# Wimble v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, W.D. New York · November 3, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10364295

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 3, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CORY W., §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Case # 1:20-cv-1424-DB
§
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, § MEMORANDUM
§ DECISION AND ORDER
Defendant. §

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Cory W. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the
“Commissioner”), that denied his application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title
XVI of the Act. See ECF No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c), and the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned in accordance with a
standing order (see ECF No. 14).
Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c). See ECF Nos. 11, 12. Plaintiff also filed a reply brief. See ECF No. 13. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 11) is
DENIED, and the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 12) is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI on July 27, 2017, alleging disability
beginning September 1, 2015 (the disability onset date), due to celiac disease and anxiety.
Transcript (“Tr.”) Tr. 135-40, 158. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on December 12, 2017,
after which he requested an administrative hearing. Tr. 15. On September 6, 2019, Administrative
Law Judge Paul Georger (the “ALJ”) held a hearing in Buffalo, New York. Tr. 15, 32-60. Plaintiff
appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by Zachary Zabawa, an attorney. Tr. 15.
Kathleen Doehla, an impartial vocational expert (“VE”), also appeared and testified. Id.
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on October 24, 2019, finding that Plaintiff was

not disabled. Tr. 15-27. On August 4, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
further review. Tr. 1-6. The ALJ’s October 24, 2019 decision thus became the “final decision” of
the Commissioner subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
LEGAL STANDARD
I. District Court Review
“In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the
SSA’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a
correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
405(g)) (other citation omitted). The Act holds that the Commissioner’s decision is “conclusive”
if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence means more

than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). It is not the Court’s function to “determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled.”
Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F. 3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1990).
II. The Sequential Evaluation Process
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is
disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Parker v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71
(1986). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ
proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of
impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning of the Act, meaning that it imposes significant
restrictions on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments meeting the durational

requirements, the analysis concludes with a finding of “not disabled.” If the claimant does, the
ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or medically
equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the
“Listings”). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing
and meets the durational requirement, the claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1509. If not, the ALJ
determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity, which is the ability to perform physical or
mental work activities on a sustained basis notwithstanding limitations for the collective
impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant’s RFC permits

him or her to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. Id. If he or she
cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g). To do so, the
Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant “retains a residual
functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy” in light of his or her age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168
F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S FINDINGS
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the process described above and
made the following findings in his October 24, 2019 decision:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 27, 2017, the
application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: Mood disorder, social anxiety
disorder, depression (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: the claimant is able to
perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks. The claimant is able to make simple work-
related decisions. The claimant is able to interact occasionally supervisors, coworkers, and
the general public.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born on April 3, 1990 and was 27 years old, which is defined as a younger
individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR
416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant
work (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since
July 27, 2017, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
Tr. 15-27.
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that, based on the application for supplemental security
benefits protectively filed on July 27, 2017, the claimant is not disabled under section
1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Tr. 27.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts a single point of error. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s mental RFC finding
is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ purported to give persuasive weight to
the opinion of consultative psychiatric examiner Gregory Fabiano, Ph.D. (“Dr. Fabiano”), but

failed to account for Dr. Fabiano’s opined limitations in the RFC and failed to make any
individualized findings regarding Plaintiff’s stress. See ECF No. 11-1 at 1, 8-13.
The Commissioner argues in response that the ALJ properly considered the medical
opinions of record, and Plaintiff failed to explain how the limitations the ALJ assessed do not
account for Dr. Fabiano’s opinion. See ECF No. 12-1 at 10-15.
A Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not disabled will be set aside when the
factual findings are not supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Shaw v.
Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence has been interpreted to mean “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The
Court may also set aside the Commissioner’s decision when it is based upon legal error. Rosa, 168

F.3d at 77.
Upon review, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ’s mental RFC did not account for his stress is
meritless, as the ALJ provided a well-reasoned analysis of the record evidence in support of his
RFC finding, and the ALJ’s finding is consistent with any stress-related limitations Plaintiff may
have.
A claimant’s RFC is the most he can still do despite his limitations and is assessed based
on an evaluation of all relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
404.945(a)(1), (a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474-01 (July 2, 1996). At the hearing level, the
ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-
5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the
assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC
is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional. See 20 C.F.R. §

416.927(d)(2) (indicating that “the final responsibility for deciding these issues [including RFC]
is reserved to the Commissioner”); Breinin v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-01166(LEK TWD), 2015 WL
7749318, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 7738047
(N.D.N.Y. 2015) (“It is the ALJ’s job to determine a claimant’s RFC, and not to simply agree with
a physician’s opinion.”).
Additionally, it is within the ALJ’s discretion to resolve genuine conflicts in the evidence.
See Veino v Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002). In so doing, the ALJ may “choose between
properly submitted medical opinions.” Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998).
Moreover, an ALJ is free to reject portions of medical-opinion evidence not supported by objective
evidence of record, while accepting those portions supported by the record. See Veino, 312 F.3d

at 588. Indeed, an ALJ may formulate an RFC absent any medical opinions. “Where, [] the record
contains sufficient evidence from which an ALJ can assess the [plaintiff’s] residual functional
capacity, a medical source statement or formal medical opinion is not necessarily required.”
Monroe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 676 F. App’x 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotation
omitted).
Moreover, the ALJ’s conclusion need not “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions
of medical sources cited in [his] decision,” because the ALJ is “entitled to weigh all of the evidence
available to make an RFC finding that [i]s consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue,
508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971) (the
RFC need not correspond to any particular medical opinion; rather, the ALJ weighs and
synthesizes all evidence available to render an RFC finding consistent with the record as a whole);
Castle v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-00113 (MAT), 2017 WL 3939362, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2017)
(The fact that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not perfectly match a medical opinion is not grounds

for remand.).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the ALJ in this case properly analyzed the opinion
evidence and the other evidence of record when developing Plaintiff’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527, 416.927. Effective for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Social Security
Agency comprehensively revised its regulations governing medical opinion evidence creating a
new regulatory framework. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence,
82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (technical errors corrected by 82 Fed. Reg. 15, 132-01 (March
27, 2017). Here, Plaintiff filed his claims on July 27, 2017, and therefore, the 2017 regulations are
applicable to his claim.
First, the new regulations change how ALJs consider medical opinions and prior

administrative findings. The new regulations no longer use the term “treating source” and no
longer make medical opinions from treating sources eligible for controlling weight. Rather, the
new regulations instruct that, for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, an ALJ cannot “defer or
give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical findings(s), including those from [the claimant’s own] medical
sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (2017).
Second, instead of assigning weight to medical opinions, as was required under the prior
regulations, under the new rubric, the ALJ considers the persuasiveness of a medical opinion (or a
prior administrative medical finding). Id. The source of the opinion is not the most important factor
in evaluating its persuasive value. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). Rather, the most important factors
are supportability and consistency. Id.
Third, not only do the new regulations alter the definition of a medical opinion and the way
medical opinions are considered, but they also alter the way the ALJ discusses them in the text of

the decision. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). After considering the relevant factors, the ALJ is not
required to explain how he or she considered each factor. Id. Instead, when articulating his or her
finding about whether an opinion is persuasive, the ALJ need only explain how he or she
considered the “most important factors” of supportability and consistency. Id. Further, where a
medical source provides multiple medical opinions, the ALJ need not address every medical
opinion from the same source; rather, the ALJ need only provide a “single analysis.” Id.
Fourth, the regulations governing claims filed on or after March 27, 2017 deem decisions
by other governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities, disability examiner findings, and
statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner (such as statements that a claimant is or is not
disabled) as evidence that “is inherently neither valuable nor persuasive to the issue of whether [a

claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c)(1)-(3) (2017). The regulations also make clear
that, for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, “we will not provide any analysis about how we
considered such evidence in our determination or decision” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(c).
Finally, Congress granted the Commissioner exceptionally broad rulemaking authority
under the Act to promulgate rules and regulations “necessary or appropriate to carry out” the
relevant statutory provisions and “to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs
and evidence” required to establish the right to benefits under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1) (making the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) applicable to title XVI); 42
U.S.C. § 902(a)(5) (“The Commissioner may prescribe such rules and regulations as the
Commissioner determines necessary or appropriate to carry out the functions of the
Administration.”); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212. 217-25 (2002) (deferring to the
Commissioner’s “considerable authority” to interpret the Act); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458,
466 (1983). Judicial review of regulations promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) is narrow

and limited to determining whether they are arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of the
Commissioner’s authority. Brown v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 145 (1987) (citing Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. at 466).
Plaintiff complains that the ALJ’s RFC is unsupported because the ALJ found Dr.
Fabiano’s opinion to be persuasive, but then did not account for the doctor’s limitations in the
RFC. See ECF No. 11-1 at 8-10. Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ’s RFC finding is
unsupported by the record because the ALJ did not make any individualized findings regarding
Plaintiff’s stress. See id. at 10-13. Plaintiff’s arguments are incorrect.
Dr. Fabiano opined that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and apply simple and
complex directions and instructions; use reason and judgment to make work-related decisions;

sustain concentration and perform a task at a consistent pace; sustain an ordinary routine and
regular attendance; and had only moderate limitations in his ability to interact adequately with
supervisors, coworkers, and the public, regulate emotions and behavior, and maintain well-being.
Tr. 237-38. Moderate mental limitations do not necessarily indicate disabling functional
restrictions that would prevent a claimant from performing the basic mental demands required for
unskilled work. See Martinez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:16-CV-0908, 2017 WL 2633532, at
*7 (N.D.N.Y. June 15, 2017) (finding that an RFC determination for unskilled work is not
necessarily inconsistent with moderate mental limitations and noting that the Second Circuit has
recognized that moderate mental limitations do not prevent a claimant from performing unskilled
work) (citing Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 2010); Whipple v. Astrue, 479 Fed.
Appx. 367, 370 (2d Cir. 2012); Cohen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 643 Fed. Appx. 51, 53 (2d Cir.
2016)); see also Diakogiannis v. Astrue, 975 F. Supp. 2d 299, 315 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding
that an RFC determination limiting a claimant to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and not

production rate or pace work was consistent with ALJ's assessment that claimant had moderate
difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
difficulties reading, short term memory problems, and difficulties handling stress).
Furthermore, objective clinical findings support the ALJ’s mental RFC findings. For
example, treatment notes showed that although Plaintiff had a flat affect, he was cooperative, alert,
and fully oriented (Tr. 229, 232, 236, 291, 294); he related adequately (Tr. 236); and he had intact
attention, concentration, memory; average intellectual functioning; fair insight; and good judgment
(Tr. 237). Despite testifying that he had trouble concentrating (Tr. 44), a September 2017 function
report completed by Plaintiff’s father denied that Plaintiff had any difficulty paying attention (Tr.
178). See SSR 16-3p (An ALJ may consider the consistency of a claimant’s statements against the

evidence in the record). The function report also stated that Plaintiff could finish what he started,
follow spoken and written instructions, and had no problems getting along with others. Tr. 178-
79.
Although he reported having no friends, Plaintiff said that he had a good relationship with
his family (Tr. 237) and would occasionally go out to dinner with his mother when she was in
town (Tr. 265). Tr. 24. Plaintiff also cared for his personal needs, prepared food, cleaned, did
laundry, managed his finances, read, watched television, exercised, enjoyed playing video games,
and used the internet for up to three hours each day. Tr. 45-47, 165, 173, 237, 240, 265, 277. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (An ALJ may consider the nature of a claimant’s daily activities in
evaluating the consistency of allegations of disability with the record as a whole.); see also Ewing
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-68S, 2018 WL 6060484, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2018)
(“Indeed, the Commissioner’s regulations expressly identify ‘daily activities’ as a factor the ALJ
should consider in evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms.”) (citing 20

C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)); Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009) (claimant’s
abilities to watch television, read, drive, and do household chores supported ALJ’s finding that his
testimony was not fully credible). The ALJ noted, that while Plaintiff’s reluctance to leave his
home was “of concern,” Plaintiff was able to occasionally shop, attend doctor’s appointments, and
went for a walk once or twice each month. Tr. 24.
The Commissioner’s regulations also explicitly direct the ALJ to consider a claimant’s
medications and treatment other than medications, and their effectiveness. 20 C.F.R. §
416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v). Despite complaints of anxiety and depression, Plaintiff was unwilling to try
therapy or medications. Tr. 24, 265, 282. He said he only used meditation or walking to treat his
symptoms. Tr. 265, 291, 294. Evidence of only conservative treatment, when considered with the

record evidence as a whole, weighs against allegations of totally disabling functional limitations.
See Botta v. Colvin, 2016 WL 6117724 at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 2016); Guerra v. Colvin, 618 F.
App’x 23, 25 (2d Cir. 2015); Netter v. Astrue, 272 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2008); see also
Shaffer v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-00745 (MAT), 2015 WL 9307349, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2015)
(ALJ properly discredited the claimant’s allegations because her routine treatment with medication
and physical therapy managed her conditions). “While conservative treatment alone is not grounds
for an adverse credibility finding,” see Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008), “the
ALJ may take it into account along with other factors.” Rivera v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.
Supp. 3d 626, 646-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), appeal dismissed (May 31, 2019).
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s described
limitations were not consistent with his activities of daily living or the “extremely conservative”
treatment he sought for his conditions. Tr. 24.
The ALJ also considered records from treating nurse practitioner Linda Miller, FNP (“Ms.

Miller”), at The Pulmonary Group of WNY. Tr. 20-21., Ms. Miller, issued several opinions all of
which assessed limitations the ALJ found “extreme,” as they were inconsistent with the evidence
of record and with Ms. Miller’s own treatment notes. Tr. 25. As the ALJ noted, Ms. Miller’s
treatment notes indicated that Plaintiff was mentally and physically stable, even as recently as July
2019. Tr. 25, 266, 294. As the ALJ aptly observed, “Ms. Miller appears to be sympathetic to the
claimant’s reporting of symptomology, as the expressed limitations rely solely on the claimant’s
reporting of symptoms.” Tr. 23.
With respect to Ms. Miller’s opinion that Plaintiff was very limited in making simple
decisions, understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, and interacting with
others (see, e.g., Tr. 252, 254-55, 304), the ALJ reasonably found her opinions to be unpersuasive

as they were inconsistent with the objective findings of record discussed above, including
Plaintiff’s wide variety of activities of daily living, his conservative treatment, and Ms. Miller’s
own reports that Plaintiff was mentally stable. Tr. 25, 252, 254-55, 282-87, 295, 302; See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(c)(1) (supportability factor), (c)(2) (consistency factor); see also 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(b)(2). (Supportability and consistency “are the two most important factors in
determining the persuasiveness of a medical source’s medical opinion.”).
For example, the ALJ noted that Ms. Miller’s July 2018 assessment that Plaintiff was
moderately limited in his mental functioning, specifically, understanding and remembering
instructions, carrying out instructions, and maintaining attention and concentration, and very
limited when making simple decisions, interacting appropriately with others, maintaining socially
appropriate behaviors without exhibiting behavioral extremes, and functioning in a work setting
at a consistent pace (Tr. 252), was inconsistent with her examination findings and her own
treatment notes that Plaintiff was stable physically and mentally, with no abnormal findings upon

examination (Tr. 266). Tr. 22. Because the ALJ thoroughly explained his reasons for finding Ms.
Miller’s opinions unpersuasive, including providing multiple citations to the record in support of
his finding, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Miller’s opinions.
Plaintiff complains that, while the RFC limits Plaintiff to simple tasks, simple work-related
decisions, and occasional social interaction, it does not clearly account for moderate limitations in
“regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being” and does not address
“behavioral extremes [such as] off-task behavior, need for unscheduled breaks, performing tasks
at a consistent pace, or handling changes in a work setting.” See ECF No. 11-1 at 9. According to
Plaintiff, these limitations are consistent with the limitations Ms. Miller included in her opinions.
See id. (citing Tr. 252, 254-55, 282-83, 304). However, as explained above, the ALJ properly

determined that Ms. Miller’s extreme opinions were not supported by the record or her own
treatment notes. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s reliance on Ms. Miller’s opinions to support his argument
is unavailing.
Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion (see ECF No. 11-1 at 10-13), limitations to
simple, unskilled work account for moderate and even marked limitations in an ability to deal with
stress. See Uplinger v. Berryhill, No. 18-CV-481, 2019 WL 4673437, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2019) (“Marked limitations in mental functioning, including a marked limitation in ability to deal
with stress, do not mandate a finding of disability, but can be addressed with additional limitations
to a plaintiff’s RFC, such as limiting plaintiff to simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a work
environment free of fast-paced production requirements.”); Blocker v. Saul, No. 18-CV-6788,
2020 WL 1047737, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2020) (holding that, although claimant was “markedly
limited in appropriately dealing with stress,” the ALJ accounted for this by limiting claimant to “
‘simple routine tasks,’ ‘occasional interaction with coworkers and the general public,’ and ‘low

stress work defined as work involving only occasional decision making’ ”).
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the ALJ’s RFC limitation to simple, routine
and repetitive tasks involving simple work-related decisions and occasional interaction with others
does not adequately account for limitations in dealing with stress. Although the ALJ did not
specifically use the word “stress” in the RFC finding, he imposed specific restrictions as part of
Plaintiff’s RFC to offset any workplace-related stressors and demands with which Plaintiff might
have difficulty as a result of his mental impairments, and appropriately translated the mental
limitations he found to be supported by the record into concrete, work-related terms to address the
impact of Plaintiff’s mental impairments on his ability to work. Tr. 20, 25. See SSR 96-8p. An
RFC determination may adequately account for a claimant’s stress-related limitations even without

explicitly referencing stress limitation. See Ridosh v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-6466L, 2018 WL
6171713, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) (citing Cosme v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4154280, *13
(W.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the ALJ’s RFC finding “adequately accounted for [claimant’s]
limitations, including any limitations dealing with stress”).
The record in this case reflects that the ALJ explicitly considered Plaintiff’s depression and
anxiety, social anxiety, and his difficulty handling stress, by limiting him to performing simple,
routine and repetitive tasks; making simple work-related decisions; and limiting him to occasional
interaction with supervisors, coworkers and the public. Tr. 25. As the ALJ explained, and as
discussed throughout this opinion, Plaintiff’s numerous activities of daily living, including daily
internet usage, video gaming, regularly exercising, and daily meditation techniques, demonstrate
that no greater stress-related limitations are warranted in this case.
As detailed above, substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s RFC finding.
When “there is substantial evidence to support either position, the determination is one to be made

by the fact-finder.” Davila-Marrero v. Apfel, 4 F. App’x 45, 46 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2001) (citing
Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990)). While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s
conclusion, Plaintiff’s burden was to show that no reasonable mind could have agreed with the
ALJ’s conclusions, which he has failed to do. The substantial evidence standard is “a very
deferential standard of review – even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,” and the
Commissioner’s findings of fact must be upheld unless “a reasonable factfinder would have to
conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012)
(emphasis in the original). As the Supreme Court explained in Biestek v. Berryhill, “whatever the
meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not
high” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal citations
omitted).
For all the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the
record as a whole, including the treatment reports, the medical opinions, and Plaintiff’s mostly
routine and conservative care, as well as Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, and the ALJ’s findings
are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds no error.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 11) is DENIED, and the
Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court will enter
judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Doe A Brce
DON D. BUSH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10364295. Public record. Not legal advice.