820; Doc. No. 77, 856.) Doe argues that personal
jurisdiction can be established when a defendant is validly served in their state of residence, subject
only to the Fifth Amendment’s due process limitations. (Id.)
On June 28, 2023, Bain and Charlesbank jointly filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority.
(Doc. No. 99.) Bain and Charlesbank appended four opinions from the District of South Carolina,

all issued on June 27, 2023. (See Doc. Nos. 99-1, 99-2, 99-3, 99-4.) Webb filed a similar Notice of
Supplemental Authority on July 19, 2023. (Doc. No. 107.) He appended four opinions, all issued by
the District of South Carolina on June 26, 2023. (Doc. Nos. 107-1, 107-2, 107-3, 107-4.) All of these
opinions were issued in cases nearly identical to this one: each involved former minor all-star cheer
athletes asserting CAVRA, RICO, and multiple state-law claims against cheerleading gyms, coaches,
and all the same corporate defendants as here, including Bain, Charlesbank, and Webb. (See, e.g.,

24
Doc. No. 99-1, Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., No. 6:22-cv-2957-HMH, D.S.C. June
27, 2023; Doc. No. 107-1.) In each opinion, the District of South Carolina concluded that it could
exercise personal jurisdiction over Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb because CAVRA, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2255(c)(2), and RICO, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d), provide for nationwide service of
process. (Doc. No. 99-1, PageID# 1212-14; Doc. No. 107-1, PageID# 1406-08.) The court concluded
that the plaintiffs’ claims were at least “colorable” for jurisdictional purposes, and that the defendants

had sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole, such that the court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction would not violate the Fifth Amendment. (Id.) The court further concluded that it could
exercise pendent claim personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Charlesbank,
Bain, and Webb, but noted that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over Doe’s state-law claims
hinged on the viability of the plaintiffs’ CAVRA and RICO claims. (Id.) Ultimately, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state CAVRA or RICO claims as a matter of law under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and, therefore, the court declined to exercise pendent claim personal jurisdiction over
the state-law claims against Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb. (Doc. No. 99-1, PageID# 1231; Doc. No.
107-1, PageID# 1424-25.) The court dismissed the state-law claims against Charlesbank and Bain.4
(Doc. No. 99-1, PageID# 1231.)

The parties do not analyze § 2255(c)(2) separately from § 1965, but instead address these
statutes together. However, the statutory language in § 2255(c)(2) differs from that in § 1965(b), so
the Court will address each statutory basis for personal jurisdiction separately.

4 As discussed above, the District of South Carolina deferred ruling on whether an independent basis for exercising
specific personal jurisdiction over Webb existed. (Doc. No. 107-1, PageID# 1424-25.) However, in this case, there is no
independent basis for exercising specific personal jurisdiction over Webb. See supra.
25
a) 18 U.S.C. § 2255(c)(2)
18 U.S.C. § 2255 is titled “Civil remedies for personal injuries” and provides in pertinent part:
(c) Venue; service of process.—
. . .
(2) Service of process.—In an action brought under subsection (a), process may be
served in any district in which the defendant—

(A) is an inhabitant; or
(B) may be found.

18 U.S.C. § 2255(c)(2).
Courts, including at least one within this circuit, have interpreted § 2255(c)(2) to provide for
nationwide service of process. See, e.g., In re Hotel TVPRA Lit., No. 2:22-CV-1924, 2023 WL
3075851, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2023); Doe #1 v. MG Freesites, LTD, 7:21-cv-00220-LSC, 2022
WL 407147, at *25-26 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2022); Doe v. WebGroup Czech Republic, AS, No. 2:21-
cv-02428, 2022 WL 982248, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2022); C.T. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 2:19-
CV-5384, 2021 WL 2942483, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2021) (stating, in dicta, that § 2255 “confers
nationwide service of process for minors bringing TVPRA suits” and that “Congress thus has the
power to confer nationwide personal jurisdiction when it includes a nationwide service of process
provision in a statute”) (internal citations omitted). Because § 2255 allows service of process to be
served in any district where the defendant is an inhabitant or may be found, a court need only
determine whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States, rather than a
particular forum state. In re Hotel TVPRA Litig., 2023 WL 3075851, at *7 (citing DeSoto, 245 F.3d
at 567; Haile v. Henderson Nat’l Bank, 657 F. 2d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 1981)).

26
“When a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction depends on the assertion of a right
created by federal statute, the court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction only if the right claimed is
so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions, or otherwise devoid of merit as not to
involve a federal controversy.” Keidel v. Li, No. 2:04-CV-270, 2005 WL 8162438, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 25, 2005) (citing Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Jane Doe
1, 2023 WL 4209799, at *9.

There is no dispute that Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb have sufficient minimum contacts with
the United States. Additionally, the Court concludes that Doe’s § 2255 claim is not so “insubstantial,
implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions, or otherwise devoid of merit so as not to involve a federal
controversy.” Keidel, 2005 WL 8162438, at *4; see also Jane Doe 1, 2023 WL 4209799, at *9.
However, as in Jane Doe 1, the Court emphasizes that its determination as to this threshold issue is
distinct from the question of whether Doe’s § 2255 claim is plausible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Jane Doe 1, 2023 WL 4209799, at *9. Accordingly, the Court concludes that, under § 2255(c)(2), it
may exercise personal jurisdiction over Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb as to Doe’s CAVRA claim.
b) 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b)
18 U.S.C. § 1965 of RICO, titled “Venue and Process,” provides:

(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may be
instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such person
resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.

(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the United
States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing
in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to
be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of
the United States by the marshal thereof.

(c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the United States under
this chapter in the district court of the United States for any judicial district, subpoenas
27
issued by such court to compel the attendance of witnesses may be served in any other
judicial district, except that in any civil action or proceeding no such subpoena shall
be issued for service upon any individual who resides in another district at a place
more than one hundred miles from the place at which such court is held without
approval given by a judge of such court upon a showing of good cause.

(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be served on
any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent,
or transacts his affairs.

18 U.S.C. § 1965.
The Sixth Circuit recently announced, as a matter of first impression within the circuit, that §
1965(b) governs the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-district RICO defendants. Peters
Broad. Eng’g, Inc. v. 24 Capital, LLC, 40 F.4th 432, 438 (6th Cir. 2022). In so holding, the Sixth
Circuit joined the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits in adopting § 1965(b)’s
“forum-state” approach. Id. The Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits’
“national contacts” approach under § 1965(d).5 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the “forum-state”
approach comported with congressional intent and ensured that no subsection within § 1965 was
rendered redundant. Id. at 439-40. The Sixth Circuit’s Peters decision is notable because it expressly
rejected, in the context of RICO cases, the “national contacts” test the District of South Carolina
applied in determining that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Jane Doe 1.
(See, e.g., Doc. No. 99-1, PageID# 1213.)
Thus, under the “forum state” test, when a plaintiff brings a civil RICO action in a district
court against at least one defendant with traditional forum state contacts (i.e., the defendant described
by § 1965(a) and reached by Rule 4(k)(1)(A)), then nationwide summonses can be served on other

5 The “national contacts” approach mirrors § 2255(c)(2)’s approach: (1) whether a defendant has sufficient minimum
contacts with the United States, and (2) whether the plaintiff has stated a colorable claim. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut,
Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1997).
28
out-of-district defendants if “the ends of justice” so require. Peters Broad., 40 F.4th at 441-42. Put
another way, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements to establish personal jurisdiction under
§ 1965(b): (1) at least one other defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2)
the “ends of justice” must require that the district court in question is the one in which the matter
should be heard. Id. at 441-42. The Court separately addresses each question.
(1) Does at least one defendant have minimum contacts with
Ohio?
According to the Sixth Circuit, for a defendant to have “minimum contacts” with Ohio, the
court requires the following three criteria be met:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the
forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action
must arise from the defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with
the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

Id. (quoting AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2016)).
The Court concludes that at least two defendants in this case, namely Hale and Davis, have
sufficient minimum contacts with Ohio. First, Hale and Davis purposely availed themselves of the
privilege of acting within Ohio when they traveled to northeast Ohio in July 2016 to conduct
choreography skills clinics for at least two different all-star cheerleading gyms in the area and stayed
overnight in a hotel in Westlake, Ohio. (Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 192, 195, 199.) Second, the cause of action
arises from Hale’s and Davis’s purported activities in Ohio, specifically their alleged sexual abuse of
Doe. (Id. at ¶¶ 196-97, 199, 268-70.) Third, Hale’s and Davis’s alleged acts have a substantial
connection to Ohio because the alleged abuse occurred in Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 14, 195-97.) Thus, there
are at least two defendants with minimum contacts with Ohio. Accordingly, the only remaining
29
question under the § 1965(b) inquiry is whether the “ends of justice require” that Charlesbank, Bain,
and Webb be brought before this Court.
(2) Do the ends of justice require this Court to hear this
matter?
The Sixth Circuit declined to define the term “ends of justice.” Peters Broad., 40 F.4th at 440
n.4 (“We need not, and therefore do not, delve into the meaning of § 1965(b)’s ‘ends of justice’
language because there is no initial defendant that meets the requirements of § 1965(a).”). However,
other courts within this district have considered the meaning of the term. See Rexam Healthcare
Packaging, Inc. v. Osiris Med., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1584, 2010 WL 819063, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9,
2010).
In Rexam Healthcare, another court within this district observed that Circuit courts are split
on the meaning of “ends of justice”:

The Ninth Circuit has read the phrase “the ends of justice” in § 1965(b) to mean that
“the plaintiff must show that there is no other district in which a court will have
personal jurisdiction over all of the alleged co-conspirators.” Butcher’s Union Local
No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit did
not explain why it felt that § 1965(b) required this crabbed and inflexible
interpretation, however, and better-reasoned opinions from other courts have reached
a contrary conclusion.

In Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006), for example,
the Tenth Circuit “disagree[d] with the Ninth Circuit” and “conclude[d] that the ‘ends
of justice’ analysis is not controlled by the fact that all defendants may be amenable
to suit in one forum.” In so holding, the Tenth Circuit cited persuasive evidence that
Congress modeled RICO § 1965(b) on antitrust laws that “prescribe[d] an ‘ends of
justice’ analysis for allowing ‘other parties’ to be summoned before the court,
‘whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not.’” Id. at 1232
(quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 5 (Sherman Act), 10 (Wilson Tariff Act), & 22 (Clayton Act)).
The Tenth Circuit also noted that it would be inconsistent with RICO’s purpose of
“eradicat[ing] organized crime” to force a RICO plaintiff to litigate in an inconvenient
judicial district “whenever organized criminals operate within the same locale and
cause harm in a distant state.” Id. at 1232; see also Rolls-Royce Corp., 576 F. Supp.
2d at 782 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“The court agrees with the reasoning of Cory and declines
30
to follow the Ninth Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of § 1965(b)”); American Trade
Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1305 n.20
(E.D.Pa. 1990) (declining to follow Butcher’s Union because “[n]owhere in section
1965(b) does it say that there must not be some other appropriate forum.”).

Id.
The Rexam court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach and concluded that the Tenth
Circuit set forth the correct standard: that “‘the ‘ends of justice’ is a flexible concept uniquely tailored
to the facts of each case.’” Id. (quoting Cory, 468 F.3d at 1232). In Rexam, the court listed several
factors that other courts have considered when determining whether the ends of justice require RICO
service of process, including: “the desirability of having the whole action litigated in one court[,] the
cost of the delay involved in transferring the case to another forum[,] and the general balance of
hardships between plaintiff and defendant.” Id. (cleaned up). The Rexam court concluded that these
considerations weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction over all the defendants in the action before
it. Id. The court reasoned that if it found that § 1965(b) jurisdiction was improper, it would result in
the dismissal of only two of the three defendants, which would potentially require the claims to be
simultaneously litigated in both Texas and Ohio, potentially causing great expense and inconvenience
for both parties. Id. Further, the case was already seven months old, no discovery had yet been
conducted, and any transfer would result in even more delay as the parties brought new local counsel
up to speed on the case. Id. Finally, any burdens on the two out-of-district defendants were minimal,
as they already had competent local counsel and appeared capable of defending the action in Ohio.
Id. at *6. As the balance of hardships “clearly favor[ed]” keeping the case in Ohio, the court
concluded that the “ends of justice” required that it exercise personal jurisdiction over all the
defendants, pursuant to § 1965(b). Id. See also, e.g., Suarez Corp. Ind. V. McGraw, 71 F. Supp. 2d

31
769, 778-79 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (concluding that, in light of Congress’s intent that RICO provide a
plaintiff with the means of bringing all members of a nationwide RICO conspiracy before the court
in a single trial, it would not serve the ends of justice to require separate trials in different fora against
parties who both had close involvement in the underlying events and who worked in the same
department, even if there was some inconvenience in defending an action in Ohio federal court); Iron
Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 796, 803 (N.D. Ohio

1998). Here, the Court will apply the “ends of justice” framework set forth in Rexam Healthcare.
In this case, the Court concludes that it is highly desirable to have the entire action litigated
in one court. Rexam Healthcare, 2010 WL 819063, at *5-6 (citing Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortg.
Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D.Del. 1978); Suarez Corp., 71 F. Supp. 2d at 778)). There are eleven
different defendants involved in this matter. (See Doc. No. 1.) Doe’s claims against Charlesbank,
Bain, and Webb are identical to the claims that he asserts against several other combinations of
defendants. (Id.) Requiring the plaintiff to file multiple identical actions against Charlesbank and
Bain, who maintain their principal places of business in Massachusetts, and Webb, a citizen of
Tennessee, in addition to maintaining the instant action, does not serve the ends of justice. (Doc. No.
1, ¶¶ 18, 26, 27.) Rather, it would cause significant delay, redundancy, and expense for multiple

parties.
Additionally, declining to exercise personal jurisdiction would further delay resolution of this
case. This action has been pending in this Court for eight months, and no discovery has yet occurred,
while the parties await this Court’s decisions on the myriad motions to dismiss. (See Doc. No. 1.) If
this Court dismissed Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb, these defendants (and Doe) would find
themselves back at square one should Doe decide to refile separate actions against these defendants

32
in their home districts. The Court assumes that, if Doe refiled his Complaint, the defendants would
refile identical Rule 12(b)(6) motions, thus placing the parties in the same posture as they find
themselves in now. Rather than further delaying resolution of this matter, the Court believes it serves
the ends of justice to address Doe’s claims against Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb as part and parcel
of the Court’s resolution of all the motions to dismiss Doe’s various claims.
Finally, the general balance of hardships between Doe and Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb

weighs in favor of keeping this case in Ohio. The burden on Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb to litigate
in Ohio is minimal. These parties have retained competent local counsel and can easily conduct most
of their litigation via electronic means. See Rexam Healthcare, 2010 WL 819063, at *5-6.
Accordingly, the Court finds that “the ends of justice require” exercising personal jurisdiction
over Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb as to Doe’s RICO claim, pursuant to RICO’s nationwide service
of process provision, § 1965(b).
3. Pendent Claim Personal Jurisdiction
Pendent claim personal jurisdiction “is a common law doctrine that recognizes the inherent
fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction over claims asserted against a Defendant over whom the
Court already has personal jurisdiction with respect to another claim or claims arising out of the same

nucleus of operative facts.” J.M. Smucker Co. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 646,
658 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (internal quotation omitted). Several Circuit courts of appeals, as well as
district courts, have adopted this doctrine. Id.; see also Wiggins v. Bank of Am., 488 F. Supp. 3d 611,
624 (S.D. Ohio 2020). The Sixth Circuit, however, is not one of them.
In Canaday v. Anthem Co., Inc., the Sixth Circuit observed that it “has never recognized”
pendent claim personal jurisdiction before, and further declined to recognize the doctrine at that

33
time—although the court stopped short of holding that pendent claim personal jurisdiction did not
exist within the Sixth Circuit.6 9 F.4th 392, 401 (6th Cir. 2021). The Sixth Circuit observed that
when other courts had recognized pendent claim personal jurisdiction, it was, as is the case here,
“usually because the underlying federal statute . . . authorized nationwide service of process and the
plaintiff filed claims related to the federal anchor claim.” Id. (citations omitted). However, the Sixth
Circuit also observed that “no federal statute or rule authorizes pendent . . . claim personal

jurisdiction,” and that “[n]o such law exists—not in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, not in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 401-02.
None of the parties address the Canaday court’s apparent skepticism of pendent claim
personal jurisdiction, nor discuss the issue of pendent claim personal jurisdiction in detail. However,
even if the Court can exercise pendent claim personal jurisdiction over Doe’s state-law claims, it may
only do so if Doe’s federal “anchor” claims are viable. Id.; see also Doe 1, 2023 WL 4209799, at
*10. Accordingly, the Court now turns to Charlesbank’s, Bain’s, and Webb’s Rule 12(b)(6)
challenges to Doe’s CAVRA and RICO claims.
B. Count 1, 18 U.S.C. § 2255
In Count 1, Doe brings a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 against all Defendants, including Bain,

Charlesbank, and Webb. 18 U.S.C. § 2255 was enacted as part of the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights
Act of 1986 (“CAVRA”) and “empowers victims of child sexual abuse to recover money for the
harms caused by their abusers.” Prewett v. Weems, 749 F.3d 454, 457 (6th Cir. 2014).
The statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section
1589, 1590, 1591, 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422,

6 Canaday involved a proposed collective action under the Federal Labor Standards Act. 9 F.4th at 394. Unlike CAVRA
and RICO, the FLSA does not provide for nationwide service of process. Id. at 401.
34
or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation,
regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may sue in
any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such
person sustains or liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000, and the cost of the
action, including reasonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred. The court may also award punitive damages and such other preliminary and
equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.

18 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Under § 2255, a plaintiff “must establish a liability predicate for the award and a damages
predicate for the award.” Prewett, 749 F.3d at 457. “As for liability, the victim must show that his
abuser violated a qualifying criminal statute.” Id. As discussed below, Doe alleges that he was a
victim of abuse in contravention of § 2422, one of the qualifying criminal statutes enumerated in
§ 2255(a). See infra. Section 2422 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel
in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United
States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce,
or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained
the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any
person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined
under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.

18 U.S.C. § 2422.
No criminal conviction is necessary to recover damages under § 2255. Prewett, 749 F.3d at
458. Rather, a plaintiff need only show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant
committed one of the enumerated offenses. Id.
Doe alleges that the specific abusive acts were performed by “Defendants Hale, Davis, and
ShowPro against Plaintiff John Doe 1 and enabled by the ongoing certification and ratification of the
35
Varsity Defendants, Defendant USASF, Defendant USA Cheer, Defendant Charlesbank, and
Defendant Bain Capital.” (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 253.) Doe alleges that Hale, Davis, and ShowPro qualify
as covered individuals under the statute and that the facts of this case indicate that the abuse occurred
at “events,” as defined by the statute. (Id. at ¶ 256.) Doe further alleges that Hale, Davis, and
ShowPro “were held out by the Varsity Defendants, Defendant USASF, Defendant USA Cheer,
Defendant Charlesbank, and Defendant Bain Capital as being members and part of a safe network of

coaches, choreographers, vendors, and other affiliates.” (Id. at ¶ 257.) Doe alleges that he “was a
minor at the time he was sexually abused and assaulted in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, thus
constituting violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2255,” and that he has suffered personal injuries because of
these violations of law. (Id. at ¶¶ 258-59.) Notably, though Doe asserts this claim against all
Defendants, Doe does not name Webb as one of the defendants responsible for certifying and/or
ratifying Hale’s and Davis’s conduct in Count 1. (Id. at ¶¶ 253, 257.) Indeed, Doe does not list
Webb’s name in any of the paragraphs under Count 1. (Id. at ¶¶ 252-60.)
Webb and Bain contend that Doe’s § 2255 claim should be dismissed because Doe does not
allege that either party committed a predicate violation of § 2255. (Doc. No. 54-1, PageID# 467;
Doc. No. 56-1, PageID# 524.) Charlesbank, Webb, and Bain further argue that § 2255 does not

provide for secondary or vicarious liability, and, at any rate, that Doe does not plausibly allege such
liability. (Doc. No. 53-1, PageID# 425; Doc. No. 54-1, PageID# 468; Doc. No. 56-1, PageID# 525.)
In his Oppositions, Doe argues that “numerous courts” have determined that a party may be
criminally liable under § 2422 “for aiding and abetting.” (Doc. No. 75, PageID# 789; Doc. No. 76,
PageID# 825; Doc. No. 77, PageID# 861.) Doe argues that Webb’s creation of USASF and use of
safety certification as a marketing tool “placed certified individuals” in positions of trust and

36
authorized them to obtain access to children in the Varsity network. (Doc. No. 75, PageID# 789.)
Doe further argues that, during a time in which Bain owned the Varsity Defendants, “Defendants”
failed to properly investigate allegations of abuse and that “Defendants” empowered ShowPro, Hale,
and Davis, “despite specific knowledge that” these individuals posed a serious risk of harm to
children. (Doc. No. 77, PageID# 861-62.) As to Charlesbank, Doe argues that Varsity Spirit, which
was “owed[ ] and funded” by Charlesbank, authorized Hale and Davis to access minor children within

the Varsity network. (Doc. No. 76, PageID# 826.)
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Doe fails to state a claim under § 2255
against Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb. First, Doe’s § 2255 claim fails because he has not pleaded
any specific facts suggesting that Charlesbank, Bain, and/or Webb themselves committed any of the
predicate offenses alleged in the Complaint. Indeed, in Doe’s Complaint, he alleges that “the specific
acts complained of [were] performed by Defendants Hale, Davis, and ShowPro against” him, and that
Charlesbank and Bain, among others, “enabled” these acts through “ongoing certification and
ratification . . . .” (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 253.) Further, as noted above, Doe does not allege that Webb
enabled, certified, or ratified Hale’s and Davis’s alleged acts in any way. See supra. Thus, Doe
plainly does not allege that Charlesbank, Bain, or Webb themselves violated § 2422 (or any of the

other enumerated statutes in § 2255).
Further, to the extent Doe attempts to hold Charlesbank, Bain, or Webb secondarily liable
under an aiding-and-abetting theory, this attempt fails because § 2255 does not provide for secondary
liability. See Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., No. 6:22-cv-2957, 2023 WL 4088483,
at *7 (D.S.C. June 20, 2023). In interpreting a statute,
the Court determines and gives effect to the intent of Congress as expressed in the
statute it enacted. See, e.g., Donovan v. FirstCredit, Inc., 983 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir.
37
2020) (citations omitted). The Court begins “where all such inquires must begin: with
the text of the statute itself.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,
471 U.S. 681, 685, 105 S.Ct. 2297, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985)). Where the statute’s
language is plain, the inquiry also ends with the text. Id. Courts “endeavor to ‘read
statutes with an eye to their straightforward and commonsense meanings.’” Black v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 983 F.3d 858, 863 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bates v. Dura
Auto. Sys., Inc., 625 F.3d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 2010)). In doing so, courts ascribe “terms
the ordinary meaning that they carried when the statute was enacted.” Id. (citation and
quotation omitted).

Skyworks, Ltd. v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 524 F. Supp. 3d 745, 756-57 (N.D.
Ohio 2021) (emphasis added). Section 2255 does not mention, or provide for, secondary liability.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2255. This absence alone indicates that Congress did not intend to permit secondary
liability under § 2255. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (“[S]tatutory silence on the subject of secondary liability means there is none . . . .”);
see also Doe v. City of Gauley Bridge, No. 2:21-cv-00491, 2022 WL 3587827, at *13 (S.D. W. Va.
Aug. 22, 2022).
Recently, in Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., the District of South Carolina
likewise concluded that the plain language of § 2255 did not provide for secondary liability against
Webb, Charlesbank, and Bain. Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, et al., No. 6:22-cv-2957,
2023 WL 4191600, at *9 (D.S.C. June 26, 2023) (as to Webb); Jane Doe 1, et al. v. Varsity Brands,
LLC, et al., No. 6:22-cv-2957, 2023 WL 4209799, at *11 (D.S.C. June 27, 2023) (as to Charlesbank
and Bain).7 In Jane Doe 1, as in this case, nine former all-star cheerleaders alleged that they were
sexually abused by various adults affiliated with the all-star cheerleading community. Jane Doe 1,
2023 WL 4191600, at *1. The plaintiffs in Jane Doe 1 alleged that the perpetrators’ acts of abuse

7 Though the District of South Carolina issued two separate opinions, one as to Webb’s Motion and the other as to
Charlesbank’s and Bain’s Motions, the court’s analysis regarding the substance of the § 2255 claim is nearly identical
between the two.
38
were “enabled by the ongoing certification and ratification” of the Varsity Defendants, USA Cheer,
USASF, Charlesbank, and Bain, and that the perpetrators were held out as “part of a network of safe
and trustworthy cheer coaching gyms.” Id. at *8. The Jane Doe 1 court concluded that, to the extent
the plaintiffs attempted to hold the defendants secondarily liable under an aiding-and-abetting theory,
a plain reading of § 2255 and Supreme Court case law foreclosed such an argument. Id. at *9. The
court further concluded that, to the extent a few courts have read secondary liability into § 2255, those

courts “overlooked the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A.”
Id. at *8.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court reasoned, in the context of interpreting the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, that “Congress kn[ows] how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it
cho[oses] to do so. If . . . Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it
would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory text. But it did not.” Central Bank, 511
U.S. at 176-77. The Supreme Court further explained that because “Congress has not enacted a
general civil aiding and abetting statute, there is no general presumption that [a] plaintiff may also
sue aiders and abettors when Congress creates a private cause of action,” and thus, when a person
sues to recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of a statute, “there is

no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.” Id. at 182.
The Jane Doe 1 court observed that “Central Bank’s rationale is not limited to the context of
federal securities laws, as ‘nothing in its holding turns on particular features of those laws.’” Jane
Doe 1, 2023 WL 4088483, at *9 (quoting Boim, 549 F.3d at 689; citing Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A.,
897 F.3d 266, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 2018) and Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 & n.1
(9th Cir. 2006)). Indeed, district courts within this circuit have also applied Central Bank’s reasoning

39
in multiple unpublished opinions that there is no presumption in favor of recognizing civil aiding and
abetting liability in the absence of statutory authorization outside the context of securities cases. See,
e.g., HLV, LLC v. Cnty. of Van Buren, No. 1:13-cv-1366, 2015 WL 13873105, at *7-8 (W.D. Mich.
June 29, 2015); HMV Props., LLC v. IDC Ohio Man., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-895, 2011 WL 53166, at *14
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2011); Wuliger v. Liberty Bank, N.A., No. 3:02-cv-1378, 2004 WL 3377416, at
*10 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2004). Thus, the Court declines to read secondary liability into § 2255. Jane

Doe 1, 2023 WL 4088483, at *10.
Doe’s argument that “[n]umerous Circuits and district courts have determined that a party
may be criminally liable under section 2422 for aiding and abetting” is unpersuasive. (Doc. No. 75,
PageID# 789, emphasis added; see also Doc. No. 76, PageID# 825; Doc. No. 77, PageID# 861.) As
the D.C. Circuit noted in Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., the “presumption against the inclusion of
aiding and abetting liability rests partially on the fact that ‘Congress has not enacted a general civil
aiding and abetting statute,’ . . . akin to the general criminal aiding and abetting statute, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a).” Owens, 897 F.3d at 277 (quoting Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182) (cleaned up) (emphasis
added). Here, Doe claims that the defendants are civilly, not criminally, liable under § 2255.
Likewise, Doe’s citation to Jane Doe No. 8 v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. for the

proposition that § 2255 does not limit liability to the first party perpetrator is not persuasive. (Doc.
No. 75, PageID# 788, emphasis added; see also Doc. No. 76, PageID# 825; Doc. No. 77, PageID#
860.) In Jane Doe No. 8, the plaintiff brought two claims against a defendant cruise line after one of
the cruise line’s employees sexually assaulted the plaintiff when she was a 17-year-old passenger on
one of its ships. Jane Doe No. 8 v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1338 (S.D.
Fla.). The defendant cruise line argued that the plaintiff’s § 2255 claims against the cruise line should

40
be dismissed because § 2255 provided a cause of action only against the criminal offender, i.e., the
cruise line’s employee. Id. at 1339. In conducting its statutory analysis of § 2255, the court noted
that particularly relevant to its analysis of § 2255 was the “well-established canon of construction
that ‘[s]tatutes which invade the common law or the general maritime law are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evidence.’” Id. at 1339 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343

U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). The court noted that “[s]quarely applicable to this case is the principle of
federal maritime law that a cruise line is strictly liable for a crew member’s assault of a passenger,”
a principle clearly established by two Supreme Court decisions from the late 19th century that
remained binding precedent. Id. The Jane Doe 8 court reasoned that it “must presume Congress
intended to incorporate this long-standing principle of federal maritime law when enacting § 2255.”
Id. at 1340. However, the instant case does not involve maritime law. Thus, the Jane Doe 8 court’s
approach to statutory interpretation of § 2255 is inapposite.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Doe fails to state a § 2255 claim against Charlesbank,
Bain, or Webb. Count 1 is dismissed.
C. Count 2, Violations of the RICO Act, Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d)

In Count 2, Doe alleges that all Defendants, including Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb,
committed civil conspiracy in violation of the RICO Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d).
(Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 261-84.) 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides a civil cause of action for any “person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . . .” Doe alleges
that all Defendants violated § 1962(c) and (d). (Id.) Section 1962(c) provides that “[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful

41
debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
Section 1962(d) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
A substantive RICO claim brought under § 1962(c) has four elements: ‘“(1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”‘ Courser v. Allard, 969 F.3d 604, 621

(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). A RICO
plaintiff must also establish that he suffered an injury to “business or property” because of the
defendant’s unlawful conduct. Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Man. Servs., Inc., 731 F.3d 556, 563-64
(6th Cir. 2013). Section 1962(d) makes it “unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of”
§ 1962’s provisions, including § 1962(c).
Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb challenge essentially all aspects of Doe’s § 1962(c) and (d)
RICO claims. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Doe fails to plausibly allege claims
under either § 1962(c) or (d).
1. Doe Fails to Allege RICO standing
RICO’s standing requirement has two elements: (1) injury to business or property; and (2)

causation. Jackson, 731 F.3d at 563-64; Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006).
See also Saro v. Brown, 11 Fed. App’x 387, 389 (6th Cir. 2001). An “injury to business or property”
under RICO excludes “personal injuries” and also those injuries flowing therefrom. See Jackson,
731 F.3d at 563-64. Moreover, “[t]he injury to business or property must be concrete,” rather than
speculative or intangible. Raymo v. FCA US LLC, 475 F. Supp. 3d 680, 699 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing
Saro, 11 F. App’x at 389) (internal quotations omitted). Doe claims that he suffered two injuries

42
sufficient to convey RICO standing. First, he claims that he was injured because he “had a property
interest in his membership dues . . . and other fees and costs . . . .” (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 281.) Second, he
claims that he had a property interest in the “continued ability to cheer competitively.” (Id.)
a) Loss of Ability to Cheer Competitively
The Court begins with Doe’s second alleged injury, that Doe had a property interest in the
“continued ability to cheer competitively,” which would have allowed Doe to gain “social media

notoriety, ‘Cheerlebrity’ status, scholarship opportunities,” and even possibly to become a cheer
coach, gym owner, and/or event promoter himself. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 281.) The Court rejects this
argument. First, this is too speculative of an injury to support RICO standing. See Raymo, 475 F.
Supp. 3d at 699. In Doe 1, the District of South Carolina considered, and rejected, the identical
argument that the plaintiffs’ loss of their continued ability to cheer competitively was a sufficient
injury to confer RICO standing. Doe 1, 2023 WL 4191600, at *10-11. The Doe 1 court reasoned
that the “[p]laintiffs had, at best, mere expectancy interests in realizing future financial and business
opportunities in which [they] and their famil[ies] invested.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing
Bowen v. Adidas Am., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 3d 670, 679-80 (D.S.C. 2021) (holding college basketball
player did not have a recoverable expectancy interest in potential lost earnings he hoped to obtain as

a potential first-round NBA draft pick)). Likewise, here, a hoped-for career in all-star cheerleading
is too speculative to comprise a protected property right under RICO.
Second, even if the loss of a potential career in all-star cheerleading was a concrete injury,
such an injury could not confer RICO standing as Doe’s loss of his alleged potential continued ability
to cheer is derivative of his personal injury. In other words, Doe’s loss of his continued ability to
cheer stems directly from any personal injuries Doe suffered as the result of Hale’s and Davis’s

43
alleged sexual abuse. Jackson, 731 F.3d at 565-66; see also Gucwa v. Lawley, 731 F. App’x 408,
412 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Even though personal injuries may lead to monetary damages, such personal
injuries and their associated pecuniary losses—including medical expenses—do not confer relief
under § 1964(c).”). Thus, the Court concludes that Doe fails to sufficiently allege RICO standing
based on his alleged loss of his ability to compete in competitive cheerleading.
b) Membership Dues and Fees

Doe also contends that he had a property interest in his membership dues and fees remitted to
the Defendants. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 281.) “Money, of course, is a form of property.” Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979).
Charlesbank, by reference,8 Webb, and Bain argue that Doe’s alleged monetary losses are not
redressable under RICO because they derive from his personal injury claim, i.e., the alleged sexual
abuse perpetrated against Doe by Davis and Hale. (Doc. No. 53-1, PageID# 426; Doc. No. 54-1,
PageID# 472; Doc. No. 56-1, PageID# 527.) However, this argument is unavailing because Doe paid
his dues and fees to Defendants before Davis and Hale allegedly assaulted him. Doe 1, 2023 WL
4191600, at *11. Logically, then, the dues and fees Doe paid to the defendants could not derive from
his non-compensable personal injuries, so as not to be compensable under RICO. Id.

However, Charlesbank, Webb, and Bain also argue that Doe fails to plead the requisite
proximate cause between Defendants’ alleged conduct and Doe’s injury to support any RICO claims.
(Doc. No. 53-1, PageID# 426; Doc. No. 54-1, PageID# 472-73; Doc. No. 56-1, PageID# 528.) “[T]o
state a claim under civil RICO, the plaintiff is required to show that a RICO predicate offense ‘not

8 Charlesbank adopted by reference all of the arguments that Varsity Spirit asserted in § II of its Motion. (Doc. No. 53,
PageID# 426.) Charlesbank contends that the “RICO claims against Charlesbank fail for the same reasons that the claims
fail against Varsity Spirit.” (Id.)
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only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.’” Hemi Grp., LLC v.
City of New York, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,
268 (1992)). “When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it
must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.” Anza v. Ideal Steel
Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006) (emphasis added).
Here, Doe fails to plausibly allege that Charlesbank, Bain, or Webb made any

misrepresentations about athlete safety in the first place, let alone that any such purported
misrepresentations about athlete safety led directly to Doe paying his membership dues, fees, and
other incidental costs to them. Doe’s only allegation as to proximate cause in the RICO context is
that “[t]he actions of the Enterprise and its conspirators were the direct and proximate cause of these
injuries to the Plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 282.) This is no more than a threadbare recital of one of the
elements of a civil RICO claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Doe’s allegations
elsewhere in his Complaint belie his claim that he paid his dues and fees because of Defendants’
representations about safety. Rather, Doe alleges that he paid his membership dues, fees, and other
incidental expenses to Defendants because he was required to do so to participate in Varsity-

sponsored competitions and events. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 25.) For example, Doe alleges that
“ . . . Defendant Webb mandated that All-star athletes cheering on behalf of Varsity-affiliated gyms
purchase a USASF membership as a requirement to compete at Varsity-sponsored events.” (Id.
at ¶ 56, emphasis added.) Doe also alleges that “[a]ll-star athletes competing on behalf of Varsity-
member gyms pay monthly or annual fees to the gym as well as annual fees to the Varsity Defendants
for music, training, competition attendance, accessories, and other related fees.” (Id. at ¶ 61,

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emphasis added.) Thus, based on the face of his Complaint, Doe paid membership fees, dues, and
other incidental costs because he wished to participate in competitive all-star cheerleading, not
because of Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations about safety. Accordingly, having failed to allege
that he was injured because of Charlesbank’s, Bain’s, and Webb’s purported predicate acts, Doe fails
to state a civil RICO claim based on membership dues, fees, and/or other incidental costs. See also,
e.g., Gilbert v. U.S. Olympic Comm., No. 18-cv-00981-CMA-MEH, 2019 WL 1058194, at *25,

report and recommendation adopted in relevant part by 423 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (D. Colo. 2019)
(rejecting former national taekwondo athletes’ argument that they had civil RICO standing based, in
part, on the $50 annual membership fee they paid to USA Taekwondo because the athletes paid their
fees to engage in USAT events, not because of the defendants’ predicate acts).
2. Doe Fails to Allege a RICO “Association-in-Fact” Enterprise
Even if Doe could establish RICO standing, his § 1962(c) claim would nevertheless fail
because he does not sufficiently allege the existence of a RICO “association-in-fact” enterprise.
A RICO association-in-fact enterprise “includes any . . . group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). In Boyle v. U.S., the Supreme Court described
the characteristics of such an enterprise:

Such a group need not have a hierarchical structure or a “chain of command”;
decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods—by
majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of the group need not have
fixed roles; different members may perform different roles at different times. The
group need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations,
disciplinary procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the group must
function as a continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a course
of conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts
of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence.

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Boyle v. U.S., 556 U.S. 938, 948 (2009). Thus, an association-in-fact enterprise “has at least three
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity
sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946.
Here, Doe alleges that all Defendants formed an association-in-fact enterprise. (Doc. No. 1,
¶ 267.) Doe alleges that each defendant “operated as a single unified entity with the common goal of
taking billions of dollars from minor athletes who wanted to be a part of the competitive cheer world

Defendants oversee, as well as to perpetuate a pipeline of new child-athletes, coaches and gyms.”
(Id. at ¶ 239.) Doe alleges that each defendant participated in the operation and management of the
enterprise. (Id. at ¶ 241.) Doe further alleges that the enterprise “consists of a group of persons
associated together for the common purpose of recklessly, intentionally, and willfully endangering
the Plaintiff as a minor athlete by exposing him to illegal sexual abuse and exploitation of children
while continuously and repeatedly taking money from Plaintiff, and also assuring his parents and/or
guardians he was particularly safe in order to take this money.” (Id. at ¶ 270.) Charlesbank, through
reference, Webb, and Bain argue that Doe fails to allege a common purpose among the alleged
enterprise participants. (Doc. No. 53-1, PageID# 426; Doc. No. 54-1, PageID# 474; Doc. No. 56-1,
PageID# 529.) Notably, Webb asserts that Doe does not allege that Webb formed any association-

in-fact or otherwise participated in the alleged enterprise. (Doc. No. 54-1, PageID# 474.)
The Court concludes that Doe fails to plead any non-conclusory allegations that Defendants
shared the common purpose of exposing Doe to sexual abuse while repeatedly taking his money.
Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946. While Doe’s Complaint contains myriad allegations about Charlesbank’s,
Bain’s, and Webb’s business goals and purposes, Doe’s Complaint contains no factual allegations
that Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb aimed to expose Doe to sexual abuse, or that these defendants

47
shared a purpose with the alleged perpetrators of exposing Doe to such abuse. (See Doc. No. 1.)
Doe’s allegations regarding the specific acts of abuse relate only to actions allegedly taken by Hale
and Davis. (Id. at ¶¶ 187-219.) Doe’s allegations that Charlesbank and Bain shared in a “common
purpose” to sexually abuse Doe are conclusory and do not rise above the level of mere speculation.
Bassett, 528 F.3d at 430 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).
Additionally, Doe does not allege that Webb himself was part of this enterprise, or that he

shared a “common purpose” to sexually abuse Doe. (See Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 235-50, 261-84.) Doe
appears to assert in his Opposition to Webb’s Motion that the Court may interpret Doe’s allegations
as to the membership of the RICO enterprise to include Webb because Webb “was considered by all
to have utter control over Allstar competitive cheer.” (Doc. No. 75, PageID# 795.) The Court agrees
with Webb that Doe plainly does not allege that Webb was a member of any RICO enterprise. (Doc.
No. 85, PageID# 1003.) Further, even if the Court credited Doe’s strained interpretation of the
Complaint to include Webb in the purported enterprise, the allegations as to the common purpose of
the enterprise remain conclusory, as discussed above.
Doe also fails to address the Defendants’ arguments that Doe fails to plausibly allege a
common purpose to establish the existence of a RICO “association-in-fact” enterprise. Though Doe’s

Oppositions include sections titled “Plaintiff has alleged facts plausibly establishing a RICO
‘association-in-fact’ enterprise with a common purpose,” Doe does not address Defendants’
arguments that he failed to plausibly allege a common purpose among all members of the enterprise.
(See Doc. No. 76, PageID# 828; Doc. No. 77, PageID# 864.) Nor does Doe attempt to direct the
Court’s attention to any paragraph(s) within the Complaint that set forth sufficient allegations
regarding the enterprise’s common purpose.

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that Doe fails to allege the existence of a RICO
“association-in-fact” enterprise. Doe’s § 1962(c) claim fails.
3. Doe Fails to Allege RICO Conspiracy Claim
Because Doe’s § 1962(c) RICO claim fails for the reasons set forth above, Doe’s RICO
§ 1962(d) claim likewise fails. Without a viable § 1962(c) claim, Doe’s conspiracy claim under
§ 1962(d) necessarily fails. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); see also, e.g., Aces High Coal Sales, Inc. v.

Cmnty Bank & Tr. W. Ga., 768 Fed. App’x 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Because plaintiffs failed to
plausibly allege a violation of § 1962(b) or (c), the district court properly dismissed the RICO
conspiracy claim as well.”); see Marinac v. Todd, No. 1:20-cv-1571, 2022 WL 3904049, at *14 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 30, 2022) (“[B]ecause plaintiffs have failed to successfully allege all the elements of a
substantive RICO violation, plaintiffs have necessarily failed to plausibly allege a RICO-conspiracy
claim.”). Accordingly, Doe’s RICO claim is dismissed in its entirety.
D. Remaining State Law Claims
Because the Court has dismissed Doe’s two federal claims against Charlesbank, Bain, and
Webb, Doe has no remaining viable federal “anchor” claims.9
The Court declines to exercise pendent claim personal jurisdiction over the remaining state-

law claims against Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb. See, e.g., U.S. v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273-
74 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding district court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction over
remaining claims after dismissing the anchor claim); cf. J.M. Smucker Co., 420 F. Supp. 3d at 659

9 As discussed supra, the Court may not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb as to
Doe’s state-law claims because there is no basis for doing so under the traditional personal jurisdiction analysis. See
Section IV.A.1. However, even if the Court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Charlesbank, Bain, and
Webb, the Court would nonetheless decline to exercise supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction over Doe’s state-law
claims against Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb for the reasons set forth in Section IV.C. of the Court’s opinion as to the
Varsity Defendants, USASF, and USA Cheer.
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(exercising pendent claim personal jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment claim where the claim
arose out of the same nucleus of fact as an ongoing federal claim). Accordingly, Doe’s remaining
state-law claims against Charlesbank, Bain, and Webb are dismissed.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Charlesbank’s, Bain’s, and Webb’s Motions to Dismiss (Doc.
Nos. 53, 54, and 56) are GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: August 2, 2023 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372330. Public record. Not legal advice.