# Stanislaw v. City of Warren, Ohio

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · July 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371056

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371056

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an employee was permissibly terminated when she was unable to return to work at the end of FMLA leave

## Opinion text

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MEGAN STANISLAW, )
) CASE NO. 4:21-CV-01029
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
)
CITY OF WARREN, OHIO )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
Defendant. ) ORDER
) [Resolving ECF No. 24]

Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 24. The motion has been
fully briefed. ECF Nos. 33, 35. In accordance with the Court’s Case Management Order, the
parties also filed a Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts.1 ECF No. 19. For the following reasons,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff is a career employee of Defendant, having worked for the City of Warren’s Water
Department for more than 18 years. ECF No. 21 at PageID #: 115. Prior to the events giving rise
to this case, Plaintiff worked as the Executive Secretary to the Director of Utilities from December
of 2013 to July of 2017. Id. at PageID #: 117. In July of 2017, Plaintiff applied for and received

1 “The trial court is not required to search the entire record to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists.” Malee v. Anthony & Frank Ditomaso, Inc., No. 1:16CV490, 2018
WL 1805402, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2018) (citing Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 531
(6th Cir. 2008)) (abrogated on other grounds). “‘[I]f a party fails to properly support an
assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule
56(c),’ the court may determine that fact is undisputed.” Malee, No. 1:16CV490, 2018 WL
1805402, at *2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2)).
an appointment to the position of Shift Leader at the Water Filtration Plant. ECF No. 31-1.
Defendant imposed two testing requirements onto Plaintiff. First, Defendant required Plaintiff to
take an Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Class I Water Operator Certificate examination
and obtain at least a 35% score by the end of Plaintiff’s first year in the Shift Leader position. ECF

No. 21 at PageID #: 261. Second, Defendant required Plaintiff to obtain a passing result for the
same examination and tender a Class I Water Operator Certificate (the “Certificate”) to the City
of Warren by the end of Plaintiff’s second year in the position. Id. at PageID #: 282. These
requirements were outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding between Defendant and
AFSCME, Ohio Council 8, Local 74, the union representing the non-management employees of
the City of Warren. ECF No. 23 at PageID #: 481. According to the Memorandum of
Understanding, if Plaintiff failed to obtain the Certificate, she would be removed from the Shift
Leader position and returned to her Executive Secretary position, or an equivalent position at the
same rate of pay as an Executive Secretary. Id. Defendant moved the date on which Plaintiff was
to begin the Shift Leader position back from July of 2017 to September of 2017 so that she could

train her replacement for the Executive Secretary role, and the testing dates were changed
accordingly.2 ECF No. 21 at PageID #: 261.
Plaintiff successfully met the first testing requirement by taking the Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency Class I Water Operator Certificate examination on August 31, 2018, less than
a week before the September 5, 2018 cutoff. Id. at PageID #: 272; ECF No. 23 at PageID #: 381.
Although Plaintiff did not obtain her Certificate from the first examination, Defendant provided

2 Plaintiff was required to obtain (1) a score of at least 35% on the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency Class I Water Operator Certificate examination by
September 5, 2018, and (2) a passing result for the same examination and tender a Class I
Water Operator Certificate on or before September 5, 2019.
Plaintiff with free access to preparatory courses, reimbursement for her first unsuccessful attempt
at the Certificate examination, and multiple written notices of the Certificate requirement and the
associated due dates. ECF No. 21 at PageID #: 159, 258, 272, 282, 288. As late as August 9,
2019, Plaintiff had not registered to retake the Certificate examination. Id. at PageID #: 165.

Plaintiff then requested leave under FMLA which began on August 18, 2019, so that she could
undergo medical tests that would later reveal a diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis. Id. Plaintiff did
not complete the second testing requirement or obtain the required Certificate prior to the
September 5, 2019, cutoff, which passed while she was on FMLA leave. ECF No. 19 at PageID
#: 103. On September 9, 2019, Defendant informed Plaintiff that after her return from FMLA
leave, she would be reassigned to a Consumer Service Representative role at the pay rate of her
previous Executive Secretary role because she had not obtained the required Certificate by
September 5, 2019. ECF No. 21 at PageID #: 289. Plaintiff’s pay for the Consumer Service
Representative position was to be equal to her pay as an Executive Secretary, which was $3.69
less per hour than the Shift Lead position. Id. at PageID #: 258, 289.

After returning from leave in November of 2019, Plaintiff met with Defendant and
requested that she be assigned to a position other than the Consumer Service Representative role
as Plaintiff had concerns about the stress of that role exacerbating the symptoms of her Multiple
Sclerosis. ECF No. 26 at PageID #: 833. Defendant initially offered Plaintiff a position with the
City of Warren Police Department – Plaintiff declined. ECF No. 21 at PageID #: 184. Plaintiff
was permitted to try several other positions and eventually settled into the role of a Data Entry
Operator with the Water Department under Deborah DelBene. Id. at PageID #: 185-187.
Defendant also permitted Plaintiff to be flexible with Plaintiff’s work hours to accommodate
migraines and other symptoms. Id. at PageID #: 197.
After being placed in the Data Entry Operator role, Plaintiff made complaints against
DelBene to Defendant, accusing DelBene of manipulative and intimidating behaviors in the
workplace. Id. at PageID #: 219. DelBene has a substantial disciplinary history for similar
behaviors. ECF No. 23 at PageID #: 411 – 422. In response to these complaints, Defendant

directed Plaintiff and DelBene to conduct all communication through Plaintiff’s immediate
supervisor, Erica Davis, to reduce Plaintiff’s stress arising from interactions with DelBene. Id. at
PageID #: 422 – 423. The evidence suggests that both Plaintiff and DelBene have not complied
with this instruction. Id. at PageID #: 423 – 424.
Notably, nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff ever asked for more time to complete
her certificate or to return to the Shift Lead position. Rather, Plaintiff has since requested to be
placed in a clerical role in the Water Treatment Plant that management has decided not to fill since
the previous employee in that position passed away. Id. at PageID #: 363 – 364. Defendant cites
redundancy and cost savings as reasons for leaving the position unfilled. Id.
II. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Scola
v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 557 F. App'x 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The fact under dispute must be “material,” and the dispute itself must be “genuine.” A fact is
“material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007). In determining whether a factual issue is “genuine,” the Court assesses whether
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find that the non-moving party is entitled to a
verdict. Id. (“[Summary judgment] will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”). The moving party is not required to file affidavits
or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so
long as the movant relies upon the absence of an essential element in the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986).
To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party “must ‘do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Baker v. City of Trenton, 936 F.3d
523, 529 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to
the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. An opposing party may
not simply rely on its pleadings; rather, it must “produce evidence that results in a conflict of
material fact to be resolved” by a factfinder. KSA Enterprises, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co.,
761 F. App'x 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cox v. Ky. Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position

will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC, 725 F.3d 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). In analyzing a motion for summary
judgment, the Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Latits v. Phillips, 878
F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2017).
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for (1) disability
discrimination and (2) FMLA interference. In support, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was
repeatedly accommodated, and not entitled to reinstatement or an equivalent position because of
the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding.3
B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Disability Discrimination
To establish a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate a disability, Plaintiff must

show that: 1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 2) she is otherwise qualified for the
position and could perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation; 3) her employer knew or had reason to know about her disability; 4) she requested
an accommodation; and 5) her employer failed to provide the requested accommodation.4
O'Donnell v. Univ. Hosps. Cleveland Med. Ctr., 833 F. App'x 605, 614 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing
Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595, 603 (6th Cir. 2018)). The
parties do not dispute elements one, two, three, and four. Therefore, Plaintiff must have shown
that there is sufficient evidence that a jury could reasonably find that Defendant failed to provide
the requested accommodation. Plaintiff argues that she was not sufficiently accommodated
because she was not given the specific position that she desired and others with similar conditions

had been placed in that position. ECF No. 33 at PageID #: 998 – 1004. Defendant argues that

3 Plaintiff abandons her state law disability harassment/hostile workplace claim in a
footnote of her opposition, without having provided notice to Defendant or the Court, in
violation of the Case Management Conference Order. ECF No. 8 at PageID #: 59 (“Absent
written consent of the adverse party, the party seeking to amend at least must alert the Court
and the adverse party to the substance of the proposed amendment by filing a Motion for Leave
with an accompanying memorandum of law”).
4 Because Ohio state-law disability claims rise or fall with an employee’s claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), the Court may apply the ADA statutory
framework and case law to analyze Ohio claims. O'Donnell v. Univ. Hosps. Cleveland Med.
Ctr., 833 F. App'x 605, 614 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1031
(6th Cir. 2014)).
Plaintiff was sufficiently and repeatedly accommodated when she was permitted to try multiple
jobs, and was given attendance accommodations. ECF No. 24-1 at PageID #: 521 – 523.
The evidence shows that Plaintiff requested that she be reassigned to a lower stress position
to avoid exacerbating her Multiple Sclerosis symptoms. In response, Defendant met with Plaintiff

to discuss available alternatives and offered her a different position with the Police Department.
Plaintiff rejected this accommodation and, in doing so, ended Defendant’s obligations to her under
the ADA. Hedrick v. W. Rsrv. Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004) (“if an individual rejects a
reasonable accommodation, the individual will no longer be considered a qualified individual with
a disability”). Even then, Defendant continued to allow Plaintiff to try different positions before
Plaintiff accepted a position as a Data Entry Operator as sufficiently accommodating. After
providing this accommodation, Defendant made further efforts to abate Plaintiff’s stress in her
new position by assigning Davis to act as an intermediary between Plaintiff and DelBene when
Plaintiff reported their contentious interactions.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant should accommodate her further by placing her in the

clerical role at the Water Treatment Plant. Plaintiff’s argument is rejected as “an employee cannot
force her employer to provide a specific accommodation if the employer offers another reasonable
accommodation.” Talley v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1108 (6th Cir. 2008).
Because the accommodations provided by Defendant were reasonable and in excess of the
requirements of the ADA, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant failed to grant appropriate
accommodation to Plaintiff. Summary judgment is granted on this claim.
C. Plaintiff’s Claim for FMLA Interference
The FMLA requires employers to provide up to twelve weeks of leave during a twelve-
month period when a qualifying employee experiences a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. §
2612. The FMLA also requires employers to restore the employee on return from leave to the
position held by the employee when the leave commenced or to a position with equivalent
employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2614. The
similarity requirement for an equivalent position has been clarified as meaning “one that is

virtually identical to the employee’s former position in terms of pay, benefits, and working
conditions, including privileges, perquisites and status” and “the same or substantially similar
duties and responsibilities, which must entail substantially equivalent skill, effort, responsibility,
and authority.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a). The FMLA does not entitle an employee, however, to
any “right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or position to which
the employee would have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” Id.
To succeed on a claim for FMLA interference, Plaintiff must navigate the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting framework. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under this framework, if a
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for FMLA interference, a defendant may then show a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action that may be rebutted by a showing
from the plaintiff that the proposed reason was mere pretext. Id. To establish a prima facie case
for FMLA interference, Plaintiff must show the following elements:
(1) she was an eligible employee; (2) the defendant was an employer as defined
under the FMLA; (3) the employee was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) the
employee gave the employer notice of her intention to take leave; and (5) the
employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.

Donald, 667 F.3d at 761 (citing Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2005)).
The parties do not dispute elements one, two, three, and four. Therefore, Plaintiff must show that
there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant denied Plaintiff
FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.
Plaintiff argues that by being returned to a different position at a lower rate of pay after her
leave, Defendant interfered with her rights under the FMLA. ECF No. 33 at PageID #: 992 – 994.
Defendant argues it was barred from returning Plaintiff to her Shift Lead position due to the
Memorandum of Understanding, and returning Plaintiff to an equivalent rate of pay she was

receiving at the time she began FMLA leave would confer a greater benefit on Plaintiff than she
would have received had she not taken the leave. ECF No. 24-1 at PageID #: 518 – 521. Defendant
cites to the Memorandum of Understanding, noting that Defendant was required to remove
Plaintiff from the Shift Lead position and place her in another position at her former rate of pay as
an Executive Secretary because Plaintiff failed to obtain the Certificate by the agreed upon date.
Id.
The right of an employee to reinstatement after exercising FMLA rights is not absolute.5
It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to show that an employer simply denied an extant right under
FMLA, it must be a right to which the plaintiff was entitled. Donald, 667 F.3d at 761. The Sixth
Circuit has clarified this requirement: “[i]f an employer takes an employment action based, in

whole or in part, on the fact that the employee took FMLA-protected leave, the employer has
denied the employee a benefit to which he is entitled.” Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441,
447 (6th Cir. 2007). The evidence shows that Defendant took an employment action based not on
Plaintiff’s FMLA leave, but on Plaintiff’s failure to abide by a long-standing agreement that
Plaintiff would obtain the required Certificate no later than two years after her appointment to the

5 29 C.F.R. § 825.216; Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding
that an employee was permissibly terminated when she was unable to return to work at the end
of FMLA leave); Arban v. W. Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 2003) (“An employee
lawfully may be dismissed, preventing him from exercising his statutory rights to FMLA leave
or reinstatement, but only if the dismissal would have occurred regardless of the employee’s
request for or taking of FMLA leave.”).
Shift Leader position. Plaintiff was aware of her obligations under the Memorandum of
Understanding and knew that if she failed to timely obtain the required Certificate, she would be
returned to another position at the same rate of pay as her former Executive Secretary role. By
Plaintiff’s own admission, she had not even registered for the Certificate examination with less

than one month remaining to do so. Because Plaintiff has not shown a connection between her
exercise of FMLA rights and the employment action taken by Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to
make a prima facie showing of interference.
Even if Plaintiff had made such a showing, Defendant would satisfy its burden to show a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action against Plaintiff. Donald, 667 F.3d
at 761. Plaintiff’s failure to obtain the Certificate required by the Memorandum of Understanding
is such a reason. The abundance of well documented notice to Plaintiff regarding the Certificate
requirement similarly precludes any showing from Plaintiff that this reason was mere pretext.
Because no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of interference
and Defendant had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions that Plaintiff has not

shown to be mere pretext, the Court grants summary judgment with on this claim.
D. Plaintiff’s Claim Raised on Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has raised, for the first time in her opposition, the issue of whether Defendant
should have provided more time after her return from FMLA leave for her to obtain the Certificate.
ECF No. 33 at PageID #: 992 – 994. Plaintiff relies on 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(b), which states:
If an employee is no longer qualified for the position because of the employee's
inability to attend a necessary course, renew a license, fly a minimum number of
hours, etc., as a result of the leave, the employee shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to fulfill those conditions upon return to work.

Defendant relies on cases from outside the Sixth Circuit to support its argument that § 825.215(b)
applies only to individuals whom already possessed a professional license prior to taking FMLA
leave and were unable to renew that license while on leave, as opposed to Plaintiff who had yet to
initially obtain the required Certificate.6 The Sixth Circuit has not resolved this question; and the
undersigned need not rule on this issue because Plaintiff’s allegation is absent from the Complaint
and was raised only in opposition to dispositive motion. “A plaintiff may not raise a new legal

claim for the first time in response to the opposing party’s summary judgment motion.” Hoffman
v. O'Malley, 447 F. Supp. 3d 629 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (aff’d on other grounds, Hoffman v. O'Malley,
849 F. App'x 535 (6th Cir. 2021)) (citing Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps.,
407 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005)).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is
granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

July 20, 2022 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

6 See, e.g., Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D. Me. 2001); Aponte
v. Brown & Brown of Fla., Inc., 806 F. App'x 824 (11th Cir. 2020).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10371056. Public record. Not legal advice.