# Reynolds v. Gaughan

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · July 12, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372230

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 12, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ERIN M. REYNOLDS, et al., Pro Se, ) Case No. 1: 23 CV 489
)
Plaintiffs )
) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
v. )
)
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. )
GAUGHAN, )
)
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Defendant ) AND ORDER

Background
Plaintiffs Erin M. Reynolds, David A. Reynolds, III, and Taylin D. Reynolds
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this pro se action in state court against United States District
Judge Patricia Anne Gaughan. (Doc. No. 1-1.) Their Complaint relates to a pro se case Erin
Reynolds previously filed in federal court against multiple defendants over which Judge
Gaughan presided. See Reynolds v. Dominic J. Coletta, et al., No. 1: 22 CV 1642, 2022 WL
17487820 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 2022).
Plaintiffs seek damages against Judge Gaughan, contending she breached a “settlement
agreement” in Reynolds’s prior case by “favoring the tortfeasors” and entering a December 7,
2022 Judgment Entry and Memorandum of Opinion and Order granting the defendants’ motion
to dismiss. (See Doc. No. 1-1 at 14.)
The United States filed a Notice of Substitution in this case on April 3, 2023, substituting
itself as the Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).1 On May 16, 2023, the Government
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ P. 12(b)(1) and (6) on
the grounds of judicial immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Doc. No. 6.) Plaintiffs filed pleadings in
response labeled as a “Notice of Wrongful Administration and Offer to Contract” (Doc. No. 7)
and a “Notice of Breach and Opportunity to Cure (Doc. No. 8). They also filed two Motions to

Remand (Doc. Nos. 3 and 5).
Plaintiffs’ Motions to Remand are both denied as this action was properly removed to
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which provides that a civil action commenced
in state court that is brought against or directed to the United States or any officer of the United
States is properly removed to federal court. And for the reasons stated below, the Government’s
Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Standard of Review and Discussion

A party may move for the dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive dismissal, a complaint
must present enough facts “to state a claim to relief that it is plausible on its face” when its
factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-moving
party’s favor. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 552
F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). Although pro se pleadings generally are liberally construed and
held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d

1Title 28 U.S.C. § 2679 provides that a civil action brought against a federal employee acting
within the scope of his employment is deemed to be an action against the United States.
2
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), the lenient treatment accorded pro se litigants “has limits.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Even a pro se complaint must satisfy Rule 12(b)(6)
standards to avoid dismissal. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Courts
are not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims on behalf of pro se plaintiffs. See
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Erwin v. Edwards, 22
F.App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Even liberally construed, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a plausible damages claim
against Judge Gaughan upon which they may be granted relief . “It is well established that
judges and other court officers enjoy absolute immunity from suit on claims arising out of the
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir.
1988), citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967). Absolute judicial immunity shields
judicial officers from damages suits arising out of the performance of their judicial functions
even when they act erroneously or in bad faith. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991);
Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). There are only two sets of

circumstances in which a judicial officer is not entitled to immunity. A judge is not immune
from liability for “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” or
for actions “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Plaintiffs’ action as against Judge Gaughan clearly pertains to alleged conduct occurring
during the performance of official judicial functions in a prior lawsuit as to Judge Gaughan is
absolutely immune from a damages suit. Plaintiffs do not allege facts plausibly suggesting that
Judge Gaughan took any action falling outside of the scope of her absolute judicial immunity.

3
Further, “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the [United States] and its
agencies from suit.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Block v. North
Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (“[T]he United States cannot be sued at all without the
consent of Congress.”).2 The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) constitutes a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity and authorizes suit against the United States for certain torts committed by
federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1);

Schindler v. United States of America, 661 F.2d 552, 554 n.2 (6th Cir. 1981). But it is a
prerequisite to an FTCA lawsuit against the United States in federal court that a claimant must
first file an administrative claim. Before filing suit in federal court to recover damages against
the United States for injury or property damage caused by a federal employee's negligent or
wrongful conduct, § 2675(a) requires the plaintiff to “present[ ] the claim to the appropriate
Federal agency,” and the agency must have denied the claim “in writing and sent by certified or
registered mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
Plaintiffs do not contend or demonstrate that they filed an administrative claim as

required to assert a claim for wrongful conduct of a federal employee under the FTCA.
Therefore, their action is subject to dismissal for this reason as well. See Greene v. United
States, No. 21-5398, 2022 WL 13638916, at *4–5 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2022) (holding that district
court correctly dismissed FTCA claims for failure to comply with § 2675(a)).

2Suits against federal employees in their official capacity are generally treated as suits against
the United States. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985).
4
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) is granted and Plaintiffs’
Complaint is dismissed. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
July 12, 2023

5

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10372230. Public record. Not legal advice.