# Chilton v. Walters

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · February 23, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370574

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 23, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

KRISTOPHER CHILTON, CASE NO. 3:21 CV 1312

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

DEPUTY WARDEN RYAN L. WALTERS,
et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Kristopher Chilton, an inmate incarcerated at Toledo Correctional
Institution (“TCI”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various TCI employees
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. See Doc. 1. The served Defendants (Ryan Walters, James
Hobbs, Troy Reed, Abel Buck, Peter Kimball, and Christopher Salatin), along with interested
party, the State of Ohio on behalf of unserved Defendants (Captain John Doe and Matthew
Elder) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff has not filed a response, and the time in which to do so has expired.
See Local Rule 7.1(d) (providing that an opposition to a case-dispositive motion shall be filed
within 30 days). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons stated below, the
Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
At all relevant times to the instant case, Plaintiff was confined at the Toledo Correctional
Institution (“TCI”). (Doc. 1, at ¶ 5). Following an October 2019 visit with his sister in the TCI
visitation room, Plaintiff was ordered to dry cell watch. Id. at ¶ 16-18. He was “placed inside of
an empty concrete room with absolutely nothing in it besides four concrete walls”, including no
bed or blanket, sink or toilet, and “was stripped down and given a paper gown.” Id. at ¶¶ 21-22,
27-29. This room was in the receiving and discharge (“R&D”) unit. Id. at ¶ 19. He remained in
the room in this condition for nine days. Id. at ¶ 22. He slept on the concrete floor with cold air

conditioning blowing through the room. Id. He used a five-gallon bucket for toileting, which was
not emptied until the day he left the room. Id. at ¶ 29.
Plaintiff brings claims against the Deputy Warden of Operations, Investigators, the Safety
and Health Coordinator, a Major, the Second Shift Captain, and two Corrections Officers at TCI,
asserting each had some involvement in the above actions (or failed to respond to his
complaints). See id. at ¶¶ 6-13, 23-44. He seeks compensatory damages, as well as declaratory
and injunctive relief. Id. at 8-9.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the Court tests the

complaint's legal sufficiency. The Court is required to accept the allegations stated in the
complaint as true, while viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (noting that “[a]lthough for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must
take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it requires more
than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a complaint survives
a motion to dismiss if it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). And “[a]
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Hensley

Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief”).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss, asserting the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. They contend Plaintiff has not pled facts to satisfy the objective component
of an Eighth Amendment claim, citing caselaw regarding temporary uncomfortable prison
conditions such as sleeping on the floor, cold cell temperatures, and unsanitary conditions.
Again, as noted, Plaintiff has not responded.

To state a claim that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment under § 1983, an
inmate must allege prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or
safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher
standard than negligence, and it contains objective and subjective components. Id. at
834; Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008). The risk of harm to the prisoner caused
by the conditions of confinement must have been, objectively, sufficiently serious to require
constitutional protection. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The subjective component requires the
inmate to “show that (1) ‘the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer
a substantial risk to the prisoner,’ (2) the official ‘did in fact draw the inference,’ and (3) the
official ‘then disregarded that risk.’” Richko v. Wayne County, 819 F.3d 907, 915-16 (6th Cir.
2016) (quoting Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014)).
To establish such deliberate indifference, the prisoner must allege he was deprived of the
“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347,
(1981). Conditions that are restrictive or even harsh, but are not cruel and unusual under

contemporary standards, are not unconstitutional. Id.; see also Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F.
App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Harsh and uncomfortable prison conditions do not
automatically create an Eighth Amendment violation.”). Rather, an inmate must allege an
“extreme deprivation”. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Thus, federal courts may not
intervene to remedy conditions that are merely unpleasant or undesirable.
In considering whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, a court must
consider “‘[t]he circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation.’” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449
F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220
(2007) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts he was confined to a cold concrete room for nine days,
wearing a paper gown, without a bed, blanket, sink, or toilet; he used a bucket for toileting, and
the bucket was not emptied until the day he left the room. See Doc. 1. The Court finds that
although Plaintiff certainly alleges uncomfortable and unpleasant conditions, none of Plaintiff’s
allegations rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.
Lack of Mattress
Requiring an inmate to sleep on the floor without a mattress for a relatively short duration
does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Grisson v. Davis, 55 F. App’x 756, 757 (6th Cir.
2003) (allegations of seven day deprivation of mattress and blanket did not “allege facts that, if
proven, would rise to the level of the serious deprivation and deliberate indifference required to
support and Eighth Amendment claim.”); Jones v. Toombs, 77 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table disposition) (requiring inmate to sleep on floor for a two week period does
not violate the Eighth Amendment) (citing Schroeder v. Kaplan, 1995 WL 398878, at *2 (9th
Cir.) (requiring prisoner to sleep on floor for four weeks does not violate the Eighth

Amendment)); Valdes v. Evans, 2019 WL 334171, at *5 (W.D. Ky.) (“A . . . one-week period
without a mattress where an inmate does not allege any specific harm from going without it does
not give rise to a constitutional violation.”); Lee v. Wagner, 2017 WL 2608752, at *4 (W.D.
Mich.) (eight day deprivation of mattress not a violation); Bodman v. Dennis, 2011 WL 3739033,
at *7 (W.D. Mich.) (“Plaintiff’s allegation that he was . . . made to sleep on the floor for eight
days constitutes only a minor inconvenience; it falls short of demonstrating the sort of inhumane
conditions that implicate the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155,
163-65 (2d Cir. 2003) (no violation when inmate deprived of clothing, blanket, and mattress for
several weeks, and toilet paper for more than a week as a disciplinary measure because

discomfort of lacking clothing and bedding did not risk inmate’s health and safety).
As such, Plaintiff’s assertions regarding denial of a mattress and bedding for nine days do
not state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Toilet
The Sixth Circuit has recognized on more than one occasion that the Eighth Amendment
does not require flushable toilets in prison. See Abdur-Reheem-X v. McGinnis, 198 F.3d
244,1999 WL 1045069, at *2 (6th Cir.) (table) (the “Eighth Amendment does not require that
prisoners enjoy immediately available and flushable toilets”); Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996,
1013 (6th Cir. 1992) (“We do not agree that it violates the Eighth Amendment to require
prisoners to use nonflushable toilets on occasion.”); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508,
511 (6th Cir. 2001) (“With respect to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims—that he was
deprived of a lower bunk, was subjected to a flooded cell, and was deprived of a working
toilet—Plaintiff alleged only temporary inconveniences and did not demonstrate that the
conditions fell beneath the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a

contemporary standard of decency.”); Wiley v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 2012 WL 5878678, at *4
(E.D. Ky.) (“Temporary placement in a cell with no flushable toilet is not an extreme deprivation
of a basic necessity.”) (dismissing for failure to state a claim Eighth Amendment claim based on
plaintiff’s confinement to a dry cell for two weeks with, inter alia, no flushable toilet and no
running water).
Again, the Court finds Plaintiff has not alleged facts which, if proven, would demonstrate
an Eighth Amendment violation, and as such, dismissal is appropriate.
Cold Temperatures
The Supreme Court has explained that “[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish

an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only
when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at
night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
As with all Eighth Amendment claims, however, a court must consider the relevant factors of
“‘[t]he circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation.’” Spencer, 449 F.3d at 728
(quoting Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731).
Plaintiff alleges he was dressed in a paper gown, not provided with a blanket, and cold air
conditioning was blowing through the room. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 22). He does not allege he suffered any
specific injury as a result.
However, courts have found being subject to cold temperatures for a relatively short
duration does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Wells v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriff Dep’t,

35 F. App’x 142, 143 (6th Cir. 2002) (allegations that Plaintiff was forced to sleep in a cold cell
for six days does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); Dean v. Campbell, 1998 WL
466137, at *2 (6th Cir. 1998) (confinement in a cold segregation cell for more than
twenty days not sufficient to show the type of extreme deprivation necessary for
an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim”); Martinez v. Gore, 2021 WL 2269987,
at *3 (W.D. Ky.) (“The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim that he spent four days with nothing but
paper boxers to wear in a cold cell with no mat, sheets, blankets, shoes, socks, or other property,
standing alone, does not state an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Wiley, 2012 WL 5878678, at *4
(conditions including cold temperatures did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation

when they were “experienced for a short period of time, fourteen days”);
The Court finds the same result appropriate here. Although Plaintiff alleges he was
subject to cold cell conditions, he asserts no specific injury resulting therefrom, the conditions
were temporary (nine days), and the facts alleged do not set forth the sort of “extreme
deprivation” required.
Taken together, although certainly unpleasant, uncomfortable, and undesirable, “the
conditions about which Plaintiff complains . . . were discomforts which he experienced for a
short period of time”, nine days. Wiley, 2012 WL 5878678, at *4. They were “temporary
inconveniences, not conditions that fall beneath the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities as measured by a contemporary standard of decency”. Id. They do not amount to the
“extreme deprivation” necessary to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503
U.S. at 9.1
Physical Injury 42 U.S.C. § 1915e(e)
Furthermore, in addition to the above, even if Plaintiff had stated a constitutional claim,

dismissal of his damages claims would still be appropriate. Although Plaintiff’s Complaint
includes a conclusory allegation he suffered physical injury and seeks damages for such, the
Complaint does not allege facts to identify any specific injury or connect it to any particular
condition imposed. See Doc. 1. Section 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act states that
“[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The
physical injury need not be significant, but must be more than de minimis for a request for
compensatory damages based on an Eighth Amendment claim. Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249,
254 (6th Cir. 2010). Without such allegations, claims for mental or emotional injury may not be

maintained. See Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (“In the absence of
evidence that a prisoner suffered a physical injury, the deprivation of a mattress and bedding for

1. Additionally, and alternatively, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and the time in which to do so has expired. He has thus waived opposition to
the motion. See Humphrey v. U.S. Attorney General’s Office, 279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir.
2008) (“where, as here, plaintiff has not raised arguments in the district court by virtue of his
failure to oppose defendants’ motions to dismiss, the arguments have been waived”) (citing, inter
alia, Scott v. State of Tennessee, 878 F.2d 382, 1989 WL 72470, at *2 (6th Cir. 1989)
(unpublished table decision) (affirming district court’s grant of defendants’ unopposed motion to
dismiss and noting that “if a plaintiff fails to respond or to otherwise oppose a defendant’s
motion, then the district court may deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the
motion.”)); see also Brown v. Panther Premium Logistics, Inc., 2017 WL 6502822, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio) (“This Court may interpret the absence of a response to a motion to dismiss as a waiver of
opposition.”); Burdick v. Anthony, 2007 WL 275968, at *1 (N.D. Ohio) (“The district court's
power to grant motions to dismiss because they are unopposed is firmly settled.”).
a fixed period of time does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”); Grissom, 55 F. App’x at 758
(allegations that deprivation of mattress caused “aching” were “nothing more than [allegations
of] a de minimis physical injury”).
A plaintiff must allege “a specific physical injury” to satisfy § 1997e(e). Herman v.
Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001). General allegations of physical health problems and

conditions that do not require medical attention are insufficient. See id. at 665-66 (inmate’s
general allegations of “physical health problems” not sufficiently specific to satisfy § 1997e(e)).
Although Plaintiff generally alleges he suffered “serious physical injury” as a result of
Defendants’ actions, he does not describe or name a specific ailment or injury, nor specifically
connect any such injury to the conditions imposed. As such, § 1997e(e) provides an independent
basis for dismissing Plaintiff’s damages claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) be, and the same hereby is,

GRANTED; and the Court
FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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