# Foster v. Jeep Country Federal Credit Union

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 23, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370606

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 23, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

TALISIA J. FOSTER, CASE NO. 3:21 CV 2402

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

JEEP COUNTRY FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendant. ORDER

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Talisia J. Foster has filed this action against Jeep Country Federal Credit
Union. (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, this action is dismissed in part.
Plaintiff’s complaint concerns her purported purchase of a vehicle financed through
Defendant Jeep Country Federal Credit Union. See id. at 7. She says after she selected the
vehicle she desired to purchase, she signed paperwork prepared for her by Defendant; however,
she was not informed of her right to recission, nor was she provided the proper documents to
exercise this right. Id.
Plaintiff states she began making payments on the loan in January 2021 but realized in
September 20211 that funds were being withdrawn from her personal checking account to pay
the loan. See id. She was ultimately “locked out” of her account. Id. at 8. When Plaintiff
contacted Defendant, Defendant told her it had authorization to withdraw funds from her account
when the alleged debt was more than 15 days overdue. Id. at 7. Despite issuing a “cease-and

1. Plaintiff lists this date as September 2020, but in context this appears to be a typographical
error. See id.
desist” letter, a request to rescind the contract, and a notice of intent to sue, Defendant continued
to attempt to collect on the alleged debt. See id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to inform her of the right to rescind, refused her right to
rescind, failed to comply with the Truth in Lending Act’s (“TILA”) obligation concerning “a
finance charge and contract law,” failed to validate the alleged debt, continues to attempt to

collect on the alleged debt with “harassing” and “threatening” letters, and continues to “willfully
furnish inaccurate and false information” that is negatively affecting her credit. Id. at 8-9.
Plaintiff appears to allege these actions constitute a violation of the TILA and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). See id. at 3, 8-9. Plaintiff also appears to allege
Defendant’s actions constitute criminal conduct under 15 U.S.C. § 1611. See id. at 8-9.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and a Court order requiring Defendant to: cease all
collection attempts, sign the vehicle’s title over to Plaintiff, and “remove and stop reporting all
fraudulent accounts to all credit agencies regarding [Plaintiff’s] account.” Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted when it lacks plausibility in the complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is
entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more
than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Court is not required, however, to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against
defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”). The FDCPA is a sub-chapter of the Consumer Credit Protection Act that protects
both debtors and non-debtors from misleading and abusive debt-collection practices. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692e. The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Wallace v.
Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e). The
FDCPA defines the term “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of
interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection
of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or
due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA specifically
excludes from that definition “any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the

creditor, collecting debts for such creditor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A); see also MacDermid v.
Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2007) (a “creditor” is not a debt collector
under the FDCPA and not subject to suit when collecting on account).
Here, Defendant is the creditor attempting to collect a debt on its own account. By
FDCPA definition, it is not a “debt collector”; rather, it is the very party to whom the debt is due.
Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant under the FDCPA and her FDCPA
claim must be dismissed.
Criminal Liability
Plaintiff also appears to allege Defendant’s actions constitute a violation of 15 U.S.C. §

1611. Section 1611 provides criminal liability for “[w]hoever willfully and knowingly . . . gives
false or inaccurate information or fails to provide information which he is required to disclose
under the provisions of the [TILA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.] or any regulation issued
thereunder.”
To the extent Plaintiff claims Defendant’s actions constitute criminal conduct and she
seeks criminal charges in federal court, her claim fails to state a claim. A private citizen “has no
authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution [against] defendants for their alleged unlawful
acts.” Williams v. Luttrell, 99 F. App’x 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing, inter alia, Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986)); Saro v. Brown, 11 F. App’x 387, 388 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A
private citizen has no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution; that power is vested
exclusively in the executive branch.”) (citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693
(1974)); see also Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 877-78 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (the United
States Attorney General is authorized to initiate criminal proceedings under 15 U.S.C. § 1611).
And in the absence of a private right of action, Plaintiff lacks standing to commence a

federal criminal action against Defendants. See Profit v. City of Shaker Hts., 2019 WL 319052, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio); see also Poole v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 WL 4772177, at *5 (E.D. Mich.)
(private citizen lacks standing to initiate criminal proceedings) (citing, inter alia, Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).
Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted to the extent she
seeks federal criminal charges against Defendant under 15 U.S.C. § 1611.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, and

purported criminal claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1611 be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED;
and it is
FURTHER ORDERED THAT this action shall proceed solely on Plaintiff’s claims under
the TILA.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370606. Public record. Not legal advice.