# Tripathy v. Lockwood

> District Court, W.D. New York · March 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367020

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367020

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the burden “is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SANJAY TRIPATHY,

Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
v.
19-CV-6614-MJP

CAPTAIN LOCKWOOD, et al.,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Pedersen, M.J. On August 21, 2019, plaintiff Sanjay Tripathy (“Plaintiff”),
proceeding pro se, commenced this civil rights action against numerous defendants
alleging that a laundry policy at Gowanda Correctional Facility violated his religious
beliefs as a Hindu. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) He thereafter filed two amended complaints
asserting similar claims, but in which he either limited the scope of the defendants
or added defendants, the latter of which is the case with the operative complaint filed
on January 19, 2023. (2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 132.)
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)1 and (6)

1 In their notice of motion, Defendants indicate that they are moving to dismiss the
second amended complaint pursuant to “Rule 12(b)(2) and (6) and Rule 12(c).” (Not. of Mot.,
(continued)
and 12(c)2. (Defs.’ Not. of Mot., Mar. 24, 2023, ECF No. 138.) For the reasons stated
below the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

JURISDICTION
On December 15, 2023, the parties jointly and voluntarily consented to
Magistrate Jurisdiction and the Honorable Frank P. Geraci, Jr. referred this case to
the undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of a final judgment in

ECF No. 138.) However, in their memorandum of law, Defendants seek dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1) rather than 12(b)(2). (Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 7, ECF No. 138-2.) The Court, therefore,
construes Defendants’ motion as one seeking dismissal under 12(b)(1) instead of 12(b)(2), as
well as under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c).
2 Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter the pleadings
are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (emphasis added). In place of answering Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint, Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss. In other words, since
Defendants never filed an answer, the pleadings were never closed for purposes of Rule 12(c)
and Defendants cannot seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint under that
Rule. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005) provides:
We conclude that Doe’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) before any answer was filed . . . was procedurally
premature and should have been denied. The rule provides in relevant part:
“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial,
any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Rule
7, entitled "Pleadings Allowed," defines what filings are considered pleadings
and declares which pleadings shall be filed with the district court. It provides:
There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim
denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a
cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party
is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer if a [ ]
third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that
the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)).
Based upon the forgoing, the Court denies Defendants’ motion as premature to the
extent it seeks judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. (Notice, Consent, and
Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge, ECF No. 162.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 25, 2019, the Court dismissed with prejudice certain of Plaintiff’s
claims alleged in his initial complaint, some with leave to file an amended complaint,
and allowed others to proceed to service. (Decision and Order, Nov. 22, 2019, ECF No.
3; Compl., Aug. 21, 2019, ECF No. 1.) On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint pursuant to the Court’s Order against Captain Lockwood,
Reverand Harris, Superintendent Susan R. Kickbush, and the Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision of New York State (“DOCCS”). (Am. Compl.

at 1, ECF No. 4.).3
In liberally construing Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court determined
that it adequately stated the following claims, which were allowed to proceed to
service: (1) First Amendment claim against Defendants Lockwood, Harris, and
Kickbush, in their individual capacities; (2) Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act claim (“RLUIPA”) against DOCCS; and (3) claim for prospective

injunctive relief under the First Amendment against Lockwood, Harris, and
Kickbush in their official capacities. (Order, Feb. 24, 2020, ECF No. 7.) Defendants
filed their answer on April 20, 2020. (Defs.’ Answer, ECF No. 9.) On November 25,

3 References to page numbers are to those automatically assigned when the document
was electronically filed on CM/ECF and can be found in the upper right-hand corner of the
document.
2020, Plaintiff moved to add Acting Superintendent Andrea N. Schneider as a
defendant after Defendant Superintendent Susan R. Kickbush retired and the Court
granted that motion. (Mot. to Add Parties, ECF No. 25; Decision and Order, Dec. 18,

2020, ECF No. 29.)
On January 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in which he
added seven new defendants, all but one of whom work(ed) at either Fishkill
Correctional Facility or Collins Correctional Facility. (2d Am. Compl. at 3, ECF No.
132.) In particular, with respect to Fishkill, Plaintiff added defendants Sharon Frost,
Father George J. Dash, and Superintendent Edward Burnett (“Fishkill Defendants”).

(Id.) With respect to Collins, Plaintiff added Reverend Joel L. Terragnoli, Richard
Moffit, and Superintendent Leanne Latona (“Collins Defendants”). (Id.) Finally,
Plaintiff added Defendant Nancy K. Fernandez (“Fernandez”), Director of Ministerial
Services at DOCCS. (Id.)
In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges similar claims to those
asserted previously against the defendants associated with Gowanda Correctional
Facility, but also adds three new claims (numbers 3, 4, and 5, below) as follows: (1) a

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, First Amendment (freedom of religion) against all
Defendants in their official and individual capacities; (2) RLUIPA claim against all
Defendants in their official capacities and against all Defendants but DOCCS in their
individual capacities; (3) violations of 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and § 1985—conspiracy to
deprive Plaintiff of his religious rights against all Defendants in their official and
individual capacities; (4) supplemental jurisdiction for violation of Article 1, § 3 of the
New York State Constitution regarding “Freedom of Worship, Religious Liberty”
against all Defendants in their official and individual capacities; (5) supplemental
jurisdiction for violation of Article 1, § 19 of the New York State Constitution

regarding “Environmental Rights (Each person shall have a right to clean air and
water, and a healthful environment)” against all Defendants in their official and
individual capacities. (2d Am. Compl. at 7.) In response, Defendants filed the present
motion in which they seek to dismiss each claim contained in Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A New York City jury convicted Plaintiff of a criminal sexual act in the first
degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and related offenses in May 2018. The Court
sentenced Plaintiff to seven years of imprisonment. The First Department affirmed
his conviction. See generally, People v. Tripathy, 187 A.D.3d 515 (1st Dep’t 2020), lv.
denied, 36 N.Y.3d 1101 (2021).
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (ECF
No. 132.) Plaintiff is “a life-long (born and raised) Hindu . . . and one of his core and

sincerely held religious beliefs is not to consume or come in close personal contact
with beef and pork food products.” (2d Am. Compl. at 8 ¶ 2(b).) Plaintiff alleges that
DOCCS is “aware of [Plaintiff’s] Hindu faith and DOCCS records reflect [Plaintiff’s]
faith (Hindu) since the start of his incarceration.” (Id.)
Plaintiff further asserts that prior to April 2019, DOCCS’s laundry policy
permitted him to “wash (wash/dry) his clothes with no personal contact with other
inmates’ clothes.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 2(c).) In April 2019, DOCCS changed its laundry policy
such that “at least 2 inmates’ clothes (minimum) must be washed together in close
personal contact.” (Id.) Believing that the new laundry policy violated his core and

sincerely held religious beliefs, Plaintiff asked for an exception—both “informally
verbally and formally in writing”—to wash his clothes consistent with the prior
laundry policy that did not launder clothes with the clothes of other inmates. (Id. at
9 ¶ 2(d).)
Plaintiff alleges that the three correctional facilities at which he was housed—
Gowanda, Fishkill, and Collins—denied his request and, as a result, Plaintiff “was

forced to either hand wash his clothes, go long periods without washing his clothes,
or violate his religious beliefs (that his clothes may not come into close contact with
beef or pork) whenever he used (was forced to use with no viable humane options) the
laundry facilities.” (Id.) He contends that for “almost 4 years, [Plaintiff] was unable
to enjoy a healthful environment, and was constantly subjected to dirty, unhealthy,
soiled and smelly clothes, as he was deprived/unable to use DOCCS laundry
facilities.” (Id. at 25 ¶ 5(b).) He alleges that he was therefore forced “many times to

violate his core and sincerely held religious beliefs,” which created a “substantial
burden.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants did not grant him the exception
“deliberately and intentionally, in a conspiracy to deny civil rights.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he exhausted all administrative remedies “per DOCCS
Grievance process (DOCCS Directive #4040)” because he “filed a grievance (denied),
filed an appeal with the Superintendent (denied)[,] and appealed to the CORC4
(denied),” thus “making him compliant with the PLRA5.” (Id. at 10 ¶ 2(e).) Plaintiff
asserts that “as DOCCS laundry policy was across all prisons, [Plaintiff] did not file

separate grievances at Fishkill CF and Collins CF, but he spoke and wrote to
Defendants to ask for relief which was denied.” (Id. at 10–11 ¶ 2(e).)
Plaintiff further alleges that all Defendants “were personally involved in
directly denying [Plaintiff] any relief (from the laundry policy), and were aware
(personally both verbally and in writing on multiple occasions), had the direct
authority and responsibility to provide relief, but denied any relief, while hiding

behind procedures, rules and regulations, and also engaged in conspiracy.” (Id. at 11
¶ 2(f).) He also alleges that, apart from DOCCS, all Defendants were involved in their
official capacity. (Id.) He alleges that Defendants at each facility met as a group,
conferred, had discussions with DOCCS Albany Ministerial Services, and denied him
relief. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts almost identical factual allegations concerning “Gowanda CF
Defendants (Lockwood, Harris, Kickbush, [Schneider]),” “Fishkill CF Defendants

(Dash, Frost, Burnett),” and “Collins CF Defendants (Terragnoli, Moffit, Latona) (Id.
at 22–23 ¶ 4(b), (c), (d).) Specifically, he alleges that each group of Defendants “met,
conferred, decided, and denied any relief to petitioner, on multiple occasions,”

4 “CORC” is an acronym for Central Office Review Committee.
5 “PLRA” is an acronym for the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
“individually and collectively conferred with DOCCS Officials in Albany6, and met
with [Plaintiff] on multiple occasions to deny relief,” and “knowingly, willingly, and
under false pretexts [ ] derided and ridiculed [Plaintiff]” about “his Hinduism beliefs.”

(Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants gave religious exemptions to
“Muslims/Jews” by providing a “Pork free menu and kitchen . . . but because
[Plaintiff] is 1 Hindu, exceptions cannot be made.” (Id.)
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that he “personally met and wrote to all Defendants
(except Fernandez at DOCCS, whom he only wrote to) at Gowanda CF (where he was
based till 1/21/2021), Fishkill CF (where he was based from 1/21/2021 to 10/19/2021)

and Collins CF (where he was based from 10/19/2021 to 11/22/2022).” (Id. at 12 ¶ 2(f).)
DOCCS released Plaintiff in November 2022 after he successfully moved to
vacate under New York State Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10. See Tripathy v.
Brotz, No. 6:22-cv-6469-FPG, 2023 WL 4032831, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 15, 2023).
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6)
“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents

attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in

6 With respect to his allegations against the Fishkill and Collins Defendants, Plaintiff
adds “(including Defendant Fernandez)” after the word “Albany.” (Id. ¶ 4(b) and (c).)
the complaint.”7 DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted). A court should consider the motion by “accepting all factual
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Trustees of the Upstate N.Y. Eng'rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561,
566 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). To withstand dismissal, a claimant must set
forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589

F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal quotations, alterations and citations omitted). “To state a plausible claim,

7 Given his pro se status, the Court will also consider Plaintiff’s response to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 139) under the same 12(b)(6) standard. See Pflaum
v. Town of Stuyvesant, 937 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted) (“[A] pro
se plaintiff’s papers in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
may be considered as effectively amending the allegations of his complaint—to the extent
those papers are consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”); Donhauser v. Goord, 314
F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (collecting district court cases) (“[I]n cases where a pro
se plaintiff is faced with a motion to dismiss, it is appropriate for the court to consider
materials outside of the complaint to the extent they are consistent with the allegations in
the complaint.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192,
195 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering allegations in pro se plaintiff’s opposition to motion to
dismiss).
the complaint’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.’” Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir.
2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In addition, “[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants generally are entitled to a
liberal construction of their pleadings, which should be read to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.” Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357
F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the plaintiff proceeds pro se . . . a court is obliged
to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights

violations.”). “[A] pro se litigant should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate that he has a valid claim.” Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785 (2d
Cir. 1984). “Even in a pro se case, however, ‘although a court must accept as true all
of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal
conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162,
170 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)). A court

may not “invent factual allegations that [a plaintiff] has not pled.” Chavis, 618 F.3d
at 170.
DISCUSSION
Exhaustion of Remedies8
Congress enacted the PLRA in 1996 “to address the large number of prisoner
complaints filed in federal court.” Walker v. Schult, 45 F.4th 598, 611 (2d Cir. 2022)
(quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007)). “Among other reforms, the PLRA
. . . requires prisoners to exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing suit.”

Walker, 45 F4th at 611–12 (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 202); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”). The “PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about
prison life . . . .” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners filing in New

York State must exhaust their remedies by “follow[ing] the prescribed three-step
grievance procedure set forth at 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.5.” Johnson v. Annucci, 314 F.
Supp. 3d 472, 475 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).

8 Defendants indicate that their “motion is a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
pleadings for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter under Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(1).”
(Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 7, ECF No. 138-2.) In support of this argument they cite to several
cases, including Harris v. Totten, 244 F. Supp. 2d 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which dismissed
the plaintiff’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
as the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at 231. However,
Defendants cite to outdated case law as the Second Circuit has clearly established that the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is not jurisdictional. Richardson
v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 433–434 (2d Cir. 2003). For this reason, the Court denies Defendants’
motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1).
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies “is an affirmative defense under
the PLRA.” Walker, 45 F.4th at 612 (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 216). “[A] prisoner
need not specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in the complaint because

‘failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the
PLRA, not a pleading requirement.’” Rucker v. Giffen, 997 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2021)
(quoting Williams v. Correction Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2016). As
an affirmative defense, the defendants bear the burden “of showing that a prisoner
failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirements” before the burden shifts to the plaintiff.
Thomas v. Waugh, No. 913CV0321MADTWD, 2018 WL 3121622, at *10 (N.D.N.Y.

Feb. 28, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:13-CV-00321, 2018 WL
1508563 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018).
Once the burden shifts, the plaintiff may try to invoke an exception to the
exhaustion requirement by showing that administrative remedies were “unavailable
to him.” Id. The PLRA requires exhaustion only insofar as the exhaustion is
“available to the inmate.” Green Haven Prison Preparative Meeting v. DOCCS, 16
F.4th 67, 81 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 2676 (May 2,

2022). But “[t]he bar for the availability of remedies . . . is low. To constitute an
‘available’ remedy, a process requires only ‘the possibility of some relief.’” Id. (quoting
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016)). Dismissal is appropriate “when it is apparent
from the face of the complaint” that the prisoner “failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.” Allah v. Adams, 573 F. Supp. 3d 904, 910 (W.D.N.Y. 2021), cert. denied
143 S. Ct. 433 (Nov. 14, 2022) (citation omitted); see also Williams, 829 F.3d at 122
(“[A] district court still may dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies if it is clear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff did not satisfy the
PLRA exhaustion requirement.”) (citation omitted).

Defendants assert that the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985
claims against the Fishkill and Collins Defendants because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as required by 7 NYCRR § 701 and, therefore, his claims are
barred by the PLRA. (Brown Decl. ¶¶ 17, 25, ECF No. 138-1.)
Plaintiff concedes he “did not file separate grievances at Fishkill CF and
Collins CF.” (2d Am. Compl. at 10 ¶ 2(e).) He makes two arguments against the need

to file such grievances. First, he argues that the “DOCCS-wide” laundry policy
rendered filing grievances at these facilities futile (Id. at 11 ¶ 2(f).) Second, even if he
needed to file grievances at these facilities, Plaintiff argues that he satisfied the
PLRA’s requirement by speaking with and writing to the Fishkill and Collins
Defendants on the matter. (Id. at 10 ¶ 2(e).)
Plaintiff first alleges that filing “separate grievances at Fishkill CF and Collins
CF[ ] would have been futile and a dead-end, as the laundry policy was state-wide.”

(Pl’s Resp. at 17 ¶ 1, Mar. 27, 2023, ECF No. 139.) To invoke the futility exception to
exhaustion of remedies, the challenged policy must be “unavailable.” Ross, 578 U.S.
at 643. For example, if the policy is “outside the control of the jail,” the claim is “not
grievable.” Saeli v. Chautauqua Cnty., NY, 36 F.4th 445, 457–58 (2d Cir. 2022). But
facilities may—and often do—retain local control over the implementation of state-
wide policies. Here, Plaintiff’s exhibits indicate he only grieved Gowanda’s laundry
policy. (See, e.g., Pl’s Ex. 4 at 5, 13, ECF No. 139-4.) His challenge is based on a
Gowanda-specific memorandum (Id. at 15.) CORC denied his grievance in order to
“uphold[ ] the discretion of the facility administration to promulgate local policy and

procedures.” (Id. at 1 (emphasis added).) His allegations thus indicate that the
laundry policy was not “outside the control” of each prison facility. Saeli, 36 F.4th at
457. As a result, the futility exception does not apply.
Second, even if he needed to grieve the laundry policy at Fishkill and Collins,
Plaintiff alleges that he exhausted his remedies there because he “reached out
extensively” to Fishkill and Collins Defendants “via letters, meetings and

communications of all [g]rievances including CORC decisions.” (Pl’s Resp. at 18 ¶ 1.)
But exhaustion is not satisfied through enough informal steps like letters and
communications. See Dabney v. Pegano, 604 F. App’x 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary
order); see, e.g., Girard v. Chuttey, 826 F. App’x 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order)
(citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006); Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 44 (2d
Cir. 2007) (holding that “letters to prison officials did not constitute exhaustion”
because “they did not conform to the agency’s grievance procedures”)). This District

has consistently held that “complaints that were not filed as formal grievances cannot
satisfy the exhaustion requirement.” Collins v. Goodliff, No. 12-CV-6595-FPG, 2014
WL 6065670, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2014) (collecting cases). Plaintiff was required
to exhaust the formal grievance procedure pursuant to 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.5. at the
Fishkill and Collins facilities.
To satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, Plaintiff was required to file
formal grievances challenging the laundry policy at each facility. He “did not file
separate grievances at Fishkill CF and Collins CF.” (2d Am. Compl. at 10 ¶ 2(e).)

Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the Fishkill and Collins
Defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As Defendants did not
raise a failure to exhaust with respect to Fernandez, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s
claims against the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez below.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants assert that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
DOCCS and the individual Defendants in their official capacities under the Eleventh

Amendment, which provides that the State is entitled to sovereign immunity. (Brown
Decl. ¶ 27.) Defendants further assert that DOCCS is an agency of the State and a
“lawsuit against a state employee in their official capacity it a lawsuit against the
State itself.” (Id. ¶¶ 26, 27.) In addition, Defendants contend that the Court should
dismiss the § 1983 and § 1985 claims against DOCCS because only “persons” can be
sued under them and DOCCS is not a person. (Id. ¶ 28.)

The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits by citizens against a state unless the
state has waived this immunity. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 67–68 (1996) (“[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens.”). This
immunity extends to state agencies, like DOCCS, and state agents in their official
capacities. See Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he dismissal
of [the plaintiff]’s claims against . . . [DOCCS] . . . is affirmed, because these claims
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 921 (2d Cir.

1988) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment protects prison officials from suits
for damages in their official capacity but not in their personal capacity).
Here, there is no allegation that the State waived its sovereign immunity. As
a result, Plaintiff cannot bring claims against Defendants in their official capacities.
See Guarneri v. West, 518 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (“To the extent that
plaintiff’s claims are asserted against defendants in their official capacities, the

claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed. The Eleventh
Amendment bars lawsuits by citizens against a state unless the state has waived its
sovereign immunity.”) (citation omitted).
The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s
claims against DOCCS and the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez in their official
capacities.
RLUIPA Claim

RLUIPA9 protects prisoners from a “government” imposed substantial burden
on their religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “Government” under RLUIPA
means any “State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under
the authority of a State[,]” along with subdivisions thereof and those “acting under

9 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.
color of State law[.]” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i)–(iii). RLUIPA “invok[es] federal
authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 715 (2005). Under the Spending Clause basis, RLUIPA applies if “the substantial

burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). Under the Commerce Clause basis, RLUIPA applies if “the
substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect”
interstate commerce. Id. § 2000cc-1(b)(2). Prisoners affected in either situation may
obtain “appropriate relief against a government.” Id. § 2000cc-2(a).
To state a claim under RLUIPA, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state

has imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion; however, the state
may overcome a RLUIPA claim by demonstrating that the challenged policy or action
furthered a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.” Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 536 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). Under RLUIPA’s Spending Clause basis, the Second Circuit
“does not authorize claims for monetary damages against state officers in either their
official or individual capacities.” Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2014)

(citing Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 145–46 (2013).10 As a result, a prisoner
can only recover damages under RLUIPA’s Commerce Clause basis.

10 The Second Circuit summarized the rationale as follows:
RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, which allows the
imposition of conditions, such as individual liability, only on those parties
actually receiving state funds. Applying restrictions created pursuant to the
(continued)
To recover under the Commerce Clause basis, the prisoner must allege that a
government-imposed substantial burden on free exercise “affects, or removal of that
substantial burden would affect,” interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). A

plaintiff adequately alleges a substantial burden through his assertion that the
government forced him to “‘choose between following the precepts of [his] religion and
forfeiting benefits . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of [his] religion.’”
Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 2007)
(alternations added) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)). A plaintiff
plausibly shows an effect on commerce by establishing an “interstate commerce

nexus.” Id. at 354 (noting that RLUIPA requires claimants to establish a
jurisdictional “nexus”); Refaat El Badrawi v. United States, No. 07-CV-1074 (JCH),
2011 WL 13086946, at *15 (D. Conn. May 16, 2011) (applying Westchester to hold that
RLUIPA claimants may sue officials in their individual capacities if they establish an
“adequate interstate commerce nexus”). The standard for showing a nexus is
“minimal.” See Westchester Day School, 504 F.3d at 354 (“As we have recognized, the

Spending Clause to persons or entities other than the recipients of the federal
funds at issue would have the effect of binding non-parties to the terms of the
spending contract. Indeed, to decide otherwise would create liability on the
basis of a law never enacted by a sovereign with the power to affect the
individual rights at issue—i.e., the state receiving the federal funds—and this
would raise serious questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded its
authority under the Spending Clause . . . RLUIPA [does] not permit a plaintiff
to sue state officials in their individual capacities because the state prison, and
not the state prison officials, was the contracting party, which had agreed to
be amenable to suit as a condition to received funds.
Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 465–466 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations
omitted, cleaned up.).
evidence need only demonstrate a minimal effect on commerce to satisfy the
jurisdictional element.”) (citation omitted).
In this case, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, which

Defendants characterize as injunctive relief, is moot because Plaintiff is no longer in
DOCCS custody. (Brown Decl. ¶ 33.) Defendants also argue that the Court should
dismiss any claim against the individuals for money damages because such damages
are not available under RLUIPA. (Id. ¶ 34.) The Court agrees that injunctive relief is
moot. But it disagrees that money damages are completely unavailable.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether individual capacity suits

against government officials—like DOCCS employees—are barred under RLUIPA’s
Commerce Claus basis. Rather, it has held that “States, in accepting federal funding,
do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages
under RLUIPA because no statute expressly and unequivocally includes such a
waiver.” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011) (emphasis added). But
Sossamon only addressed whether RLUIPA permitted “the recovery of money
damages against a state or state officers sued in their official capacities.” Tanvir, 894

F.3d at 464. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether States, by facilitating
interstate commerce, consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits. See
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (limiting its holding to private suits against
nonconsenting States).
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding in Tanzin v. Tanvir,
592 U.S. 43 (2020), that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”)
authorized individual capacity suits against state officials. As RFRA’s “sister
statute,” RLUIPA permits individual capacity suits for money damages. See Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 730 (2014). The Supreme Court explained

that RFRA permits individual capacity suits against government officials because
RFRA expanded the term “government” beyond its plain meaning “to include ‘a
branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting
under the color of law) of the United States.’” Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 47 (quoting
42 U.S.C § 2000bb–2(1) (emphasis added)). Like RFRA, RLUIPA defines
“government” as “a State, county, municipal entity created under the authority of a

State; any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity
[thereof]; and any other person acting under the color of State law,” 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i)–(iii) (emphasis added). The plain language of RFRA and RLUIPA
authorizes individual capacity suits against State officials.
As DOCCS employees, the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez fall within the
scope of RLUIPA as “person[s] acting under the color of State law.” Id.; see also Pierre
v DOCCS, No. 21-CV-163-LJV, 2021 WL 11605447, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2021)

(noting that “DOCCS is an agency of New York State”). RFRA’s use of the phrase
“persons acting under the color of law” is drawn from Section 1983. Tanzin, 592 U.S.
at 490 (citation omitted). “Because RFRA uses the same terminology as § 1983 in the
very same field of civil rights law, ‘it is reasonable to believe that the terminology
bears a consistent meaning.’” Id. at 491 (quoting SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 323 (2012)). Similarly, RLUIPA uses the same
phrase “under the color of State law” in the context of civil rights, also drawing from
§ 1983. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii). Defendants not only fall under the scope
of RLUIPA based on its plain language, but also based on the nature of an individual

capacity claim, for “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against the
Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez, therefore, falls within the scope of the
RULIPA’s Commerce Clause basis.
Plaintiff states a claim for relief under the Commerce Clause basis by

adequately alleging that Gowanda’s laundry policy substantially burdened him and
affected interstate commerce. Because Defendants allegedly denied him a religious
accommodation to the laundry policy, Plaintiff was “forced to wash his cloths in
DOCCS’s laundry in violation of his core and sincerely held religious beliefs” or “not
wash them for long periods of time.” (Pl’s Resp. at 16, 24.) He developed “skin
infections, rashes, severe itching.” (Id. at 24 ¶ 6.) He needed money for “soap” to hand
wash his clothes and “new clothes.” (Id.) As a result, “his family and friends . . . not

based in NY,” including “family based in India,” sent him “extra money[ ] and items
across state lines, thus impacting inter-state commerce.” (Id.) Drawing all inferences
in favor of Plaintiff, these allegations plausibly establish a substantial burden. The
laundry policy forced him to make an unconditional choice—he could follow his Hindu
religion and forfeit the benefit of prison-washed clothes or he could abandon the
Hindu precept mandating that he avoid contact with beef or pork, a prohibition that
he alleges he sincerely believed encompassed washing his clothes with the clothes of
inmates who may have consumed such products. Plaintiff also plausibly establishes
an “interstate commerce nexus” by alleging that his family sent him new clothes and

soap across state lines as a result of Defendants’ laundry policy.
Defendants did not address RLUIPA’s Commerce Clause basis but instead cite
Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2014), for the proposition that the Second
Circuit bars all individual capacity claims for damages under RLUIPA. (Defs.’ Mem.
of Law at 18.)11 But Holland relied on Gonyea to deny a claim for damages in the
individual capacity under RLUIPA. Holland, 758 F.3d at 224 (citing Gonyea, 731 F.3d

at 145–46). Gonyea explicitly denied damages under RLUIPA “because the legislation
was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power . . . .” Gonyea, 731 F.3d at 145
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(b)(1) (collecting cases in other circuits). Since the Second
Circuit only addressed RLUIPA’s Spending Clause basis in Holland and Gonyea,
Defendants’ legal argument is insufficient to preclude claims for damages against
officials in their individual capacity under RLUIPA’s Commerce Clause basis.

11 In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff only mentions RLUIPA’s Commerce
Clause basis in passing and fails to provide factual allegations to support the claim. (2d Am.
Compl. at 19.) But he bolsters the claim by alleging facts in his Response. (Pl’s Resp. at 16,
24.) Defendants addressed the claim in their reply. (Defs.’ Reply Mem. of Law at 7, ECF No.
140.) Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes his response as providing notice of
the claim to Defendants. The Court construes Defendants’ reply as an opportunity to respond.
Therefore, the Court rules dispositively on the claim now. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(2)
(authorizing courts to grant leave to amend “when justice so requires); see also id. at 8(e)
(“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”).
Based upon the forgoing, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss with
respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim under the Spending Clause basis. The Court
denies Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim under the

Commerce Clause basis as to the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez.
Section 1983 Claims (First Amendment)
“Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ‘[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ is ‘liable to the party
injured.’” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 129 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983)). “To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state
law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400,
405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875–76 (2d Cir. 1994)). To
establish § 1983 liability against a state official, a plaintiff must plead the

“prerequisite” of personal involvement. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.
1994) (quotation omitted). Pleading liability under the theory of respondeat superior
is insufficient. Iqbal¸ 556 U.S. at 663, 676 (“vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . .
§ 1983 suits.”). Rather, a “plaintiff must plead and prove that ‘each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.’” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 612 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676). A plaintiff demonstrates personal involvement in one of the
following ways:

(1) [A]ctual direct participation in the constitutional violation, (2) failure
to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report or appeal, (3)
creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a
constitutional violation, or allowing such a policy or custom to continue,
(4) grossly negligent supervision of subordinates who committed a
violation, or (5) failure to act on information indicating that
unconstitutional acts were occurring.
Wells v. McKoy, No. 1:16-CV-00113 EAW, 2018 WL 6833665, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,
2018) (citing Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Defendants assert that the Court should dismiss the § 1983 claim because
Plaintiff did not allege the “personal involvement of any specific Defendant.” (Brown
Decl. ¶ 35.) The Court disagrees. While Plaintiff may not have inadequately alleged
personal involvement initially in his second amended complaint, he successfully
supplemented the allegations in his Response. Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the
Court will consider the factual allegations in his response “to the extent” they are
“consistent with the allegations” in his second amended complaint. See Pflaum, 937
F. Supp. at 300 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted) (considering consistent, additional
facts pleaded in a pro se plaintiff’s response).
Personal Involvement of the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez
Lockwood
Plaintiff alleges that “Gowanda CF Defendants met, conferred, and made
decision together while directly denying [Plaintiff] relief, while they colluded, along
with extensive discussions with DOCCS Albany Ministerial Services.” (2d Am.
Compl. at 11, ¶ 2(f).) He additionally alleges that, after the “laundry policy was
changed at Gowanda . . . Lockwood is on record to not only confer with DOCCS
Albany but also get approval . . . via documents/communications . . . .” (Pl.’s Resp. at

19 ¶ 2.) He also alleges that Lockwood “directly oversaw, ran and implemented the
laundry policy [at Gowanda], and despite [Plaintiff’s requests] (letters, meetings, and
all Grievances communications) denied any relief” and that Lockwood asked his
Sergeant “to intimidate and threaten” him “on many occasions” (Id. at 22 ¶ 3.) The
Court notes that Plaintiff’s allegations are somewhat ambiguous because he lists
these facts with respect to a group: “Lockwood, Frost, and Moffit.” (Id.) But based on

the liberal construction afforded to pro se plaintiffs, the Court finds Plaintiff has
adequately alleged personal involvement of Defendant Lockwood at this stage of the
litigation.
Harris
Plaintiff alleges that “Gowanda CF Defendants met, conferred, and made
decision together while directly denying [Plaintiff] relief, while they colluded, along
with extensive discussions with DOCCS Albany Ministerial Services.” (2d Am.

Compl. at 11, ¶ 2(f).) He additionally alleges that “Coordinating Chaplain[]
Harris . . . [is] tasked and responsible for all religions at [Gowanda]” and that he was
“responsible to understand [Plaintiff’s] request.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 20 ¶ 3.) He also alleges
that Harris responded by “email” to his requests for relief “via letters, meetings, and
all Grievance communications” but ultimately “formally denied relief.” (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that denial of relief occurred without asking for an expert opinion on the
Hindu religion and despite that “Chaplains have the power to not only recommend
religious based exemptions but also the power to get them implemented.” (Id.) As
with Lockwood, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s allegations are somewhat ambiguous

because he lists these facts with respect to a group: “Chaplains Harris, Dash, and
Terragnoli.” (Id.) But based on the liberal construction afforded to pro se plaintiffs,
the Court finds Plaintiff has adequately alleged personal involvement of Defendant
Harris.
Kickbush & Schneider
Plaintiff alleges that “Gowanda CF Defendants met, conferred, and made

decision together while directly denying [Plaintiff] relief, while they colluded, along
with extensive discussions with DOCCS Albany Ministerial Services.” (2d Am.
Compl. at 11, ¶ 2(f).) He additionally alleges that “Kickbush” and “Schneider,” in their
roles “as Superintendents of their facilities, were the final facility escalation point to
all policies and its implementation . . . who individually denied any relief” despite
that he had “meetings, sent letters, and provided all Grievance communications” to
them. (Pl.’s Resp. at 22 ¶ 3.) He further alleges that Kickbush and Schneider “had

the power, had the understanding of how the new laundry policy impacted [Plaintiff’s]
religious beliefs, knew about religious exemptions, but still knowingly and
deliberately denied relief.” (Id.) Despite again asserting these allegations towards a
group, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged the personal involvement
of Defendants Kickbush and Schneider.
Fernandez
Plaintiff only initially alleged that he did not meet with “Fernandez at DOCCS”
but “only wrote to [her].” (2d Am. Compl. at 10 ¶ 2(f).) In his Response, Plaintiff

additionally alleges that “Fernandez,” in her role “as the lead religious affairs
coordinator at DOCCS Albany,” was “tasked with not only understanding [Plaintiff’s]
concerns but also engaging with respective facilities and experts to provide any
exemptions.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 23 ¶ 3.) He alleges that Fernandez “advised CORC to deny
any relief in the laundry case.” (Id. at 19 ¶ 2.) He alleges that she “had personal
involvement (via letters, grievances, meetings), personally knew about the [laundry

issue] . . . had the power to provide relief, but deliberately ignored and denied any
relief . . . .” (Id. at 21 ¶ 2.) Later, Plaintiff reiterates that Fernandez “directly
confer[red] and recommend[ed] to the CORC to deny [Plaintiff] any relief” and that
she “also knew 100% the numerous religious accommodations provided to
Muslims/Jews due to religious proximity with pork.” (Id. at 23 ¶ 3). The Court finds
that these allegations adequately demonstrate the personal involvement of
Defendant Fernandez.

Plaintiff adequately alleged the personal involvement of the Gowanda
Defendants and Fernandez. Therefore, the Court will analyze the merits of Plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 below.
Merits of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
Prisoners “retain” free exercise rights under the First Amendment. Kravitz, 87
F.4th at 119 (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). To
evaluate a prisoner’s § 1983 free exercise claim against prison officials, courts apply
“a reasonableness test” that is “less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged
infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.” See id. (quoting O’Lone, 482

U.S. at 349) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the prison context . . . ‘the right
to free exercise of religion’ is balanced against ‘the interests of prison officials charged
with complex duties arising from administration of the penal system.’” Id. at 128
(quoting Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990).
Section 1983 free exercise claims require courts to conduct a threefold analysis.
First, “a prisoner ‘must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially

burdens12 his sincerely held religious beliefs.’” Lightner v. Wenderlich, 271 F. Supp.
3d 445, 453 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Hall v. Ekpe, 408 F. App’x 385, 388 (2d Cir.
2010)). In evaluating an alleged substantial burden, courts inquire into the
“centrality” of the belief within the religion at issue. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d
582, 593 (2d Cir. 2003). “Courts are particularly ill-suited” for this task:

12 The Second Circuit has “not decided whether the substantial burden test
survives Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).” Wiggins v. Griffin, 86
F.4th 987, 993 (2d Cir. 2023); see also Holland, 758 F.3d at 220 (“It has not been
decided in this Circuit whether, to state a claim under the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause, a prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct
substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.”) (citation omitted). In
Holland, “[t]he Second Circuit chose not to . . . alter the previous assumption that the
substantial burden test is a threshold question.” Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F. Supp. 3d
570, 586 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Accordingly, this Court will follow the analysis of
Holland, “assuming that the substantial burden test is still valid.” Id. (quoting
Weathers v. Rock, No. 9:12-CV-1301 NAM/ATB, 2014 WL 4810309, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2014).
“distinguish[ing] important from unimportant religious beliefs.” Id. Accordingly, the
Second Circuit has “been appropriately wary of making ‘conclusory judgments about
the unimportance of the religious practice to the adherent.’” Brandon v. Kinter, 938

F.3d 21, 32 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Ford, 352 F.3d 582, 593). “[T]he substantial burden
requirement presupposes that ‘there will be cases in which it comfortably could be
said that a belief or practice is so peripheral to the plaintiff's religion that any burden
can be aptly characterized as constitutionally de minimis.’” Id. (quoting Ford, 352
F.3d 582, 593). However, “establishing a substantial burden is ‘not a particularly
onerous task.’” Id. (quoting McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Second, if the inmate plausibly alleges a substantial burden, the “defendants
then bear the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological
interests that justify the impinging conduct.” Lightner, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 453
(W.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Hall v. Ekpe, 408 F. App’x 385, 388 (2d Cir. 2010); see also
O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (holding that infringement of an inmate’s free exercise rights
is conditionally permissible to the extent that such infringement is “reasonably
related to pedagogical interests”). Courts use the Turner13 factors to determine

whether the defendants meet that standard:
(1) whether there is a rational relationship between the regulation and
the legitimate government interests asserted; (2) whether the inmates
have alternative means to exercise the right; (3) the impact that
accommodation of the right will have on the prison system; and

13 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987).
(4) whether ready alternatives exist which accommodate the right and
satisfy the governmental interest.

Lightner, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (cleaned up and citation omitted).
Third, the burden shifts back to the inmate to show that the articulated concerns by
the defendants are “irrational.” Hall, 408 F. App’x at 388 (citing Salahuddin v. Goord,
467 F.3d 263, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132
(2003) (noting that the burden “is not on the State to prove the validity of prison
regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it”).
In this case, it appears there is no precedent stating that a laundry-based
injury like the one Plaintiff alleges is merely de minimis. Brandon, 938 F.3d at 32.

Even after extensive research, the Court could not find even one applicable case
discussing whether a laundry policy was a substantial burden on an inmate whose
religion required him to avoid contact with particular food products. See Lopez v.
Cipolini, 136 F. Supp. 3d 570, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (collecting cases on whether
“preclusion from attending two religious services” was a substantial burden); Lloyd
v. City of New York, 43 F. Supp. 3d 254, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases on

whether providing allegedly inadequate and inappropriate space for worship services
was a substantial burden). While there is precedent on whether prisons must
accommodate a religiously sanctioned diet, DeJesus v. Bradt, 174 F. Supp. 3d 777,
785 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases), there is little or no precedent on whether
prisons must accommodate a religiously sanctioned laundry service.
Plaintiff has adequately alleged a substantial burden by demonstrating that
his beliefs were sincerely held and central to his Hindu faith. He alleges that, as
Hindu, “one of his core and sincerely held religious beliefs is not to consume or come

in close personal contact with beef and pork food products.” (2d Am. Compl. at 8
¶ 2(b).) While the former DOCCS laundry policy permitted Plaintiff to “wash
(wash/dry) his clothes with no personal contact with other inmates’ clothes,” the new
laundry policy after April 2019 required that “at least 2 inmates’ clothes (minimum)
must be washed together in close personal contact.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 2(c).) These allegations
indicate that Plaintiff’s belief—Hinduism required contactless clothes washing to

avoid the clothes of inmates who might have eaten beef or pork—was “sincerely held”
in his “own scheme of things, religious.” Ford, 352 U.S. 582 at 588 (quoting Fifth Ave.
Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002)).
In addition, Plaintiff’s sincere belief is arguably central to Hinduism, at least
to the extent that “contact” with beef and pork pertains to consumption. See Agrawal
v. Keim, No. CIV. 06-945-GPM, 2009 WL 309990, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2009)
(“Observant Hindus who do eat meat almost always abstain from beef.”); see also

Mathieu Ferry, What’s India’s Beef With Meat? Hindu Orthopraxis and Food
Transition in India Since the 1980s, 35 SOCIO. F. 514 (2020) (“The consumption of
pork renders eaters particularly impure and beef all the more so because cow is a
sacred animal.”); Aditya Kiran Kakati, For the Love of Pork, in ODYSSEYS OF PLATES
AND PALATES: FOOD, SOCIETY AND SOCIALITY 115 (Magliveras & Callin, eds. 2015)
(“Indian Hindu societies do not usually eat beef or pork and its consumption has come
to be associated with tribal societies. Food restrictions are often governed by ideas of
purity and impurity . . . .”). As courts are “particularly ill-suited” to determine which
beliefs are important or unimportant, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a

rights violation based on a central Hindu tenet, despite that the Court could only
confirm that Hinduism prohibits “contact” with pork and beef to the extent that such
products are “consumed.”
Plaintiff adequately alleges that his sincere religious belief was substantially
burdened. (Pl’s Resp. at 19 ¶ 2 (“[T]he impact of the changed laundry policy created
a substantial burden.”).) After being denied a religious accommodation, Plaintiff

alleges that “he was constantly subjected to dirty, unhealthy, soiled and smelly
clothes, as he was deprived/unable to use DOCCS laundry facilities.” (2d Am. Compl.
at 25 ¶ 5(b)) and “forced to wash his cloths in the DOCCS laundry in violation of his
core and sincerely held religious beliefs” or “not wash them for long periods of time,”
(Pl.’s Resp. at 16, 24.) He developed “skin infections, rashes, severe itching” as a result
(Id. at 24 ¶ 6.). “Reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise
the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment.” Cruz v.

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972). At this point in the case, Plaintiff’s request for an
exemption may have been reasonable compared to the gravity of violating his sincere
religious beliefs.
Plaintiff has adequately alleged a substantial burden. In the present motion,
Defendants do not indicate what “legitimate penological interests” supported their
denial of a religious accommodation. Lightner, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 453.14 However, as
explained below, the Court agrees with Defendants that qualified immunity bars this
claim against the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez. Accordingly, the Court

grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the First Amendment claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Conspiracy Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985
Both Section 1983 and 1985 conspiracy claims “require[ ] a plaintiff to plead a
violation of a constitutional right.” Richard v. Fischer, 38 F. Supp. 3d 340, 352
(W.D.N.Y. 2014), reconsideration denied 125 F. Supp. 3d 334 (W.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2015)
(discussing the requirement in the Section 1985 context); see also McCloud v. Prack,

55 F. Supp. 3d 478, 481–82 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases in the Section 1983
context). Furthermore, “to state a claim for conspiracy under Section 1983, a plaintiff
must allege: (1) an agreement between two or more actors (at least one a state actor);
(2) to act in concert to cause an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in
furtherance of that agreement, causing damages.” Ocasio v. City of Canandaigua, 513

14 As the Southern District concluded:
This being a motion to dismiss, Defendants have not answered, and so
have not yet articulated any ‘legitimate penological interest’ or
‘compelling state interest’ that would justify the alleged “substantial
burden” on Plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs under the Free
Exercise Clause or RLUIPA. They may yet do so, of course, but . . .
Plaintiffs have satisfied their less-than onerous task of pleading that
Defendants placed a substantial burden on their ability to freely
exercise their religion.

Lloyd, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (citation omitted).
F. Supp. 3d 310, 323 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292
F.3d 307, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2002)). The plaintiff “must make an ‘effort to provide some
details of time and place and the alleged effects of the conspiracy . . . .’” Id. (quoting

Ivery v. Baldauf, 284 F. Supp. 3d 426, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 2018)). To state a Section
1985(3) conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege the following elements:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States.

Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015). “The conspiracy must also be
‘motivated by some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory
animus.’” Id. (quoting Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir.
2007)). “The Second Circuit has ‘defined “class-based animus” to include
discrimination based on religion.’” Masri, 2020 WL 1489799, at *7 (quoting Jews for
Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Cmty. Rels. Council of N.Y., Inc., 968 F.2d 286, 291 (2d Cir. 1992)
(collecting cases)).
Defendants contend that these claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff has
not alleged facts sufficient to plead a conspiracy claim and because they are barred
by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. (Brown Decl. ¶ 41.) “The intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine bars conspiracy claims against employees of entities such as
DOCCS, when those employees are alleged to have conspired solely with each other
unless, [per the personal interest exception], the employees were pursuing personal
interests wholly separate and apart from the entity by whom they were employed.”
Fischer, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 353 (cleaned up and citation omitted). “Courts in the
Western District of New York apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to bar
inmates’ conspiracy claims against DOCCS.” Id. (collecting cases); see also Richard v.

Dignean, 126 F. Supp. 3d 334, 338–39 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). To adequately plead the
personal interest exception, a plaintiff must allege “that the individuals were
pursuing personal interests wholly separate and apart from the entity,” accordingly,
“more is required of a plaintiff than simply alleging that the defendants were
motivated by personal bias against the plaintiff.” Vega v. Artus, 610 F. Supp. 2d 185,
205 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff must adequately plead that the personal interest
exception applies to overcome the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine that bars his
conspiracy claims against DOCCS. Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes
his pleadings liberally. Fischer, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 350 (citing Green v. United States,
260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff seems to argue that the personal interest
exception “applies” because Defendant “Lockwood at Gowanda CF . . . directly and
personally benefitted from denial of relief” by getting an “extra bonus, promotions,

and other benefits.” (Pl’s Resp. at 24 ¶ 5.) The Court construes these allegations as
an attempt to plead the personal interest exception.
Plaintiff fails to “allege facts plausibly suggesting that each Defendant
possessed an independent person purpose” apart from “personal bias.” Vega, 610 F.
Supp. 2d at 206. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants “ridiculed” his religious
beliefs may demonstrate personal bias. (2d Am. Compl. at 8–10 ¶¶ 4(b), (c), (d); Pl.’s
Resp. at 40 ¶ 4.) But even if they do, he fails to adequately allege that Defendants
were pursuing personal interests wholly separate and apart from their scope of
employment with DOCCS by denying him an accommodation to the laundry policy.

Vega, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (“[T]o allege facts plausibly suggesting that individuals
were pursuing personal interests . . . more is required of a plaintiff than simply
alleging that defendants were motivated by personal bias.”) (quotation omitted);
Stevenson v. DOCCS, No. 1:21-CV-355, 2022 WL 179768, at *16 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20,
2022) (holding that the plaintiff failed to invoke the personal interest exception by
inadequately alleging that defendants’ personal motivations caused the alleged rights

violation). In fact, Plaintiff concedes that Defendants were not pursuing their own
interests but denied him relief “as a result of implementation of [DOCCS’] laundry
policy.” (Id. at 24 ¶ 5.)
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims
because he has failed to plead the personal interest exception. In addition, Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims are barred by qualified immunity, as explained below. The Court grants
Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and § 1985.
State Law Claims
“Pursuant to Correction Law § 24, any claim against” a DOCCS officer under
New York law “arising out of any act done or the failure to perform an act within the
scope of the employment and in the discharge of the duties of said officers shall be
brought and maintained in the court of claims as a claim against the state.” Crist v.
Rosenberger, 219 A.D.3d 569, 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2023) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s
state law claims in this case. See Davis v. McCready, 283 F. Supp. 3d 108, 123–24

(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Courts in the Second Circuit have long held that Section 24
precludes a plaintiff from raising state law claims in federal court against state
employees in their personal capacities for actions arising within the scope of their
employment.”) (collecting cases). Plaintiff’s remedy for DOCCS’s employees’ conduct
“lies in the Court of Claims against the State of New York, not this Court.” Est. of
King ex rel. King v. Annucci, No. 9:20CV1413 (TJM/ML), 2023 WL 6122868, at *15

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2023).
The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s state law claims. Therefore, the
Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice: NYS Constitution art.
I, § 3 (Freedom of Worship) and NYS Constitution art. I, § 19 (Environmental Rights).
Emotional Injury
Defendants allege that “[b]ecause Plaintiff alleges no physical injury regarding
the laundry policy at Gowanda CF . . . the PLRA bars any compensatory damages for

mental or emotional injuries and such claims should be dismissed.” (Brown Decl.
¶ 45.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff only alleged a physical injury in his response. (Resp.
at 41 ¶ 7). The Court cannot consider allegations that are inconsistent with a
plaintiff’s complaint. Pflaum, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 300; see also Schenck v. United
Airlines, No. 21-CV-659-LJV, 2023 WL 2165181, at *6 n.11 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2023)
(declining to consider a new argument raised by the pro se plaintiff for the first time
in her response brief to defendant’s motion to dismiss).
Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA states that “[n]o Federal civil action may be

brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility, for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir.
2002) (explaining Section 1997e(e) bars a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation
from recovering damages for mental or emotional injury without showing an actual
physical injury). The purpose of this requirement is “to weed out frivolous claims

where only emotional injuries are alleged.” Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135, 140
(S.D.N.Y.2002) aff'd, 56 F. App'x 43 (2d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff did not allege physical injury in his second amended complaint. As a
result, he is barred from recovering non-pecuniary damages under the PLRA. The
Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for mental and emotional injuries.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity asserting that

the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims “[b]ecause it cannot be said that it
was clearly established that requiring an inmate to wash laundry with other inmates’
laundry violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.” (Brown Decl. ¶ 46.)
“Qualified immunity is meant to ‘provide[ ] ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Wiggins, 86 F.4th at
994 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The doctrine protects
defendants whose conduct does not violate a “clearly established” right. Brandon v.
Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 39 (2019) (citation omitted). A right is “clearly established when
‘(1) the law is defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme Court or the Second

Circuit has recognized the right, and (3) a reasonable defendant would have
understood from the existing law that his conduct was unlawful.’” Wiggins, 86 F.4th
at 994 (quoting Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2004). Even if the court finds
a clearly established right, defendants may “establish immunity by showing that
reasonable persons in their position would not have understood that their conduct
was within the scope of the established prohibition.” LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d

68, 73 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
Courts must take care to define the right at issue particularly rather than
generally. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015). “The dispositive question is
whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
The inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case,
not as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)

(per curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Accordingly, the
Second Circuit has reversed district courts for construing the right at issue too
narrowly. See, e.g., Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 994–95 (reversing summary judgment
because the prisoner “did not challenge the prison’s use of a call-out list generally . .
. [but] contested Defendants’ inaction in response to his requests to be reinstated on
such list.”). While “a case directly on point” is not required to determine that a right
is clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 741).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the previous “DOCCS laundry policy . . . allowed
[Plaintiff] to wash . . . his clothes with no personal contact with other inmates’ clothes
(most of whom consume beef and pork food products).” (2d Am. Compl. at 9 ¶ 2(c).) In
contrast, the later policy “mandated . . . that at least 2 inmates’ clothes (minimum)
must be washed together in close personal contact.” (Id.) As this case rests on a
12(b)(6) motion, the Court takes all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. Bell Atl.

Corp., 550 U.S. at 545 (stating tenet that on a motion to dismiss against a plaintiff’s
complaint the court assumes “that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”) But
his own factual allegations contradict the claim that his clothes risked touching the
clothes of individuals who had consumed pork because DOCCS had “removed Pork
food products” from the inmate “menu” based on Muslim and Jewish “religious
concerns of proximity to Pork.” (2d Am. Compl. at 13 ¶ 2(g).) The Court defines the
right at issue per Plaintiff’s own factual allegations as only implicating contact with

the clothes of an inmate who might have consumed beef. Contra Wiggins, 86 F.4th at
995 (describing the district court’s “characterization of the right at issue” as “too
narrow” because “it ignore[d] the substance of Wiggins’s pleas”). The right at issue,
therefore, is whether the laundry policy violated Plaintiff’s free exercise rights by
mandating that his clothes be washed with the clothes of inmates who might have
consumed beef.
Defendants retain qualified immunity because Plaintiff’s allegations fail to
invoke a “clearly established” right. Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 994. First, the law is not
reasonably clear that a prisoner’s First Amendment right to a religious dietary

accommodation includes the right to wash his clothes separately from clothes worn
by inmates who may eat food products that violate his religious beliefs.15 Even under
analogous Eighth Amendment precedent concerning the right to clean clothes, the
right at issue in this case is not “established.”16 Second, neither the Supreme Court
nor the Second Circuit have defined religious-based dietary accommodations broadly
to include contact between clothes. To the contrary, existing precedent only requires

that prisons provide inmates with “a diet sufficient to sustain the prisoner in good
health without violating his religion’s dietary laws.” Lightner, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 454
(alteration omitted) (quoting Abdul–Malik v. Goord, No. 96 CIV. 1021 (DLC), 1997

15 Examples of more established—although not necessarily “clearly” established—
freedom of religion prisoner jurisprudence include “restrictions on attending religious
services or worship areas, receiving visits from religious advisors, sending and receiving
religious mail, changing one’s name or diet for religious reasons, refusing to receive medical
treatment for religious reasons, and wearing special religious attire.” COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV., A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL 928 (12th ed. 2020); id. at 928–41 (collecting cases).
16 Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has established that prisoners have a
constitutional right to “clothing that is clean or to have an opportunity to clean it themselves.”
Patterson v. City of New York, No. 11 CIV. 7976 DLC, 2012 WL 3264354, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
9, 2012); see also Simmons v. Cripps, No. 12 CIV. 1061 PAC DF, 2013 WL 1290268, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12 CIV. 1061 PAC DF,
2013 WL 1285417 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (“[W]here bar soap and access to a sink is
provided to pretrial detainees, as it may have been in this case, the requirements of the
relevant constitutional requirements are satisfied.”). Even if Tripathy had filed an Eighth
Amendment claim instead of a First Amendment claim, he had the opportunity to “hand
wash” his clothes and access to “soap,” indicating that no rights violation occurred. (2d Am.
Compl. at 9, ¶ 2(d); Pl’s Resp. at 24 ¶ 6.)
WL 83402 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997)); see also Brown v. Fischer, No. 6:11-CV-
6065 MAT, 2013 WL 5567503, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2013) (“The Second Circuit has
held that it is clearly established that a prisoner has a right to a diet consistent with

his religious beliefs.”). Third, based on the lack of applicable precedent construing
religious dietary needs to include laundry separation requirements, Defendants
would not have reasonably understood from the existing law that their “conduct”—
denying a religious accommodation to the DOCCS laundry policy—was “unlawful.”
Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 994.
The Court holds that all remaining Defendants—the Gowanda Defendants and

Fernandez—are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s Section
1983 claims.17
CONCLUSION
Based upon the forgoing, the undersigned:
• GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 138) all claims
against the Collins and Fishkill Defendants on the basis that Plaintiff
did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to them;
• GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to DOCCS, as well as to the

Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez in their official capacities under
the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment;

17 As Defendants only argued for qualified immunity with respect to Section 1983, the
Court does not consider whether they are entitled to qualified immunity under Section 1985.
(Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 23.)
• GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claims under the Spending Clause basis, but DENIES
Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim

under the Commerce Clause basis as to the Gowanda Defendants and
Fernandez.
• GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims (First Amendment);
• GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s
conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985;

• GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s state
law claims;
• GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to any assertion
of emotional injury; and
• FINDS that the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez are entitled to
qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgement in favor of Defendants
Sharon Frost, Father George J. Dash, Superintendent Edward Burnett, Reverend
Joel L. Terragnoli, Richard Moffit, Superintendent Leanne Latona, and DOCCS. The
only claim that remains for adjudication is Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim under the
Commerce Clause basis as to former Superintendent Susan R. Kickbush,
Superintendent Schneider, Reverand Harris, Captain Lockwood, and Nancy K.
Fernandez, Director of Ministerial Services at DOCCS.

DATED: March 28, 2024
Rochester, New York
MARK W. PEDERSEN
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10367020. Public record. Not legal advice.