# Krites v. Wayne County Schools Career Center Board of Education

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371863

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371863

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining the burden shifts requiring a plaintiff to show that a qualifying defendant violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct

## Opinion text

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LESA KRITES, )
) CASE NO. 5:21CV891
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
)
WAYNE COUNTY CAREER CENTER )
BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., )
) ORDER
Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF No. 23]

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. See ECF No.
23. Plaintiff Lesa Krites filed a brief in opposition. See ECF No. 26. Defendants replied. See
ECF No. 28. Having been duly advised by the parties’ filings and the applicable law, the Court
grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all pending claims.
I. Background
A. Undisputed Facts
The parties jointly submitted the following undisputed facts.1
1. Plaintiff Lesa Krites has been employed with Defendant Wayne County Career Center
Board of Education (“Board of Education” or “WCSCC”) since August 2010. ECF No. 30 at
PageID #: 1535.
2. During her employment, Plaintiff served in various positions, including: a) Part-Time
Cook/Instructor with the Mentoring Our Mothers for Success Program (MOMS); b) Part-Time

1 Significantly, these jointly stipulated facts acknowledge the theories and legal
positions held by the parties after the completion of summary judgment briefing and filing
of the Amended Complaint.
Cook with WCSCC’s Adult Education Department; c) Part-Time Instructional Aide/Monitor
(“Instructional Aide”) (Culinary Arts); d) Culinary Arts Teaching Assistant (Part-Time); and e)
Part-Time Instructional Aide (Culinary Arts; Powerline Technologies; Study Hall). Id.
3. John “Kip” Crain (“Defendant Crain,” “Superintendent,” or “Dr. Crain”) is the

Superintendent of WCSCC and has been employed in this position since 2004. Id.
4. Plaintiff was issued a One-Year Long Term Substitute Teacher Career Technical
License (4-12) in the Teaching Field of Culinary Arts and Food Service Management (“Long-
Term Substitute License) in 2012. She held the Long-Term Substitute License while serving in
the position of Culinary Arts Teaching Assistant. Id.
5. Plaintiff applied for the vacant Culinary Arts Instructor position on April 30, 2018.
Plaintiff was interviewed for the vacant Culinary Arts Instructor position and participated in two
rounds of interviews (i.e., first and final round of interviews). ECF No. 30 at PageID #: 1536.
6. Peter Kerling was selected to fill the vacant Culinary Arts Instructor position. Dr.
Crain recommended that the Board hire Kerling to serve in the position of Culinary Arts

Instructor at its meeting on June 20, 2018. Id.
7. Plaintiff was employed by the Board to serve as a part-time Instructional Aide in
Culinary Arts effective at the beginning of the 2018-2019 school year. Id.
8. Plaintiff was assigned to the Powerline Technologies Program as an Educational Aide
effective at the beginning of the 2018-1019 school year.
9. An Educational Aide Permit was required for the Powerline Technologies
Instructional Aide position. Id.
10. Plaintiff’s License was voided. After the license was voided, she was provided with
a credit of $25.00. Id.
11. Plaintiff’s Long-Term Substitute License was not revoked. Id.
12. There is a difference between a license being revoked and a license being voided. Id.
13. ODE does not generate a separate email or letter notifying an individual that his/her
license or permit has been voided. Id.

14. Plaintiff was issued a One-Year Educational Aide Permit on May 25, 2019. Id.
15. Plaintiff was assigned to serve as an Instructional Aide for Study Hall effective at the
beginning of the 2020-2021 school year. Id.
16. An Educational Aide Permit is required for the position of Instructional Aide for
Study Hall. Id.
17. Plaintiff was issued a One-Year Educational Aide Permit on July 18, 2020. ECF No.
30 at PageID #: 1537.
B. Factual Disputes
Plaintiff asserts two claims for relief in the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31): 1)
violation of civil rights pursuant to 42. U.S.C. § 1983, and 2) violation of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff asserts that her state-law
recognized contract of employment amounted to a property right protected by the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See ECF No. 26 at PageID #: 1374. Plaintiff
also alleges that Defendant John Crain, in his individual capacity as superintendent,
“intentionally misled/tricked the Ohio Department of Education into voiding” Plaintiff’s Long-
Term Substitute Teaching License in Culinary Arts without her consent. ECF No. 26 at PageID
#: 1369-1370.
Defendants retort that Plaintiff’s license was properly voided. See ECF No. 28 at PageID
#: 1509-1513. Defendants rely on the following:
As mentioned in Defendants’ MSJ, in May of each year, [CTE
Manager Chris] Boyan reminds Instructional Aides and other non-
teaching/classified employees of their need to renew their required
permits, including Permits in preparation for the upcoming school
year. In May 2019, Boyan informed employees, including
[Plaintiff] Krites, of the need to renew their Permits. On or about
May 14, 2019, Boyan informed Crain that Krites had already applied
for her License and paid the $25.00, but needed to apply for a Permit
and wanted to figure out if there was a way she would not have to
pay any additional fees for the Permit

ECF No. 28 at PageID #: 1509 (internal citations omitted).
Defendants contend that the voiding of Plaintiff’s license was not nefarious, rather her
license was voided to allow her to apply for the necessary Educational Aide Permit without an
additional cost. See ECF No. 28 at PageID #: 1505. Ultimately, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s long-term substitute license was properly voided, Defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process claims, Plaintiff failed to
plead and demonstrate that post-deprivation state remedies were inadequate, and that the
superintendent is entitled to qualified immunity.
II. Standard of Review
“Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Scola
v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 557 F. App'x 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The fact under dispute must be “material,” and the dispute itself must be “genuine.” A fact is
“material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007). In determining whether a factual issue is “genuine,” the Court assesses whether
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find that the non-moving party is entitled to a
verdict. Id. (“[Summary judgment] will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).
The moving party is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim
on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the movant relies upon the absence
of an essential element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “The trial court is not required to

search the entire record to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Malee v.
Anthony & Frank Ditomaso, Inc., No. 1:16CV490, 2018 WL 1805402, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 16,
2018) (citing Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2008)) (abrogated on other
grounds). “ ‘[I]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),’ the court may determine that fact is
undisputed.” Malee, No. 1:16CV490, 2018 WL 1805402, at *2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2)).
To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party “must ‘do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Baker v. City of Trenton, 936
F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. An opposing
party may not simply rely on its pleadings; rather, it must “produce evidence that results in a
conflict of material fact to be resolved” by a factfinder. KSA Enterprises, Inc. v. Branch Banking
& Tr. Co., 761 F. App'x 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cox v. Ky. Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d
146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC, 725 F.3d 608, 613 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). In analyzing a
motion for summary judgment, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018)
(citing Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2017).
III. Discussion

A. Procedural Due Process Claim
“ ‘Procedural due process’ at its core requires notice and an opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Garcia v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 782 F.3d
736, 741 (6th Cir. 2015). “The elements of a procedural due process claim are: (1) a life, liberty,
or property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause, and (2) a deprivation of
that interest (3) without adequate process.” Fields v. Henry Cnty., Tenn., 701 F.3d 180, 185 (6th
Cir. 2012). “[T]he Supreme Court [has] reasoned…that where a deprivation occurs through
random and unauthorized acts, the state has not run afoul of the Due Process Clause unless there
is no adequate post[-]deprivation process.” Hayes v. City of Memphis, No. 12-2253-JDT-TMP,
2015 WL 1345213 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2015). A procedural due process claim fails when
Plaintiff does not sufficiently demonstrate that available state remedies are inadequate.2 See

Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 597 (6th Cir. 2004).
At issue is the voiding of Plaintiff’s license and that process’s deleterious effect on her
right to procedural due process. There is no dispute that there was a discussion between Boyan
and Crain about Boyan’s conversation with Plaintiff concerning her application and fee paid for

2 While “voiding” is not an explicitly stated term in the statute, Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 119.12(A)(1) provides the adversely affected party with redress for the loss of a
license by outlining an appeal process. Plaintiff’s brief (ECF No. 26), arguing that “there
was no need to plead and prove post-deprivation remedies” is strong indication that she
failed to avail herself of the state’s post-deprivation remedial process. ECF No. 26 at
PageID #: 1374.
her license. What Plaintiff needed, however, was a permit and she was seeking assistance
regarding obtaining a permit, without paying an additional fee. ECF No. 28 at PageID #: 1510.
Plaintiff concedes that the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”), not the school district, has
the sole authority to void a license, although she asserts that the voiding of a license only occurs

at the request of the school district. See ECF No. 26 at PageID #: 1367 n.3.
While Plaintiff acknowledges that the ODE is the state actor responsible for depriving
Plaintiff of her due process, she makes no mention of a charge against the ODE or its license
voiding process. Rather, Plaintiff remains fixated on Defendant Crain’s role in the voiding of
her license without her consent. Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendant Crain pushed for the ODE to void her license without consent, Plaintiff fails to
demonstrate that she was “deprived of property as a result of established state procedure that
itself violates due process rights; or…[to prove] that the defendants deprived [her] of property
pursuant to a ‘random and unauthorized act’ and that available state remedies would not
adequately compensate for the loss.” Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951 F.2d 700, 706 (6th

Cir.1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 497 (6th Cir.1989)).
Rather than alleging that the ODE’s license voiding process lacked notice and an opportunity to
be heard as necessitated by a Due Process claim, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant Crain, who did
not have the ability to void a license, had it voided without Plaintiff’s consent. Id. Plaintiff fails
to acknowledge the available state remedies and, consequently, fails to show the inadequacies of
such remedies.
Because, among other things, Plaintiff has failed to show the inadequacy of the state
remedies, she has failed to establish her claim of procedural due process. Accordingly, the Court
finds in favor of Defendants on the procedural due process claim.
B. Substantive Due Process Claim
“Substantive due process is ‘[t]he doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty
or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed.’”
Johnson v. City of Saginaw, Michigan, 980 F.3d 497, 513 (6th Cir. 2020). “Proving a violation

of substantive due process requires not only that the challenged state action was arbitrary and
capricious, but also that the plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest.”
Id. (quoting Andreano v. City of Westlake, 136 F. App'x 865, 870-71 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff claims the following violations of her substantive due process rights:
First of all, she maintains that her ability to teach and/or her license
to teach and/or pursuit of her career are both protected property and
liberty interests protected by the US Fourteenth Amendment. The
"freedom to choose and pursue a career, `to engage in any of the
common occupations of life,' qualifies as a liberty interest which
may not be arbitrarily denied by the State." Further, there was a
violation of the Plaintiff’s liberty interest due to the voiding itself.
The voiding of her license itself was a disparaging mark on her
career. For one reason, she was effectively downgraded from a
license to a permit. Even though Crain’s actions violated the
Plaintiff’s fundamental rights, his acts meet the shock the conscious
test even if no fundamental rights were involved.

ECF No. 26 at PageID #: 1376 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s claim that her license was protected property is unsubstantiated. Neither the
Supreme Court of the United States nor the Sixth Circuit, whose decisions bind the Court, have
held that a citizen’s ability to hold a government-issued license for a job constitutes a
fundamental right to hold said license under the Constitution. As evidence of this, the ODE
“may refuse to issue a license to an applicant; may limit a license it issues to an applicant; may
suspend, revoke, or limit a license that has been issued to any person.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3319.31.
“The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that “ ‘[t]o establish a deprivation of a
protected liberty interest in the employment context, a plaintiff must demonstrate stigmatizing
governmental action which so negatively affects his or her reputation that it effectively
forecloses the opportunity to practice a chosen profession.’ ” Parrino v. Sebelius, 155 F.

Supp.3d 714, 721-722 (W.D. Ky. 2015) (quoting Joelson v. United States, 86 F.3d 1413, 1420
(6th Cir.1996)).
The record does not support Plaintiff’s claim of stigmatizing deprivation. After leaving
the position of Culinary Arts Teaching Assistant, for which she needed a license, Plaintiff was
assigned as an Instructional Aide in the Powerline Technologies Program at the beginning of the
2019-2020 school year, a role that required an Educational Aide Permit, not a license. See ECF
No. 30 at PageID #: 1536. After that, Plaintiff was reassigned to serve as an Instructional Aide
for Study Hall at the beginning of the 2020-2021 school year, a position she continued to hold at
the filing of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. See ECF No. 23 at PageID #: 1013.
In summary, Plaintiff moved from one position to another and, along the way, obtained the

credentials necessary to hold the position.
Plaintiff responds that Defendant Crain’s actions “shock the conscience.” See ECF No.
26 at PageID #: 1376. “Actions that shock the conscience are generally so brutal and offensive
that they do not comport with traditional ideas of fair-play and decency.” Kouider on behalf of
Y.C. v. Parma City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp.3d 772, 783 (N.D. Ohio 2020). The
Sixth Circuit has established that such a standard is difficult to satisfy. See id.; see also Blythe v.
Schlievert, 245 F. Supp.3d 952, 957 (N.D. Ohio 2017). The actions in question pertain to the
allegation that Defendant Crain voided Plaintiff’s license without her consent. See ECF No. 26
at PageID #: 1364. Even if the Court were to accept the allegation as true, such actions do not
amount to conduct that violates “society’s ideas of decency and fair play,” especially not under
the circumstances presented in this case. Dohner v. Neff, 240 F.Supp.2d 692, 703 (N.D. Ohio
2002).
Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of a substantive due process right.3 The Court,

therefore, finds in favor of Defendants on the substantive due process claim.
A. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity is a defense government officials can raise when claims arise from
the performance of their discretionary functions.” Meeks v. Larsen, 999 F. Supp.2d 968, 977
(E.D. Mich. 2014), aff'd, 611 F. App'x 277 (6th Cir. 2015). Government officials performing
discretionary functions are shielded from liability unless their conduct violates clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “To avoid the shield of qualified immunity,
a plaintiff must properly plead ‘facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged

conduct.’” Feucht v. Triad Loc. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 425 F. Supp.3d 914, 929 (S.D. Ohio 2019)
(citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)).
Defendants assert that Defendant Crain4 “is entitled to qualified immunity from suit
because Plaintiff failed to establish that her due process rights were violated.” ECF No. 28 at

3 The Court does not overlook that a license may be preferred to a permit. That,
alone, is not sufficient to sustain Plaintiff’s claim of substantive due process.
4 Defendant Crain was the Superintendent of the Wayne County Schools Career
Center, making him a government official. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 2. Perhaps out of
an abundance of caution, Defendants raised the qualified immunity defense, noting that
Plaintiff asserts the claims against Defendant Crain in his individual capacity as
Superintendent. See United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 768 F.3d 464,
484 (6th Cir. 2014); see also ECF No. 23 at PageID #: 1023.
PageID #: 1521.5 The Court does not address the qualified immunity argument of Defendant
Crain, in his individual capacity, because it concludes for the reasons set forth above that
Plaintiff has not sustained her burden to demonstrate a deprivation of her constitutional rights
regarding any of her claims.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 23) is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 29, 2023 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

5 Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining the burden shifts
requiring a plaintiff to show that a qualifying defendant violated a constitutional right and
that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371863. Public record. Not legal advice.