# Smith v. Core Civic of America

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · October 29, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367702

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** October 29, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MAURICE DWAN SMITH, ) CASE NO. 4:19CV1417
)
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
v. )
)
CORE CIVIC OF AMERICA, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) AND ORDER
Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF No. 2]

Pending before the Court is the Complaint of pro se Plaintiff Maurice Dwan Smith
against Core Civic of America (“Core Civic”) and Northeast Ohio Correctional Center
(“NEOCC”) Medical Employee Saferra.' Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to immediately diagnose a serious infection in his foot,
resulting in surgery. Plaintiff contends Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs.
For the reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.
I. Background
Plaintiff alleges he was incarcerated in NEOCC prior to March 2017. ECF No. | at
PagelD #: 3. He alleges he developed a wound on his ankle that was very painful. He submitted

' Plaintiff's Complaint provides conflicting statements about Saferra’s professional capacity
at the prison. He indicates first that she is the head nurse (ECF No. | at PageID #: 1, 3). He then
indicates that she is a physician with final authority for medical decisions and patient care at
NEOCC) (/d. at PageID #: 2).

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numerous sick call slips and grievances but was not seen at the medical department for three
weeks. /d. He claims Saferra was one of the attending clinic supervisors at the time of his
injury. He states he asked her to personally examine his ankle, but she declined saying she was
“too busy.” Jd. Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was examined by another medical
professional, and if so, what his or her recommended course of action was. He alleges his
condition did not abate and he continued for several weeks to submit sick call slips, marking
them as urgent. /d. He contends he did not receive a reply. Thereafter, Plaintiff reported “to the
medical department unannounced” and discovered his slips in the trash. /d. Plaintiff states he
rescued the slips and mailed them to his mother. /d. After, he sought assistance from the captain
and showed him the wound. /d. at PageID #: 4. The captain immediately approved Plaintiffs
transport to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital where emergency personnel determined he had contracted a
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) infection. Jd. Plaintiff states he was
immediately taken into surgery to have the infection removed. /d. He contends he has lost full
mobility in his ankle and cannot be physically active or work in certain types of employment. Jd.
He claims Saferra was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and Core Civic has a
custom or policy of tolerating medical malpractice. /d. Plaintiff seeks $1,500,000.00 in
damages. /d. at PageID #: 6.
II. Standard for Dismissal
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon

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which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 US. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a
Defendant is immune from suit or when a Plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which
clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when
the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accept
all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The Plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd.
Although a Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the Complaint are true.” /d. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), further explains the
“plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is

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not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant acted unlawfully.” /d. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d.
II. Law and Analysis
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The
Eighth Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” /vey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework
for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A Plaintiff must first plead facts
which, if true, establish that a “sufficiently serious” deprivation has occurred. /d. Seriousness is
measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1,8 1992). Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Jd at 9. Only deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of
confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. /d. A Plaintiff must also
establish a subjective element showing that the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. /d. Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not
inadvertence or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Liability cannot

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be predicated solely on negligence. /d. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only
when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994).
MRSA is arguably an objectively serious medical condition. To state a claim for
violation of the Eighth Amendment against Saferra, Plaintiff must allege facts suggesting she
was deliberately indifferent to his condition. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03. Deliberate indifference
“entails something more than mere negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. This standard is met
if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249,
253-55 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Allegations of negligence are not
enough to state a claim for a constitutional violation. /d. at 835-36. Consequently, allegations of
medical malpractice, negligent diagnosis, or negligent treatment fail to state an Eighth
Amendment claim. Plaintiff claims only that he requested Saferra at the clinic and she declined
to examine him personally as she was too busy. Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was
examined by other medical personnel or what they recommended as a course of treatment. There
is no suggestion in the Complaint that Saferra was aware of Plaintiff's medical condition and
appreciated the substantial risk of harm it could pose to him.
Plaintiff contends Core Civic has a custom or policy of tolerating medical malpractice.
An employer cannot be held liable in a civil rights action for an employee’s wrongdoing under a
theory of respondeat superior. They can only be sued if their own actions “implicitly authorized,

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approved, or...acquiesced” in the constitutional violation. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300
(6th Cir. 1999). When the employer is a government entity, or in this case a private prison
corporation, it can only be held liable if it is “alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through
‘a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers.’ ” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (quoting Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). Plaintiff claims Core Civic
has a policy of tolerating medical malpractice. Medical malpractice does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation and Plaintiff has not established that Core Civic has authorized or
approved constitutional violations. Thus, Core Civic cannot be held liable under § 1983.
Finally, the statute of limitations for filing either a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 or a medical malpractice action under Ohio tort law expired before Plaintiff brought this
action. He indicates all of the incidents described in the Complaint took place before March
2017. Ohio’s two year statute of limitations for bodily injury applies to §1983 claims. □□□□
Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F. 3d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir. 1995). Medical
malpractice claims in Ohio have a one year statute of limitations. Ohio Revised Code §
2305.113(A). Plaintiff filed this action in June 2019, well beyond the expiration of the statute of
limitations periods for these claims.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could

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not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 29, 2019 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367702. Public record. Not legal advice.