# Doe v. St. Edward High School

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · August 11, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371119

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 11, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371119

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that O.R.C. § 2305.111(C) was enacted to ameliorate the harsh repercussions of imposing a one-year statute of limitations on victims of childhood sexual abuse
- stating that there was “no question” that the statute of limitations on a minor plaintiff’s claims were tolled

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN DOE JR., et al., )
) Case No. 22-cv-440
Plaintiffs, )
) Judge Dan Aaron Polster
v. )
) OPINION & ORDER
ST. EDWARD HIGH SCHOOL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

Before the Court is the joint Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”) by Defendants Jayden
Williams, Darryl Williams, and Lashan Spencer (collectively, the “the Williams
Defendants”). ECF Doc. 45. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND1
In the summer and fall of 2019, Defendant Jayden Williams allegedly committed multiple
sexual assaults and batteries against Plaintiff John Doe Jr. (“Junior”), who was Jayden’s
schoolmate and cross-country teammate at Defendant St. Edward High School. ECF Doc. 1 at ¶¶
23-61. When the sexual assaults occurred, Junior was a minor. Id. ¶ 1.
Thereafter, on March 18, 2022, Junior’s father, Plaintiff John Doe Sr. (“Senior”),
commenced this action on Junior’s behalf because Junior was still a minor on that date. Id. The
complaint asserts multiple state-law tort claims against the Williams Defendants: there are five
causes of action against Jayden for assault and battery (Count 8), conspiracy to commit assault and
battery (Count 11), negligence (Count 12), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 13),
and spoliation of evidence (Count 14); and there are two causes of action against both of Jayden’s

1 Given the case’s procedural posture, the Court takes the following statement of facts the complaint (ECF Doc. 1)
and assumes that the allegations asserted therein are true. See Maclin v. Reliable Reports of Tex., Inc., 314 F. Supp.
3d 845, 851 (N.D. Ohio 2018).
parents, defendants Mr. Williams and Ms. Spencer, for parental liability under O.R.C. § 3109.10
(Counts 9 and 10) and spoliation of evidence (Count 14). Id. ¶¶ 224-76.2
Two weeks after the complaint was filed, Junior turned eighteen years old, and the Court
subsequently dismissed Senior from the lawsuit in his capacity as Junior’s former guardian. ECF

Doc. 79 at 4; ECF Doc. 68. As a result of the Court’s order, Junior is the sole plaintiff for every
claim against the Williams Defendants.
Now, the Williams Defendants have filed the instant Motion and seek dismissal of the
claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on statute of
limitations grounds. See generally ECF Doc. 45. Plaintiffs opposed the Motion by filing a response
brief, and the Williams Defendants then filed a reply brief. ECF Docs. 79, 82. The Court has
reviewed the parties’ briefing and now concludes that the Motion must be denied.
LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must view the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept well-pleaded allegations as

true. Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 939 F.3d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 2019). The factual allegations must be
sufficient “to state a plausible claim to relief” for the claim to survive a motion to dismiss. Saumer
v. Cliffs Nat. Res., Inc., 853 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2017). “Assessment of the facial sufficiency
of the complaint must ordinarily be undertaken without resort to matters outside the
pleadings.” Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016).
Typically, the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations is not an appropriate ground
for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, but such dismissal may be warranted if “the allegations in the

2 Counts 11 and 13 were also brought against Jayden’s alleged co-conspirators, Defendants Evan Typpo and Thomas
Hoffman, and Count 14 was brought against all nine of the co-defendants. ECF Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 244-50, 257-76. None of
the other defendants have joined the Williams Defendants’ request to dismiss these shared counts on statute of
limitations grounds.
complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred.” Courser v. Michigan House of Reps.,
831 F. App’x 161, 179 (6th Cir. 2020). Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense
and a plaintiff need not plead the absence of that defense in the complaint, the expiration of a
statute of limitations is often a matter outside of the complaint’s allegations and, thus, outside of

Rule 12(b)(6) review. Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Jones
v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)). Yet, when the allegations demonstrate that the statute of
limitations has expired, then dismissal the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
claim. Jones, 549 U.S. at 215.
Here, the Court agrees with the Williams Defendants that the application of the relevant
statutes of limitations and the applicable tolling statute can be discerned from the face of the
complaint. See ECF Doc. 45 at 1. Thus, the Court will resolve the Motion on the merits.
ANALYSIS
For civil causes of action, Ohio law imposes various statutes of limitations, all of which
establish a time limit for commencing a civil case. See generally O.R.C. §§ 2305.01-2305.14.3

These time limits run from the date a plaintiff’s claim accrued, whether by injury or
discovery. Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 421 (2020). As relevant here, Ohio’s statutes
of limitations impose: a one-year time limit to bring an action for assault or battery; a two-year
limit to bring an action for negligence; and a four-year time limit to bring an action for civil
conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or spoliation. O.R.C. §§ 2305.09, 2305.10,
2305.111(B).
Yet, Ohio law also tolls the statutes of limitations for minors in most circumstances
pursuant to O.R.C. § 2305.16. Thus, if an individual has a legal claim accrue before he reaches the

3 Every claim against the Williams Defendants is brought under Ohio’s tort law, and so Ohio’s statutes of limitations
apply to each claim. Charash v. Oberlin Coll., 14 F.3d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 1994).
age of majority—i.e., before the individual turns eighteen years old—then the applicable statute
of limitations is tolled until his eighteenth birthday. Id. §§ 2305.16, 3109.01; see also Fehrenbach
v. O’Malley, 113 Ohio St.3d 18, 19-20 (2007) (stating that there was “no question” that the statute
of limitations on a minor plaintiff’s claims were tolled). At that point, once the individual is no

longer a minor, the statute of limitations will begin to run and may bar an untimely action. Brooks
v. Skinner, 139 F. Supp. 3d 869, 881 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (applying Ohio law).
Here, application of O.R.C. § 2305.16 to Junior’s claims establishes that none of the causes
of action are time barred, including the claims against the Williams Defendants. First, the
complaint alleges that Junior was still a minor in 2019 when every cause of action asserted in the
complaint accrued, and no party disputes this fact. See ECF Doc. 1 at ¶ 1; ECF Doc. 45 at 4. In
turn, Junior was entitled to the benefit of the Section 2305.16 toll for any claims arising out of the
events alleged in the complaint, and the applicable one-, two-, and four-year time limits would not
start until Junior turned eighteen years old. Yet, the instant case was filed before Junior’s
eighteenth birthday, which means all of Junior’s claims were interposed before the statutory time

limits began to run. Therefore, on the face of the complaint, it is clear that all of Junior’s claims
are timely.
Despite this simple application of the minor tolling statute, the Williams Defendants argue
that Section 2305.16 does not apply on two primary grounds: first, that Senior cannot assert the
Section 2305.16 toll on Junior’s behalf, and, second, that Junior’s claims are governed by the more
specific tolling provision in O.R.C. § 2305.111(C).4 The Court considers each argument in turn.

4 The Williams Defendants also make several other arguments, but none of the arguments warrant significant treatment
because they are mooted by the Court’s ensuing analysis. More specifically, the Motion argues that: the one-year
statute of limitation applies to every claim; the prosecution of untimely claims against a minor defendant would violate
public policy; and the savings statute in O.R.C. § 2305.19 is not applicable. ECF Doc. 45 at 5-7, 9-11. Each of these
arguments hinges upon Junior’s claims being untimely, and, in turn, these arguments fail because the Court has
concluded that the claims are timely. The Motion also argues that the tolling provision in O.R.C. § 2305.111(C) cannot
apply here because it is triggered only when the underlying conduct is criminal in nature. Id. at 7-8. However, the
A. O.R.C. § 2305.16’s Applicability to Claims Brought by a Guardian on a Minor’s Behalf
The Williams Defendants first argue that the Section 2305.16 toll applies only when a
minor brings a lawsuit in his own capacity. ECF Doc. 82 at 3.5 From this premise, the Williams
Defendants maintain that the toll cannot not apply here because Senior brought the lawsuit on

Junior’s behalf, and Senior cannot assert or otherwise benefit from the toll because he had the
capacity to bring the lawsuit within the statutes of limitations. ECF Doc. 45 at 2-3; ECF Doc. 82
at 3. To support this argument, the Williams Defendants cite to Fehrenbach v. O’Malley, in which
the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed whether the statute of limitations for a parent’s individual
claim could be tolled by Section 2305.16’s provision for joint and inseparable claims.
The Court begins by noting that this argument is moot because Junior is now the sole
plaintiff for every claim against the Williams Defendants, and he may assert the toll. Indeed, Junior
is—and has always been—the real party in interest to this lawsuit, but Senior brought the case
because Junior still lacked the capacity to sue in March 2022. ECF Doc. 1 at ¶ 1; see also F.R.C.P.
Rule 17(c); Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (1985). Once Junior reached the age of

majority, the Court dismissed Senior in his representative capacity and identified Junior as the
proper plaintiff, and the case now proceeds as though Junior had always been the sole plaintiff. See
ECF Doc. 68; F.R.C.P. 17(a)(3). Curiously, the Williams Defendants do not address this change
in the parties, even though their reply brief was filed nearly three weeks after the Court issued the
ordered. See ECF Docs. 68, 82. This omission ultimately dooms the Williams Defendants’
position—even if the Court were to accept as true the argument that the Section 2305.16 toll can

Court has concluded that O.R.C. § 2305.16 applies to Junior’s claims, and so the scope of the O.R.C. § 2305.111(C)
is irrelevant.

5 The Court notes that a minor lacks the capacity to sue under Rule 17(c). Perhaps the Williams Defendants intended
to argue that the minor tolling statute may be invoked only when an adult individual brings a lawsuit to assert claims
that accrued when the individual was a minor, but this is not how their point was expressed in the briefing.
be asserted only by a minor suing in his own capacity, Junior would now be permitted to do so
under the Williams Defendants’ proposed rule.6
Furthermore, the Williams Defendants’ proposition that Senior could not assert the Section
2305.16 toll on Junior’s behalf has been rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio, albeit under

slightly different circumstances. Namely, in Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hospital, the state high court
interpreted Section 2305.16 and concluded that, under the statute’s plain language, the
appointment of a guardian for an adult who had become mentally incompetent did not trigger the
statute of limitations on any claims that accrued during the incompetency. 104 Ohio St.3d 390,
398 (2004). Rather, Section 2305.16’s toll inures to the benefit of an incompetent individual until
such time that the incompetency is removed, if ever, because “the cause of action belongs to the
ward, not to the guardian.” Id. at 394-95. Thus, the guardian-plaintiffs in Weaver were permitted
to assert the Section 2305.16 toll for the claims they brought on behalf of their incompetent son,
even though the guardian-plaintiffs were themselves competent and capable of bringing their son’s
claims before the applicable statutes of limitations expired. Id.

Applying the Weaver ruling here, it is clear that Senior’s role in this litigation did not divest
Junior of the tolling benefit afforded to him by Section 2305.16. Every claim asserted against the
Williams Defendants belongs to Junior personally, and the calculation of any statutes of limitations
or statutory tolls are determined based Junior’s age. Thus, under Weaver, the relevant statutes of
limitations were tolled until Junior’s incompetency was removed—i.e., when Junior turned
eighteen years old—regardless of whether Senior instituted a lawsuit on Junior’s behalf before the

6 Still, the Williams Defendants maintain that Junior failed to bring his claims within the necessary time after reaching
the age majority. ECF Doc. 82 at 3-4. The Court cannot discern any basis for this argument because Junior turned
eighteen years old on April 1, 2022, and he became the sole plaintiff by court order on July 13, 2022. Thus, Junior
interposed his claims, in his own capacity, well before even the shortest statute of limitation was set to expire.
incompetency ended or whether Senior had the capacity to bring the suit within the statutory time
limits after the claims accrued. In fact, courts have routinely applied the Section 2305.16 toll to
minors’ legal claims, even when—as here—the cases were commenced by adult guardians on
behalf of minors. See, e.g., Brooks, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 874, 880-81; H.M. v. Board of Educ. of the

Kings Local Sch. Dist., 117 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1016 (S.D. Ohio 2015); Mayo v. Federal Exp., 13-
cv-1380, 2014 WL 2600302, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 10, 2014). Therefore, the law makes clear that
an adult may assert the Section 2305.16 toll on a minor’s behalf, and the Court can find no reason
why Senior was unable to do so here.
The Court also notes that the Williams Defendants have misrepresented the holding in
Fehrenbach v. O’Malley, and that case does not entitle them to the relief they now request.7 More
specifically, the Williams Defendants state that Fehrenbach stands for the proposition that, when
a parent brings a claim on behalf of his minor child, Section 2305.16 will toll the statute of
limitations for the minor child’s claims only if the parent also brings his own independent claim
that is joint and inseparable from the minor’s claim. ECF Doc. 45 at 2-3; ECF Doc. 82 at 3. Yet,

nowhere in the opinion did the Supreme Court of Ohio create such a contingent relationship
between a minor’s tolling rights and a parent’s individual claim. In fact, the court reached the
opposite conclusion: in deciding whether Section 2305.16 tolled the statute of limitations on
plaintiff-parents’ loss of consortium claim, the court began with the premise that “[t]here is no
question that [the minor] may assert the tolling provision” for the claims that her parents brought
on her behalf. 113 Ohio St.3d at 20. Thus, the minor daughter could assert, through her parents,
Section 2305.16’s toll, regardless of how the court resolved the question about the toll’s

7 The Fehrenbach case involved parents who brought a medical malpractice claim on behalf of their daughter and a
loss of consortium claim for themselves. 113 Ohio St.3d at 19. The Supreme Court of Ohio was asked to address
whether O.R.C. § 2305.16 tolled the statute of limitations on the adult parents’ claim, and the court concluded that the
parents could assert the toll because their claim was joint and inseparable from their daughter’s claim. Id. at 20-21.
applicability to the parents’ individual claim. The same holds true here, and Junior’s statutory
tolling rights are not contingent upon the nature of Senior’s individual claim. Accordingly, the
Williams Defendants’ interpretation of Fehrenbach is erroneous, and the argument fails.
In short, Junior’s claims were tolled by O.R.C. § 2305.16, and the Williams Defendants’

arguments to the contrary are unsupported by law. Therefore, the Williams Defendants are not
entitled to dismissal on this ground.
B. O.R.C. § 2305.111(C)’s Applicability to Junior’s Claims
The Williams Defendants alternatively argue that Junior is not entitled to any toll
whatsoever, regardless of who brought the lawsuit. ECF Doc. 82 at 1-2. The Williams Defendants
begin from the premise that Section 2305.16 is a general tolling statute, and it can be superseded
by a specific tolling statute. Id. In turn, when a plaintiff brings a claim relating to childhood sexual
abuse, Section 2305.16 is superseded by O.R.C. § 2305.111(C) because the latter statute explicitly
addresses the statute of limitations and the toll for a childhood sexual abuse claim. Id. From there,
the Williams Defendants state that Section 2305.111(A) requires that “childhood sexual abuse” be

perpetrated by someone who stands in loco parentis to the child, but Jayden does not fit within
this definition of an abuser. Id. The Williams Defendants therefore conclude that Junior’s claims
were not subject to any toll because: (1) Junior’s claims do not meet the statutory requirements
necessary to benefit from Section 2305.111(C)’s tolling provision; and (2) Section § 2305.16 has
been superseded and cannot apply to any of Junior’s claims of childhood sexual assault and battery
claims.
The Williams Defendant’s conclusion that Junior cannot assert any toll is simply illogical.
Indeed, this argument is based on the faulty premise that every claim involving sexual assault and
battery against a child is governed by Section 2305.111(C), but this is simply untrue. By its plain
terms, Section 2305.111(C) only governs claims that meet Section 2305.111(A)’s definition of
“childhood sexual abuse.” Under Section 2305.111(A), a sexual assault and battery against a child
qualifies as “childhood sexual abuse” only if the abuse was perpetrated by one of the types of
actors enumerated in the statute.8 If the statutory conditions are met, then any claims arising from

the childhood sexual abuse are tolled until the victim’s eighteenth birthday, at which point a
twelve-year statute of limitations begins to run. See O.R.C. § 2305.111(A, C). However, it does
not then follow that Section 2305.111(C) creates an all-or-nothing scenario—i.e., that a claim
arising from childhood sexual assault either meets the statutory definition of “childhood sexual
abuse” and the statute of limitations is tolled under Section 2305.111(C) or does not meet the
statutory definition and the statute of limitations is not tolled at all. Such a scheme would be absurd,
as it would mean that a fourteen-year-old child who is sexually assaulted by a teacher would have
until he was thirty years old to file a lawsuit, but a fourteen-year-old child who is sexually assaulted
classmate would have to file the lawsuit when he is fifteen years old and lacks the capacity to sue.
The far more logical conclusion is that Junior may assert the Section 2305.16 toll. Even

though the Williams Defendants are correct that Section 2305.111(C) does not apply here because
Junior’s claims do not meet Section 2305.111(A)’s statutory definition of “childhood sexual
abuse,” there is no reason to conclude that his claims would not instead be governed by the general
toll in Section 23015.16. Rather, any other conclusion is nonsensical, particularly because Section
2305.111(C) was enacted to protect victims of childhood sexual assault by extending the statute

8 Under the statute, “childhood sexual abuse” can be committed by any number of individuals who had the trust of or
exercised control over the child victim, including a law enforcement officer, a teacher, a coach, a troop leader, mental
health professional, or cleric. O.R.C. § 2305.111(A)(1)(b)(i-viii). Thus, the list of possible abusers is more robust than
simply those who stand in loco parentis to the child, as stated by the Williams Defendants.
of limitation for childhood sexual abuse from one year to twelve years.9 The Court cannot fathom
a scenario in which the Ohio legislature intended to strip victims of childhood sexual assault from
the benefit any toll whatsoever, simply because Section 2305.111(C) does not apply to their claims
Accordingly, the Court concludes that O.R.C. § 2305.111(C) is inapplicable to this case,

and the relevant statutes of limitations for Junior’s claim were instead tolled by O.R.C. § 2305.16.
Therefore, the Williams Defendants are not entitled to dismissal on this ground either.
*****
In sum, the Court concludes that none of the applicable statute of limitations has lapsed,
the Williams Defendants’ dismissal arguments do not alter this conclusion. Therefore, Junior’s
claims are timely, and the Motion must be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons states above, the Williams Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(ECF Doc. 45) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: August 11, 2022

/s/ Dan Aaron Polster ___
Dan Aaron Polster
United States District Judge

9 See Watkins v. Dep’t of Youth Servs., 143 Ohio St.3d 477, 480 (2015) (recognizing that O.R.C. § 2305.111(C) was
enacted to ameliorate the harsh repercussions of imposing a one-year statute of limitations on victims of childhood
sexual abuse).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371119. Public record. Not legal advice.