# Meadows v. Buffalo Police Department

> District Court, W.D. New York · January 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10365807

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** January 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10365807

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that prosecutors have absolute immunity for decisions and acts that “constituted an exercise of their prosecutorial discretion in preparing a case for indictment and deciding when, where, and how to prosecute”
- noting that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be “futile”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CAROLETTE MEADOWS,

Plaintiff,
21-CV-449-LJV-HKS
v. DECISION & ORDER

BUFFALO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et
al.,

Defendants.

On March 29, 2021, the pro se plaintiff, Carolette Meadows, commenced this
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 and 1985-1986 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Docket Item 1. Meadows says that her neighbor, Rachel
Eckert, violated her rights under those statutes and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) over
the course of a long-running feud between them. See Docket Item 44. And Meadows
says that local law enforcement and county prosecutors inadequately responded to her
complaints about Eckert while giving undue weight to Eckert’s grievances. See id.
On October 18, 2021, Eckert moved to dismiss the complaint. Docket Item 8. A
few weeks later, defendants Erie County, John Flynn, Milton Gordon, John Schoemick,1
and Ankur Singh (the “Erie County defendants”) also moved to dismiss. Docket Items
13, 16, 19, 22, 25. When Meadows responded to those motions in January 2022, she
also filed an amended complaint and “supplemental pleading.” Docket Items 42-46.

1 Although the complaint names “John Schoemic” as a defendant, his last name
apparently is spelled “Schoemick.” See Docket Item 56. The Clerk of the Court shall
correct the caption accordingly.
The parties disputed the timeliness of Meadows’s amended complaint, see
Docket Items 47 and 48, but this Court accepted the amended complaint as timely filed
and extended the defendants’ time to respond to it, see Docket Item 52. The Erie
County defendants then renewed their motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), and Eckert moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).2 Docket Items 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 78. Both sides then
fully briefed those motions. Docket Items 77, 85, 88-92.
After the motions were fully briefed, Meadows moved to amend her complaint
once again. Docket Item 93. The Erie County defendants and Eckert opposed that
motion. Docket Items 95, 96, 102. Meadows then moved to amend her complaint still
again and filed numerous other “amended claims” and “supplemental pleadings.”
Docket Items 97, 106, 109, 111, 125.3 Meadows also moved to strike certain filings,

2 On April 18, 2022, Meadows moved to strike Eckert’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings “due to [Meadows] not having service and time to respond to the defense
request.” Docket Item 87. But Meadows responded to Eckert’s motion on April 13,
2022, see Docket Item 85, which suggests both that Meadows was served with the
motion and that she had sufficient time to respond to it. Nevertheless, to address
Meadows’s claim that she did not have enough time to respond to the motion, this Court
extended Meadows’s time so that she could further respond to Eckert’s motion. See
Docket Item 86. But Meadows did not file another response to the motion. Because
Meadows has responded to Eckert’s motion and was given an opportunity to respond
further, Meadows’s motion to strike is denied.
3 This Court never gave Meadows permission to file these supplemental
pleadings, and they do not appear to be permissible under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) permits a supplemental
pleading only “[o]n motion” and with “reasonable notice.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
And because many of Meadows’s allegations in those supplemental pleadings are
undated, this Court cannot conclude that the allegations in those pleadings are the sort
that are permissible under Rule 15(d). See id. (noting that supplemental pleadings must
“set[] out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the
pleading to be supplemented”).
requested a preliminary hearing, and asked to withdraw her claims against some
defendants. Docket Items 87, 119, 120, 125.
For the reasons that follow, the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss are
granted in part. And the remainder of the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss

as well as Eckert’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted unless
Meadows files an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies noted below.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

Meadows and Eckert, who reside next door to each other in Buffalo, New York,
have a contentious relationship that has spawned numerous law enforcement

In any event, because Meadows may amend her complaint as provided below,
this Court declines to consider the allegations in Meadows’s supplemental pleadings
and denies Meadows’s motions to amend as moot. Because the only claims dismissed
below are those that “better pleading will not cure,” see Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d
99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that leave to amend may be denied where amendment
would be “futile”), even if this Court considered those filings, nothing in them would
change the result here.
4 The following facts are taken from the amended complaint, Docket Item 44. In
deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the
court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2013).
In addition to her amended complaint, Meadows also submitted several videos
as exhibits. See Docket Item 45. Meadows does not describe those videos in her
amended complaint or say who or what is depicted in them; instead, she simply
attached them as “recordings.” See Docket Item 44 at 41. The Court therefore declines
to consider the video excerpts unless Meadows provides some further explanation of
their significance. Meadows may amend her complaint to explain how the exhibits she
submitted relate to the factual allegations in her complaint.
investigations, multiple state court cases, and now two lawsuits in this Court.5
Meadows’s and Eckert’s mutual discontent apparently was sparked by a dispute about
a pipe attached to Eckert’s house; that dispute in turn led to a protracted feud. Although
Meadows’s amended complaint covers a number of disparate incidents over the course

of more than a year, almost all those incidents follow a similar pattern: Meadows and
Eckert got into some dispute; one or both of them called local law enforcement; and
local law enforcement and county prosecutors either minimized Meadows’s grievances
or gave undue weight to Eckert’s.
I. THE INITIAL PIPE DISPUTE
In March 2020, Eckert “install[ed] piping on her home that blocked Meadows from

removing her car from the driveway.” Docket Item 44 at 7. After Eckert refused to
move the piping so that Meadows could access the driveway, Meadows “cut the pipe
and le[ft].” Id. at 8. Eckert then called 911 and falsely reported that Meadows was
“threatening” her. Id. Buffalo police officers responded to the scene, and Detective
McDermott ultimately “filed a warrant for Meadows [which] maintain[ed] that the pipe
was cut without cause.” Id.
Around that same time, Meadows “had washed and hung a tent out to dry which
was destroyed when she woke up the next morning.” Id. Meadows asked Eckert
whether “she knew anything about the tent”; in response, Eckert “threatened to hit

Meadows in the head with a pipe.” Id. at 9. Meadows called the police, but the

5 Eckert has filed a separate case in this Court, raising claims against Meadows
and various other state and municipal defendants related to similar disputes. See
W.D.N.Y. Case No. 22-cv-540.
responding officer “declined to file a report.” Id. After Eckert repeated similar threats on
Facebook that night, Meadows again called the police. Id. This time, Officer Brown
“wrote a complaint for harassment against Eckert for the threats,” although another
officer later changed that complaint to “a dispute form.” Id.

Eckert “remove[d] Meadows’[s] gate,” which a Buffalo police officer “made her
put back.” Id. Eckert also claimed that much of Meadows’s property belonged to her,
“threaten[ed] Meadows numerous times,” and “push[ed] [Meadows].” Id. Although
Meadows tried to show a video of the incident to a Buffalo police officer, he “declar[ed]
that he wasn’t looking at any videos.” Id. No charges were filed regarding this incident.
Id. at 10.
Eckert then took to social media, where she “ma[de] several racially charged
statements . . . claiming the dispute was because Eckert ‘was white’ and [] Meadows
‘doesn’t like white women.’” Id. Meadows also attached various social media posts to
her amended complaint that show additional interactions between herself and Eckert.6

For example, Eckert posted that Meadows was “really messing w[ith] the wrong one.”7
Id. at 54. Eckert also remarked that Meadows’s life would “go to shit”—if it had not
already after Meadows’s “husband left her for a white woman.” Id. Meadows
responded that Eckert should “just keep going with the slander.” Id.
Eckert also posted that Meadows “is racist af [sic]” and “doesn’t like [Eckert]”
because “[Eckert is] white.” Id. at 58. Eckert “declar[ed] ‘neighbor war’” on Meadows

6 The attached social media posts were not made by an account with the name
“Rachel Eckert.” See, e.g., Docket Item 44 at 54. Based on the context, the Court
presumes that the posts are from Eckert.
7 The posts are undated.
and said that “she ‘would not stop,’ and would[] ‘destroy [Meadows’s] whole life.’”8 Id. at
10. Others “respond[ed] to Eckert’s racially charged comments by saying that Meadows
should be spit on, shot, beat with a bat, [or have] other violence inflicted upon her.” Id.
Meanwhile, the dispute over the pipe remained unresolved. Buffalo city

employees “asked [] Meadows to let Eckert reconnect the pipe so it wouldn’t cause
[carbon monoxide]” emissions. Id. Eckert also “posted on social media that she took
her kids to the [emergency room] and they tested positive for [carbon monoxide]” and
that she therefore “wanted Meadows arrested for attempted murder.” Id. at 11. But
Eckert was to blame because she had not “repair[ed] the cut pipe that was supposed to
be a [carbon monoxide] risk.” Id. So Meadows “called [Child Protective Services]” on
Eckert,9 and Eckert then fixed the pipe. Id.
Although that should have ended the matter, sometime in April 2020 Meadows
“noticed [that she had] difficulty breathing while in the driveway.” Id. at 13. Meadows
informed a Buffalo city inspector about this, but the inspector responded that “the fumes

were ‘only 5% [carbon monoxide].’” Id. After Meadows protested that this level of
carbon monoxide was still too high, “Eckert was informed that she would need to move
the pipe.” Id. But Eckert “push[ed ]back” and the city “gave in[].” Id.

8 Meadows also alleges that Eckert has made other “social media posts” that
“attack[] Meadows[’s] disability status and question[] her medical history.” Docket Item
44 at 12. Meadows “does not know how Eckert obtained her medical information.” Id.
9 Meadows called the police three other times between March 28 and April 1,
2020. Docket Item 44 at 11. Each time, the responding officers rebuffed Meadows’s
complaints and instead “directed [Meadows] to cease and desist” calling law
enforcement. Id.
About four months later, Meadows “reached out to the Erie County Health
Department regarding the furnace pipe and the fumes.” Id. at 23. Defendant Singh
“responded to her and informed [her] that despite the health department[’s] being
responsible for public health and air quality, they would not get involved with Eckert’s

pipe []or any possible ill effects from it.” Id.
II. THE RESULTING PHYSICAL ALTERCATION
The dispute between Eckert and Meadows subsequently devolved into physical
violence. On May 23, 2020, Meadows was “crouching near the ground[]” on the
“disputed boundary between her property and Eckert’s property.” Id. at 15. Eckert then
“walked up behind [Meadows], pushed the fence on top of her, and struck [Meadows]

on the back of her head . . . and in the middle of [her] back with a cast iron skillet.” Id.
Meadows went to the hospital where she was treated for her injuries. Id. Although
Buffalo police officers were called to the scene, they initially “declined to press charges
against” Eckert and maintained that Eckert was “protecting her property.” Id. at 16.
After Meadows protested, an officer charged Eckert with assault and Meadows with
trespassing and harassment. Id.
In July 2020, Meadows “went to Buffalo City Court to file the Felony Assault
warrant card” for this incident. Id. at 18. Meadows obtained the card and left, but “the
warrant clerk [then] called Meadows and told her to return to the court.” Id. At that

point, Meadows learned that “the [Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”)] changed Eckert’s
charge from a felony to a misdemeanor.” Id. Meadows “went upstairs” to protest this
decision, but defendant Schoemick, the ADA then assigned to the case, told her that
Eckert’s assault “can’t be that serious” because Eckert “wasn’t arrested.” Id. Meadows
“declined to accept the decreased charges.” Id. at 19.
Upset with Schoemick’s decision, Meadows staged a “daily protest of the [Erie
County District Attorney’s] office” during the first week of August 2020. Id. Meadows

then was “called up to the [District Attorney’s] office and met with Erie County
investigators,” who “refer[red] her case for prosecution to a new ADA.” Id.
On August 13, 2020, defendant Gordon “reached out, via email, to inform
Meadows that he was the new ADA” assigned to her case. Id. at 21. Meadows sent
additional information about her issues to Gordon, but Gordon “never responded to
[Meadows’s] inquiry on [possible] charges against Eckert.” Id. After Meadows
“questioned Gordon about the racial bias being displayed by the [Erie County District
Attorney’s Office],” Gordon “told Meadows to ‘be courteous’ if she wanted to be deemed
‘credible.’” Id. Meadows then filed a complaint about the Erie County District Attorney’s
Office with the New York State Attorney General. Id. Eckert ultimately was charged

with a misdemeanor “despite Meadows[’s] protest[s].” Id. at 22.
Meadows also “reached out to [Erie County District Attorney] John Flynn . . .
numerous times in 2020 and 20[21] to inform him of the disparate/differential treatment”
between Eckert’s and Meadows’s complaints about each other. Id. at 22. Meadows
likewise repeatedly reached out to Flynn and Gordon in 2020 and 2021 in an attempt to
“obtain their assistance in getting the [Buffalo Police Department] to follow through on
the complaints she was making about Eckert.” Id. at 28. Neither Flynn nor Gordon
responded to Meadows’s inquiries. Id. at 22, 28.
III. MEADOWS’S OTHER CONFRONTATIONS WITH ECKERT
In addition to the pipe dispute and physical altercation, Meadows and Eckert had
several other confrontations about their property boundary.10 Id. at 14, 20-21. Eckert
also falsely accused Meadows of “cut[ting] the lock off her shed, st[ealing] her grill, and
st[ealing] hundreds of dollars[’] worth of tools.” Id. at 17. A Buffalo police officer then

“g[ave] Eckert a warrant for Meadows for theft, trespass, and mischief even though
Eckert had no proof” of the incident. Id. at 18. In August 2020, Eckert filed two more
false complaints, now alleging that Meadows had cut the fence that divided their
properties. Id. at 20-21.
In November 2020, “Meadows observed Eckert pouring epoxy out of her window
and onto the driveway.” Id. at 25. About a month later, a responding police officer who
was called to the area “refused to intervene” when Eckert “took Meadows’[s] panels and
broke them.” Id. at 27. About a month after that, Eckert stole two eight-foot wooden
posts in Meadows’s driveway. Id. at 32. And at one point in March 2021, Eckert

“dump[ed] a bag of dog feces at the property line.” Id. at 34.
Eckert also installed multiple cameras that recorded Meadows’s property. Id. at
12, 14, 22, 25. Meadows then discovered that Eckert had posted numerous videos of
Meadows on Facebook and YouTube, including videos in which Meadows was only
partially clothed. Id. at 22, 30, 31, 33. In December 2020, Meadows “erect[ed] a pole
with a sheet as a partition to prevent Eckert’s roof cam[era] from peering into the

10 Meadows also alleges that Buffalo police officers inadequately responded to
her complaint about a damaged electrical line near her home. Docket Item 44 at 17. It
is unclear whether Meadows claims that Eckert was responsible for that damage.
backyard.” Id. at 26. Eckert then stole the sheet. Id. Although the police “did a report
for petit larceny,” Meadows “was not given a warrant for Eckert’s crime.” Id.
Meadows’s and Eckert’s disputes extend beyond their houses. For example,
Eckert “ma[de] numerous complaints to the [United States Department of Veterans

Affairs,] alleging [that] Meadows would kill the president.” Id. at 13. Eckert also “tr[ied]
to get [Meadows’s] nursing license revoked,” accused Meadows of food stamp and
Social Security fraud, made “false child abuse allegations against Meadows,” and called
a crisis services emergency phone line in an attempt to have Meadows “involuntarily
committed to a psychiatric facility.” Id. at 13, 20. And Eckert “file[d] fraudulent
insurance claims against” Meadows’s insurance policies. Id. at 29-30.
When Meadows once found a “loose dog” in her yard, she took it to the Buffalo
animal shelter. Id. at 28. Apparently, the dog that Meadows took to the shelter was
Eckert’s, although Meadows was “unaware” of that. Id. at 29. Meadows then received
“a summons . . . to appear in court for dog theft.” Id.

In connection with nearly all these incidents, Meadows called local law
enforcement. But local law enforcement, by and large, refused to press charges that
Meadows thought were appropriate.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”11

11 The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is “the same standard [that
applies] to dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC,
647 F.3d 419, 429 (2d Cir. 2011) (alterations omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556).
DISCUSSION

I. THE ERIE COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND ECKERT’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
A. Claims Against Erie County Prosecutors
Meadows brings claims against Erie County District Attorney John Flynn, as well
as Assistant District Attorneys John Schoemick and Milton Gordon, related to their
failure to bring sufficiently severe criminal charges against Eckert. See, e.g., Docket
Item 44 at 28. Meadows also challenges the Erie County prosecutors’ decisions to
“press the most insignificant and often untrue charges” against her. Id. at 35. Both of
those sets of allegations fail to state viable claims.12

12 Although Meadows generally alleges that “all governmental defendants”
violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 and 1985-1986, the ADA, and the FHA, see Docket
Item 44 at 7, 35, the only factual allegations related to the Erie County prosecutors’
conduct involves their charging decisions. This Court accordingly analyzes those
claims below.
1. Official-Capacity Claims
As an initial matter, Meadows brings claims against the Erie County prosecutors
in their official capacities. Id. at 6. “[I]t is well established that New York prosecutors
act on behalf of the state, not the county in which they serve, when prosecuting a
criminal matter.” Schnitter v. City of Rochester, 556 F. App’x 5, 9 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014)

(summary order) (citing Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988)). “Thus, if a
district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts as a prosecutor, [he] is an agent of
the State, and therefore immune from suit in [his] official capacity.” D’Alessandro v. City
of New York, 713 F. App’x 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). On the other hand, if a
suit “centers ‘on the administration of the district attorney’s office’—that is, on the ‘office
policy’ that the district attorney sets—then the district attorney is ‘considered a municipal
policymaker,’ and the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize him from suit.” Id.
(quoting Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993)).
For those reasons, Meadows’s official-capacity claims against the Erie County

prosecutors that do not relate to any office policy are dismissed without leave to amend
because those claims are barred by sovereign immunity. And Meadows’s claims
related to an alleged Erie County District Attorney’s Office policy are subject to
dismissal for the reasons stated below.
2. Claims Related to Eckert’s Prosecution
Meadows also alleges that the Erie County prosecutors violated her

constitutional rights by declining to investigate Meadows’s allegations against Eckert
and refusing to charge Eckert with sufficiently severe crimes. See, e.g., Docket Item 44
at 28. But any claim related to the prosecutors’ alleged failure to investigate is not
viable because Meadows “has no constitutional right to have [another person] criminally
investigated.” Baltas v. Rivera, 2021 WL 3023240, at *1 (D. Conn. July 16, 2021).
Meadows likewise has no viable claim related to the prosecutors’ failure to adequately
charge Eckert because “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the

prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973). And that is so even when the private citizen is the victim of a crime because “[a]
crime victim who sues to force the prosecution of the person who did [her] wrong was
injured by that person, not by the failure to prosecute that person.” Brady v.
Schneiderman, 2016 WL 3906737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2016), aff’d, 714 F. App’x 60
(2d Cir. 2018).
Because Meadows has no viable claim related to the failure to investigate or
prosecute Eckert, any such claim is dismissed without leave to amend.

3. Prosecutorial Immunity
At the end of her amended complaint, Meadows alleges that the Erie County
prosecutors violated her rights by “press[ing] the most insignificant and often untrue
charges” against her. Docket Item 44 at 35. And in Meadows’s response to the Erie
County defendants’ motions to dismiss, she says that she “would like to add malicious
prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct” claims against the Erie County prosecutors
challenging their conduct in three state court criminal cases.13 Docket Item 77 at 1-2.

13 Meadows is warned that a court generally “will not consider [] factual
allegations raised for the first time in a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”
Harrell v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 2019 WL 3817190, at *2 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019). So Meadows should include any factual allegations in a
second amended complaint, not in papers responding to a motion.
Although Meadows may amend her complaint to include those claims, any such claim
may well be barred by prosecutorial immunity.
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit, and that immunity “appl[ies] with
full force” to activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Prosecutorial
immunity
encompasses not only [prosecutors’] conduct of trials but all of their
activities that can fairly be characterized as closely associated with the
conduct of litigation or potential litigation, including presentation of evidence
to a grand jury to initiate a prosecution, activities in deciding not to do so,
and conduct of plea bargaining negotiations.
Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see
also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that
prosecutors have absolute immunity for decisions and acts that “constituted an exercise
of their prosecutorial discretion in preparing a case for indictment and deciding when,
where, and how to prosecute”). But such immunity does not include “those aspects of
the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or
investigative officer rather than that of advocate.” Warney v. Monroe County, 587 F.3d
113, 121 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31). And a prosecutor who
“proceeds in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” is not immune from suit. Shmueli v.
City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d
358, 361 (2d Cir. 1987)).
To the extent that Meadows alleges that the Erie County prosecutors violated her
constitutional rights by bringing criminal charges against her, those are precisely the
sort of claims that are barred by prosecutorial immunity. See Giraldo v. Kessler, 694
F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that prosecutors are absolutely immune from
claims challenging “legal decisions at the core of the prosecutorial function,” including
the “pursuit of [] charges”). And even though “racially invidious . . . prosecutions,
pursued without probable cause, are reprehensible, [] such motives do not necessarily
remove [a prosecutor’s] conduct from the protection of absolute immunity.” See

Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 504 (2d Cir. 2004). So any claims against
any Erie County prosecutor challenging their charging decisions are not viable.
In light of her pro se status, Meadows may amend her complaint to state viable
claims against the Erie County prosecutors. See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. But if she
does, she must allege facts showing why those claims are not barred by absolute
prosecutorial immunity.

B. Monell Claims
Meadows also brings claims against Erie County related to an alleged policy of
failing to prosecute “Black complaints against White[]” individuals while over-prosecuting
“when the complainant is White and the accused is Black.”14 See Docket Item 44 at 22.
She seeks relief for that unlawful policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 2.
“To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the
challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and
(2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir.

1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994)). A municipality
cannot be held liable under section 1983 unless the challenged action was undertaken

14 The Court construes Meadows’s official-capacity claims against Erie County
prosecutors as municipal liability claims for the reasons stated above.
pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To state a
claim under Monell, a plaintiff must plead three elements: “(1) an official policy or
custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional
right.” Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Batista v.

Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983)).
As noted above, Meadows has no constitutional right to have her complaints
against Eckert investigated by Erie County prosecutors or to have those prosecutors
charge Eckert with a crime. So any Monell claim related to those allegations is not
viable and is dismissed without leave to amend. See Est. of M.D. by DeCosmo v. New
York, 241 F. Supp. 3d 413, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“If a plaintiff alleges no constitutional
violation, or a district court finds that the plaintiff has inadequately alleged one, the
Monell claim fails.”).15
Any claim against Erie County based on Meadows’s own prosecution also is not
viable. “Monell liability attaches only where an infringement of constitutional rights is

caused by a local government policy,” not some policy attributable to the state. See
Bellamy v. City of New York, 914 F.3d 727, 757 (2d Cir. 2019). Although “the actions of
county prosecutors in New York are generally controlled by municipal policymakers for
purposes of Monell” liability, see id. at 759, the Second Circuit has “consistently held
that ‘inherently prosecutorial functions (i.e., decisions whether to prosecute) are
controlled by state policies for purposes of Monell,’” see Kellner v. City of New York,
2021 WL 4251343, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021) (quoting Bellamy, 914 F.3d at 758).

15 For that reason, and for the reasons stated below, Meadows has not alleged a
viable Monell claim based on Singh’s conduct. See Est. of M.D. by DeCosmo, 241 F.
Supp. 3d at 430.
For that reason, “a prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute an individual may not
form the basis for Monell liability.” Id. In other words, a prosecutor’s charging decision
is attributable to the state, not the county, and therefore cannot provide the basis for a
section 1983 claim against a municipality. So Meadows’s allegations that the Erie

County prosecutors unlawfully charged her by “press[ing] the most insignificant and
often untrue charges,” see Docket Item 44 at 35, do not and cannot state a viable
Monell claim against Erie County.
Meadows’s claims against Erie County therefore are subject to dismissal.
Nevertheless, in light of her pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, she may amend
her complaint to state a viable claim under Monell. But for the reasons stated above,
any such claim cannot be based on the Erie County prosecutors’ failure to charge
Eckert or their decisions to charge Meadows.

C. Claims Against Singh
Meadows also brings claims against Singh, an employee of the Erie County
Department of Health, for his failure to investigate Meadows’s complaints about the pipe
on Eckert’s property. See Docket Item 44 at 23. But “there is no constitutional or
otherwise enforceable right to an investigation by government officials.” Vazquez v. City
of New York, 2021 WL 1966397, at *9 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (citing DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989)); see also

Bernstein v. New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 448, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Courts within the
Second Circuit have determined that there is no constitutional right to an investigation
by government officials.” (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because Meadows’s claims against Singh relate to his purported failure to adequately
investigate her complaints, those claims are not viable and are dismissed without leave
to amend because any amendment would be “futile.”16 See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. If
Meadows can plead other factual allegations showing that Singh is liable to her under
some other theory of liability, she may do so in a second amended complaint.

D. Claims Against Eckert
Meadows alleges that Eckert violated her rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983
and 1985-1986, the ADA, and the FHA. Docket Item 44. For the reasons that follow,
none of those claims are viable as pleaded.

1. 1981 Claim
“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must establish the
following elements: (1) she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended
to discriminate against her on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned
‘one of the statute’s enumerated activities.’” Gatling v. West, 850 F. App’x 91, 96 (2d
Cir. 2021) (summary order) (quoting Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d
Cir. 2000)). “The enumerated activities include the rights ‘to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens.’” Id. at 96-97 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). “To prevail” on a claim under
section 1981, “a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, [she]

16 Because this Court finds that Meadows’s claims against Singh are not viable, it
does not reach Singh’s alternative argument that those claims are barred by res
judicata. See Docket Item 89.
would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020).
Although the amended complaint does not identify the protected right that Eckert
allegedly deprived Meadows of, Meadows seems to rely on section 1981’s “full and

equal benefit” clause. See Docket Item 85 at 3 (suggesting that Eckert violated
“Stephanie’s Law, The Backyard Camera Bill[,] and Penal Code [sections] 250.00 and
250.05”).17 “Few cases in this circuit or elsewhere arise under the ‘equal benefit’ clause
of [section] 1981.” Benzinger v. NYSARC, Inc. N.Y.C. Chapter, 385 F. Supp. 3d 224,
235 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Pierre v. J.C. Penney Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 308, 310
(E.D.N.Y. 2004)). “To establish a violation of [section] 1981’s guarantee of ‘full and
equal benefit’ of laws, a plaintiff must ‘[(1)] allege racial animus; [(2)] identify a relevant
law or proceeding for the security of persons and property; and [(3)] allege that [the]
defendants deprived [her] of the full and equal benefit thereof.’” Id. (alterations and
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bishop v. Toys “R” Us-NY LLC, 414 F. Supp.

2d 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
Even if this Court very liberally reads the allegations in Meadows’s response to
the motion for judgment on the pleadings, see supra at 13 n.13, Meadows does not say
how Eckert deprived her of her rights under those laws, nor does she say how her race
was a but-for cause of that deprivation. And without those allegations, Meadows’s
section 1981 claim is not viable. See Williams v. Calderoni, 2012 WL 691832, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (dismissing section 1981 claim because a conclusory allegation

17 Sections 250.00 and 250.05 of the New York Penal Law prohibit unauthorized
eavesdropping. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 250.00, 250.05.
that a challenged action was taken because of race, “without a fact-specific allegation of
a causal link between [the] defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s race[,] is too
conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss”), aff’d, 529 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2013).
Although Meadows’s claim under section 1981 therefore is not viable as currently

pleaded, she may amend her complaint to state a viable section 1981 claim.
2. 1983 Claims
Meadows also brings claims against Eckert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserts
that Eckert violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Docket Item 44. But
Meadows has not sufficiently alleged that Eckert is a state actor subject to liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and her claims therefore are subject to dismissal.

Generally, the “United States Constitution regulates only the [g]overnment, not
private parties.” Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 768 F.3d 259,
263 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Phillips v. Sage Colls., 83 F. App’x 340, 341 (2d Cir. 2003)
(summary order) (“With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against
slavery, the United States Constitution regulates only government action, not that of
private parties.”). So when a plaintiff “alleges that her constitutional rights have been
violated,” she “must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.”
Grogan, 768 F.3d at 263 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Second Circuit has “identified three main tests to determine” whether an

otherwise private entity has engaged in state action:
“(1) when the entity acts pursuant to the coercive power of the state or is
controlled by the state (‘the compulsion test’); (2) when the state provides
significant encouragement to the entity, the entity is a willful participant in
joint activity with the state, or the entity’s functions are entwined with state
policies (‘the joint action test’ or ‘close nexus test’); and (3) when the entity
has been delegated a public function by the state (‘the public function test’).”
Barrows v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 116, 135 (2d Cir. 2022) (alterations omitted) (quoting
Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012)). “The fundamental question
under each test is whether the private entity’s challenged actions are ‘fairly attributable’
to the state.” Fabrikant, 691 F.3d at 207 (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
838 (1982)).
The only allegations in the amended complaint that might possibly bear on
whether Eckert was a state actor relate to Eckert’s calling law enforcement on
Meadows.18 In other words, Meadows may be alleging that Eckert is liable under

section 1983 because she has invoked the assistance of law enforcement on numerous
occasions. But a “call to the police does not amount to ‘willful collaboration’ giving rise
to [section] 1983 liability.” Johns v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 221 F.R.D. 400, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (collecting cases). Nor does a private individual’s invocation of legal
process necessarily transform her into a state actor. See Vazquez v. Combs, 2004 WL
2404224, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004) (“[M]erely filing a complaint with the police,
reporting a crime, requesting criminal investigation of a person, or seeking a restraining
order, even if the complaint or report is deliberately false, does not give rise to a claim
against the complainant for a civil rights violation.”). And that is true even if Eckert
allegedly “supplied the police with false information.” See Johns, 221 F.R.D. at 405.

18 While Meadows suggests in her response to Eckert’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings that Eckert was a state actor because she “unlawfully surveill[ed]”
Meadows using the house-mounted video cameras and provided that video to law
enforcement, Docket Item 85 at 3, nothing in the amended complaint indicates that law
enforcement encouraged Eckert to do this. Likewise, Meadows’s conclusory assertion
in her response that local law enforcement “deputized” Eckert into some governmental
role, see id., finds no support in the amended complaint.
Finally, Meadows has not alleged any sort of “plan, prearrangement, conspiracy,
custom, or policy” shared by Eckert and any state actor. See Ginsberg v. Healey Car &
Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999). Instead, Meadows alleges
throughout the amended complaint that local law enforcement simply reacted to

whatever true or false information Eckert provided, not that they directed her to do
anything or conspired with her. And that is not enough to raise a viable claim.
Because there is no plausible basis in the amended complaint to find that Eckert
was a state actor, Meadows’s claims against her under section 1983 are not viable.
Nevertheless, and again in light of her pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112,
Meadows may amend her complaint to allege how Eckert was a state actor who
violated Meadows’s constitutional rights and therefore is subject to liability under section
1983.

3. 1985 and 1986 Claims
Meadows also asserts claims against Eckert under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.
Docket Item 44 at 2. To bring a claim under section 1985, a plaintiff must allege
1) a conspiracy; 2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance
of the conspiracy; 4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or
property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264, 269 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006). “A section 1985(3) conspiracy
must also be motivated by some racial or [] otherwise class-based, invidious
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). A claim under section 1986, which “imposes liability on an
individual who has knowledge of discrimination prohibited under [section] 1985,” is
“contingent on a valid [section] 1985 claim.” Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d
Cir. 1996).
The amended complaint details a series of encounters when Eckert or Meadows
called the police and the police responded to the scene. The amended complaint

further alleges that Meadows spoke with Erie County prosecutors who inadequately
handled her complaints about Eckert. But nothing in those allegations suggests that
Eckert conspired with law enforcement, county prosecutors, or anyone else to deprive
Meadows of any protected right.
Because Meadows has not alleged that Eckert conspired with anyone, her claims
under section 1985 and 1986 are not viable. But in light of her pro se status, see
Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, Meadows may amend her complaint to state viable claims
under those sections.

4. ADA Claim
Meadows also alleges that Eckert violated Meadows’s rights under the ADA.
Docket Item 44 at 2. The basis of Meadows’s ADA claim against Eckert is not entirely
clear, although Meadows may be alleging that Eckert violated the ADA when she
assaulted Meadows with a skillet. See id. at 15 (alleging that Eckert struck Meadows
while “ha[ving] full, prior knowledge that Meadows is disabled”). Troubling as that sort
of private violence may be, it does not give rise to a viable ADA claim. See generally

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004) (“[The ADA] forbids discrimination
against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is
covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the
subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III.”); see
generally Wilshire v. L&M Dev. Partners, 2022 WL 847067, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,
2022) (“To prevail on a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish, among other
things, that [the] defendants are subject to one of the titles of the ADA.”). Although
Meadows’s ADA claim does not appear to be viable in any form, the Court nevertheless

grants her leave to amend this claim to show how Eckert violated her rights under the
ADA.
5. FHA Claim
Meadows also alleges that Eckert violated the Fair Housing Act.19 Docket Item
44 at 35. Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act “provides that ‘it shall be unlawful to
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of,

or on account of [her] having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of [her] having aided
and or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted
or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.’” Birch Fam. Servs.,
2021 WL 2312852, at *5 (alterations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3617).20 “To prevail

19 Meadows does not say which section of the FHA that Eckert purportedly
violated, but other courts have applied section 3617 to similar neighbor-on-neighbor
disputes. See, e.g., Birch Family Servs., Inc. v. Wlody, 2021 WL 2312852, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 1468160 (2d Cir. May 10, 2022). So at this
stage, the Court declines to grant Eckert’s motion for judgment on the pleadings simply
because Eckert “is not [Meadows’s] landlord.” See Docket Item 78-1 at 4.
20 Although section 3617 refers specifically to other sections of the FHA, courts
“within and outside of the Second Circuit have held that [section] 3617 can serve as a
separate and independent basis for an FHA claim” challenging conduct that occurred
after the sale or lease of a dwelling “even if there is no predicate for liability” under the
other sections referenced in section 3617. Birch Family Servs., 2021 WL 2312852, at
*6; see also Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 88 (2d Cir. 2021) (Lohier,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“[T]he plain language of [section] 3617
creates a separate cause of action that more comprehensively prohibits post-acquisition
discriminatory conduct barred by [section] 3604(b).”); but see id. at 80 n.50 (majority
opinion leaving open the extent to which “the FHA’s prohibition of discrimination
on a [section] 3617 claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected
class under the FHA, (2) she was engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of her fair
housing rights, (3) [the] defendants were motivated in part by an intent to discriminate,
and (4) [the] defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated[,] or interfered with [the]

plaintiff on account of her protected activity under the FHA.” Id. (alterations, citation,
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Watters v. Homeowners’ Ass’n at Pres.
at Bridgewater, 48 F.4th 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2022) (same).
Not “every quarrel among neighbors” gives rise to a viable FHA claim. See
Halprin v. Prairie Single Fam. Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th
Cir. 2004). “After all, isolated acts of racial animus are not enough; there must be some
nexus between a stray remark and the challenged action.” Watters, 48 F.4th at 786
(alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “even the
worst behavior toward one’s neighbors requires some nexus to an adverse housing
action; otherwise, the claim is not actionable under the FHA.” Id. at 791 (St. Eve, J.,

dissenting in part).
Meadows has not alleged such a nexus between any racial animus and an
adverse housing action here. Instead, Meadows alleges that sometime after the first
dispute over the pipe, Eckert posted on social media that “the dispute was because
Eckert ‘was white’ and [because] Meadows ‘doesn’t like white women.’” Docket Item 44
at 10. It is unclear how those statements had an effect on any challenged housing

reaches conduct engaged in after a tenant acquires [a] dwelling”). This Court therefore
assumes without deciding that Meadows’s claims against Eckert, which all relate to
conduct that occurred after Meadows moved into her home and do not arise out of any
real estate transaction, relate to the sort of conduct that is protected under section 3617
of the FHA.
action; in fact, after Eckert made those statements, the pipe issue appeared to have
been voluntarily resolved. See id. at 11 (“Eckert had the pipe fixed one week later.”).
Moreover, Meadows does not otherwise tie those “stray remark[s]” to any other
challenged action. See Watters, 48 F.4th at 786. Instead, the remainder of Meadows’s

amended complaint is devoted to the sort of neighborhood quarrels that do not give rise
to a viable FHA claim. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330. So there does not appear to be
any connection between race and any issue under the FHA.
For those reasons, Meadows has not raised a viable FHA claim. Nevertheless,
and again in light of her pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, Meadows may
amend her complaint to allege how Eckert violated her fair housing rights and how that
violation was connected to racial animus.

6. 1982 Claim
Section 1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
“To prevail on a section 1982 claim, [a] plaintiff[] must show that (1) [she is a] member[]
of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intended to discriminate against [her] on the basis
of race; and (3) the discrimination involved one or more activities enumerated in the
statute.” Okudinani v. Rose, 779 F. App’x 768, 771 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order). So

“[a] plaintiff states a viable cause of action under [section] 1982 only by alleging a
deprivation of [her] rights on account of [her] race, ancestry, or ethnic characteristics.”
Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Comcast, 140
S. Ct. at 1016 (“[The Supreme Court] has repeatedly held that a claim arises under
[section] 1982 when a citizen is not allowed to acquire property because of color.”
(emphasis in original) (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
As mentioned above, the only factual allegations in Meadows’s amended
complaint that could show that Eckert acted with racial animus are Eckert’s social media

posts. But Meadows alleges that those posts were made after the pipe incident that
spurred Meadows’s and Eckert’s dispute, and Meadows does not otherwise tie those
posts to Eckert’s subsequent conduct or provide any further link between racial animus
and Meadows’s ability to “purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982. So Meadows has not sufficiently alleged a link between
any challenged conduct and alleged racial animus.21 See Grimes v. Fremont Gen.
Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 269, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[F]act-specific allegations of a causal
link between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s race are required” for a claim
under section 1982, “and conclusory or naked allegations will not suffice.” (alterations,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, and again in light of her

pro se status, see Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, Meadows may amend her complaint to state
a viable claim under section 1982.

21 Eckert asserts that Meadows’s section 1982 claim is not viable because
“[Meadows] has not alleged that [] Eckert in any way interfered with [Meadows’s] ability
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” Docket
Item 78-1 at 4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because this Court
concludes that Meadows’s section 1982 claim is subject to dismissal for the reasons
stated above, it does not reach whether any of the conduct alleged in the amended
complaint is the sort that would interfere with Meadows’s “freedom to hold property, a
right protected by section 1982.” Okudinani, 779 F. App’x at 772; see also id. (noting
that other courts have considered section 1982 claims involving the “detonat[ion of] a
flash simulator near the plaintiff’s vehicle while she was driving; throwing a Molotov
cocktail onto the plaintiffs’ porch; and burning a cross on the plaintiffs’ lawn”).
E. Leave to Amend
As repeatedly noted above, because Meadows is proceeding pro se and
therefore is entitled to heightened deference, she is granted leave to amend her
complaint. See Shibeshi v. City Univ. of N.Y., 531 F. App’x 135, 136 (2d Cir. 2013)
(summary order) (“[D]istrict courts should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint

without granting the plaintiff leave to amend.”). But Meadows’s claims related to
Eckert’s non-prosecution, her Monell claims against Erie County challenging
prosecutorial charging decisions and Singh’s failure to investigate, and her claims
against Singh related to his failure to investigate are dismissed without leave to amend
because any amendment would be “futile.” See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112.
Meadows is advised that an amended complaint is intended to completely
replace the prior complaint and thus “renders [any prior complaint] of no legal effect.”
Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Meadows also is
advised that she must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if she seeks to amend

her complaint again and cannot continue to file “supplemental pleadings” that do not
comply with those rules. Supplemental filings that do not comply with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or this Court’s orders will not be considered. Meadows therefore
should include any allegations that she wants the Court to consider in a second
amended complaint.

II. MEADOWS’S REMAINING MOTIONS
A. Voluntary Dismissal
On September 29, 2022, Meadows filed an “amended claim w[ith] supplemental
pleadings.” Docket Item 125. In that filing, Meadows said that she “wish[ed] to
withdraw the following ‘lesser actors’ of the [Buffalo Police Department] from this claim”:
Officer Dixon, Officer Otwell, Officer Salazar, Officer Casey, Officer Reed, Officer
Antonio, Officer George, Lieutenant Harrison, Officer Brown, Officer Rachuna, Officer
Keenan, Officer Cullen, Officer Hayden, Officer Creahan, John Flynn, Lieutenant

Danner, Officer Maryanski, Officer Santiago, Officer Domoros, Officer Raye, Officer
Kline, and Officer Nowak. Id.
Most of those defendants have not answered the complaint, moved for summary
judgment, or even appeared in this case. So Meadows may voluntarily dismiss her
claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(i); see also Frank v. Trilegiant Corp., 2012 WL 214100, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
24, 2012) (noting that “district courts within the Second Circuit have [] adopted the
approach of the majority of courts in other circuits—that is, that Rule 41(a) does not
require dismissal of the action in its entirety”). Based on Meadows’s representation that
she wishes to “remov[e] [those defendants] from liability,” Docket Item 125, the Court

interprets Meadows’s filing as a notice of voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1)(A) and dismisses all claims against all defendants listed above
except John Flynn.
Because Flynn may have been erroneously included in that list—the list
otherwise includes only police officers and does not include any other Erie County
prosecutor—Meadows may inform this Court whether she intends to pursue her claims
against him within 45 days of the date of this order. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90,
95 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting the “obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable
allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights”).
That filing may be made at the same time any second amended complaint is filed.

B. Motion to Strike
On August 4, 2022, Meadows filed another “amended claim.” Docket Item 111.
Eckert and the Erie County defendants objected to and rejected that filing, arguing that
it did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Docket Item 111, 114.
Meadows has moved to strike the Erie County defendants’ objection, Docket Item 120,
apparently on the grounds that this Court gave her leave to amend her complaint when
the Court “respon[ded]” to one of Meadows’s filings asking this Court to enter a default
against certain defendants who had not been served. See Docket Items 110, 120.

On August 8, 2022, this Court denied Meadows’s request that this Court direct
the Clerk of the Court to enter a default. Id. In that order, this Court also extended the
time for Meadows to serve the remaining defendants who had not yet been served.
See id. That order said nothing about granting Meadows leave to amend her complaint.
So while Meadows says that she believed that this Court granted her leave to amend
when it “respon[ded]” to one of her filings, Meadows’s filing was not a motion to amend
and this Court never granted leave to amend.22

22 What is more, Meadows filed her amended claim before this Court issued the
order that she claims authorized that supplemental pleading. Compare Docket Item 111
(Meadows’s amended claim filed on August 4, 2022), with Docket Item 112 (this Court’s
order filed on August 8, 2022). So Meadows could not have plausibly relied on that
order in filing her amended claim. Although Meadows is proceeding pro se and her
submissions “must be construed liberally,” see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006), that latitude is not boundless.
For those reasons, Meadows’s motion to strike is denied. And this Court again
advises Meadows that her failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
this Court’s orders may result in this Court’s not considering her filings. See Roberts v.
Blowers, 2022 WL 10068263, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2022) (“[Pro se] litigants have an

obligation to comply with a court’s orders, and when they fail to do so, they, like all
litigants, must suffer the consequences of their actions.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Wilson v. Gantert, 2004 WL 1591400, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 12, 2004)
(“[E]ven pro se litigants must abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
(italicization added)).

C. Motion for a Preliminary Hearing
Finally, Meadows’s motion for a preliminary hearing, Docket Item 119, is denied.
No hearing was necessary to decide these motions. See Whitnum v. Town of
Woodbridge, 833 F. App’x 924, 925 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (“[A] district court’s
decision whether to permit oral argument rests within its discretion.”). As stated above,
Meadows may file a second amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this order,
and Eckert and the Erie County defendants may answer, move against, or otherwise
respond to the second amended complaint within 30 days of its filing. If oral argument
is necessary to decide any motions made in response to a second amended complaint,
this Court will schedule it at a later time.

III. SERVICE ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS
Although Meadows has voluntarily dismissed her claims against several
defendants, she still has not effected service on several others. This Court previously
extended Meadows’s time to effect service and advised her that if she could not effect
service within 90 days of the date of that order, she should request an extension of time
to do so. See Docket Item 112. On September 27, 2022, Meadows filed an affidavit of
service asserting that the “City of Bflo, BPD, et al [sic]” were served with the summons
and complaint. Docket Item 121. But the Buffalo Police Department and the City of

Buffalo already had appeared and answered the amended complaint, see Docket Item
118, and this Court has no idea to which of the remaining defendants “et al” refers. So
the City of Buffalo and the Buffalo Police Department need not be served again, and
this Court has no way of knowing whether Meadows has served any of the remaining
defendants who had not been served already.
Meadows’s time to effect service is extended another 90 days from the date of
this order. The Court reminds Meadows that while she may rely on the United States
Marshals Service to effect service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3), she must inquire of the
Marshals at 716-348-5300 as to whether service has been made and, if necessary,
request an extension of time to effect service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63

(2d Cir. 2012). If Meadows has not effected service within 90 days of the date of this
order or requested an extension of time to do so, this Court may order her to show
cause why her claims against the unserved defendants should not be dismissed for
failure to effect service.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss,
Docket Items 54, 56, 58, 60, and 62, are GRANTED in part. Meadows’s claims related
to Eckert’s non-prosecution, her Monell claims against Erie County challenging
prosecutorial charging decisions and Singh’s failure to investigate, and her claims
against Singh related to his failure to investigate are dismissed without leave to amend.
And the remainder of the Erie County defendants’ motions to dismiss, as well as
Eckert’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 78, will be granted unless
Meadows files an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies noted above within 45

days of the date of this order. Eckert and the Erie County defendants may renew their
motions or otherwise respond to any amended complaint within 30 days of its filing. If
Meadows does not file an amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this order,
then her claims against Eckert and the Erie County defendants will be dismissed and
the Clerk of the Court shall terminate Eckert, Schoemick, Flynn, Gordon, Erie County,
and Singh as defendants in this case.
Meadows’s motions to strike, Docket Items 87 and 120, are DENIED.
Meadows’s motions to amend, Docket Items 93 and 109, are DENIED as moot, and
Meadows’s motion for a preliminary hearing, Docket Item 119, is DENIED without
prejudice. Meadows’s motion to withdraw certain defendants, Docket Item 125, is

GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate the following defendants from this
case: Officer Dixon, Officer Otwell, Officer Salazar, Officer Casey, Officer Reed, Officer
Antonio, Officer George, Lt. Harrison, Officer Brown, Officer Rachuna, Officer Keenan,
Officer Cullen, Officer Hayden, Officer Creahan, Lt. Danner, Officer Maryanski, Officer
Santiago, Officer Domoros, Officer Raye, Officer Kline, and Officer Nowak. Meadows
may inform this Court within 45 days of the date of this order if she also wishes to
withdraw her claims against John Flynn. Meadows’s time to effect service on the
unserved defendants is extended another 90 days from the date of this order.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2023
Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10365807. Public record. Not legal advice.