# Reams v. Local 18, International Union of Operating Engineers

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · November 5, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370138

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 5, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

HEIDI REAMS, CASE NO. 3:21 CV 878

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

LOCAL 18, INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendant. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

In this matter, Plaintiff Heidi Reams brings state and federal law disability discrimination
claims against Defendant Local 18, International Union of Operating Engineers. (Doc. 12).
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss.1 (Doc. 13). Plaintiff opposed
the motion (Doc. 14), and Defendant replied (Doc. 15). For the following reasons, the Court denies
Defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff’s claims are supported by two related but distinct sets of facts. Plaintiff worked as
a clerk, an at-will position, for Defendant. (Doc. 12, at ¶¶ 13-15). A medical condition kept her
out of work, and she was fired shortly after returning from work. See generally id. at ¶¶ 16-66.
These facts are not put in issue by Defendant’s motion.

1. Though not captioned as such, Defendant’s motion attacks only one aspect of Plaintiff’s state
law claim, leaving undisturbed the remainder of her claims.
2. The Court is required to accept the allegations stated in the complaint as true, while viewing the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984)
Plaintiff’s pension was “months away” from fully vesting when Defendant terminated her
employment. Id. at ¶ 67. She sought work as a union member “in order to save her pension.” Id. at
¶ 68. Defendant operates a hiring hall, referring union members to employers. (Doc. 13-1, at 12-
16). Plaintiff provided Defendant with a medical release that lifted all restrictions and said she
could “operate heavy equipment in a safety sensitive environment.” Id. at ¶¶ 70-71. One of

Defendant’s managers prevented Plaintiff’s application from being processed by grabbing the
medical release, telling Plaintiff her release was insufficient, and that she could not work as a union
member. Id. at ¶¶ 73-79.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss attacking the state law claim stemming from Plaintiff’s
attempt to work as a union member. (Doc. 13). It argues the claim is preempted by federal labor
law. Id. at 1. Defendant’s motion initially attacked both collections of facts. Id. (“Plaintiff Heidi
Reams alleges that the union discriminated against her…when it: (1) terminated her employment;
and (2) refused to process her application to the Union’s hiring hall …These claims all fail as a
matter of law because they are completely preempted…”). But its reply abandons the attack on

claims stemming from Plaintiff’s termination. (Doc. 15, at 3) (“Here, the Union’s Motion seeks
the dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s § 4112 claims related to Reams attempt to work through the
Union’s hiring hall under two theories of federal preemption.”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the Court tests the
complaint’s legal sufficiency. The Court is required to accept the allegations stated in the
complaint as true, while viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Westlake
v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976).
Defendant bears the burden of showing Plaintiff’s claim is preempted. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394-95 (1986).
DISCUSSION

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s state-law discrimination claim is preempted under two
different theories. (Doc. 13, at 6-16). First, Defendant argues Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) preempts Plaintiff’s claim because it necessarily requires
interpreting a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 6-12. Second, Defendant argues Garmon
preemption also bars Plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 12-16. For the following reasons, the Court finds
Defendant has not met its burden to show either theory of preemption bars Plaintiff’s state-law
discrimination claim.
Section 301 Preemption
Section 301 of the LMRA displaces any state-law cause of action for violation of a contract
between a labor organization and an employer. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394
(1987). “Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining

agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining
agreement.” Id. Its preemptive force reaches state-law tort claims when an “essential element of
the tort . . . require[s] interpretation of the labor agreement”. Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d
1326, 1330 (6th Cir. 1989).
But tort claims independent of a collective bargaining agreement are not preempted. Mattis
v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2004). A claim is independent if it does not require
interpreting the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and if the right claimed was created
by state law rather than the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 906 (“In short, if a state-law
claim fails either of these two requirements, it is preempted by § 301.”). The Court examines each
prong of the preemption standard in turn.
Contract Interpretation
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim requires direct interpretation of some unspecified
provision of the collective bargaining agreement. (Doc. 13, at 8-10). But, looking at the elements

of Plaintiff’s claim, it becomes clear she has brought an independent claim.
Plaintiff claims she was barred from applying for employment as a union member because
of her disability. (Doc. 12, at ¶¶ 73-80). Under Ohio law, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice
for any employer to refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against a person because of her
disability. Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). “In order to prevail in an employment discrimination
case, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent.” Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St. 3d
578, 583 (1996). Plaintiff must also show “a link or nexus between the discriminatory statement
or conduct and the prohibited act of discrimination”. Byrnes v. LCI Commc’n Holdings Co., 77
Ohio St. 3d 125, 130 (1996). Only in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination do the

familiar McDonnell Douglas factors become relevant. Kohmescher v. Kroger Co., 61 Ohio St. 3d
501 (1991).
These elements do not require the Court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement.
Defendant argues the “only way for the Court to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to work
as a ‘union member’ or otherwise participate in the Hiring Hall is by reviewing and enforcing the
Hiring Hall rules regarding working as a Union member and participation in the Hiring Hall.”
(Doc. 13, at 9). Notably, Defendant does not identify any contractual provision which this Court
will need to interpret to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim. See Guidry v. Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Ass’n, 2007 WL 707511, at *6 (N.D. Cal.) (“Although MEBA asserts in conclusory fashion that
adjudication of the state-law claim would require the Court ‘to analyze . . . contractual provisions,’
it has failed to identify any contractual provision whose meaning is disputed. Nor apparently could
it do so, for Plaintiff’s right to be free from retaliatory action, which was conferred by the
California legislature via FEHA, does not depend on Plaintiff's contract with MEBA and could not
be abrogated by it.”). Plaintiff’s well-pled allegation is that Defendant prevented her from applying

for work, and thereby necessarily refused to hire her3, because of her disability. (Doc. 12, at ¶¶ 70-
79). That allegation, alone, alleges Plaintiff’s prima facie case under the direct evidence standard.
“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the existence of improper discrimination
animus without inference or presumption.” Shaw v. Access Ohio, 118 N.E.3d 351, 358 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2018). Here, Plaintiff alleges she was unable to apply for a job with Defendant because
Defendant’s manager physically blocked her from applying. (Doc. 12, at ¶ 74). And the manager
did so, according to Plaintiff’s allegation, because he believed she was disabled. Id. at ¶¶ 76-78.
No inference is required to connect the alleged adverse action to the requisite discriminatory intent.
That is, taking Plaintiff’s account as true, she has pled allegations which satisfy the direct evidence

standard for proving disability discrimination, and that prima facie case is made without reference
to or interpretation of any collective bargaining agreement provision.

3. Interpreting other anti-discrimination law, persuasive authority supports finding Defendant
preventing Plaintiff from applying for employment is an adverse employment action. Robinson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 823 F.2d 793, 796 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Although a plaintiff who did not
apply for a position is not foreclosed from success in an employment discrimination action, in such
a situation the plaintiff must establish that she was inhibited from applying because of the
employer's discriminatory practices.”). This is a natural, logical extension of a statute forbidding
employers from refusing to hire for discriminatory reasons. Ohio Rev. Code. § 4112.02(A) (“It
shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice…[f]or any employer, because of…disability…to
refuse to hire…”).

Defendant begins to raise various defenses to that prima facie case in its briefing, including
that it properly sought medical clearance from Plaintiff, and that she may not have been entitled to
work as a union member. (Doc. 13, at 9). But these defenses rebut or contradict Plaintiff’s case –
they are not elements she has to prove herself. “It is irrelevant to the preemption question whether
or not the employer can defend by showing it had the right under the collective bargaining

agreement to do what it did.” O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 1989). Those
defenses remain available at later stages of the litigation, but Defendant’s argument that they intend
to make this Court interpret the collective bargaining agreement to its advantage does not bar
Plaintiff from bringing her claim that, on its face, has nothing to do with any provision of that
agreement.
Defendant argues a Southern District of Iowa case supports their argument that state law
discrimination claims are preempted by federal labor law. (Doc. 13, at 10-12) (citing Pitts v.
Steamfitters Local Union No. 33, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1014 (S.D. Iowa 2010)). But that case is
distinguishable, and does not advance Defendant’s argument. The plaintiff in Pitts was already in

the union, and she alleged the union refused to refer her specific employment opportunities. 718
F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16. The court held determining whether an adverse employment action
occurred at all required interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1016. Here, the
Court does not have to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether Plaintiff
suffered an adverse action – she was not hired, and Defendant prevented her from even applying,
easily satisfying that element of her claim. See Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). Further, the Iowa
court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in its analysis, whereas here Plaintiff appears to
have alleged a claim under the direct evidence standard. (Doc. 12, at ¶¶ 70-79). This makes the
elements of the prima facie case different, as Plaintiff has less work to do in dismissing alternative
explanations and motivations for Defendant’s actions. Mauzy, 75 Ohio St. 3d at 583 (“The function
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test is to allow the plaintiff to raise an inference of
discriminatory intent indirectly. It serves to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory reasons
for the employer's action: lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy.”). In this case, as
discussed above, Defendant’s argument that it had a right to do what it did is a defense, rather than

a nondiscriminatory reason Plaintiff must disprove as part of her prima facie case. As such it
cannot be the basis for preempting Plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, Defendant has not met its burden
to show the claim is preempted.
Source of Right
A state law claim may also be preempted when a collective bargaining agreement creates
the right a plaintiff seeks to enforce. Mattis, 355 F.3d at 905. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim is
dependent upon rights created by the collective bargaining agreement. See Doc. 13, at 12 (“Even
when assigning all reasonable inferences in Reams’ favor, Reams’ Complaint makes clear that the
rights or benefits at issue – ‘to work as a union member’ – all emanate from the CBA.”). But

Plaintiff, as discussed above, does not need to prove she had a right to work as a union member.
She must prove Defendant did not hire her, and prevented her from applying, because of her
disability. See Byrnes, 77 Ohio St. 3d. at 130 (“[I]n a cause of action for age discrimination under
R.C. 4112.02 or 4112.14, when relying upon the direct evidence standard…an employee must
prove a causal link or nexus between evidence of a discriminatory statement or conduct and the
prohibited act of discrimination to establish a violation.”). Indeed, Defendant’s proffered case law
demonstrates how this case is not based on rights emanating from a collective bargaining
agreement. (Doc. 15, at 8). The Sixth Circuit held a nonunion employee’s lawsuit, alleging the
union deprived him of membership, “the opportunity to work in his trade, and the benefits of a
pension system into which he had paid the required contributions”, was based in the collective
bargaining agreement and thus within the scope of Section 301. Hill v. Iron Workers Loc. Union
No. 25, 520 F.2d 40, 41-42 (6th Cir. 1975). Defendant tries to connect these contract claims to
Plaintiff’s tort claim, but the analogy fails – for example, that Plaintiff sought employment with
Defendant to preserve her nearly-vested pension does not mean she is suing to enforce a

contractual right to a pension like the Hill plaintiff did. That is, Plaintiff’s personal motivations for
applying for work with Defendant do not transform the nature of the claim from a tort to a breach
of contract claim. Plaintiff’s right to be considered for employment free from invidious disability
discrimination plainly emanates from Ohio statutory law, not the collective bargaining agreement.
See Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). The case law presented by Defendant does not persuade this
Court otherwise.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, Defendant has not met its burden to show
Section 301 preempts Plaintiff’s state law disability claim.
Garmon Preemption

Defendant also argues Garmon preemption bars Plaintiff’s state law disability claim.
“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relation] Act, the States
as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Loc. 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim is, in substance, a claim of breach of Defendant’s duty of fair
representation, which is rooted in Section Nine of the National Labor Relations Act. (Doc. 13, at
13) As an initial matter, the Court notes Garmon preemption does not reach claims related to the
duty of fair representation:
Plaintiff mischaracterizes this latter preemption argument as involving Garmon
preemption, see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79
S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Garmon preemption concerns federal protection
of the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. In Garmon, the
Supreme Court held that “[when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the
[National Labor Relations] Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer
to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of
state interference with national policy is to be averted].” 359 U.S. at 249, 79 S.Ct.
at 780. The purpose of the Garmon rule, thus, is to ensure that disputes within the
Board's expertise are first committed to it. Brown, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3186. See
also, Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 838 F.2d 856, 874 (6th Cir.1988)
(Merritt, J., concurring in part). However, the Supreme Court made clear in Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), that the NLRB has no
special expertise over claims of a union's breach of its duty of fair representation,
and thus, Garmon preemption is inapplicable to this class of cases. 87 S.Ct. at 912–
14.

Bredesen v. Detroit Fed’n of Musicians, Loc. No. 5, Affiliated with Am. Fed’n of Musicians, 165
F. Supp. 2d 647, 653 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Nonetheless, claims that fall within a union’s duty of fair representation are preempted.
Maynard v. Revere Copper Products, Inc. 773 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 1985). But here, there can
be no duty of fair representation claim because Defendant owed Plaintiff no duty. The duty of fair
representation is owed only to members of a collective bargaining unit. McTighe v. Mechanics
Educ. Soc. of Am., Loc. 19, AFL-CIO, 772 F.2d 210, 213 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff was never an
employee within the bargaining unit Defendant represents, therefore it never owed her a duty of
fair representation, and that duty cannot then preempt her claim.
Defendant also points to Supreme Court precedent, but the present case is distinguishable.
The Court recognizes the Supreme Court has held a union, operating a hiring hall, which denies
employment through unfair, irrelevant, or invidious practices violates its duty of fair
representation. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Loc. Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 78
n.3 (1989). But again that case addresses the hiring hall’s treatment of employees within the
bargaining unit which it refers out to other employers, see id., rather than here where Defendant’s
alleged discriminatory conduct prevented Plaintiff from ever joining the bargaining unit. The duty
of fair representation only preempts claims where it exists, and at this stage Defendant has not
shown it had a duty to fairly represent Plaintiff, as a nonemployee. Since Defendant has not shown
it had such a duty to Plaintiff, that duty cannot preempt Plaintiff’s claim.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13), be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10370138. Public record. Not legal advice.