# Harris v. Hunt

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · October 31, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371416

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** October 31, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ISAIAH S. HARRIS, SR., et al., ) CASE NO. 1:22-CV-1255
)
Plaintiffs, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
)
vs. )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
DEBORAH S. HUNT, et al., ) ORDER
)
Defendants. )
)
)

I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Isaiah S. Harris, Sr., an inmate at Richland Correctional Institution, filed
this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, on behalf of himself and three
purported family members and against the following court personnel: Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk of
Court for the Sixth Circuit; Clarence Maddox, Circuit Executive of the Sixth Circuit; Susan
Rogers, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Sixth Circuit; Marc Theriault, Circuit Executive of the Sixth
Circuit; Julie Cobble, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Sixth Circuit; “Amy TBD,” “Executives, Clerks,
and Supervisors of the Sixth Circuit;” John and Jane Does, “Executives, Clerks, and Supervisors
of the Sixth Circuit;” Clayton R. Higgins, Jr., Case Analyst of the United States Supreme Court;
Scott S. Harris, Clerk of the United States Supreme Court; and John and Jane Does, “Executives,
Clerks, and Supervisors of the United States Supreme Court.” (ECF No. 1).
Harris’s complaint centers on Defendants’ actions surrounding the appeal of this Court’s
judgment dismissing Harris’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. Harris seeks compensatory and injunctive relief. Id.
II. BACKGROUND
According to the complaint, Harris filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Id. The Court
dismissed his petition, finding Harris’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and he was
not entitled to equitable tolling. Id. This Court also denied Harris’s motion for reconsideration

and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. See Harris v. Clipper, No.
1:14CV846, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88213 (N.D. Ohio June 8, 2017). Harris appealed the order
dismissing his petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (Id., ECF No.
30). The Sixth Circuit denied Harris’s application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”). (Id.,
ECF No. 35). Harris subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. (ECF No. 1). The Supreme Court returned Harris’s filing, noting that the time to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari had expired and the Court had no power to review the petition.
Id.
In this action, Harris alleges that the Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and

1986 and have denied his access to the courts. He contends that Hunt “illegally” denied his COA
in the Sixth Circuit because it was not issued by a circuit judge, and Maddox, Rogers, and “Does
1-10” failed to correct this action. Harris also alleges that Theriault, Cobble, Hunt, Amy, and Does
1-10 failed to file and docket Harris’s application for a COA and motion to recall the mandate.
Regarding the Supreme Court filing, Harris appears to allege that Higgins caused Harris’s petition
for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court to be deemed untimely and he
continues to be a hindrance to Harris’s filings. Finally, Harris claims that Higgins, Scott S. Harris,
and John/Jane Does “failed to supervise, train, or intervene” and therefore “displayed a deliberate
indifference to any documented widespread abuses which highlight the culture of their office in
relation to pro se litigants.” (ECF No. 1, PageID 11).
Harris appears to also allege that the defendants’ actions constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 242. On behalf of his alleged family members, Harris also raises state claims of loss of
consortium.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
By separate order, the Court grants that application. Accordingly, because Plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis, his complaint is before the Court for initial screening under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when
it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
plausibility in the Complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). Explaining
“plausibility,” the Supreme Court stated that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, “[t]he
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This
determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78. The factual allegations in the pleading must be
sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to
include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal
conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading
standard. Id.
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

IV. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, a party may plead and conduct his or her case personally or through a
licensed attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. A pro se litigant, however, may not represent anyone
other than himself or herself. See e.g. Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[I]n federal court a party can represent himself or be represented by an attorney, but [he] cannot
be represented by a nonlawyer.”); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“While a non-attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, ‘he has no authority to appear as an
attorney for others than himself.’”); see also Jackson v. Kment, No. 13CV10819, 2016 WL
1042538, * 7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2016) (finding Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief
on behalf of “his friends and family members”). An adult litigant who wishes to proceed pro se
must personally sign the complaint or petition to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. Steelman v.
Thomas, 848 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988); Banks v. Valaluka, No. 1:15 CV 1935, 2015 WL 7430077,
*3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654).
Here, the complaint attempts to raise claims on behalf of Harris’s three children. Upon

review, the Court finds that only Harris signed the complaint. The Court is therefore without
jurisdiction to hear the claims of any adult child. And there is no indication from the complaint
that Harris is a licensed attorney. Harris therefore lacks standing to seek relief on behalf of his
children. Accordingly, the Court will address only Harris’s claims.
Harris’s complaint concerns the actions taken by quasi-judicial officers, including the
Clerk of Court for the Sixth Circuit, Circuit Executives of the Sixth Circuit, Chief Deputy Clerks
of the Sixth Circuit, the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, Case Analyst of the Supreme
Court, and the “Executives” of the Supreme Court. Even construing this pro se complaint liberally,
Harris’s complaint is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Judicial officers are absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages for all actions
taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of any
jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“It is well-established that judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out of the
performance of their judicial functions.”). The Supreme Court has specifically held that state
judges are absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brookings, 389 F.3d at 617
(citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983)). And this immunity applies even if the action
at issue was performed in error, done maliciously, or exceeded his or her authority. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Likewise, this absolute judicial immunity has also been extended to non-judicial officers
who perform “quasi-judicial” duties. See Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). “Quasi-
judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the
judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.”
Id. The fact that an error is made is immaterial. Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir.

1988). Court clerks and other court officials and employees have therefore been accorded absolute
immunity from civil rights actions on claims arising from conduct intrinsically associated with a
judicial proceeding. See, e.g., id. (court clerk); Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir.
1973) (municipal court clerk); Bush, 38 F.3d at 847 (court administrator and referee).
The named Defendants in this case are court clerks, executives, and analysts. The acts
about which Harris complains, including docketing pleadings and accepting court filings, are
integral parts of the judicial process. There is no suggestion in the complaint that these actions
were taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction. These Defendants are therefore entitled to
absolute judicial immunity. See Pelmear v. O’Connor, No. 3:18-cv-01480, 2018 WL 4335634

(N.D. Ohio Sep. 11, 2018).
Moreover, even if Harris’s claims were not barred by judicial immunity, his claims
concerning the appeal to the Sixth Circuit in 2017 and the petition for a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court in 2018 would be barred by the statute of limitations because they have occurred
more than two years before the filing of this action. See Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th
Cir. 2008) (finding the district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)
as time-barred where, as here, the defect is obvious on the face of the pleading); Browning v.
Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations for bodily
injury applies to Section 1983 claims).
Additionally, it appears that Harris alleges the defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 242
(deprivation of civil rights). Section 242 is a criminal statute and provides no private right of
action to civil plaintiffs. See Bey v. State of Ohio, No. 1:11 CV 1306, 2011 WL 4944396, at *3
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2011) (citing U.S. v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 2003 WL 21580657, *2 (6th
Cir. 2003)). To the extent Harris is attempting to bring criminal charges against the defendants,

he lacks standing. See Williams v. Luttrell, 99 F. App’x 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2004) (A private citizen
“has no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution [against] defendants for their alleged
unlawful acts.”) (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1986)); Poole v. CitiMortgage,
Inc., No. 14-CV-10512, 2014 WL 4772177, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2014) (a private citizen
lacks standing to initiate criminal proceedings) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973)). The Court therefore dismisses any claims alleging a violation of Section 242.
Finally, to the extent Harris has raised any state law claims, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. A district court “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if that court “has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because Harris’s complaint does not allege any
cognizable federal claim, and there is no basis in this action for original diversity jurisdiction, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim Harris may also be
attempting to assert. Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]
federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claims should not ordinarily reach the
plaintiff’s state-law claims.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)).
Accordingly, any state law claims Harris may have asserted are dismissed without
prejudice. Bullock v. City of Covington, 698 F. App’x 305, 307 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Normally, when
a court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the court dismisses the [state] claims without
prejudice.”).
Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken
in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: October 31, 2022 Have
CHARLES E. FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371416. Public record. Not legal advice.