# Stewart v. Sheldon

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · April 29, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370890

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 29, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370890

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[a] violation of state law is not cognizable in federal habeas [] unless such error amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice or a violation of the right to due process in violation of the United States Constitution”

## Opinion text

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MR. ALEXIS J. STEWART, )
) CASE NO. 1:19CV2283
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
)
WARDEN ED SHELDON, )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
) ORDER
Respondent. ) [Resolving ECF No. 8]

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Mr. Alexis J. Stewart’s Objection to the assigned
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7) as it pertains to Ground One. ECF
No. 8. The assigned magistrate judge recommended that the underlying habeas petition (ECF
No. 1) be denied and Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability.
For the following reasons, Petitioner’s objection is overruled, the Report and
Recommendation is adopted, the underlying habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is denied, and no
certificate of appealability will be issued.
I. Background
In June 2017, a Logan County Court of Common Pleas grand jury indicted Petitioner
with: (i) one count of possession of cocaine; (ii) one count of aggravated possession of drugs;
(iii) two counts of corrupting another with drugs; (iv) one count of illegal conveyance of drugs of
abuse on to grounds of a specified governmental facility; and (v) one count of engaging in a
pattern of corrupt activity. ECF No. 4-1 at PageID #: 60 – 61. In October 2017, a jury trial was
held, and the jury found Petitioner guilty of (i) two counts of corrupting another with drugs, and
(ii) one count of illegal conveyance of drugs onto grounds of a specified governmental facility.
Id. at PageID #: 67 – 68. The jury found Petitioner not guilty of the remaining charges. Id. In
the aggregate, Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen (17) years in prison. Id. at PageID #: 71.
In November 2017, Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Ohio Court of Appeals,

setting forth a total of six assignments of error. Id. at PageID #: 78. Most relevant to the instant
matter, however, are Petitioner’s two ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which state:
I. Mr. Stewart was denied the effective assistance of counsel when
counsel did not seek suppression of the statements by Stewart to an
undercover agent while incarcerated at a critical stage of the case in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the parallel
Ohio right.

II. Mr. Stewart was denied the effective assistance of counsel when
counsel did not object to the Edward Yingling testimony and related
non-disclosure.

Id. at PageID #: 92 – 97, 98 – 101. The basis of Petitioner’s first ground is that a confidential
informant deliberately elicited incriminating statements outside the presence of his (Petitioner’s)
counsel and, as a result, Petitioner suffered unfair prejudice at trial. The basis for Petitioner’s
second ground is that defense counsel was not aware the prosecution would call a state
criminologist to proffer expert testimony about drug test results, but had counsel known, an
objection could have been raised, and Petitioner could have avoided unfair prejudice at trial.
In opposition, the prosecution argued that Petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel because (i) the right to effective assistance of counsel had not yet attached, the
information was volunteered by Petitioner, and in the alternative, any error was harmless (Id. at
PageID #: 157 – 161), and (ii) the prosecution did in fact provide a summary of their expert’s
report, thereby fulfilling all obligations pursuant to applicable law (Id. at PageID #: 161 – 163).
In June 2018, the Ohio Court of Appeals overruled each of Petitioner’s grounds and affirmed his
convictions. In September 2018, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction.
The habeas petition giving rise to the instant matter (ECF No. 1) was filed in October
2019, raising two grounds:

Ground One: Trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to
suppress Stewart’s statements to the informant regarding Baker’s
overdose as obtained in violation of Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964); and

Ground Two: Trial counsel was ineffective when he did not object
to the state’s toxicology expert’s testimony that [Victim]’s urine test
was presumptively positive for Fentanyl, when the expert’s written
report did not say there was a positive test result and the expert’s
intended testimony was not previously disclosed to the defense.

ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 6 – 8, ECF No. 7 at PageID #: 812. Petitioner objects to the assigned
magistrate judge’s recommend resolution of Ground One, but “offers no objection to the Report
and Recommendation as to Ground Two.” ECF No. 8 at PageID #: 832. As grounds for the sole
objection, Petitioner states that “there is no reasonable review of the case upon which reasonable
jurists could conclude a lack of prejudice to [Petitioner].” Id.
II. Discussion
When objections have been made to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,
the District Court standard of review is de novo. Fed. R. Civ. 72(b)(3). A district judge: “must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected
to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further
evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id. Importantly,
objections “must be specific in order to trigger the de novo review.” Bulls v. Potter, No. 5:16-
CV-02095, 2020 WL 870931, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2020) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)).
“A party disappointed with the magistrate judge's recommendation has a ‘duty to pinpoint those
portions of the magistrate's report that the district court must specially consider.’” Spring v.
Harris, No. 4:18-CV-2920, 2022 WL 854795, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2022) (quoting Enyart
v. Coleman, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1068 (N.D. Ohio 2014)). “A general objection to the entirety
of [a Report and Recommendation]” or “an exact recitation of arguments previously raised” will

fail to “meet the specificity requirement for objections.” Potter, 2020 WL at *1.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the state
court proceedings: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
– (2); see also Wilson v. Sheldon, 874 F.3d 470, 474 – 475 (6th Cir. 2017).
A federal court may review a state prisoner’s habeas petition only on the grounds that the
challenged confinement violates the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a). “A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.”
Nguyen v. Warden, N. Cent. Corr. Inst., No. 19-3308, 2019 WL 4944632, at *4 (6th Cir. July 24,
2019) (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)). Because state courts are the final
authority on state-law issues, the federal habeas court must defer to and is bound by the state
court’s rulings on such matters. See Mason v. Nagy, No. 21-1040, 2021 WL 6502177, at *3 (6th
Cir. July 27, 2021) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)) (stating that “it is not
the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
questions”); see also Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[a]
violation of state law is not cognizable in federal habeas [] unless such error amounts to a
fundamental miscarriage of justice or a violation of the right to due process in violation of the
United States Constitution”).

In this case, the majority of Petitioner’s seven-page objection is a nearly verbatim
restatement of what was set forth in the Traverse to Return of Writ (ECF No. 6).
Traverse to Return of Writ (ECF No. 6) Objection (ECF No. 8)
Ground One deals with Mr. Stewart’s Ground One deals with Mr. Stewart’s
conviction (Corrupting Another with Drugs) conviction (Corrupting Another with Drugs)
for allegedly causing the death of a drug for allegedly causing the death of a drug
(heroin) trafficking client due to an overdose. (heroin) trafficking client due to an overdose.
The State case was based upon supposed The State case was based upon supposed
claims of a dying victim not supported by the claims of a dying victim not supported by the
observations of officers, as she had claimed to observations of officers, as she had claimed to
have overdosed on heroin provided by Mr. have overdosed on heroin provided by Mr.
Stewart despite the lack of any powder or Stewart despite the lack of any powder or
residue at the scene. That case was brought residue at the scene. That case was brought
home, however, when the prosecution home, however, when the prosecution
introduced evidence from Mr. Stewart’s mouth introduced evidence from Mr. Stewart’s mouth
that “I sold the heroin, someone overdosed.” that “I sold the heroin, someone overdosed.”
The problem was that this confession was The problem was that this confession was
elicited in violation of Massiah when elicited in violation of Massiah when
detectives sent in a fake inmate to question Mr. detectives sent in a fake inmate to question Mr.
Stewart without the assistance of counsel. Stewart without the assistance of counsel.
ECF No. 6 at PageID #: 755 – 756. ECF No. 8 at PageID #: 832 – 833.
As Respondent correctly noted, the exact As Respondent correctly noted in his Return of
statement made by Mr. Stewart and used Writ, the exact statement made by Mr. Stewart
against him is in the State court decision. and used against him is in the State court
“Well, I’m kinda fucked. I had originally — I decision. “Well, I’m kinda fucked. I had
got an F2. * * * Cause when I sold the heroin, originally — I got an F2. * * * Cause when I
someone overdosed.” ECF No. 6 at PageID #: sold the heroin, someone overdosed.” ECF
757. No. 8 at PageID #: 833.

As to the relevant case – the count alleging In this case, the State had a problem that
corrupting Martha Baker – the State had a explains the decision to violate Massiah. The
problem that explains the decision to violate State had no proof of the substance causing the
Massiah. The State had no proof of the overdose. Martha Baker had died prior to
substance causing the overdose. Martha Baker testifying. No testing was done on her blood or
had died prior to testifying. No testing was urine at the time. Thus, the sole bases
done on her blood or urine at the time. Thus, (excluding the admission) for concluding that
the sole bases (excluding the admission) for the overdose was due to an opiate were
concluding that the overdose was due to an essentially the fact of the overdose, the fact that
opiate were essentially the fact of the overdose, Narcan worked, and the fact that Martha Baker
the fact that Narcan worked, and the fact that allegedly told the EMT Josh Strayer that she
Martha Baker allegedly told the EMT Josh snorted white powder of unknown type
Strayer that she snorted white powder of received from “Alex.” Transcript of Jury Trial,
unknown type received from “Alex.” Doc. 5-1, pp. 166-167, 171, PageID #491-492,
Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, pp. 166-167, 496.
171, PageID #491-492, 496.
This, however, was problematic. No one found
This, however, was problematic. No one found any powder residue. However, Deputy Drew
any powder residue. However, Deputy Drew Dixon found a pill, bottle and “some pills in the
Dixon found a pill, bottle and “some pills in the car * * * Vicodin, which is a Schedule II drug
car * * * Vicodin, which is a Schedule II drug pain reliever.” Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-
pain reliever.” Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5- 1, p. 175, PageID #500. The same were tested
1, p. 175, PageID #500. The same were tested and confirmed to include hydrocodone.
and confirmed to include hydrocodone. Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 176,
Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 176, PageID #501. As such, the pills were opiates.
PageID #501. As such, the pills were opiates. Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 189,
Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 189, PageID #514. Narcan works on Vicodin.
PageID #514. Narcan works on Vicodin. Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 278,
Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 278, PageID #603.
PageID #603.
In light of this, the jury would have strong
In light of this, the jury would have strong reason to believe that the State could
reason to believe that the State could not prove not prove that the overdose was caused by
that the overdose was caused by anything anything given to Ms. Baker by Mr. Stewart.
given to Ms. Baker by Mr. Stewart. First, the fact that Vicodin was found suggests
First, the fact that Vicodin was found suggests that the whole story about an unknown white
that the whole story about an unknown powder might have been made up by Ms.
white powder might have been made up by Ms. Baker to avoid criminal charges for
Baker to avoid criminal charges for illegal possession and use of Vicodin. Second,
illegal possession and use of Vicodin. Second, even if the story about the unknown white
even if the story about the unknown white powder was taken as reliable by the jury, the
powder was taken as reliable by the jury, the nature of the same being unknown coupled
nature of the same being unknown coupled with the known presence of opiates in pill form
with the known presence of opiates in pill form suggests that possibly the white powder
suggests that possibly the white powder was not an opiate (might have been cocaine,
was not an opiate (might have been cocaine, for example) and thus did not cause an
for example) and thus did not cause an opiate overdose. Simply put, cocaine as a
opiate overdose. Simply put, cocaine as a stimulant is believed by many on the street to
stimulant is believed by many on the street to offer a counteraction to an opiate overdose
offer a counteraction to an opiate overdose risk. Thus, a person sensing a possible opiate
risk. Thus, a person sensing a possible opiate overdose from Vicodin might in fact snort
overdose from Vicodin might in fact snort cocaine as an attempt at a “Street Narcan”
cocaine as an attempt at a “Street Narcan” substitute. The point is, though, that the
substitute. The point is, though, that the presence of the Vicodin pills in the car caused
presence of the Vicodin pills in the car caused
problems with the jury finding beyond a problems with the jury finding beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the “unknown white reasonable doubt (1) that the “unknown white
powder” story was reliable, (2) that the powder” story was reliable, (2) that the
“unknown white powder” was an opiate, and “unknown white powder” was an opiate, and
(3) that the unknown white powder caused the (3) that the unknown white powder caused the
overdose. ECF No. 6 at PageID #: 762 – 763. overdose. ECF No. 8 at PageID #: 833 – 834.

Respondent argues alternatively that the error Respondent argued that the error was actually
was actually harmless because of harmless because of the supposedly
the supposedly strong evidence against Mr. strong evidence against Mr. Stewart, and that
Stewart. The major problem with that claim argument won the day with the Report and
is that the State of Ohio belied that claim Recommendation. The major problem with
themselves with the prior arguments by the that claim is that the State of Ohio belied that
prosecution to the jury. claim themselves with the prior arguments by
the prosecution to the jury.
During the opening statement, the State, up
until the point of discussing these admissions During the opening statement, the State, up
by Mr. Stewart with the jury, had only a claim until the point of discussing these admissions
from an EMT that the deceased had claimed to by Mr. Stewart with the jury, had only a claim
have used powder provided by Mr. Stewart, from an EMT that the deceased had claimed to
with opiates in a non-powder form found in the have used powder provided by Mr. Stewart,
vehicle (Vicodin) but no powder found on the with opiates in a non-powder form found in the
victim or in the vehicle. Thus, this hearsay vehicle (Vicodin) but no powder found on the
testimony, although admissible, was suspect. victim or in the vehicle. Thus, this hearsay
The State, however, in explaining the case to testimony, although admissible, was suspect.
the jury, spent a great deal of time leading up The State, however, in explaining the case to
to the very admission that should have been the jury, spent a great deal of time leading up
suppressed, noting “You’ve got your to the very admission that should have been
admission right there.” Transcript of Jury suppressed, noting “You’ve got your
Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 117, PageID #442. At close, admission right there.” Transcript of Jury
the State relied largely upon the admission, as Trial, Doc. 5-1, p. 117, PageID #442. At close,
well. Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, pp. the State relied largely upon the admission, as
355, 370-371, PageID #680, 695-696. When well. Transcript of Jury Trial, Doc. 5-1, pp.
the State starts with the confession and ends on 355, 370-371, PageID #680, 695-696. When
the confession, the confession is the the State starts with the confession and ends on
centerpiece of the State argument. To now the confession, the confession is the
suggest otherwise is simply disingenuous. centerpiece of the State argument.

Respondent has correctly noted the deference Respondent correctly noted the deference due
due to the State appellate court. However, to the State appellate court, which persuaded
Respondent’s assessment of the conclusions to the Magistrate Judge apparently. However, the
be drawn is legally inaccurate. The State assessment of the conclusions to be drawn is
appellate court, in making its conclusion, made legally inaccurate. The State appellate court, in
the same error in the analysis done by making its conclusion, made the same error in
Respondent in this habeas action. The Court the analysis done by Respondent in this habeas
and Respondent both searched the record to action and then adopted by the Magistrate
see whether the facts alleged by the Judge. The Court and Respondent both
prosecution could be found, and they could in searched the record to see whether the facts
fact be found. That is not the proper analysis, alleged by the prosecution could be found, and
however. Harmless error is not shown by they could in fact be found. That is not the
simply assessing the case from the standpoint proper analysis, however. Harmless error is not
of sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, the shown by simply assessing the case from the
analysis is more akin to a weight of the standpoint of sufficiency of the evidence.
evidence analysis. ECF No. 6 at PageID #: Rather, the analysis is more akin to a weight of

765 – 766. the evidence analysis. ECF No. 8 at PageID

#: 834 – 835.
Without Mr. Stewart’s unconstitutionally Without Mr. Stewart’s unconstitutionally
elicited statement, the evidence of Mr. Stewart elicited statement, the evidence of Mr. Stewart
causing the overdose amounted to admissible causing the overdose amounted to admissible
hearsay from the deceased lady of using hearsay from the deceased lady of using
powder from Mr. Stewart, despite no powder powder from Mr. Stewart, despite no powder
residue being seem and despite Vicodin (also residue being seem and despite Vicodin (also
an opiate) plainly in view at the scene. From a an opiate) plainly in view at the scene. From a
standpoint of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, standpoint of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
a real jury would not likely be impressed by a real jury would not likely be impressed by
this evidence alone but would not even this evidence alone but would not even
question the State case after the admission was question the State case after the admission was
introduced. ECF No. 6 at PageID #: 766. introduced. ECF No. 8 at PageID #: 835.
As to the obvious problem for the prosecution As to the obvious problem for the prosecution
of the Vicodin but no powder, in the context of of the Vicodin but no powder, in the context of
an improperly admitted confession, the only an improperly admitted confession, the only
Third District analysis of the Vicodin was that Third District analysis of the Vicodin was that
“Stewart further was aware that Martha had “Stewart further was aware that Martha had
two Vicodin with her, indicating even more two Vicodin with her, indicating even more
knowledge of her circumstances.” That knowledge of her circumstances.” That
statement in the decision is astonishing. The statement in the decision is astonishing. The
Third District took the major defense point that Third District took the major defense point that
should have been made (the Vicodin caused should have been made (the Vicodin caused
the overdose, not anything Mr. Stewart might the overdose, not anything Mr. Stewart might
have given her) and turned it strangely into have given her) and turned it strangely into
evidence bolstering somehow the credibility of evidence bolstering somehow the credibility of
the EMT and hence the State case. It does not the EMT and hence the State case. It does not
but for the unconstitutional eliciting of a but for the unconstitutional eliciting of a
confession and introduction thereof. ECF No. confession and introduction thereof. ECF No.
6 at PageID #: 766 – 767. 8 at PageID #: 836.
Because Petitioner’s objection is a mere restatement of arguments previously before the
Court and thoughtfully analyzed by the assigned magistrate judge, it is not a proper objection and
the Court need not conduct de novo review. This determination is consistent with, and well-
grounded-in, applicable law. Green v. Andrews, No. 07CV2093, 2010 WL 1957482, at *6 (N.D.
Ohio May 14, 2010) (refusing to address petitioner’s objections because they “[amounted] to
approximately ten pages of text lifted verbatim from [petitioner]'s Traverse” and thus do not
qualify as objections”); Potter, 2020 WL at *2 (reasoning that because petitioner’s objection

was supported “with an exact recitation of arguments that were previously raised before the
Magistrate Judge, Petitioner's objections do not meet the specificity requirement that triggers this
Court's obligation to perform a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation”); Cannon v.
Potter, No. 1:16-CV-1849, 2019 WL 4315931, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2019) (declining to
conduct de novo review because petitioner’s “objections simply repeat and recite the arguments
he made in his Traverse – in many instances, those arguments are repeated word-for-word”).
Accordingly, the Court need not, and will not, consider Petitioner’s objection.
III. Certificate of Appealability (COA)
The Court must now determine whether to grant a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”)
for Petitioner’s ground for relief. Habeas courts are guided in their consideration of whether to

grant a COA by 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides in relevant part:
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may
not be taken to the court of appeals from --
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention
complained of arises out of process issued by a State court . . .
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
28 U.S.C. § 2253.
This language is identical to the requirements set forth in the pre-AEDPA statutes,
requiring the habeas petitioner to obtain a Certificate of Probable Cause. The sole difference
between the pre- and post-AEDPA statutes is that the petitioner must now demonstrate he was
denied a constitutional, rather than federal, right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
(2000) (interpreting the significance of the revision between the pre- and post-AEDPA versions
of that statute). Also, if a habeas claim is not procedurally defaulted, then the court need only
determine whether reasonable jurists would find the district court’s decision “debatable or

wrong.” Id. at 484.
After taking the above standard into consideration, the Court finds as follows:
The Court will not issue a COA for Ground One (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel). No
jurist of reason would debate the Court’s conclusions on that claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons provided above, the assigned magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation is adopted in its entirety, Petitioner’s objection is overruled, the underlying
habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is denied, and the Court will not issue a COA. A separate Judgment
Entry will issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 29, 2022 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370890. Public record. Not legal advice.