# Avant v. County of Erie

> District Court, W.D. New York · April 29, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367152

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** April 29, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367152

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “Monell’s bar on respondeat superior liability under [section] 1983 applies regardless of the category of relief sought”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

KRYSTAL A. AVANT, individually and as
administrator of the estate of Connell A.
Burrell,
20-CV-1689-LJV-HKS
Plaintiff, DECISION & ORDER

v.

COUNTY OF ERIE, ERIE COUNTY
HOLDING CENTER, and ERIE COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Defendants.

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff,
Krystal A. Avant, individually and as administrator of the estate of Connell A. Burrell,
Docket Item 42, and the defendants, the County of Erie (“the County”), the Erie County
Holding Center, and the Erie County Sheriff’s Department, Docket Item 46. More
specifically, Avant moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, Docket
Item 42, while the defendants move for summary judgment on all claims, Docket Item
46. The parties responded to each other’s motions, Docket Items 47 and 50, and Avant
replied in support of her motion, Docket Item 51.
For the reasons that follow, this Court denies Avant’s motion for partial summary
judgment, Docket Item 42, and grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, Docket Item 46. More specifically, this Court denies the
defendants’ motion with respect to Avant’s failure to train claim against the County
under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but otherwise
grants the motion.

BACKGROUND1
This case concerns the tragic death of Connell Burrell. On July 31, 2019, Burrell
was sentenced to 15 days’ incarceration for disorderly conduct. Docket Item 42-3 at 2.

Burrell—who was diabetic—was taken into custody at the Erie County Holding Center
that day and seen by a registered nurse for an intake assessment. Id. He later was
transferred to the Echo One housing unit. Id. at 3.
At 9:54 that evening, Registered Nurse Natasha Strough arrived at the Echo One
housing unit in response to a medical emergency call and found Burrell lying on the
floor. Id.; Docket Item 42-2 at 10. Burrell’s glucose level measured 26, he appeared
“confused,” and he was “unable to follow direction without multiple verbal redirections.”
Docket Item 42-3 at 3. “[H]is gait was unsteady,” and he was walked over “to medical
with assistance.” Id.
When he arrived at medical, “Burrell was reportedly alert and speaking in full

sentences,” but his “glucose was rechecked and was recorded at a critical level of 21.”
Id. Nurse Strough then instructed another nurse “to prepare a peanut butter sandwich
for Burrell to eat,” and “Burrell was given juice, milk, and the sandwich.” Id. Burrell
began to eat the sandwich, and security staff reported that he appeared to be choking.
Id. Licensed Practical Nurse Charles Broody performed the Heimlich maneuver, and

1 On a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d
Cir. 2011).
Burrell “expel[led] part of the sandwich.” Id.; Docket Item 42-2 at 13. “Burrell remained
unable to follow directions.” Docket Item 42-3 at 3.
The medical staff again checked Burrell’s blood glucose level and recorded it as
26. Id. “Burrell then became combative and more confused.” Id. The staff performed a

third blood glucose level check and recorded it as 31. Id. Nurse Strough then gave
Burrell 1 milligram of Glucagon in his right deltoid at 10:25 p.m. Id. She gave him a
second dose of Glucagon at 10:32 p.m. Id.
At 10:37 p.m., Burrell became unresponsive and had no pulse. Id. The staff
performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) and applied an automated external
defibrillator (“AED”). Id. Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) arrived at 10:47 p.m.
and found “Burrell lying supine on the ground of the infirmary, in cardiac arrest.” Id.
When EMS arrived, the staff was still performing CPR and the AED was still in place.
Id.
The EMS staff administered Dextrose and attempted to intubate Burrell. Id.

EMS transported Burrell to Buffalo General Hospital where his “admitting diagnoses
included: acute encephalopathy, acute respiratory failure with left lower lobe
consolidations, pulseless electrical activity arrest secondary to hypoglycemia, anion gap
metabolic acidosis secondary to lactic acidosis, and sepsis.” Id. at 3-4.
The following afternoon—August 1, 2019—“at 3:05 p.m., Burrell was released
from custody with time served but remained hospitalized in intensive care.” Id. at 4.
The next day, “at 7:30 a.m., Burrell was pronounced dead at Buffalo General Hospital.”
Id.
At the time of Burrell’s death, the Erie County Holding Center had the following
policy and procedure for hypoglycemic patients:
If Blood Glucose (BG) is <60, notify an RN immediately for assessment. If
the inmate is asymptomatic, give 2 juices/milk or oral glucose and re-check
BG in 15 minutes. May repeat juice/oral glucose if necessary. If repeat BG
is > 70, provide nourishment and advise him/her of signs and symptoms of
low blood sugar. Repeat BG in 90 minutes.

If BG is <60, notify an RN immediately for assessment. If there is a change
in [level of consciousness (LOC)], give 1 mg glucagon IM. Continue to
assess inmate in medical and check BG in 15 minutes. If BG continues to
be <70, or no improvement of LOC, transfer patient to Emergency
Department via EMS.

If BG is <60, notify an RN immediately for assessment. If there is a change
in LOC, give 1 mg glucagon IM. If repeat BG is >70 and inmate returns to
baseline after 15 minutes, provide nourishment and advise him/her of signs
and symptoms of low blood sugar. Repeat BG in 90 minutes.
Id.
Following Burrell’s death, the Erie County Sheriff’s Office conducted an
investigation. Id. Based on that investigation, Nurse Strough “was found to be in
violation of agency policy and procedure for hypoglycemic patients.” Id. She was
subsequently terminated from her position. Id.
The New York State Commission of Correction Medical Review Board also
issued a report, which found that Nurse Strough “failed to perform proper rescue
measures that resulted in Burrell becoming fatally hypoglycemic and going into cardiac
arrest.” Id. The report also found that Strough “failed to follow agency policy and
procedure for a hypoglycemic patient and ordered an unauthorized and contraindicated
therapy.” Id. “Additionally, [Nurse Strough] failed to activate EMS to respond to the
facility immediately when Burrell’s airway had become compromised.” Id. The Medical
Review Board concluded that “[h]ad [Nurse Strough] properly recognized Burrell’s
critical hypoglycemia, properly followed agency policy and procedure, and requested
immediate treatment and transfer to a hospital via an advanced life support ambulance,
Burrell’s death could have been prevented.” Id.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court appropriately grants summary

judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“The movant”—that is, the party seeking summary judgment— “has the burden of
showing that there is no genuine issue of fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The movant may satisfy that burden by relying on evidence in the
record, “including depositions, documents, . . . [and] affidavits,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A), or by “point[ing] to an absence of evidence to support an essential element
of the [non-moving] party’s claim,” Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51
F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986));
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

Once the movant has satisfied its initial burden, the non-moving party “must
come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine” dispute of material
fact—that is, that a “rational trier of fact [could] find for the non-moving party” on the
“record taken as a whole.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586-87 (1986) (citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). If the
non-moving party fails to do so, the court will grant summary judgment. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

DISCUSSION
I. AVANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Avant moves for partial summary judgment “on the issue of [l]iability.” Docket
Item 42-2 at 16. The crux of her argument is that the Medical Review Board’s findings

establish as a matter of law that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to
Burrell’s serious medical need. See generally Docket Item 42-2.
But—as the defendants observe in their opposition—“[t]here is no respondeat
superior liability under [section] 1983.” Docket Item 47 at 4 (citing Jemmott v. Coughlin,
85 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1996)); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[W]e conclude that a
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [section] 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.”); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining
that “Monell’s bar on respondeat superior liability under [section] 1983 applies

regardless of the category of relief sought”). In other words, “a local government may
not be sued under [section] 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under [section] 1983.” Id.
Here, the only defendants are municipal entities; the plaintiff did not sue the
individual staff members who attempted to treat Burrell. See Docket Item 1-1. So even
if, as Avant argues, the Medical Review Board’s finding means that Nurse Strough
acted with deliberate indifference to Burrell’s serious medical need, that is not enough to
hold the municipal defendants liable. What is more, while there is a policy at issue, it is
Nurse Strough’s failure to follow that policy that forms the basis for the claim; there is no

alleged issue with the policy itself.
In such a case, “municipal liability turns on the plaintiff[’s] ability to attribute the
subordinates’ conduct to the actions or omissions of higher[-]ranking officials with
policymaking authority.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d
Cir. 2004). “One means of doing so, of course, is to establish that a policymaker
ordered or ratified the subordinates’ actions.” Id. (citing Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796,
803 (2d Cir. 1986)). “Another method of implicating a policymaking official through
subordinates’ conduct is to show that the policymaker was aware of a subordinate’s
unconstitutional actions, and consciously chose to ignore them, effectively ratifying the
actions.” Id. (citing Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir.

1992)).
There is no evidence here that anyone above Nurse Strough ordered or
approved her actions. Nor is there any evidence that she had a prior track record of
failing to follow procedure that would have put the County on notice of potential future
violations. As explained below, there is evidence supporting Avant’s theory that the
County was deliberately indifferent in failing to train its employees on the policy
regarding hypoglycemic patients. The Court finds, however, that there are material
questions of fact with respect to Avant’s failure to train claims that preclude summary
judgment.
For all those reasons, Avant’s partial motion for summary judgment, Docket Item
42, is denied.

II. THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Erie County Holding Center and Erie County Sheriff’s Office
The defendants first argue that the Erie County Holding Center and the Erie
County Sheriff's Office are not entities that can be sued. Docket Item 46-1 at 9; see,
e.g., Busch v. Howard, 2021 WL 2946532, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021); Johnson-
Schmitt v. Robinson, 990 F.Supp.2d 331, 340 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). Avant does not
respond to that contention, arguing only that the defendants’ “motion should be denied
as to the County of Erie.” Docket Item 50 at 2 (emphasis added).

The Court agrees that the Erie County Holding Center and the Erie County
Sheriff’s Office are not proper defendants. See Johnson-Schmitt, 990 F. Supp. 2d at
340 n.2 (noting that the “[d]efendants correctly assert that the Erie County Sheriff’s
Department is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued individually”); Tulloch v.
Erie Cnty. Holding Ctr., 2010 WL 2609054, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 24, 2010) (finding that
“[t]he claims against the Erie County Holding Center must be dismissed because . . . the
Erie County Holding Center is merely an arm of the County[] and does not have a legal
identity separate and apart from the County and thus cannot be sued”). As such, the
defendants’ motion is granted as to those two entities.

B. Monell Failure to Train Claim
As explained above, the Supreme Court held in Monell that a municipality may
be held liable under section 1983 only “when execution of [the municipality]’s policy or
custom . . . inflicts the [alleged] injury.” 436 U.S. at 694. Here, Avant argues that the
County is liable for its failure to train its staff on the hypoglycemia policy. Docket Item
50 at 2-6; see Amnesty Am., 361 F.3d at 129 (explaining that “a municipality can be
liable [under section 1983] for failing to train its employees where it acts with deliberate
indifference in disregarding the risk that its employees will unconstitutionally apply its

policies without more training” (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387-90
(1989))).
To succeed on a Monell claim based on the failure to train, a plaintiff “must
establish that ‘the [municipal employee]’s shortcomings . . . resulted from . . . a faulty
training program’ rather than from the negligent administration of a sound program or
other unrelated circumstances.” Amnesty Am., 361 F.3d at 129-30 (quoting City of
Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91). “The elements of an identified training deficiency and a
close causal relationship, which together require the plaintiffs to prove that the
deprivation occurred as the result of a municipal policy rather than as a result of isolated
misconduct by a single actor, ensure that a failure to train theory does not collapse into

respondeat superior liability.” Id. at 130. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the
training deficiency was the result of municipal policy and not simply a failure of its
employees. See id. at 129-30.
The Supreme Court has “offered as an example of deliberate indifference a
municipality’s failure to train police officers on the proper use of deadly force.” Walker v.
City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at
390 n.10). The Court explained that “city policymakers know to a moral certainty that
their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons,” and “[t]he city has armed its
officers with firearms, in part to accomplish this task.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390
n.10. For that reason, “the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the
use of deadly force can be said to be ‘so obvious’ that failure to do so would properly be
characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional rights.” Id. (internal citation
omitted).

In the Second Circuit, “three requirements . . . must be met before a
municipality’s failure to train . . . constitutes deliberate indifference to the constitutional
rights of citizens.” Walker, 974 F.2d at 297. “First, the plaintiff must show that a
policymaker knows ‘to a moral certainty’ that her employees will confront a given
situation.” Id. (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10). In other words, “a
policymaker does not exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to train employees for rare
or unforeseen events.” Id. “Second, the plaintiff must show that the situation either
presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training . . . will make less
difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation.” Id. And
“[f]inally, the plaintiff must show that the wrong choice by the [municipal] employee will

frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 298 (citing
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390).
Here, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Avant—as this Court must on
a motion for summary judgment against her—Avant has met all three prongs. With
respect to the first prong, the existence of a specific policy dealing with the treatment of
hypoglycemic individuals suggests that the County knew such individuals would be held
at the Erie County Holding Center. See Docket Item 50 at 3 (Avant’s observing that
“[t]his specific policy would not have been drafted if policymakers did not expect
individuals with hypoglycemia to be housed at the Erie County Holding Center”). And
the same is true with respect to the second prong: the existence of the policy suggests
that there is a “difficult choice” in how to handle the treatment of a hypoglycemic patient.
See id. at 3-4. Indeed, the detail in the policy itself suggests that the decisions, required
to be made on the spot and without delay, are difficult by their very nature. Finally—and

as poignantly demonstrated by the tragic outcome of this case—“the wrong choice . . .
will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights.” See Walker,
974 F.2d at 298; see also Docket Item 50 at 4.
Moreover, Avant has identified evidence supporting her claim that the County’s
training program—if it had one—was woefully inadequate: When confronted with the
policy at her deposition, Nurse Strough testified that she didn’t “believe th[at] was the
policy that was in place at the time.” See Docket Item 47-3 at 66; see also id. (“Q. So it
is your testimony that the policy you just read, these three paragraphs, was not the
policy that was in place at the time of Mr. Burrell’s passing? A. That is correct.”).
Additionally, the Final Report of the New York State Commission of Correction in the

matter of Burrell’s death recommended that “[t]he [j]ail physician shall conduct a
comprehensive quality assurance review with all medical staff at the Erie County
Holding Center regarding proper management of hypoglycemic and diabetic patients,”
including “a review of agency policy and procedure.” Docket Item 42-4 at 5. The Final
Report further recommended that “[t]he [j]ail physician shall ensure there is a training
program for all nursing staff regarding medical policy and procedure for the Erie County
Holding Center” and that “[t]he program should also include periodic chart audits to
ensure that compliance is being maintained.” Id.
All of that creates material issues of fact as to whether the County was
deliberately indifferent in failing to train the medical staff of the Erie County Holding
Center on the hypoglycemic patient policy. The defendants’ motion for summary
judgment therefore is denied as to Avant’s Monell claim.

C. State Law Claims
1. Wrongful Death and Conscious Pain and Suffering
There is no dispute that “the individuals [allegedly] responsible for the negligent
acts and wrongful death of . . . Burrell were employees of the Erie County Sheriff’s
Department.” Docket Item 50 at 7. Avant argues that “an action against the Sheriff’s
Department is in effect an action against the County itself,” and, according to her, “the

actionable claims against the employees of the Sheriff’s Department [are] in effect
actionable against the County itself.” Id. (citing Johanson v. County. of Erie, 134 A.D.3d
1530, 1532, 22 N.Y.S.3d 763, 765 (4th Dept. 2015)).
But “[i]t is well established in New York State that a county cannot be held liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions of its sheriff or sheriff’s
deputies” unless the county establishes “a local law that expressly assumes liability for
the acts of its sheriff and deputies.” Saleh v. Savage, 2015 WL 1608839, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015) (citations omitted); see Wierzbic v. County of Erie, 2018 WL
550521, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018) (explaining that “in the absence of a local law
imputing such responsibility, a county may not be held responsible for the negligent acts

of local law enforcement pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior” (citing Villar v.
County of Erie, 126 A.D.3d 1295, 1296-97, 5 N.Y.S.3d 747, 748 (4th Dep’t 2015))).
And, as the defendants observe, “Erie County has never passed a local law assuming
responsibility for the negligent actions of the Sheriff or his employees.”2 Docket Item
46-1 at 11; see, e.g., Wierzbic, 2018 WL 550521, at *10; Mosey v. County of Erie, 117
A.D.3d 1381, 1385, 984 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (4th Dep’t 2014).
Avant did not name the Sheriff, Nurse Strough, or any of the other Sheriff’s
deputies in her complaint.3 See Docket Item 1-1. Therefore, and because the County

cannot be held vicariously liable for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering
caused by the Sheriff or his deputies, this Court grants the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to those claims.
2. Negligent Training and Supervision4
“To state a claim for negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention under

New York law, ‘in addition to the standard elements of negligence, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that the tort-feasor and the defendant were in an employee-employer relationship;
[and] (2) that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for

2 This Court previously held that the County could be liable for employment
discrimination by the Erie County Sheriff’s Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. See Davis v. Erie Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 2019 WL 4926289, at *1-2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,
2019). That decision is inapposite here. “Individuals are not subject to liability under
Title VII,” Kretzmon v. Erie County, 2013 WL 636545, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2013)
(quoting Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2009)), and
“[e]mployment discrimination claims are not ‘torts’ under New York State law,” Carlson
v. Geneva City Sch. Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 355, 365 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
3 Those claims likely would have been viable, and the County might well have
been on the hook to indemnify the individual defendants.
4 The complaint also includes a claim for negligent hiring, see Docket Item 1-1 at
¶¶ 67-75, but Avant seems to have abandoned that claim, arguing in her opposition to
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment only that “[t]here are questions of fact
relative to” her “negligent training and supervision cause of action,” Docket Item 50 at 8.
Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on Avant’s
negligent hiring claim.
the conduct which caused the injury prior to the injury’s occurrence . . . .” Zilioli v. City
of New York, 2020 WL 1548763, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020) (quoting Ehrens v.
Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam)).5
As the defendants observe, “[t]he duty to supervise and train Sheriff’s employees

rests with the Sheriff.” Docket Item 46-1 at 14; see Metcalf v. County of Erie, 173
A.D.3d 1799, 1800, 104 N.Y.S.3d 815, 816 (4th Dep’t 2019). The County, by contrast,
“has no similar duty,” and so the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, has affirmed the dismissal of claims “alleging that the County was
liable for its failure to supervise and train jail deputies” on that basis. Metcalf, 173
A.D.3d at 1800, 104 N.Y.S.3d at 816-17 (citing Villar, 126 A.D.3d at 1296, 5 N.Y.S.3d at
748).
Nor has Avant “raise[d] an issue of fact suggesting that the County assumed the
Sheriff’s duty” to train and supervise his staff. See id. In the absence of such an
assumption of the Sheriff’s duty, a claim against the County for negligent training and

supervision would effectively be holding the county vicariously liable for the Sheriff’s

5 In Ehrens, the Second Circuit identified a third element: “that the tort was
committed on the employer’s premises or with the employer’s chattels.” 385 F.3d at
235 (citation omitted). But at least one New York State court has found that was
incorrect under New York State law. See Sokola v. Weinstein, 78 Misc. 3d 842, 852,
187 N.Y.S.3d 493, 504 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2023) (“[T]his Court finds that Ehrens
incorrectly set forth the elements of a claim for negligent supervision and should not be
followed to the extent it requires a plaintiff to strictly plead or prove the ‘chattels’ or
‘premises’ element set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317.”). Regardless,
that prong does not affect the outcome of Avant’s claim here.
negligence. And as explained above, such a claim against the County is not viable.6
See Section II.C.1, supra.
For those reasons, this Court grants the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Avant’s state law negligent training and supervision claim.7

D. Punitive Damages
The defendants move for summary judgment on Avant’s claim for punitive
damages, arguing that “[i]t is well-settled that punitive damages are not available
against municipalities.” Docket Item 46-1 at 16 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)). Avant did not respond to that part of the defendants’
motion, see Docket Item 50, and this Court agrees with the defendants that punitive

damages are not available in a claim against the County, see Villar v. County of Erie,
2020 WL 33125, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2020) (explaining that “[i]t is settled that
punitive damages cannot be recovered from a municipal entity” (quoting Krause v.
Buffalo & Erie Cty. Workforce Dev. Consortium, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 68, 106 (W.D.N.Y.
2005))).

6 As noted above, Avant did not sue the Sheriff, any of his deputies or any other
individual involved in the incident at issue. See Docket Item 1-1.
7 Although it may seem incongruous to allow a Monell failure to claim train
against the County for the Sheriff’s failure to train but not a state law negligent training
claim, federal caselaw has held that “when the sheriff or his deputies are acting as final
policymakers or pursuant to County policy or custom, the County may be held liable for
their actions” under Monell. See Lin v. County of Monroe, 66 F. Supp. 3d 341, 351
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Harford v. Cnty. of Broome, 1999 WL 615190, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
July 15, 1999)); see also Leather v. Ten Eyck, 2 F. App'x 145, 149 (2d Cir. 2001)
(summary order) (finding that county could be liable for sheriff’s constitutional violations
under section 1983); Okongwu v. Cnty. of Erie, 2018 WL 1383233, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
19, 2018) (rejecting the County’s claim that it was “immunize[d] from liability for
constitutional violations by the Sheriff or his deputies” under section 1983).
This Court therefore grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
Avant’s claim for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court DENIES Avant’s motion for partial
summary judgment, Docket Item 42, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Docket Item 46. More specifically, this
Court denies the defendants’ motion with respect to Avant’s Monell failure to train claim
against the County but otherwise grants the motion. Within 30 days, the parties shall
contact this Court to schedule a status conference to set a trial date.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 29, 2024
Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367152. Public record. Not legal advice.