# Medvetz v. Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · April 12, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371954

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 12, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DEVON MEDVETZ, ) CASE NO. 1:19CV2610
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)
vs. )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) AND ORDER
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OH, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

This matter appears before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed separately
by Defendant Cuyahoga County and Defendant Benjamin Milton. Docs. 27 and 28. Plaintiff
Devon Medvetz has opposed both motions, and both Defendants have replied in support. Upon
review, both motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Medvetz started her employment with the Cuyahoga County Sheriffs’ Department in 2003-
2004 and was responsible for assisting with the transportation of inmates. Around 2012,
Medvetz’s workstation, along with the workstations of several others, moved from the first floor
to the third floor of the Sheriff’s office. Following that move, Medvetz began to work on the same
floor as Milton. At that time, and throughout his time with the Sheriff’s office, Milton was
responsible for inputting information regarding County inmates and providing reports about the
inmate population. Because of the nature of their positions, Medvetz and Milton worked for
different supervisors despite working on the same floor.
Almost immediately after Medvetz began working on the same floor as Milton, Milton
began a campaign of sexual harassment.1 Milton told Medvetz that “it was hot” when she wore
high heels to work and requested that she send him pictures while wearing high heels. Milton also
told Medvetz that she had “great tits.” Milton also admitted that he would on occasion stand over

Medvetz to get a better view of her chest. Further, Milton conceded that on a day when Medvetz
was not feeling well, he told her, “You know what is good for that? A shot of Vitamin B in all
three holes.” On yet another occasion, when Milton believed that Medvetz would be relocating
from her office, he told her that it would then be more difficult to walk up and “just tell her how
great her tits looked.” While Milton claimed to not have known the wrongfulness of his conduct
at the time he was making these statements, he agreed that intentionally made his comments
outside the hearing of other employees.
Medvetz endured Milton’s consistent sexual harassment for years. However, in late
September of 2016, Medvetz spoke with her union steward, Barbara Starey, about the harassment.
Starey immediately accompanied Medvetz to the Human Resources office where they met with

HR Manager Hadiya Butler and HR Generalist Emina Panuesku. At the conclusion of the meeting,
Medvetz was given the option of filing a formal complaint. She chose this option and returned a
formal complaint to the HR office on October 4, 2016. On October 6, 2016, Employee Relations
Specialist Rodney Harris gave Medvetz a letter to notify her that a formal investigation into her
complaint had been opened. The letter notified Medvetz that confidentiality could not be
guaranteed during the investigation and informed her that retaliation of any form would not be

1 While Milton does not concede that he made each and every comment alleged by Medvetz, he
rarely actively denies his conduct. Instead, Milton routinely indicates that he simply does not
remember whether he made certain comments.
tolerated. The letter also provided Medvetz with contact information for the EEOC and Ohio Civil
Rights Commission.
Shortly after Medvetz reported the harassment and followed up with her formal complaint,
Starey approached management and requested that Medvetz be moved from the third floor to

eliminate any interactions with Milton while the investigation was pending. While Starey asserts
that she believed she was acting at Medvetz’s request, Medvetz denies ever requesting to be
relocated. After Starey made the request, Medvetz was relocated to a first-floor area that was
already occupied by Sheriff’s deputies. Medvetz had access to a phone and computer at this new
location and chose to bring her own printer from home to lessen the chance of interacting with
Milton.
Soon after Medvetz relocated to the first floor, she heard a Sheriff’s deputy, Mark Romar,
loudly proclaim that her presence made him uncomfortable and that he felt her presence on the
first floor was unnecessary. Feeling singled out or unwelcome, Medvetz again relayed her
concerns to Starey. Starey again approached management, and Medvetz was relocated to a private

office in the Sex Offenders Unit, also on the first floor. By mid-November, Medvetz had been
relocated to her original office space on the third floor.
Meanwhile, two dates after Medvetz filed her formal complaint, the HR office had opened
an investigation. Harris initiated the investigation by notifying Medvetz that it had commenced
and informing Milton that he was the target of an investigation. Harris interviewed Medvetz to
understand her allegations. He also spoke to two other female employees that Medvetz had
identified. Both these employees asserted that they had also previously been the subject of
Milton’s misconduct. On November 2, 2016, Harris interviewed Milton. During that interview,
Milton admitted to making several of the comments detailed by Medvetz.
Based upon his investigation, Harris drafted a four-page report that he finalized on
November 14, 2016. Harris concluded that Medvetz’s claims of harassment were substantiated by
his investigation. Based upon the report, Milton was subjected to discipline and attended a pre-
disciplinary conference on November 22, 2016. While Milton maintained that he believed his

comments were made in a joking manner, the County found that a three-day suspension and
mandatory counseling was the appropriate discipline for his misconduct. The County made this
decision on December 22, 2016, and Milton did not challenge any form of the discipline.
On February 24, 2017, Medvetz resigned her position noting, “I no longer wanted to deal
with this and work here, and I was really tired of dealing with people and this place.” Medvetz
admits that following the filing of her complaint, she could recall only two encounters with Milton.
The first involved an email in which Milton informed Medvetz that he had given directions to
a fellow co-worker who could not locate Medvetz office. During the second encounter, on
October 19, 2016, Medvetz claims that Milton told her that he would miss her “big push pins.”
Medvetz believed that Milton was referring to her breasts, while Milton contends that he was

referring to actual, decorative push pins that Medvetz used on her bulletin board.
Based upon the above, Medvetz filed suit against the County and Milton. Medvetz
complaint contends that the Defendants violated her right to equal protection, engaged in gender
discrimination, and retaliated against her for protected activity. Both Defendants independently
moved for summary judgment, and Medvetz opposed both motions. The Court now resolves those
motions.
II. LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party seeking summary judgment must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
fact is material if it is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is
“genuine” requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary burdens. Id. At 252. Further, on
summary judgment, the inferences to be drawn from underlying facts must be viewed “in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The pivotal question in deciding a motion for summary judgment is whether a reasonable fact
finder could make a finding in favor of either party. See Anderson 477 U.S. at 250 (“The inquiry
performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether,
in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder
of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”).
The initial burden of showing the absence of any “genuine issue” belongs to the moving
party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has satisfied its
burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party may not
simply rely on its pleadings, but must “produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact

to be resolved by a jury” or other fact-finder at trial. Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d
146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995). A party opposing summary judgment must show that there are facts
genuinely in dispute and must do so by citing to the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(a).
There is no duty imposed upon the trial court to “search the entire record to establish
that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,
886 F.2d 1472, 1480 (6th Cir.1989). See also InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889
F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108
L.Ed.2d 967 (1990) (district court not required to speculate on which portion of the
record the non-moving party relies, nor is court obligated to “wade through” the
record for specific facts). Dozens of other panels, many speaking in unpublished
prisoner appeals, have dealt with the circumstance of a dispositive motion in want
of a response and have consistently assumed without specific comment that a
court’s reliance on the facts advanced by the movant is proper and sufficient.

Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992)
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Hostile Work Environment Claim Against Cuyahoga County
In conducting its review of this claim, the Court has been mindful of the Sixth Circuit’s
position espoused in Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997) as

later explained:
In granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the district court applied
the test enumerated in Blankenship for employer liability for coworker sexual
harassment. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was subject to unwelcomed sexual harassment;
(3) the harassment was based on her sex; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered
with her work performance and created a hostile work environment; and (5)
defendant knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed
to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action. The sexual harassment in
Blankenship involved a coworker, and we noted that hostile work environment
cases make a distinction between sexual harassment caused by supervisors and
sexual harassment caused by coworkers. When dealing with allegations of
coworker sexual harassment, the act of discrimination by the employer in such a
case is not the harassment, but rather the inappropriate response to the charges of
harassment.

Mullins v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 291 F. App’x 744, 746 (6th Cir. 2008)(internal citations,
quotations, and alterations omitted). The Circuit went on to clarify how this Court should evaluate
the response of an employer once it learns of harassment:
Once an employer is aware of and responds to charges of sexual harassment,
though, mere negligence as to the content of the response cannot be enough to make
the employer liable. When an employer responds with good-faith remedial action,
we cannot say that the employer has itself committed an act of discrimination....
When an employer implements a remedy, it can be liable for sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII only if that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate
an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to discrimination.

Blankenship, 123 F.3d at 873. In other words, “when an employer responds to charges of coworker
sexual harassment, the employer can be liable only if its response manifests indifference or
unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.” Fenton v.
HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829 (6th Cir. 1999)(quoting Blankenship, 123 F.3d at 872-73. “The
question is not whether other remedial actions should have been taken or whether the actions taken
by the Defendant were those desired by the Plaintiff. Instead, the question is whether the Defendant
encouraged harassment in the workplace or evidenced culpable indifference to it.” Starks v. West
Meade Place, LLP, No. 3:05-0442, 2006 WL 2827420, at *6 (M.D.Tenn. Sept. 28, 2006)

In this matter, the record supports a determination that Milton created a hostile work
environment with his consistent, repeated, sexually charged comments directed at Medvetz’s dress
and physical appearance. However, there is no genuine issue of material fact surrounding the
County’s response. Upon receiving Medvetz’s complaint, the County started a formal
investigation within days. Moreover, while the investigation remained pending, the County
engaged in good faith efforts to minimize or eliminate Medvetz’s interactions with Milton. While
Medvetz seems to suggest that the County should have relocated Milton while the investigation
was pending instead of her, the law does not require a perfect response from the County. Rather,
the County is legally required to respond reasonably to Medvetz’s complaint.
Further, the record demonstrates that the County did a full and complete investigation that

included interviews of Medvetz, Milton, and two additional employees that were identified by
Medvetz. This investigation validated Medvetz’s complaint and resulted in discipline against
Milton. Moreover, while Medvetz seems to suggest that the County should have done more to
limit her interactions with Milton during the investigation, the record contains only one instance
of a questionable interaction with Milton while the investigation was pending. Based upon the
record before the Court, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the County responded
reasonably to Medvetz’s complaint and is entitled to judgment on her claim of a hostile work
environment.
The Court notes that Medvetz implies in portions of her opposition that the County should
have known sooner about Milton’s alleged harassment. However, Medvetz cannot cite to any
statement or action by Milton that was witnessed by others. While she contends that Milton
testified that the third floor had a “stripper like atmosphere” and that “everybody talked nasty up

on the third flood,” Medvetz has failed to highlight a single underlying factual event that would
place the County on notice of her allegations earlier than the date she reported them. As such, she
has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact through this argument.
2. Retaliation Claim Against the County
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Medvetz must demonstrate
that: (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the County knew that she engaged in
the protected activity; (3) the County took an action that was “materially adverse” to Medvetz; and
(4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.
Weeks v. Michigan, Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 587 Fed. App’x. 850, 858 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Laster
v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014), rehearing denied (Apr. 2, 2014)). In the

context of a Title VII retaliation claim, courts have defined “materially adverse” as an action that
is “harmful to the point that [it] might well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
68 (2006) (citations omitted). A materially adverse action does not include trivial harms, such as
“petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees
experience.” Id.
Medvetz’s retaliation claim focuses upon the fact that she was relocated on multiple
occasions while the investigation was pending against Milton and that other employees ostensibly
treated her as thought she was one causing trouble. The Court finds that as a matter of law,
Medvetz’s temporary relocations do not constitute materially adverse actions. See Cecil v.
Louisville Water Co., 301 Fed. App’x 490, 51 (6th Cir. 2008)(finding that relocation of Plaintiff’s
desk was not a materially adverse action). While Medvetz appears to suggest that relocating her
to the Sex Offenders Unit was somehow a deliberate choice to punish her, she has produced no

evidence to counter that the County relocated her to a private office precisely to address her
concerns over the way others were treating her after her complaint. Accordingly, there is nothing
in the record to support that Medvetz was subjected to a materially adverse action. Her retaliation
claim, therefore, fails as a matter of law.
3. Medvetz’s Claim Against Milton
Medvetz’s sole argument in her response to Milton’s motion for summary judgment asserts
that Milton should be found liable for aiding and abetting an unlawful employment practice
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code. § 4112.02(J). As Medvetz has not presented any argument in
opposition to the arguments related to her other claims in the complaint, she has abandoned those
claims.

Moreover, because the Court has concluded that the County is entitled to judgment on each
of Medvetz’s claims, it follows that Milton cannot be found to secondarily liable for those claims.
In other words, because the County did not engage in an unlawful activity, Milton, as a matter of
law, cannot have aided and abetted an unlawful act. Milton, therefore, is entitled to summary
judgment on the claims raised against him.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Medvetz, no genuine issue of dispute of
material fact exists on any claim against Defendants. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

In closing, the Court would note that it is full agreement with Medvetz that “[n]o woman
should ever have to walk into her place of employment wondering what crude and vile comment
she will be told that day.” Doc. 29 at 5. Milton’s comments and actions were not only
unprofessional, but deplorable. However, given the claims raised before this Court and the
arguments pursued by Medvetz, a legal remedy is not available. Accordingly, this matter is hereby
closed.
It is so ordered.

Date: April 12, 2023 /s/ John R. Adams
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371954. Public record. Not legal advice.