# Vaughn v. Secretary of the Department Veteran Affairs

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · January 12, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370397

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** January 12, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370397

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007), applies in evaluating a pro se complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JULIUS MAURICE VAUGHN, ) Case No. 1:21-cv-1786
)
Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge David A. Ruiz
)
SECRETARY OF THE )
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS )
AFFAIRS, )
)
Defendant. )
)

OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Julius Maurice Vaughn filed suit Secretary of the Department
of Veterans Affairs Denis R. McDonough, seeking relief for alleged employment
“Discrimination based on sex male (none sexual) in violation of current Federal laws
and Statu[t]es.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #2.)
Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he Department of Veterans Affairs through its
Management, Managers, Supervisors, Agents, Agency and Staff created a Hostile
work environment” and “had a campaign of intimidation” against him and that he
was retaliated against after he filed an EEO Complaint. (Id.) He alleges the
Department of Veterans Affairs “did nothing to put a stop to the Demeaning
Vindictive onslaught of attacks” against him, “violate[d] the spirit of the Law with
Retribution, Harassment, Retaliation and Reprisal when [he] went to the Office of
Resolution Management to try [to] resolve issues that [he] had with Management,”
and “created a Hostile work environment through a false narrative of write up,
falsehoods, innuendoes, mistruths, and outright lies.” (Id., PageID #2–3.) Asserting
that he was “forced to retire early by [his] employer and caused to take an early
retirement penalty,” he seeks damages and other relief, including eight years of full

pay and benefits that he could have achieved for the full retirement against of sixty-
seven. (Id., PageID #3.)
With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
No. 2.) That motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, his complaint is subject to screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires district courts to screen all in
forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court and to dismiss before service any

such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) applies in
determining whether a complaint states a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard

articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007), applies in evaluating a pro se complaint under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). To survive dismissal, the complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’. . . it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The factual allegations in the pleading “must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Further, although pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are
“liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 93, 94 (2007), “the lenient

treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92
F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading
requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf.
Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 579–80 (6th Cir. 2001); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d
591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
DISCUSSION
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed in

accordance with Section 1915(e)(2)(B) because, even liberally construed, it does not
contain allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for federal employment
discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee “with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima
facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that he (1) is a
member of a protected class, (2) was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3)
was qualified for the position, and (4) was treated differently than a similarly situated

individual outside the protected class. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006).
A plaintiff may also establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex created a hostile or abusive work environment. Williams
v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 1999). “Discrimination in this
form occurs [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. (internal
citation and quotation omitted). To establish a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class,
(2) was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment complained of
was based on sex, (4) the alleged harassment created a hostile work environment,
and (5) the existence of vicarious employer liability. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 762.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate the required elements
of either kind of Title VII employment discrimination claim. Although Plaintiff
alleges in conclusory terms that he was mistreated, harassed, falsely written-up, and
subjected to a hostile work environment that forced him to retire early from his
employment, he has not alleged facts in his complaint supporting his conclusory
allegations of mistreatment or giving rise to a plausible inference that any
mistreatment he alleges was taken against him was based on or because of his sex
(or any other characteristic protected by Title VII). A complaint is properly dismissed
for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) where, as here, it “fail[s] to

provide any support” for an allegation that a defendant unlawfully discriminated on
the basis of a characteristic protected by Title VII. Tucker v. Victor Gelb, Inc.,
No. 98-4070, 1999 WL 801544, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999). “Conclusory allegations
of discrimination are insufficient to state a Title VII claim.” Id. (“A complaint that
includes only conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent without supporting
factual allegations does not sufficiently show entitlement to relief.” HDC, LLC v. City

of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Plaintiff’s complaint likewise fails to state a plausible claim under Title VII’s
retaliation provision, which it makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee “because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” Kirkland v. James, 657 F. App’x 580,
584 (6th Cir. 2016).
To establish a prima facie claim of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must show

that (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) this exercise of protected
rights was known to the defendant, (3) the defendant thereafter took adverse
employment action against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or
pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor, and (4) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or
harassment. Hunter v. Secretary of U.S. Army, 565 F.3d 986, 996 (6th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s complaint indicates he engaged in activity protected by Title VII by
filing an EEO complaint. He alleges that harassment against him intensified after
he did so, but he has not alleged specific facts in his complaint supporting his

conclusory allegations of harassment or of retaliation or demonstrating all of the
required elements of a prima facie claim. For example, he has not alleged facts
supporting a plausible inference that there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and a subsequent adverse employment action or severe or pervasive
retaliatory harassment by a supervisor. “Temporal proximity alone . . . cannot
establish a causal connection.” Dean-Lis v. McHugh, 598 F. App’x 412, 415 (6th Cir.

2015) (citation omitted). And in general, “conclusory allegations of retaliatory motive
unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim.” Harbin-Bey
v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005).
Although, as noted above, a complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level” to avoid dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Even liberally
construing Plaintiff’s complaint, it does not allege facts sufficient to meet this

standard.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In light of this dismissal, Plaintiff’s pending
motion for a status conference (ECF No. 3) is denied. Further, the Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 12, 2022

J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370397. Public record. Not legal advice.