# Globe Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Jacobs

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · June 2, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370905

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 2, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370905

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining the insurance company has interest in initiating a matter in interpleader because it “avoids the risk of paying the proceeds to the wrong beneficiary and being subject to subsequent litigation”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Globe Life and Accident Insurance ) CASE NO.: 5:20-cv-02189
Company, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
v. )
)
Dorothy E. Jacobs, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
) ORDER
Defendants. ) (Resolves Docs. 39 and 40)
)

On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff Globe Life and Accident Insurance Company (“Globe Life”)
filed a complaint in interpleader, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, alleging multiple individuals
asserted entitlement to the proceeds of a $20,000 life insurance policy (hereinafter, “Policy”)
originally owned by Gregory S. Jacobs (“Mr. Jacobs”), who died in April 2020. (See generally
Compl., ECF No. 1.) Globe Life asserts its complaint in interpleader is brought because it is unable
to determine who is entitled to the Policy’s proceeds. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-42.)
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following relevant facts are undisputed. In January 2010, Mr. Jacobs purchased a life
insurance policy from Globe Life in the amount of $20,000. (Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B at 8-9, ECF
No. 39-2.) Mr. Jacobs occasionally changed the Policy’s beneficiary designation, including on
November 27, 2017 when Mr. Jacobs, during a phone call to Globe Life, designated his wife,
Defendant Kimberly A. Jacobs (“Kimberly”), and his daughter, Defendant Dorothy E. Jacobs’
(“Dorothy”), as co-primary beneficiaries of the Policy. (See id. at 4, 26, 31; Mot. for Summ. J. Ex.
C at 4:00-6:03, ECF No. 39-3.) This is the final beneficiary designation Mr. Jacobs himself made.
(See Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B at 28-30, ECF No. 39-2. See also Compl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 1; Kimberly
Answer ¶ 16, ECF No. 15.)
In January 2019, Mr. Jacobs allegedly signed an Ohio General Durable Power of Attorney
(“POA”), appointing his ex-wife, Defendant Dottie Watson (“Dottie”), as his agent and attorney-

in-fact. (Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B at 1-3, ECF No. 39-2.) The POA instructed the following:
TO GRANT ALL OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF (N) AND
IGNORE THE LINES IN FRONT OF THE OTHER POWERS.
TO GRANT ONE OR MORE, BUT FEWER THAN ALL, OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS, INITIAL
THE LINE IN FRONT OF EACH POWER YOU ARE GRANTING.
TO WITHHOLD A POWER, DO NOT INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF IT. YOU MAY, BUT
NEED NOT, CROSS OUT EACH POWER WITHHELD.
(Id. at 1.) Mr. Jacobs’ initials do not appear before part (N), granting all powers contained in the
POA to Dottie. (Id. at 3.) In fact, Mr. Jacobs’ initials appear only before section (A), powers related
to real property transactions, section (E), powers related to banking and other financial institution
transactions, and section (L), powers related to retirement plan transactions. (Id. at 1-3.) Notably,
Mr. Jacobs’ initials do not appear before section (G), powers related to insurance and annuity
transactions. (Id. at 1.)
In April 2019, Dottie informed Globe Life that she was Mr. Jacobs’ agent and attorney-in-fact
pursuant to the POA. (Id. at 30.) In February 2020, Dottie, utilizing her alleged powers under the
POA, designated the Policy’s beneficiaries as herself as primary beneficiary, Defendant Monique
Jacobs (“Monique”) as the contingent beneficiary, and Dorothy and Defendant Mark A. Jacobs
(“Mark”) as co-tertiary beneficiaries. (Id. at 23, 28.) This was the final beneficiary designation of
the Policy before Mr. Jacobs’ death. (Id. at 28-30.) Mr. Jacobs died April 8, 2020. (Id. at 24.)
Globe Life alleges that upon Mr. Jacobs’ death, Kimberly, Dottie, Dorothy, and Monique all
claimed entitlement to the Policy’s proceeds. (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 39, ECF No. 1.) Globe Life further
alleges that although Mark and Defendant Gregory Jacobs, Jr. (“Gregory”) have not yet claimed
entitlement to the Policy’s proceeds, they were both, at times, “designated as co-primary
beneficiaries under the Policy and could contest the beneficiary designation that existed at the time
of Mr. Jacobs’ death.” (Id. at ¶ 30.) Due to this conflict regarding the Policy’s proceeds, Globe

Life filed the currently pending interpleader action that this Court will now address.
II. INTERPLEADER ACTION
As a preliminary matter, “[i]nterpleader is an equitable proceeding that affords a party who
fears being exposed to the vexation of defending multiple claims to a limited fund or property that
is under his control to a procedure to settle the controversy and satisfy his obligation in a single
proceeding.” Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. High Tech. Prods., 497 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Typically, there are two phases in interpleader actions. Lindenberg, 912 F.3d at 356. In the
first phase, this Court determines whether the stakeholder properly invoked statutory interpleader,

thereby establishing subject matter jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, by
properly pleading: “(1) the existence of actual or potential conflicting claims to a limited fund or
property held by the stakeholder . . .; (2) an amount in controversy of at least $500 . . .; and (3)
minimal diversity among the competing claimants.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
With respect to this first phase, it is this Court’s finding that Globe Life properly invoked
statutory interpleader, and established this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this
matter, in its complaint in interpleader. More specifically, Globe Life demonstrated, and no party
has argued otherwise, that: (1) Kimberly, Dottie, Dorothy, and Monique all have claimed
entitlement to the Policy’s proceeds creating actual conflicting claims to the Policy; (2) the amount
in controversy is greater than $500 given the Policy is one for $20,000; and (3) minimal diversity
exists among the competing claimants given Kimberly is a citizen of Tennessee while the other
claimants are citizens of Ohio. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1-8, 11, 29, 34, 37-39, 41, ECF No. 1. See also Mot.
for Interpleader Discharge, ECF No. 20.1)

“When the court decides that interpleader is available – typically, at the conclusion of the first
stage – it may issue an order discharging the stakeholder, if the stakeholder is disinterested,
enjoining the parties from prosecuting any other proceeding related to the same subject matter, and
directing the claimants to interplead . . . .” High Tech. Prods., 497 F.3d at 641 (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Because this Court determined that Globe Life properly invoked
statutory interpleader, this Court ordered Globe Life to deposit the Policy’s proceeds with this
Court and ultimately discharged Globe Life from the matter allowing the competing claimants to
interplead. (See Order of Deposit, ECF No. 7; Order, ECF No. 29.)
Therefore, the remaining issues before this Court begin the second phase of this interpleader
action. In the second phase, this Court “determines the respective rights of the claimants to the

fund or property at stake via normal litigation processes, including pleading, discovery, motions,
and trial.” Lindenberg, 912 F.3d at 356 (quoting High Tech. Prods., 497 F.3d at 641) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although both Kimberly and Dottie answered Globe Life’s complaint
in interpleader, only Kimberly has moved to interplead her claim against the Policy’s proceeds and
for summary judgment. (Kimberly Answer, ECF No. 15; Dottie Answer, ECF No. 16; Mot. for
Summ. J., ECF No. 39.) Kimberly’s motion goes unopposed.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

1 Although Kimberly opposed Globe Life’s Motion for Interpleader Discharge, she did not dispute that conflicting
claims to the Policy’s proceeds existed, that the amount in controversy exceeded $500, or that the competing claimants
were minimally diverse. (Opp’n to Mot. for Interpleader Discharge, ECF No. 21.)
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) sets forth that summary judgment shall be granted “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant “always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Once the movant’s burden is met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “show that there
is doubt as to the material facts and that the record, taken as a whole, does not lead to a judgment
for the movant.” Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992). In short, this
Court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
In the instant matter, the pending motion for summary judgment is unopposed. This Court is
authorized, under the local civil rules, to “rule on unopposed motions without hearing at any time
after the time for filing an opposition has expired.” LR 7.1(g). The local civil rules further provide
that the time for filing an opposition to a dispositive motion is thirty days after service. LR 7.1(d).
More than thirty days have passed in this case since Kimberly served her motion for summary
judgment, and no party has filed an opposition to her motion. This Court, therefore, will rule under
its authority to do so without hearing.
In addition, it is well settled that this Court may “grant dispositive motions because they are
unopposed.” Caroline’s Kids Pet Rescue v. Lake Humane Soc’y, No. 1:17CV297, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26382, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2022) (citing Demsey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.
1:04CV1942, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43339, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2005); Peacock v. Bayview

Loan Servicing, No. 1:05CV554, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10276, at *9-10 (N.D. Ohio May 26,
2005)). When a party fails to respond to a dispositive motion, it may be treated “as a confession
to” the motion’s merits. Demsey, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43339, at *5. With respect to unopposed
motions for summary judgment specifically, “although a district court must satisfy itself that the
moving party has met the demands of [Fed. R. Civ. P. 56] before granting summary judgment, the
court need not comb through the record to ascertain whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists.” Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Guarino, 980 F.2d
at 407, 410).
As a final note, as analyzed above, this Court properly has subject matter jurisdiction over the
instant matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 as there are actual conflicting claims to the Policy’s

proceeds, the amount in controversy exceeds $500, and there is minimal diversity between the
competing claimants. When a dispute predicated upon diversity jurisdiction is before this Court,
the substantive law of the forum state must be applied, while federal procedural law is followed.
See Himmel v. Ford Motor Co., 342 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2003); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1988). Therefore, this Court must apply the law as pronounced by the Supreme Court of
Ohio. Croce v. New York Times Co., 930 F.3d 787, 792 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Bank of N. Y. v.
Janowick, 470 F.3d 264, 272 (6th Cir. 2006)). In the event the Supreme Court of Ohio has not yet
addressed the issues present in the instant matter, this Court “may consider the decisions of the
State’s courts of appeals, relevant dicta from the Ohio Supreme Court, as well as other sources
such as ‘restatements of law, law-review commentaries, and the rules adopted by other
jurisdictions.’” Croce, 930 F.3d at 792 (quoting Mazur v. Young, 507 F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (6th Cir.
2007)).
2. Dottie Did Not Possess Authority as Mr. Jacobs’ Agent and Attorney-in-Fact to Change
the Policy’s Beneficiaries
This Court is primarily tasked with determining which individuals are entitled to the Policy’s
proceeds. This necessarily requires this Court to determine whether the beneficiary designations
made by Dottie pursuant to the powers granted her by the POA were valid. “A power of attorney
is a written instrument authorizing an agent to perform specific acts on behalf of his principal.”
Testa v. Roberts, 44 Ohio App.3d 161, 164, 542 N.E.2d 654 (6th Dist.1988). When an agent acts

on behalf of her principal, “the relationship must be characterized as fiduciary in nature.” Id. at
165 (citing Connelly v. Balkwill, 160 Ohio St. 430, 440, 116 N.E.2d 701 (1954) (“The relationship
of principal and agent is generally held to be fiduciary in nature”)). Therefore, “[t]he holder of a
power of attorney owes ‘the utmost loyalty and honesty to his principal.’” Gupta v. Lincoln Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-378, 2005-Ohio-6473, ¶ 16 (quoting Testa, 44 Ohio
App.3d at 165). Applying these principles to the current matter, the POA created a fiduciary
relationship between Dottie, as agent, and Mr. Jacobs, her principal, such that Dottie owed Mr.
Jacobs “the utmost loyalty and honesty.”
Given this fiduciary relationship, Dottie was not authorized to self-deal or transfer Mr. Jacobs’
assets to herself unless the POA “explicitly” conferred that power. See Gupta, 2005-Ohio-6473, ¶

16 (citing In re Scott, 111 Ohio App.3d 273, 675 N.E.2d 1350 (6th Dist.1996)). Therefore, any
beneficiary designation made by Dottie to the Policy, pursuant to the powers granted her by the
POA, could not benefit herself unless the POA explicitly allowed for such designation. Kimberly,
in her motion for summary judgment, argues the POA itself did not explicitly confer self-dealing
power to Dottie. (See Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B at 1-3, ECF No. 39-2.) Meaning, any beneficiary
designation of the Policy made by Dottie conferring benefits to herself upon Mr. Jacobs’ death are
invalid – this necessarily includes the beneficiary designation made by Dottie in February 2020,
which remained in place until Mr. Jacobs’ death and named Dottie, herself, as primary beneficiary

of the Policy. Because Kimberly, as unopposed movant, demonstrated the record contains no
genuine issue of material fact regarding the POA failing to confer self-dealing power to Dottie,
this Court agrees with Kimberly that the beneficiary designation made by Dottie benefiting herself
is invalid.
With respect to any other beneficiary designations Dottie made to the Policy pursuant to the
powers purportedly granted her by the POA, this Court finds that these designations are also
invalid. The POA, allegedly signed by Mr. Jacobs, instructed the following:
TO GRANT ALL OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF (N) AND
IGNORE THE LINES IN FRONT OF THE OTHER POWERS.
TO GRANT ONE OR MORE, BUT FEWER THAN ALL, OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS, INITIAL
THE LINE IN FRONT OF EACH POWER YOU ARE GRANTING.
TO WITHHOLD A POWER, DO NOT INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF IT. YOU MAY, BUT
NEED NOT, CROSS OUT EACH POWER WITHHELD.
Mr. Jacobs’ initials do not appear before part (N), granting all powers contained in the POA to
Dottie. Mr. Jacobs’ initials appear before section (A), powers related to real property transactions,
section (E), powers related to banking and other financial institution transactions, and section (L),
powers related to retirement transactions. None of these sections discuss either life insurance
policies or beneficiary designations of such policies.
Section (G) of the POA discusses powers related to insurance and annuity transactions and
reads:
To exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right, or obligation in regard
to any contract of life, accident, health, disability, liability, or other type of
insurance or any combination of insurance; and to procure new or additional
contracts of insurance for me and to designate the beneficiary of same;
provided, however, that my Agent cannot designate himself or herself as
beneficiary of any such insurance contracts.
Mr. Jacobs’ did not place his initials before this section of the POA. Once again, because Kimberly,
as unopposed movant, demonstrated the record contains no genuine issue of material fact that Mr.
Jacobs’ initials neither appear before section (G) nor section (N) of the POA, this Court agrees
with Kimberly that powers relating to the Policy, including designating beneficiaries, were not
conferred upon Dottie. This Court, likewise, agrees with Kimberly that any beneficiary changes to
the Policy made by Dottie were invalid as she did not possess the legal authority necessary to make
such changes.
In sum, this Court finds that Kimberly has met her burden as movant, and the proper
beneficiaries of the Policy are those individuals last designated by Mr. Jacobs, himself.
Accordingly, as designated by Mr. Jacobs himself during a phone call to Globe Life on November
27, 2017, Kimberly and Dorothy are the proper co-primary beneficiaries of the Policy and the
Policy’s proceeds shall be distributed to them.
B. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
On March 4, 2021, Globe Life moved this Court for an award of “attorneys’ fees and costs

incurred in bringing this interpleader action.” (Mot. for Interpleader Discharge 5, ECF No. 20.)
Globe Life seeks $7,560 in fees and costs to be paid from the Policy. (Id.) In general, “[a] federal
court has discretion to award costs and counsel fees to the stakeholder in an interpleader action,
whether brought under Rule 22 or the interpleader statute, whenever it is fair and equitable to do
so.” Holmes v. Artists Rights Enf’t Corp., 148 F. App’x 252, 259 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Although courts within the Sixth Circuit have come to different
conclusions with respect to awarding attorneys’ fees in interpleader actions, this Court will follow
the approach from the Middle District of Tennessee in UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kelling, 170
F. Supp. 2d 792 (M.D. Tenn. 2001). See also, Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. V. Deboard, No. 2:21-
cv-570, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166613, at *2-4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2021) (following UNUM, 170
F. Supp. 2d 792 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)).

In general, “a disinterested ‘mere stakeholder’ plaintiff who brings a necessary interpleader
action is entitled to a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees.” UNUM, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (citing
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bondurant, 27 F.2d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 1928)). However, “whether a court
should allow a party who commences an interpleader action to recover” attorneys’ fees and costs
is a matter of judicial discretion, and the requested fees and costs are “rarely awarded as a matter
of course.” UNUM, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 794 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). It is
within this Court’s discretion to exempt Globe Life from the general rule to award fees and costs
under three theories: (1) “insurance companies should not be compensated merely because
conflicting claims to proceeds have arisen during the normal course of business;” (2) “insurance
companies, by definition, are interested stakeholders” rather than disinterested mere stakeholders

because “filing the interpleader action immunizes the company from further liability under the
contested policy;” and (3) awards of fees and costs “would senselessly deplete the fund that is the
subject of preservation through interpleader.” Id. at 794-795.
In this Court’s view, all three theories exempt Globe Life from collecting the fees and costs
they requested. With respect to the first theory, it is clear the conflicting claims to the Policy in
this matter arose during the normal course of Globe Life’s business. Globe Life, as an insurance
company, should expect conflicting claims over life insurance policy proceeds, such as those
present in this matter, to arise. “Competing claims arise during the normal course of business and
the cost of doing such business should not be transferred to the insured.” Id. at 795. See also, Minn.
Life Ins. Co. v. Rings, No. 2:16-cv-00149, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157094, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
14, 2018) (concluding that interpleader actions brought to resolve competing claims to insurance
policy proceeds “are squarely within the normal course of business for insurance companies”).
With respect to the second theory, this Court finds Globe Life is, in fact, an interested

stakeholder rather than a disinterested mere stakeholder because obtaining judgment from this
Court regarding the proper beneficiaries of the Policy shields Globe Life from future litigation.
Clearly, without this interpleader action, Globe Life could have been subject to various conflicting
lawsuits claiming the Policy’s proceeds, suggesting Globe Life initiated this matter out of self-
interest. See UNUM, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96 (explaining the insurance company has interest in
initiating a matter in interpleader because it “avoids the risk of paying the proceeds to the wrong
beneficiary and being subject to subsequent litigation”).
Finally, with respect to the third theory, Globe Life is requesting $7,560 in fees and costs from
a $20,000 policy. That request represents 37.8% of the Policy’s proceeds, which troubles this
Court. Interpleader actions are equitable in nature and seek to preserve, not deplete, funds. To grant

Globe Life’s request for fees and costs would unnecessarily deplete the funds this interpleader
action seeks to protect.
In sum, because the competing claims to the Policy’s proceeds arose in the normal course of
Globe Life’s business, because Globe Life is insulated from future litigation regarding the Policy
given this Court’s judgment making it an interested stakeholder rather than a disinterested mere
stakeholder, and because Globe Life’s request for fees and costs would senselessly deplete the
funds sought to be preserved through this action, Globe Life is exempt from the general rule for
collecting attorneys’ fees and costs in this interpleader action. Globe Life’s requests for fees and
costs is, therefore, denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Kimberly’s pending motion is GRANTED. It is the Order of this
Court that the proceeds of the Policy be distributed to Kimberly and Dorothy per the final
beneficiary designation of Mr. Jacobs. The beneficiary designations of the Policy made by Dottie

under the powers purportedly granted her under the POA were invalid. In addition, Globe Life’s
request for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: May 31, 2022 /s/ John R. Adams
Judge John R. Adams
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370905. Public record. Not legal advice.