# Davis v. Richland County Sheriff Office

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10369420

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10369420

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
BRANDON LAMAR CAPRICE ) Case No.: 1: 20 CV 2610
DAVIS, Pro Se, )
)
Plaintiff )
) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
v. )
)
RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S )
OFFICE, et al., )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Defendants ) AND ORDER
Pro Se Plaintiff Brandon Lamar Caprice Davis, a prisoner in the Mansfield Correctional
Institution, has filed an in forma pauperis civil rights complaint in this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the Richland County Sheriff’s Office, Connie Wells, Randall Fry, Gary Bishop, and
Richland County Court of Common Pleas Judge Phillip Naumoff. (Doc. No. 1.)
His complaint does not set forth factual allegations as to each Defendant, nor does it assert
any specific legal claim. The only allegation the Plaintiff makes in the statement of claim portion
of his complaint is that “[on] March 21, 2011 Connie Wells of the Richland County Sheriff’s Office
made me register as a Tier 2 sex offender without researching my case.” (Id. at 5-6.) For relief, the
Plaintiff seeks “not [to] have to register” as a sex offender and $8 million in damages. (Id. at 6.)
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the lenient treatment accorded pro
se plaintiffs has limits. See e.g., Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996). Pro se
plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure unpled
allegations for them or “guess at the nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989).

Federal courts, moreover, are courts of limited jurisdiction and have a duty to police the
boundaries of their jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Therefore, “a district court may, at any
time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible,
attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999).
Upon review, the court finds this action warrants sua sponte dismissal pursuant to Apple v.

Glenn. The allegations in the Plaintiff’s complaint are so vague, unclear, and unsubstantial that they
do not provide a basis to establish this court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim against any
Defendant.
Further, a civil rights action under § 1983 is not the appropriate mechanism for a person in
state custody to challenge the legality of a conviction or sentence. As the Plaintiff has been informed
in a prior case, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for prisoners in state custody who wish to
challenge their state conviction or sentence in federal court, and requires as a prerequisite that the
prisoner exhaust all state court remedies prior to filing a claim. See Brandon Lamar Caprice Davis

v. Warden Ed Sheldon, No. 1: 20 CV 1227, 2020 WL 8474710, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2020)
(dismissing a prior habeas corpus action filed by the Plaintiff).
In addition, a damages cause of action under § 1983 arising out of an allegedly unlawful
2
conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until a plaintiff first shows that the challenged
conviction or sentence has already “been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994). Nothing in the Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that a state conviction or sentence he may be

challenging has been overturned or invalidated in any of the ways articulated in Heck.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed pursuant to the court’s
authority established in Apple v. Glenn. The court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Solomon Oliver, Jr.
SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
March 30, 2021

3

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10369420. Public record. Not legal advice.