# Mason v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · September 11, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367465

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 11, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD MASON, Case No. 1:18 CV 1737

Plaintiff,

v. Magistrate Judge James R. Knepp II

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Richard Mason (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to
deny supplemental security income (“SSI”). (Doc. 1). The district court has jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1383(c) and 405(g). The parties consented to the undersigned’s exercise of jurisdiction
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Civil Rule 73. (Doc. 12). For the reasons stated
below, the undersigned affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed for SSI in April 2012, alleging a disability onset date of April 1, 2011. (Tr.
157-60). His claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 116-18, 122-23).
Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 126-27).
Plaintiff (represented by counsel), and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at a hearing before the
ALJ on February 9, 2017. (Tr. 61-90). On August 24, 2017, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled
in a written decision. (Tr. 26-38). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review,
making the hearing decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6); see 20 C.F.R. §§
416.1455, 416.1481. Plaintiff timely filed the instant action on July 26, 2018. (Doc. 1).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Personal Background and Testimony
Born in 1996, Plaintiff was eighteen years old on the date of his application, and twenty

on the date of the ALJ hearing. See Tr. 37, 157. Plaintiff had completed high school, in special
education classes. (Tr. 74).
Plaintiff testified that he believed he was unable to work because his mind “wanders” and
it was difficult for him to stay on task. (Tr. 70). He worked for a brief period at Burlington Coat
Factory; the school got him the job and his teacher filled out his job application. (Tr. 71-72). His
job was to “restack the shoes”. (Tr. 72). Plaintiff testified that he was supposed to work for two
weeks, but “didn’t make it because they told [him] that they couldn’t have someone that couldn’t
focus because [he] would always get off task.” (Tr. 73).
On a typical day, Plaintiff tried to clean, but his family told him that he was frequently

off-task. (Tr. 74). He also sat on the couch, read books (though he had to re-read passages
frequently) (Tr. 74), and played games on his phone for two to three minutes at a time (Tr. 84).
Plaintiff’s step-mother tried to teach him to cook, but it went poorly because he would “get[] off
task and just walk[] away.” (Tr. 76). Plaintiff made sandwiches and used the microwave. (Tr.
77).
Plaintiff testified he had difficulty getting along with people because he often did not
understand them, and that made him upset. (Tr. 79). He yelled less after starting medication. Id.
He had one friend who he saw rarely. (Tr. 80).
Plaintiff had a period of time where he did not receive mental health treatment, but had
returned the previous year because he as “getting out of control”, “yelling, screaming at [his]
stepmom, and would get off task.” (Tr. 78). At the time of the hearing, he was taking Lexapro to
help him focus and another medication to help him sleep. Id. He noted both helped somewhat. Id.
However, he could not focus well enough to prepare a meal on the stove. Id.

Relevant Record Evidence
Plaintiff’s school records reveal low average reading scores, and low to very low math
scores. See Tr. 213-14 (September 2012 evaluation team report). Based on this, Plaintiff was
noted to need continued interventions and an individualized education program (“IEP”). (Tr.
214). His teacher described him as easily distracted, and easily frustrated. (Tr. 221). An October
2012 IEP placed Plaintiff in a special education classroom for core classes “due to his cognitive
abilities and to limit distractions so as to provide the opportunity for intensive and direct
instruction.” (Tr. 202). In May 2013, his IEP described difficulties with peer relationships, and
continued easy frustration. (Tr. 388). A June 2014 progress report noted Plaintiff showed

improvement in controlling his behavior, but he was frequently off-task and displayed attention-
seeking behavior. (Tr. 260). In April 2015, when Plaintiff was in twelfth-grade, he read at a fifth-
grade level and worked at a fourth-grade math level. (Tr. 717-18). He was passing his classes
with low grades. (Tr. 718).
In April and May 2015, Plaintiff received vocational services from the Bureau of
Vocational Rehabilitation and was placed in a two-week-long job at Burlington Coat Factory
stacking shoes. (Tr. 269-81). Plaintiff attended only 50% of his workdays due to his own illness
and his mother’s illness. (Tr. 281). He arrived early on the days he worked and he was
appropriately groomed. Id. His relationships “were appropriate and relevant”, but he required
some direction “when task changed or when he became bored with a task.” Id. He was able to
adapt to changes “yet lets it be known what he prefers and will accept change with
demonstration.” Id. In his ability to work independently, the evaluator noted he “[r]equired some
guidance”. Id. Under both work quality and quantity, he was noted to “require[] direction”, but
he worked his entire shift. Id. The Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation subsequently sent

Plaintiff letters discharging him from the program because he failed to respond to their attempts
to contact him. (Tr. 282-84).
In June 2015, Plaintiff underwent a psychological consultative examination with Deborah
Koricke, Ph.D. (Tr. 400-08). Plaintiff reported he was applying for disability because he had
“trouble concentrating and acting impulsively.” (Tr. 401). Dr. Koricke reviewed previous
education records which showed Plaintiff had a full score IQ of 71 and that it “was noted that he
is easily distracted and shuts down when he is frustrated.” Id. Plaintiff reported past psychiatric
and counseling treatment from ages five to seventeen, but that he was not currently being treated.
(Tr. 402). On examination, Dr. Koricke observed Plaintiff was cooperative, interactive, had no

deficits in attention, and had adequate memory. (Tr. 403). “He put forth consistently good effort
on all tasks and persisted to the ends of time limits, producing valid results.” (Tr. 403-04). He
was not anxious and showed no outward signs of depression. (Tr. 404). His mood, affect, and
energy level were normal and his eye contact was good. Id. His cognitive functioning showed he
was only able to perform simple mathematical computations, his ability to abstract was below
the mean, and he was unable to complete serial sevens. (Tr. 405). He had adequate insight and
judgment, “consistent with borderline IQ functioning.” Id. Dr. Koricke assessed oppositional
defiant disorder, cannabis use disorder (moderate), and borderline intellectual functioning (“by
ETR report”). (Tr. 406).
Plaintiff underwent a second psychological consultative examination with Dr. Koricke in
September 2015. (Tr. 410-16). He reported his grandmother had lied during the previous
interview. (Tr. 411). Plaintiff described depression and difficulty being around people. (Tr. 412).
On examination, Dr. Koricke noted Plaintiff was “difficult to engage” and “was easily off topic
and needed to be prompted to stay on task.” (Tr. 413). He had difficulty understanding complex

instructions and tracking conversation. Id. He had difficulty understanding simple or complex
questions and “exhibited simple speech patterns consistent with difficulties with a borderline
IQ.” Id. Plaintiff’s affect was blunted and agitated and he appeared uncomfortable and anxious.
(Tr. 413-14). Dr. Koricke observed Plaintiff’s intellectual ability to be in the borderline range,
and noted he had a “limited frustration tolerance and had difficulties persisting.” (Tr. 414). He
had limited insight and judgment into his situation. Id.
In February 2016, Plaintiff underwent a mental health assessment with social worker
Katy Kekic. (Tr. 420-26). Plaintiff reported depression, poor sleep, low energy, and anger. (Tr.
420). He stated he had stopped taking medication four years prior. Id. On mental status

examination, Ms. Kekic noted Plaintiff was adequately groomed, oriented, and had cooperative
behavior. (Tr. 424). His speech had a normal rate and flow “with noted poverty”, and his thought
processes were logical with tight association. Id. Plaintiff had fair judgment and insight, adequate
memory, and sustained attention span and concentration. (Tr. 425). His mood was depressed and
overwhelmed, and his affect was congruent. Id. Ms. Kekic assessed unspecified depressive
disorder, rule out intellectual disability, rule out post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. She
recommended pharmacologic management and referred Plaintiff to Dr. Fajobi. (Tr. 426).
At a visit later that month, Olufunke Fajobi, M.D. noted similar mental status
examination findings (Tr. 435), and diagnosed unspecified episodic mood disorder, mild
intellectual disability, and a history of ADHD and bipolar disorder (Tr. 436). He started Plaintiff
on a trial of Abilify “for mood lability and impulsivity.” (Tr. 436).
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Fajobi in March and May 2016. See Tr. 441-43, 448-50. At both
visits, Dr. Fajobi noted Plaintiff had a depressed mood and blunt affect, as well as questionable
judgment and insight. (Tr. 442, 449). His attention/concentration was sustained, and his memory

was within normal limits. (Tr. 442, 449). His thought process was logical and organized with no
evidence of delusions, and his speech was spontaneous with a normal rate and flow. (Tr. 442,
449). In March, Plaintiff reported his mood swings were better and he was amenable to starting
therapy. (Tr. 442). Dr. Fajobi prescribed a trial of Geodon (Tr. 442-43), but in May, Plaintiff
reported he only took one dose due to side effects (Tr. 449). Plaintiff reported his mood
fluctuated in response to stressors or conflict, and he retreated to his room in response. Id. His
step-mother reported that Plaintiff “gets so anxious that he ‘passes[]’ out.” Id. Dr. Fajobi
prescribed a trial of Lexapro. (Tr. 449-50). Dr. Fajobi also noted a “detailed discussion about the
need for therapy, coping skills.” (Tr. 449).

Opinion Evidence
Treating Physician
In January 2017, Dr. Fajobi completed a mental impairment questionnaire. (Tr. 811-12).
Therein, he noted he saw Plaintiff four times (February, March, and May 2016, and January
2017). He listed a diagnosis of unspecified episodic mood disorder and noted Plaintiff took
Lexapro daily, and melatonin at bedtime as needed. (Tr. 811). As the clinical findings in support
of the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairment, Dr. Fajobi wrote: “Alert, oriented x 3,
cooperative, speech normal rate and tone, thoughts logical, organized, with poor fund of
knowledge, mood euthymic, affect appropriate.” Id. Plaintiff’s prognosis was “guarded” and Dr.
Fajobi opined his impairment had lasted or was expected to last at least twelve months. Id. He
opined Plaintiff had an unlimited or very good ability to understand, remember, and carry out
short and simple instructions. (Tr. 811-12). He opined Plaintiff had a “limited but satisfactory”1
ability to: carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods; perform activities within a schedule; manage regular attendance and be punctual within

customary tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; remember
locations and work-like procedures; understand and remember detailed instructions; interact
appropriately with the general public; ask simple questions or request assistance; accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and maintain socially
appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. Id. He further
opined that Plaintiff was “seriously limited, but not precluded”2 in the areas of: working in
coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; completing a normal
workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; performing
at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, getting along

with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; responding
appropriately to changes in the work setting; being aware of normal hazards and taking
appropriate precautions; setting realistic goals or making plans independently of others. Id. Dr.
Fajobi noted he was “unable to evaluate” how often Plaintiff’s impairment would cause him to
be absent from work, or how much of an eight-hour workday Plaintiff’s symptoms would cause
him to be off-task. (Tr. 812). Dr. Fajobi did not opine Plaintiff was “unable to meet competitive
standards” or had “no useful ability to function” in any area listed. See Tr. 811-12.

1. The form did not define this term. See Tr. 811.
2. The form defined “seriously limited, but not precluded” as “ability to function in this area is
less than satisfactory, but not precluded in all circumstances. Individual would be limited in their
ability to perform activity 15% of time.” (Tr. 811).
Consultative Examining Physician
After her June 2015 consultative examination, Dr. Koricke opined that Plaintiff “would
experience difficulty understanding how to perform and carry out complex tasks and would
require supervision and structure to complete job duties accurately due to limited intellectual
capacity.” (Tr. 407). She opined that he would not have difficulty maintaining attention and

concentration, or having the persistence and pace to perform tasks. Id. She opined that he was
able to respond appropriately to supervision and coworkers “as long as instructions and job
demands are presented to him in simple terms.” (Tr. 407-08). Finally, Dr. Koricke opined that
Plaintiff’s “limited capacity causes him limited insight and judgment such that he would likely
have difficulty fully processing work pressure and he [might] become confused when under
pressure.” (Tr. 408).
After her September 2015 consultative evaluation, Dr. Koricke opined Plaintiff would
“likely have difficulties remembering and carrying out instructions related to his difficulties with
concentration due to his difficulties with mood dysregulation and anxiety and his limitations in

intellectual functioning.” (Tr. 415). He also had “limitations in attention, concentration, and
work place [sic] related to his difficulties with mood dysregulation, depression, and limitations in
intellectual functioning.” (Tr. 416). Dr. Koricke also noted Plaintiff had “limitations with regard
to responding appropriately to supervision and coworkers in an employment setting due to his
depression, symptoms of ADHD and his difficulties with limitations in intellectual functioning.”
Id. Finally, she opined Plaintiff had “limitations in his ability to respond appropriately to work
pressures in an employment setting, due to difficulties with depression and poor tolerance for
frustration.” Id.
State Agency Reviewing Physicians
In July 2015, state agency reviewing psychologist Joseph Edwards, Ph.D., reviewed
Plaintiff’s records and offered a functional capacity opinion. (Tr. 96-100). Dr. Edwards opined
that Plaintiff had mild restriction in activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining
social functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.

(Tr. 96). Dr. Edwards opined Plaintiff was not significantly limited in his ability to understand,
remember, and carry out, short and simple instructions but that he would have moderate
limitation with detailed instructions. (Tr. 98). Specifically, he explained that Plaintiff was “[a]ble
to understand and remember simple 1-2 step steps [sic] and instructions” and the he could “carry
out 1-2 step tasks in settings without strict time or production demands.” (Tr. 98-99). Dr.
Edwards also opined Plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to interact with the general
public, but not significantly limited in his ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately
to criticism for supervisors. (Tr. 99).
In October 2015, Tonnie Hoyle, Psy.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s records and affirmed Dr.

Edwards’s opinions. (Tr. 111-13).
VE Testimony
A VE appeared and testified at the hearing before the ALJ. (Tr. 85-89) The ALJ asked the
VE to consider a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as ultimately determined by the ALJ. (Tr. 86-87). The VE
responded that such an individual could perform jobs such as cleaner II, dining room attendant,
and retail trade bagger. (Tr. 87). The VE also testified that adding restrictions requiring frequent
or constant supervision or being off-task for twenty percent of the day would preclude
competitive work. (Tr. 88).
ALJ Decision
In his August 24, 2017 written decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his application date. (Tr. 28). He further found Plaintiff had
severe impairments of unspecified episodic mood disorder, attention deficit hyperactive disorder,
borderline intellectual functioning, and depressive disorder, but that none of these impairments –

singly or in combination – met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment. (Tr. 28-29). The
ALJ then set forth Plaintiff’s RFC:
[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: never required to climb
ladders, scaffolds or ropes; limited to hearing and understanding simple oral
instructions; limited to communicating simple information; restricted from
hazards such as heights or machinery but is able to avoid ordinary hazards in the
workplace, such as boxes on the floor, doors ajar, or approaching people or
vehicles; never required to operate a motor vehicle during the course of a
workday; limited to simple tasks; limited to routine and repetitive tasks; not able
to perform at a production rate pace, such as assembly line work, but can perform
goal-oriented work, such as an office cleaner; limited to simple work-related
decisions with occasional interaction with supervisors; limited to occasional
interaction with a small group of co-workers, where the contact is casual in
nature; limited to occasional, superficial contact with the public; limited to
tolerating few changes in a routine work sett[]ing, however, when said changes do
occur, they would need to take place gradually and would occur infrequently.

(Tr. 31). The ALJ then found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform. (Tr. 37). Therefore, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled from his application date
through the date of the decision. (Tr. 38).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the denial of Social Security benefits, the Court “must affirm the
Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply
the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Besaw v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992). The Commissioner’s findings
“as to any fact if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive.” McClanahan v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Even if substantial
evidence or indeed a preponderance of the evidence supports a claimant’s position, the court
cannot overturn “so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the
ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).
STANDARD FOR DISABILITY
Eligibility for benefits is predicated on the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a),
1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Commissioner follows a five-step evaluation process—found at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920—to
determine if a claimant is disabled:
1. Was claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?

2. Did claimant have a medically determinable impairment, or a combination
of impairments, that is “severe,” which is defined as one which
substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work
activities?

3. Does the severe impairment meet one of the listed impairments?

4. What is claimant’s residual functional capacity and can claimant perform
past relevant work?
5. Can claimant do any other work considering his residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience?

Under this five-step sequential analysis, the claimant has the burden of proof in Steps
One through Four. Walters, 127 F.3d at 529. The burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five
to establish whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform available work
in the national economy. Id. The ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,
education, and past work experience to determine if the claimant could perform other work. Id.
Only if a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis, including inability to do other work, and
meets the duration requirements, is he determined to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(f); see
also Walters, 127 F.3d at 529.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in his consideration of the opinion evidence, specifically,
that he did not explain his rejection of certain limitations in several opinions. See Doc. 13, at 13
(“The ALJ purported to assign ‘partial’ to ‘great’ weight to every psychological expert; despite
this, the RFC finding omitted critical limitations offered by these experts.”). The Commissioner
responds that the opinion evidence is in large part consistent with the ALJ’s RFC and that the
decision is supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned
finds no error and affirms the ALJ’s decision.
RFC Generally
A claimant’s RFC is an assessment of “the most [he] can still do despite [his]

limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In formulating the RFC, an ALJ must consider all
symptoms and the extent to which those symptoms are consistent with the objective medical
evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. An ALJ must also consider and weigh medical opinions. 20
C.F.R. § 416.927. “The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity
rests with the ALJ, not a physician.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir.
2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.946(c)). An ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by
evidence of record, but it need not correspond to, or even be based on, any specific medical
opinion. See Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2015). Instead, it is
the ALJ’s duty to formulate a claimant’s RFC based on all the relevant, credible evidence of

record, medical and otherwise. Justice v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 515 F. App’x 583, 587 (6th Cir.
2013); see also Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Moreover, an ALJ does not improperly assume the
role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a
residual functional capacity finding.”).
Treating Physician Rule & Medical Opinion Evidence
Generally, the medical opinions of treating physicians are afforded greater deference than
those of non-treating physicians. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir.
2007); see also SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188.3 A treating physician’s opinion is given
“controlling weight” if it is supported by (1) medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques; and (2) is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case
record. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). The requirement to
give controlling weight to a treating source is presumptive; if the ALJ decides not to do so, she
must provide evidentiary support for such a finding. Id. at 546; Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
710 F.3d 365, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2013).
When the physician’s medical opinion is not granted controlling weight, the ALJ must

3. Although recent revisions to the CFR have changed the rules regarding evaluation of treating
physician opinions, such changes apply to claims filed after March 27, 2017, and do not apply to
claims filed prior to that date. See Social Sec. Admin., Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5852-53, 2017 WL 168819. Plaintiff filed his
claim in April 2012 and thus the previous regulations apply.
give “good reasons” for the weight given to the opinion. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)). “Good reasons” are reasons “sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion
and the reasons for that weight.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188,
at *4). When determining weight and articulating good reasons, the ALJ “must apply certain

factors” to the opinion. Rabbers v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). These factors include the length of treatment relationship,
the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the
supportability of the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the
specialization of the treating source. Id. While an ALJ is required to delineate good reasons, he is
not required to enter into an “exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis” to satisfy the requirement. See
Francis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 414 F. App’x 802, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2011).
For medical sources who offer opinions but are not treating physicians, an ALJ is to
consider the same factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (“[W]e consider all of the following

factors in deciding the weight we give to any medical opinion”). While “an opinion from a
medical source who has examined a claimant is [generally] given more weight than that from a
source who has not performed an examination,” ALJs have more discretion in considering non-
treating source opinions. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 375. Notably, they need not give “good reasons”
for discounting non-treating source opinions. See Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App’x
255, 259 (6th Cir. 2016) (“But because Dr. Rutledge and Dr. Joslin are non-treating sources, the
reasons-giving requirement is inapplicable to their opinions.”); see also Smith v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he SSA requires ALJs to give reasons for only
treating sources.”). ALJs are not required to defer to such opinions of non-treating sources and
must only provide a meaningful explanation regarding the weight given to particular medical
source opinions. See SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (“Administrative law judges and the
Appeals Council are not bound by findings made by State agency or other program physicians
and psychologists, but they may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given to
the opinions in their decisions.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c) (“[W]e consider all of the following

factors in deciding the weight we give to any medical opinion”).
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinions of Drs. Fajobi, Koricke,
Edwards, and Hoyle. The undersigned addresses each in turn below.
Treating Physician - Dr. Fajobi
Plaintiff contends the ALJ excluded from the RFC “Dr. Fajobi’s limitations that Plaintiff
would be unable, for 15% of the workday, to work in proximity to others without being
distracted by them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, to complete a normal workday and
workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, or to perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods[.]” (Doc. 13, at 13)

(citing Tr. 811-12). The Commissioner responds that Plaintiff “fails to point to any significant
inconsistency between the ALJ’s RFC and Dr. Fajobi’s opinion.” (Doc. 16, at 10).
The ALJ summarized Dr. Fajobi’s opinion and assigned it “partial weight”, explaining:
The undersigned assigns Dr. Fajobi’s opinion partial weight as it is consistent
with the evidence as a whole, showing limitations in the claimant’s ability to
interact with others, respond to changes in a work setting, and responding
appropriately to criticism (8E; 4F; 5F; 8F). However, the undersigned finds that
the claimant is slightly more limited in his ability to carry out detailed
instructions, which is supported by Dr. Koricke’s findings that the claimant had
difficulties remembering and carrying out instructions related to his difficulty
with concentration (5F/7).

(Tr. 36). That is, the ALJ assigned Dr. Fajobi’s opinion partial weight because he found Plaintiff
more limited in his ability to carry out detailed instructions. See id.
The undersigned agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s RFC accommodated Dr.
Fajobi’s opinion. First, Dr. Fajobi found Plaintiff would be “seriously limited but not precluded”
in the following areas related to “sustained concentration and persistence limitations”: 1) work in
coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted by them; 2) complete a
normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and

3) perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” (Tr.
811). The form defined “seriously limited, but not precluded” as “ability to function in this area
is less than satisfactory, but not precluded in all circumstances. Individual would be limited in
their ability to perform activity 15% of time.” Id. The ALJ’s RFC reasonably accommodated
these restrictions in limiting Plaintiff to: 1) “occasional interaction with a small group of co-
workers, where the contact is casual in nature”; and 2) simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, but
“not able to perform at a production rate pace, such as assembly line work.” (Tr. 31).
Second, Dr. Fajobi opined that Plaintiff would be “seriously limited” in getting along
with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (Tr. 812).

Again, the ALJ’s RFC reasonably accommodated this restriction by limiting Plaintiff to
“occasional interaction with a small group of co-workers, where the contact is casual in nature”.
(Tr. 31).
Third, Dr. Fajobi opined Plaintiff had adaptation limitations, and would be “seriously
limited but not precluded” in the areas of: 1) responding appropriately to changes in the work
setting; 2) being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions; and 3) setting
realistic goals or making plans independently.” (Tr. 812). Again, the ALJ’s RFC accommodated
these restrictions by finding Plaintiff: 1) restricted from hazards such as heights or machinery but
able to avoid ordinary hazards in the workplace, such as boxes on the floor, doors ajar, or
approaching people or vehicles” and 2) “limited to tolerating few changes in a routine work
sett[]ing, however, when said changes do occur, they would need to take place gradually and
would occur infrequently.” (Tr. 31).
Plaintiff seemingly conflates the “would be limited in their ability to perform activity
15% of the time” language of the form’s definition with an opinion that he would be “off task”

for that portion of time. See Doc. 13, at 15 (“[T]he VE testified that an individual who is off task
for more than 10% of the workday or requires at least frequent supervision is unable to maintain
competitive employment. Tr. 88-89. Thus, the VE’s testimony demonstrates that the limitations
opined by Drs. Koricke and Fajobi are work-preclusive.”). However, Dr. Fajobi expressly stated
that he was “unable to evaluate” how much of an eight-hour workday Plaintiff would “be off task
from performing job tasks”. (Tr. 812). Instead, the form’s definition states that Plaintiff would
“be limited” in these areas for 15% of the day. The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s RFC
reasonably accounts for these limitations.
For these reasons, the undersigned finds Plaintiff has not shown reversible error in the

ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Fajobi’s opinion. The ALJ is tasked with the ultimate RFC
determination. Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.946(c)). And, any error in
consideration of a treating physician opinion is harmless where the ALJ makes findings
consistent with that opinion. See, e.g., Johnson–Hunt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 500 F. App’x 411,
419 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011)).4

4. Moreover, as the Commissioner points out, it does not appear even Dr. Fajobi believed his
opinion to be work-preclusive. First, Dr. Fajobi did not indicate that Plaintiff was “unable to
meet competitive standards”, meaning “your patient cannot satisfactorily perform this activity
independently, appropriately, effectively and on a sustained basis in a regular work setting” as to
any functional ability. See Tr. 811-12. Second, in response to a prompt to “[d]escribe the clinical
findings including results of mental status examination that demonstrate the severity of your
patient’s mental impairment and symptoms”, Dr. Fajobi wrote: “alert, oriented x 3, cooperative,
Examining Physician - Dr. Koricke
Plaintiff secondly argues that the ALJ “excluded Dr. Koricke’s limitation that Plaintiff
‘would require supervision and structure to complete job duties accurately due to limited
intellectual capacity.’” (Doc. 13, at 13) (quoting Tr. 407). This language is contained in Dr.
Koricke’s June 2015 opinion. See Tr. 407. The Commissioner responds that this language is

limited to complex tasks, and thus “immaterial to Plaintiff’s argument, as the ALJ limited
Plaintiff to, among other things, simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.” (Doc. 16, at 13 n.6).
The ALJ addressed Dr. Koricke’s opinions twice. First, he summarized the findings
therein (Tr. 33-34), and stated:
In examining the two reports from Dr. Koricke, the undersigned notes that her
reports had some internal consistencies. Namely, Dr. Koricke found that the
claimant could not complete the serial 7s task at either examination, he was
functioning at a borderline range of intelligence and he had difficulty relating to
and/or interacting with others. Considering the claimant’s education records and
the consistencies between the two consultative examinations, the undersigned
finds that the claimant is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks, simple
work-related decisions and occasional interaction with others.

(Tr. 34). Later, in evaluating the opinion evidence, the ALJ explained:
As indicated previously, there are some consistencies between the two reports
such as the claimant’s range of intelligence and difficulties interacting with
others. However, based on the inconsistencies in the reports, the undersigned
accords partial weight to Dr. Koricke’s June 3, 2015, opinion, and great weight to
Dr. Koricke’s September 30, 2015, opinion. On June 3, 2015, Dr. Koricke opined
that the claimant would experience difficulty understanding how to perform and
carry out complex tasks, and would require supervision and structure to complete
job duties accurately due to limited intellectual capacity (4F/9). Dr. Koricke stated
that the claimant was able to respond appropriately to supervision and to co-
workers in a work setting as long as instructions and job demands are presented to
him in simple terms (4F/9-10). Dr. Koricke further opined on June 3, 2015, that
the claimant would likely have difficulty fully processing work pressure and he
may become confused when under pressure (4F/10). The undersigned assigns this
opinion partial weight as it is consistent with the educational records and medical

speech normal rate and tone, thoughts logical [and] organized with poor fund of knowledge,
mood euthymic, affect appropriate” (Tr. 811) (emphasis in original).
records showing that the claimant had difficulty understanding complex tasks
(3F/4). However, the record shows that the claimant would have problems
responding appropriately to supervisors and co-workers, as he has a history of
aggressive behavior towards his teachers and is quick to get frustrated (8E; 8F/7).

(Tr. 35)
Again, Plaintiff contends the ALJ excluded, without explanation, Dr. Koricke’s opinion
that Plaintiff “would require supervision and structure to complete job duties accurately due to
limited intellectual capacity.” (Tr. 407). Preliminarily, the parties disagree over the meaning of
Dr. Koricke’s language. In full, the referenced sentence (and the previous sentence, included for
context) state:
He understood simple questions and instructions, but had trouble following multi-
step or complex instructions, which had to be broken down into small segments of
information for him to understand. He would experience difficulty understanding
how to perform and carry out complex tasks, and would require supervision and
structure to complete job duties accurately due to limited intellectual capacity.

(Tr. 407). The Commissioner argues the “complex tasks” phrase in the sentence also modifies
the “would require supervision to complete job duties accurately” language of the sentence, and
thus the argument is immaterial because the ALJ limited Plaintiff to simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks. (Doc. 16, at 13 n.6). Plaintiff responds that the Commissioner’s “interpretation
makes no sense as, in context, Dr. Koricke was plainly describing two aspects of Plaintiff’s
mental limitations[:] his inability to perform complex tasks and his need for supervision and
structure to complete job duties.” (Doc. 17, at 5-6) (emphasis in original). Read in the context of
the prior sentence, the undersigned agrees with the Commissioner’s reading that the supervision
requirement relates to complex tasks.
However, even under Plaintiff’s reading, the undersigned would find no error. This is so
because the Sixth Circuit has rejected the argument that an ALJ must explain every omitted
restriction from a non-treating physician’s opinion. For example, in Martin, the plaintiff
challenged an ALJ’s failure to either include – or explain his omission of – certain opined
restrictions from a State agency reviewing physician and a one-time consultative examiner in an
RFC. 658 F. App’x at 258 (“Martin also argues that the ALJ failed to explain why certain aspects
of two opinions by non-treating sources were omitted from his RFC.”). The Sixth Circuit found
no error:

Martin protests the ALJ’s lack of explanation as to why Martin’s marked
impairment in interacting with the general public—as found by Dr. Joslin—and
his moderate to marked impairment in his ability to sustain concentration—as
found by Dr. Rutledge—were not explicitly incorporated into Martin’s RFC. But
because Dr. Rutledge and Dr. Joslin are non-treating sources, the reasons-giving
requirement is inapplicable to their opinions. See Smith, 482 F.3d at 876 (“[T]he
SSA requires ALJs to give reasons for only treating sources.”); see also Reeves v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 Fed.Appx. 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2015) (same).

Id. at 259; see also Ellsworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 11260325, at *12 (N.D. Ohio)
(“This court has frequently denied remand on this issue and confirmed that there is no legal
requirement for an ALJ to explain or adopt every limitation or restriction opined by a state
agency nonexamining physician, even when the ALJ has given the opinion ‘great’ or
‘significant’ weight.”) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL
2857619.
In the instant case, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff would be limited by his intellectual
capacity. As such, he limited Plaintiff to: 1) hearing and understanding simple oral instructions;
2) communicating simple information; 3) simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, 4) no production
rate pace; 5) simple work-related decisions; 6) few changes in a routine work setting; changes
that take place gradually and occur infrequently. (Tr. 31). As with the above analysis of Dr.
Fajobi’s opinion, the undersigned finds these restrictions adequately account for the restrictions
opined by Dr. Koricke and no further explanation was required.
State Agency Reviewing Physicians - Drs. Edwards & Hoyle
Finally, Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to include Drs. Edwards and Hoyle’s
limitations to understanding and remembering one to two step tasks, carrying out one to two step
tasks in settings without strict time or production demands, and having major changes explained
ahead of time. (Doc. 13, at 13) (citing Tr. 98-99, 111-12). The Commissioner responds that the

ALJ was not required to adopt each restriction or provide a detailed explanation for each. (Doc.
16, at 14). Further, the Commissioner again contends that Plaintiff has not shown a significant
inconsistency between the opinions cited and the ALJ’s RFC. Id. at 14.
The ALJ addressed these opinions together, assigning them partial weight:
The undersigned accords these opinions partial weight as they are consistent with
the medical evidence as a whole, showing the claimant’s aggression towards
others and lack of focus (8E; 8F). however, the undersigned finds that the
claimant is more limited than opined by Dr. Edwards and Dr. Hoyle, as the record
shows that the claimant presented with a disheveled appearance and he had
difficulty with understanding and remembering (4F/5, 9; 5F/5, 7).

(Tr. 34-35).
Again, as noted above, the final determination of the RFC is reserved to the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). And the reasons-giving requirement does not apply to
reviewing State agency physicians. Martin, 658 F. App’x at 259; Ellsworth, 2016 WL 11260325,
at *12. Further, the undersigned agrees with the Commissioner in part that Plaintiff had not
shown a significant inconsistency between the opinions and the ALJ’s RFC. Preliminarily,
Plaintiff cites Drs. Edwards’s and Hoyle’s limitation that he should have “any major changes
explained to him ahead of time.” (Doc. 13, at 13) (citing Tr. 98-99, 111-12); see Tr. 99, 112
(“Clmt capable of performing static tasks in a setting with no strict time and production
demands. Major changes should be explained ahead of time and implemented gradually.”). The
undersigned finds this restriction more than adequately covered by the ALJ’s RFC, which limited
Plaintiff to “tolerating few changes in a routine work setting” and “when said changes do occur,
they would need to take place gradually and would occur infrequently.” (Tr. 31). To the extent
there is some difference in the language (e.g., “explained ahead of time”, Tr. 99, 112), any such
difference falls within the ALJ’s authority to evaluate all the evidence and determine the RFC.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).

Second, Plaintiff points to the State agency physicians’ limitation to “one to two step
tasks”. He contends that these opinions “are critical because the jobs identified by the VE and
relied upon to deny benefits . . . involve more than 1 to 2 steps.” (Doc. 13, at 15). In addressing a
similar argument, a court in the Southern District of Ohio explained:
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the state agency psychologists’
limitations and the ALJ’s limitations are not, as Plaintiff suggests, “materially
different.” Plaintiff bases his argument on two subtle discrepancies between the
wording of the state agency psychologists’ opinions and that of the ALJ’s RFC.
First, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred because one of the state agency
psychologists, Dr. Todd, limited Plaintiff to simple 1-2 step tasks, whereas the
ALJ limited Plaintiff to “simple routine tasks.” . . . The Court finds that the ALJ
did not err in choosing not to adopt the exact limitations proposed by the state
agency consultants.

Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ was not required to adopt these opinions in whole.
However, Plaintiff claims that because the ALJ gave “partial weight” to the state
agency psychologists, “the ALJ should have at least explained the rationale
behind his decision and explained either why they were omitted or how they are
properly accounted for in the residual functional capacity.” However, because the
state agency psychologists are not treating sources, the ALJ was not subject to the
“good reasons” requirement. See Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 514
(6th Cir. 2010).

Ferguson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 2414684, at *5 (S.D. Ohio) (internal pleading and
transcript citations and footnote omitted) (report and recommendation). The court then cited
Martin, 658 F. App’x 255, and concluded:
Plaintiff’s similar argument fares no better here. As Plaintiff recognizes, the ALJ
was under no obligation to adopt the state agency psychologists’ opinions in full.
See Harris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:13-CV-00260, 2014 WL
346287, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2014) (“[E]ven where an ALJ provides ‘great
weight’ to an opinion, an ALJ is not necessarily required to adopt wholesale
limitations contained therein.”). Nor, as the case law above makes clear, was the
ALJ required to explain why he did not adopt their opinions in full. See, e.g.,
Martin, 658 F. App’x at 259. The state agency psychologists are non-treating
sources, and the ALJ evaluated their opinions accordingly. As such, the ALJ did
not commit reversible error when formulating his RFC.

Id.

The same rationale applies here. Moreover, in this case, the ALJ provided significant
limitations to accommodate Plaintiff’s intellectual and understanding restrictions, including: 1)
limited to hearing and understanding simple oral instructions; 2) limited to communicating
simple information; and 3) limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. (Tr. 31). Most
importantly, as noted above, the ALJ was not required to provide “good reasons” for not
including the “one to two step task” limitation from a non-treating physician’s opinion. See
Martin, 658 F. App’x at 259; Ellsworth, 2016 WL 11260325, at *12. Further, elsewhere in his
opinion, the ALJ explained that Dr. Koricke’s consultative examinations provided support for the
simple, routine, repetitive task restriction in the RFC:
In examining the two reports from Dr. Koricke, the undersigned notes that her
reports had some internal consistencies. Namely, Dr. Koricke found that the
claimant could not complete the serial 7s task at either examination, he was
functioning at a borderline range of intelligence and he had difficulty relating to
and/or interacting with others. Considering the claimant’s education records and
the consistencies between the two consultative examinations, the undersigned
finds that the claimant is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks, simple
work-related decisions and occasional interaction with others.

(Tr. 34). Additionally, treating physician Dr. Fajobi opined Plaintiff had an “unlimited or very
good” ability to carry out very short and simple instructions” and a “limited but satisfactory”
ability to carry out detailed instructions, or maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods.” (Tr. 811). The ALJ found Plaintiff was “slightly more limited [than Dr. Fajobi found]
in his ability to carry out detailed instructions, which is supported by Dr. Koricke’s findings that
the claimant had difficulties remembering and carrying out instructions related to his difficulty
with concentration[.].” (Tr 36). The undersigned finds that these explanations and substantial
evidence of record supports the ALJ’s decision to include in the RFC a limitation to simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks (and implicit rejection of the State agency physician limitation to
one to two step tasks). See Freeman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 3580393, at *9 (N.D.

Ohio) (finding substantial evidence supported “the ALJ’s implicit rejection” of a state agency
physician’s opined restriction).
Gayheart and Wilson, cited by Plaintiff, address treating physician opinions, and do not
provide otherwise. As the Sixth Circuit explained in response to a similar argument in Martin:
Martin claims that the ALJ’s lack of explanation flouts our decision in Gayheart
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2013). There, the court faulted the
ALJ for applying a more critical standard of scrutiny to the treating source’s
opinions than he did to opinions of several non-treating doctors. Id. at 379–80.
Specifically, the court held that the inconsistencies the ALJ found in the treating
source’s opinions could not “constitute ‘good reasons’ for affording them little
weight when more flagrant inconsistencies [went] unquestioned in the medical
opinions to which the ALJ deferred.” Id. at 380. We struggle to see how Gayheart
applies to Martin’s argument, as he never posits that the ALJ erred in crediting the
non-treating sources’ opinions over those of a treating source. He argues instead
that the ALJ failed to explain reasons for rejecting portions of the non-treating
source’s opinions. Thus, his reliance on Gayheart is misplaced.

658 F. App’x at 259.

Plaintiff sees the facts differently, and argues that “[c]ritically, none of [the ALJ’s]
findings are inconsistent with the above-identified limitations offered by the psychological
experts”. (Doc. 13, at 14) (emphasis in original); see also Doc. 17, at 2 n.1 (listing findings
Plaintiff asserts are consistent with the allegedly-omitted limitations). However, this Court
cannot reverse even if substantial evidence or indeed a preponderance of the evidence supports
Plaintiff’s position, “so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the
ALJ.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 477. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision here. The
restrictions cited by Plaintiff are ultimately differences in interpretation, and in degree, rather
than entirely-ignored limitations. For the reasons set forth above, in light of the fact that it is the
ALJ’s duty to review all the evidence and formulate the RFC, Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157; 20
C.F.R. § 416.946(c), and that an ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by evidence of
record, but it need not correspond directly to a single medical opinion, Brown, 602 F. App’x at

331, the undersigned finds Plaintiff has identified no reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Following review of the arguments presented, the record, and the applicable law, the
undersigned finds the Commissioner’s decision denying SSI supported by substantial evidence
and affirms that decision.

s/James R. Knepp II
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367465. Public record. Not legal advice.