# Olivia v. Airbus Americas, Inc.

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · March 25, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10368178

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 25, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Ashley Olivia, et al., ) CASE NO. 1:19 CV 1701
)
Plaintiffs, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
Vs. )
)
Airbus Americas, Inc., et al., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order
)
Defendants. )
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon defendant HAECO Americas, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 55) and (2) plaintiff’s Alternative Motion for Extension of Time to Conduct
Discovery (Doc. 57). This action arises from injuries plaintiff Ashley Olivia sustained while an
airline passenger. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss and DENIES plaintiff’s request for an extension of discovery.
FACTS
Plaintiffs Ashley, Vickie, and John Olivia brought this lawsuit in the Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court against defendants Spirit Airlines, Spirit Airlines, Inc. (collectively “Spirit
1
Airlines”), and ten unnamed John Doe defendants. The complaint alleged negligence in
connection with injuries Ashley Olivia sustained during a Spirit Airlines flight. On June 20,
2019, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, adding Airbus Americas, Inc. (“AAI”); Airbus;
Lufthansa Technik Puerto Rico, LLC (“Lufthansa PR”); Lufthansa Technik; Lufthansa Technik,

AG; Lufthansa Group; HAECO Americas;1 HAECO Group; Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering
Company, Ltd.; Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company America, Ltd.; and Jason Sheppard
as defendants. On June 26, 2019, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (“Complaint”),
adding Brice Manufacturing Company, Inc. (“Brice”) as a defendant.2 Thereafter, on July 25,
2019, AAI removed this matter to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
For purposes of ruling on the pending motion, the facts asserted in the Complaint are
presumed to be true.
On June 26, 2017, Ashley Olivia was a passenger on a Spirit Airlines flight scheduled to
depart from Las Vegas, Nevada to Ohio. Upon boarding, Ms. Olivia sat in the middle section of

the plane in an aisle seat. Spirit Airlines flight attendants moved a passenger from the front
section of the plane to the seat directly in front of Ms. Olivia. Approximately 10-15 minutes
after the plane began to move towards the runway for takeoff, the passenger’s seat broke and
collapsed, crushing Ms. Olivia’s left foot and toes. The airplane subsequently returned to the

1 Defendant HAECO Americas, LLC asserts it was improperly sued as HAECO
Americas. Plaintiff does not dispute that the legally recognized entity name is
HAECO Americas, LLC. However, plaintiff has asserted that “discovery will be
necessary to identify the HAECO entities that are indeed legally responsible for
designing and manufacturing the airline seat at issue, which may well prove to be
either HAECO Americas, LLC or HAECO Cabin Solutions,” a non-party.
2 By Memorandum of Opinion and Order, this Court dismissed Jason Sheppard,
AAI, Lufthansa PR, and Brice from the action.
2
boarding area and Ms. Olivia was taken via ambulance to a local hospital for treatment. Ms.
Olivia returned to Cleveland, Ohio the following day.
The Complaint contains five claims for relief, though only four remain pending. Counts
one through four are asserted by plaintiff Ashley Olivia. Count One is a claim for negligence and

is asserted against all defendants. Counts two, three, and four are claims for statutory products
liability, breach of warranty, and supplier liability, respectively. These claims are asserted
against all defendants except Spirit Airlines.
This matter is now before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss of defendant HAECO
Americas, LLC (“HAECO Americas”). HAECO Americas seeks dismissal on the basis of lack
of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposes the motion and, alternatively, requests additional
discovery in order to properly respond to defendants’ motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The plaintiff always bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists.
Serras v. First Tennessee Bank National Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir.1989). When a
defendant has filed “a properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may not stand on his
pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court has
jurisdiction.” Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Weller v.
Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 1974)). When evaluating a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, a court has three options: “it may decide the motion upon the
affidavits alone; it may permit discovery in aid of deciding the motion; or it may conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions.” Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj,

673 F.3d 430, 449 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458).
3
If a court chooses to rule on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss without an evidentiary
hearing, the plaintiff “need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Bird v. Parsons,
289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d
883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002)). The plaintiff can make this prima facie showing by “establishing with
reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [the defendants] and the forum state to
support jurisdiction.” Neogen Corp., 282 F.3d at 887 (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v.

California Savings & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)). This burden is “relatively
slight.” Carrier Corp, 673 F.3d at 449. Moreover, the court must “construe the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party” and “will not consider facts proffered by the defendant
that conflict with those offered by the plaintiff.” Neogen Corp., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir.
2002). Indeed, “because weighing any controverted facts is inappropriate at this stage, dismissal
is proper only if [the plaintiff’s] alleged facts collectively fail to state a prima facie case for
jurisdiction. Carrier Corp, 673 F.3d at 449 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In diversity cases, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant if jurisdiction

is “(1) authorized by the law of the state in which it sits, and (2) in accordance with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Neogen Corp., 282 F.3d at 888 (citing Reynolds
v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Sixth Circuit has
determined that “Ohio's long-arm statute is not coterminous with federal constitutional limits,”
and has “consistently focused on whether there are sufficient minimum contacts between the
nonresident defendant and the forum state so as not to offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Bird, 289 F.3d at 871 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)). Because Ohio’s long-arm statute does not reach the full limits of the federal

4
constitution, a finding that Ohio’s long-arm statute allows for jurisdiction does not foreclose the
need for Due Process Clause analysis. See Brunner v. Hampson, 441 F.3d 457, 465 (6th Cir.
2006); Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 712 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Unlike other jurisdictions, Ohio
does not have a long-arm statute that reaches to the limits of the Due Process Clause, and the
analysis of Ohio's long-arm statute is a particularized inquiry wholly separate from the analysis
of Federal Due Process law.”).

There are two forms of personal jurisdiction to be considered under Due Process
analysis: general and specific. General jurisdiction is found when a defendant’s “affiliations
with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the
forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)
(quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). The Supreme Court
has found that general jurisdiction only occurs in a limited set of circumstances and the
“paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s place of incorporation
and principal place of business.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014). The

Supreme Court has explained that the benefit of looking to the place of incorporation and
principal place of business is that “each ordinarily indicates only one place” and is “easily
ascertainable.” Id. at 137. Indeed, for a court to find general jurisdiction in a forum other than a
corporate defendant’s place of incorporation or principal place of business is the “exceptional
case.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139
n.19).
Specific jurisdiction turns on “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,

5
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)). To establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant, a court must
find “(1) purposeful availment of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a
consequence in the forum state, (2) a cause of action arising from activities in the state, and (3) a
substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant reasonable.” Schneider v. Hardesty, 669 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

I. MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff asserts negligence, statutory products liability, breach of warranty, and supplier
liability claims against defendant HAECO Americas. According to HAECO Americas, plaintiff
has not met her burden of establishing that the Court has either general or specific jurisdiction
over it. Plaintiff argues that she has, in fact, met her prima facie burden in establishing that
personal jurisdiction exists.
Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of general
jurisdiction over HAECO Americas. In her complaint, plaintiff lists HAECO Americas’

domicile as North Carolina and alleges that HAECO Americas is “recognized under the laws of
the State of Ohio.” Plaintiff alleges no facts, however, suggesting that HAECO Americas’
principal place of business or state of incorporation is in Ohio. Nor does plaintiff allege that
HAECO Americas has such substantial operations in Ohio so as to render the company
“essentially at home” in Ohio. Thus, this is not one of the “exceptional cases” in which a court
would find general jurisdiction in a forum other than a corporate defendant’s place of
incorporation or principal place of business. See BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1558; Daimler, 571
U.S. at 139 n.19.

6
Plaintiff argues that HAECO Americas “has made no meaningful attempt to challenge the
[Complaint’s] allegations with regard to general jurisdiction.3” It is plaintiff’s burden, however,
to establish personal jurisdiction. Hutchinson v. Parent, 2014 WL 198798, *1 (N.D. Ohio 2014)
(“In opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff

to demonstrate that jurisdiction is proper.”) The minimal allegations offered by plaintiff in the
Complaint are not enough to establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction.
Plaintiff contends that because “the operational and financial information needed to
determine whether general jurisdiction exists is hardly public knowledge, and can be obtained
only through discovery,” dismissal at this stage of the proceedings would be improper. As an
initial matter, a court has the discretion to decide Rule 12(b)(2) motions on the pleadings alone,
with or without discovery. See Carrier Corp., 673 F.3d at 449. Moreover, discovery has been
ongoing since December 1, 2019. There is nothing preventing plaintiff from discovering where
HAECO Americas’ principal place of business or state of incorporation is located, or if it has

substantial operations in Ohio.
Accordingly, because plaintiff does not allege any facts that suggest HAECO Americas
has such substantial operations in Ohio to render it essentially at home in this state, general
jurisdiction is lacking.

3 Plaintiff bases this argument on the fact that HAECO Americas’s “General
Counsel’s sworn statement is completely silent with regard to whether and what
extent HAECO has been conducting business activities in, or directing such
efforts toward, the State of Ohio.” The Court notes that HAECO Americas, in
support of its motion to dismiss, attached an affidavit from its general counsel,
attesting to HAECO Americas’ lack of property, offices, and employees in Ohio.
The Court did not consider this affidavit. Rather, the Court held plaintiff to her
minimal prima facie burden.
7
The Court also finds that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of specific
jurisdiction over HAECO Americas. As set forth above, specific jurisdiction requires that a
defendant purposefully avail itself of the privilege of acting in the forum and that the cause of
action be related to the defendant’s activities within the forum. Schneider, 669 F.3d at 701. In

the Complaint, plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that each defendant “transacted business,
entered into contractual relations to supply services or goods, caused tortious injury, and
otherwise established minimum contacts in the State of Ohio as defined” by Ohio’s long-arm
statute.4 However, these bare legal conclusions, which have no supporting factual basis, do not
link any activities HAECO Americas may have conducted in Ohio to the plaintiff’s causes of
action. See Maxitrate Tratamento Termico E Controles v. Super Systems, Inc, 617 F. App’x 406,
408 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, allows a plaintiff to sue a
defendant only on claims that arise out of the defendant’s activities in the forum state.”).
Indeed, the Complaint is devoid of any facts indicating that HAECO Americas directed

any activity towards Ohio that was related to the plaintiff’s claims. At best, plaintiff alleges that
she, an Ohio resident, sustained a foot injury in Nevada from a faulty seat manufactured by
HAECO Americas. These alleged facts do not establish that HAECO Americas purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of acting in Ohio or that the claims arose from HAECO Americas’
contacts with Ohio, or even that the faulty seat was ever in Ohio. Rather, these allegations center

4 Plaintiff argues that even though she “specifically cited” to the language
contained in Ohio’s long-arm statute, HAECO Americas “has submitted no proof
at all with respect to whether and to what extent the company was transacting
business and contracting to supply goods and services in Ohio during the relevant
time frame.” However, as noted above, it is plaintiff’s burden, not HAECO
Americas, to establish personal jurisdiction.
8
on plaintiff’s status as an Ohio resident. This cannot serve as a basis for specific jurisdiction.
Walden, 571 U.S. at 285 (“But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and
the forum.”)
Plaintiff relies on a stream of commerce theory to establish that HAECO Americas

purposefully availed itself to this Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of manufacturing airline seats
which could possibly enter Ohio through air travel.5 The Supreme Court has held that a “forum
State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction
over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980). However, since World-Wide Volkswagen, the Sixth
Circuit has adopted a “stream of commerce ‘plus’ approach,” under which “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposely
directed toward the forum State.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ'g, 327 F.3d

472, 479–80 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102 (1987) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality op.)). See also Parker v. Winwood, 938 F.3d 833, 840-841
(6th Cir. 2019) (“for a defendant to purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting within a
forum state, he must do more than merely place a product into the stream of commerce”).
Here, plaintiff fails to allege that HAECO Americas did anything more than place its
airline seats into the stream of commerce. Plaintiff does not provide any facts to show that

5 In support of this argument, plaintiff cites a handful of state appellate court cases
and several federal appellate and district court cases, none of which are from
within the Sixth Circuit. Not only do many of these cases predate the Sixth
Circuit’s Bridgeport decision, infra, the decisions of these courts are not binding
precedent upon this Court.
9
HAECO Americas markets, advertises, or sells its airline seats in Ohio. Nor does plaintiff
allege that HAECO Americas sold its airline seats to Florida-based Spirit Airlines in Ohio. This
Court cannot find purposeful availment when the only allegations are that HAECO Americas
sold its airline seats to Spirit Airlines and the airline seats may have reached Ohio. See

Bridgeport, 327 F.3d at 480 (finding no purposeful availment where a defendant sold its product
through a distributor and was “merely aware that [its] distributor was likely to market the
product in all fifty states”). As such, specific jurisdiction is lacking.
Plaintiff insists that the requirement that the cause of action be related to the defendant’s
activities within the forum “cannot be read too literally.” She argues that because HAECO
Americas “could have easily foreseen the prospect for litigation” in Ohio, specific jurisdiction
exists. However, “as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that
its goods will reach the forum State.” J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873,
881(2011)(plurality opinion). See also Bridgeport, 327 F.3d at 480.

Plaintiff maintains that “the notion that the commercial airline seat manufacturer believed
it could never be sued outside its home state is simply implausible.” She complains that if the
defendants can “only be sued in their ‘home’ states, then there is no forum available” to her to
file her lawsuit. However, plaintiff appears to be conflating specific and general jurisdiction.6

6 Indeed, plaintiff argues that HAECO Americas’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Daimler AG and BNSF are “hardly analogous” and “misplaced.”
However, both of these cases only involved a discussion of what constitutes
general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of specific
jurisdiction in either of these decisions. See BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1552
(“Only the propriety of general personal jurisdiction is at issue here . . . ”);
Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 133 (“Plaintiffs have never attempted to fit this case into
the specific jurisdiction category.”) Plaintiff also attempts to distinguish the
Supreme Court decisions of Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
10
The Supreme Court has not held that the only place in which a corporate defendant can be sued
is in its “home state.” Rather, relevant Supreme Court precedent has held that general
jurisdiction cannot usually be exerted over a corporate defendant in a forum other than the state
of incorporation or principal place of business. See Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137; BNSF Ry. Co.,

137 S.Ct. at 1558.
Plaintiff also argues that specific jurisdiction exists because the seat collapsed on a plane
destined for Ohio, the injuries were sustained by an Ohio resident, and the long-term effects of
the injury were suffered in Ohio. She observes that Spirit Airlines routinely flies passengers in
and out of several cities in Ohio. However, these arguments center on plaintiff’s and Spirit
Airlines’ connections with Ohio. In order for specific jurisdiction to exist over HAECO
Americas, it is HAECO Americas, “not the plaintiff and third parties, who must create contacts
with the forum state.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 291.
Finally, plaintiff observes that preliminary discovery has revealed that Brice

Manufacturing may have produced the defective seat. She notes that HAECO Americas “holds a
100% interest” in Brice Manufacturing. However, while this discovery may go to the liability of
HAECO Americas, it does not establish specific jurisdiction. The Complaint is devoid of any
allegations that the manufacturing or production of the seat occurred in Ohio or that the defective
seat was ever physically in Ohio at all.
Accordingly, because the Complaint contains no factual allegations that any of the
alleged wrongful conduct at issue in this case is related to any activity HAECO Americas may

466 U.S. 408 (1984) and Goodyear Dunlap Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915 (2011) from the case sub judice. However, both of these cases were also
limited to general jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 466 U.S. at
418, n 12; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923.
11
have taken in Ohio, specific jurisdiction is lacking.
HAECO Americas also argues that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction under
Ohio’s long-arm statute. Because this Court finds that the plaintiff fails to satisfy the prima facie
burden of demonstrating jurisdiction is proper under the Due Process clause, the Court need not

analyze whether jurisdiction is proper under Ohio’s long-arm statute.7 Conn, 667 F.3d at 711–12
(“Of course, if jurisdiction is not proper under the Due Process Clause it is unnecessary to
analyze jurisdiction under the state long-arm statute, and vice-versa.”) See also Calphalon Corp.
v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2000) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction
solely on Due Process grounds).
Accordingly, because neither general nor specific jurisdiction exists over HAECO
Americas, its motion to dismiss must be granted.
II. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY

While not filed as a separate motion, plaintiff, in her brief in opposition, requests “a
period of at least ninety days to conduct jurisdictional discovery and supplement” her response to
the Motion to Dismiss. HAECO Americas opposes this request.
A court’s “decision whether to grant discovery or an evidentiary hearing before ruling on
a 12(b)(2) motion is discretionary.” Burnshire Development, LLC v. Cliffs Reduced Iron Corp.,
198 Fed. App’x 425, 434 (6th Cir. 2006). A court does not abuse its discretion in denying a
request for discovery when a plaintiff offers absolutely no factual basis for its jurisdictional

7 Plaintiff maintains that this Court has jurisdiction over HAECO Americas under
Ohio’s long-arm statute. She argues that since she has established jurisdiction
“upon at least three separate sections of Ohio’s long-arm statute, the requirements
of Due Process are no longer an issue.” This is incorrect. As discussed supra, the
requirements for jurisdiction under the Due Process clause are not coterminous
with the requirements set forth in Ohio’s long-arm statute.
12
assertions. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1240 (6th Cir. 1981).
Upon review, the Court denies plaintiff’s request. In support of her request, plaintiff
asserts that it “would not be surprising to learn that [HAECO Americas] has adopted plans for
specifically targeting its products to Ohio, or for complying with this state’s laws and

regulations.” This is entirely speculative on plaintiff’s part. She has provided no factual basis to
support her conjecture that HAECO Americas may have some connection to Ohio. Where, as
here, a plaintiff “offers only speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum
state, a court is within its discretion in denying discovery.” Swagelok Co. v. Dansk Ventil &
Fittings Aps, 2006 WL 8454625, *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2006) (quoting Carefirst of Maryland,
Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir. 2003)). See also Chrysler
Corp., 643 F.2d at 1239 (affirming district court’s order denying leave to conduct jurisdictional
discovery where “there [was] no reasonable basis to expect that further discovery would reveal
contacts sufficient to support personal jurisdiction”).

Plaintiff also maintains that due process “requires” that this Court grant her with “a
reasonable opportunity to submit interrogatories and conduct depositions that will reveal the true
extent of [HAECO Americas’] connections with Ohio.” Discovery has been ongoing since
December 1, 2019. Plaintiff has had ample time to investigate and present evidence of the
Court’s jurisdiction over HAECO Americas. Despite this, plaintiff has made no showing
whatsoever that personal jurisdiction exists over HAECO Americas.
Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to conduct
jurisdictional discovery.

13
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, HAECO America’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 55) is
GRANTED and plaintiff’s “Alternative Motion for Extension of Time to Conduct Discovery”
(Doc. 57) is DENIED. Accordingly, HAECO Americas is dismissed from this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 3/25/20 Chief Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10368178. Public record. Not legal advice.